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

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INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY

OF

Philosophy, Psychology, Psychical Research, Religion, Mysticism & Sociology

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MORADABAD
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VOLUME XXIV JANUARY 1984 NUMBER 1-4

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DEDICATION

This 93rd issue of the **Darshana International**
is most respectfully **dedicated** *to an eminent Indol gist*
Dr. Krishana Datt Bharadwaj (Born 1908)

Acharya, Ph.D., Vedantacharya, Doctor of Oriental Culture, Padm shri, who has done Considerable work in the fields of Indian Philosophy and Sanskrit and is the Indian National Awardee and also the author of many great works. One of his works the Philosophy of Ramanuja attracted the attention of Indian and Western Scholars alike. May he live long to serve the cause of Philosophy and Sanskrit in India.

Anurag Atreya
Managing Editor

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DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

An International Quarterly
OF
Philosophy, Psychology, Psychical Research, Religion, Mysticism & Sociology

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The Twentyfourth Year of the DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

Darshana International has completed twenty three years of its existence and is entering in its 24th year with this number. Darshana International has served the cause of Philosophy and its allied disciplines for a long period of 23 years. It is all due to God's Grace, Kindness of our learned contributors, Members of the Editorial Board, Subscribers from all over the world who have worked hard to see it survive. The Members of the Editorial Board have actively contributed to the cause of the Journal and tried to secure scholarly articles for the Darshana International and many of them even contributed to the Darshana International themselves. We express our most heartfelt thanks to our subscribers who deserve our appreciation for their continuous interest in its publication. Credit for its survival goes to all those who are associated with it in ony way or the other with the Journal. We are grateful to Readers, Subscribers, Contributors and Members of the Editorial Board of the Darshana International, who have helped the Journal to achieve the enviable status in the field of the Philosophical Journals of the world.

Mr. B.V.S.S. Mani, The Hony. Managing Director of the Swadharma Swaarajya Sangha, Madras is enabling us to send Darshana International as gift to 200 Educational Institutions of India. He has been a source of inspiration for us to continue this noble venture 24 years back. His continuous financial assistance for several years helped us to continue and promote the publication of this Journal for several years without any outside help.

We are perfectly aware of the shortcomings of the Journal. Inspite of our best efforts we have not been able to achieve what we had planned. We have not been able to achieve our desired goals for the financial stringency. Still we are trying to maintain the academic standard of the Journal. The rise and high cost of production

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has compelled us to increase the annual subscription for which we are sorry and hope the subscribers will not mind the little rise in the annual subscription.

Darshana International has maintained its standard of procuring articles of high standard to attract more and more Scholarly Readers. It is the only journal in the world which is being run single handedly by a teacher of philosophy who has exhausted all his resources in continuing this Journal.

We have been able to enlist the co-operation of four eminent scholars—Mourad Wahaba, G. Verbeke, J. Berting, Ionna Kucuradi who agreed to become members of the Editorial Board and joined us to serve the Darshana International.

Darshana Printers and its staff under the guidance of Mr. Suresh Kumar Agrawal is doing the work with devotion to maintain regularity of time. They deserve our heartfelt thanks for the work they are doing to bring out Darshana International timely.

In August 1983 our General Editor went to Montreal to attend the XVII World Congress of Philosophy and there he came in contact with many new scholars and renewed the old acquaintances.

We wish all our Readers, Subscribers, Contributors and members of the Editorial Board a Very Happy and Prosperous New Year.

ANURAG ATREYA
Managing Editor

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I

Historical Materialist Treatments of Hinduism

Dale Riepe

The sway of the nationalistic Hindu philosopher-religionists is now coming to an end. Younger scholars are looking to new interpretations of Indian religion, based upon a more scientific approach. Thirty years ago religion was critically analysed by sādhu Sāntinātha (1886—1961) in his two volume work entitled *The Critical Examination of the Philosophy of* Religion.[1] The book is mistitled because it is rather a critical examination of the *claims* of Indian religion and is not about the philosophy of religion. Its criticism is formalistic and logical, various contradictions of belief being revealed. Sāntinātha ends the work by saying that

> the divergence of conclusions among philosophers with regard to the nature of ultimate Reality and its relation to man and the world (is) based on the different conceptions of causality.[2]

His closing introductory remark is that "(Here) is...my spiritual journey which I began as a staunch believer and end as an inveterate agnostic and critic."[3] This is an intellectual improvement on the largely propagandistic edification of the famous Indian philosopher-religionists such as Sri Aurobindo and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. But it still avoids such basic issues as (1) How does religion arise ?; (2) How does religion change ?; and (3) What is the social function of religion ? When one can answer these questions then he can at least partially answer the questions as to why religions arise, why they change, and why they function in society as they do. To answer these questions, however, one cannot remain on the formalistic,

1 (Amalner: Pratap Seth, 1938).
2 *Ibid.*, p. 5.
3 *Ibid.*, p. 12.

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logical, and abstract philosophical level. For the answers d nd upon knowledge of the material history involved. To be sur ne needs a philosophical perspective in order to do this since fac do not order themselves.

After the appearance of Sântinâtha, Indian religion was to find another interpreter in M. N. Roy (1889-1954). Although a rati al-istic student of Indian religion, particularly Hinduism, he was ven more a polemicist against it. Hinduism he characterized as "superstition." In his polemic he was influenced by historical materialism, but he was not thorough-going in following its lead with the result that his work might better be called enlightened bourgeois intellectual history. His voluminous work performed in India what the French Enlightenment *philosophies* had earlier served in France. He wished to demonstrate that the only true religion of mankind was not religion at all, but rationalistic humanism, and that to realize it in India, man would have to get rid of Hinduism. Although a founder of the Mexican Communist Party and a teacher of Ho Chih Min, Roy was much closer to mechanical than evolutionary and dialectical materialism. His sharpest critique of historical materialism is to be found in his essays entitled "Hegel to Marx" and "Marxism."[4] He attacks historical materialism as basing itself on social relations when it should be grounded on the "rockbottom of human nature (which) antedates the economic and political organization of society."[5] But Roy will have no truck with man considered as a result of social relations based upon productive relations [6] And it is this that makes possible his view that historical materialism fails by "denying that basic moral values transcend space and time."[7] As fascinating as it would be to further elaborate Roy's views, since they part company with historical materialism and purvey an idealistic humanism, we shall leave them here and move on to the two critical thinkers who began to study religion and philosophy in a more scientific way. These were D. D. Kosambi (1907—1966) and Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya 1918). Kosambi was trained in the United States as well as in India, since his father was for a time professor of Sanskrit and Indology at Harvard University. Chattopadhyaya studied in Calcutta where he is at present a professor at Calcutta College and Editor of *Indian Studies : Past and Present*.

---

4 Roy, *Reason, Romanticism, and Revolution* (Calcutta: Renaissance Publishers Ltd., 1952), II, pp. 161-220.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 187.

6 Although he recognizes the germ of this idea in Condorcet's *L'Equisse d'un Tableau Historique des Progres de l'Esprit Humain.*

7 *Roy*, Ibid., p. 216.

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...ambi defines history as "the presentation in chronological or... successive changes in the means and relations of produc-ti... It is not a "succession of outstanding megalomaniac names an... posing battles."[9] He describes ethnology as an account of th... ential ways of life of a whole people. Although man does no... ve by bread alone, according to Kosambi, the Christian prayer: "G... us this day our daily bread" indicates bread as a major co... rn in the spiritual and religious life. Hence important weight is ...en by Kosambi to questions of food supply and this is basic to his discussion of religion.[10] Yet he says to the surprise of some, "E...nomic determinism will not do. It is not inevitable, nor even tru... that a given amount of wealth will lead to a given type of dev...lopment. The complete historical process through which the soc...l form has been reached is also of prime importance."[11]

Yet in India as elsewhere, Kosambi maintains, advances in me...ns of production lead to increases in population. These in turn cre...te different relations of production and consequently religious change. During periods of growth it often happens that the superstructure cannot be adjusted to the productive base. Religion is effected and conflicts of interpretation and property occur. Sometimes the old form is modified or radically altered by a revolution in the guise of reformation. If the class defending the older form wins, then there is stagnation, degeneracy, or atrophy. Kosambi believes that the "early maturity and peculiar helplessness of Indian society against later foreign invasions (that is, after the Muslim advance beginning in the seventh century) bears testimony to this general scheme."[12]

Stratification in Indian society shows that many castes owe their lower social and economic status to a refusal to use advanced techniques in plough agriculture. The lowest castes preserve tribal rites, usages, and myths relatively unchanged. Higher up the castes

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8 Kosambi, *Ancient India, A History of Its Culture and Civilization* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1965), p. 10.

9 *Ibid.*

10 Paul Radin explains the economically explotative league between the chief and shaman among the Yokuts of south central California and remarks that "Religious beliefs and attitudes were not created originally by methods of food production or a mechanism of exchange, but they did grow up together with them: and it was the economic system that made certain constitutents and certain forms relevant at one time and others relevant at another." "Economic Factors in Primitive Religion," *Science and Society*, I, 3 (Spring 1936), p. 310.

11 *Ancient India*, p. 11.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 12. Earlier invasions, such as the Greek after 327 B.C., were presumably not drastic.

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are in transition and still higher the brahmins rewrite the observances and legends to suit themselves. At the highest level we arrive at what is called Hindu culture with its literate traditions often going back to early times. The stories of gods and demons are undeveloped among the lower castes, but they are displayed as unified cycles by the work of brahminism. At this level are the philosophical treatises formulated by intellectual leaders of India.

When the philosophical doctrines were first expounded they represented an advance in generality and totality, but they later contributed to Indian backwardness after the general decline coincidental with the Muslim thrust eastward from the Panjāb. Successors refused to budge from the doctrines of the founders. Such thinking is not peculiar to India, since the West has had its cries of "back to Moses," "return to Jesus," and more recently "follow the Young Marx." Yet in no other great civilization does religion and ritual play such a continuous and predominant part in ancient documents or philosophical treatises or sprouting from so many varying strains as in India. Literary material available as source material for Indian religious history is concerned with inspiration and tradition rather than with description of objective reality.

Kosambi begins his historical account of the development of religion in India by examining the literary sources. These he claims have the validity of railroad timetables in India. Insofar as the means of production are concerned, India even at the present time does not have a single type, but many varieties, some of which are among the most primitive known in the world today. This has led the German Indologist, Helmuth von Glasenapp, to call India the greatest living museum in the world. Furthermore, various parts of an old productive system have left their superstructural traces even when the new had generally replaced it. Such remains are familiar throughout the world. They are well known in the United States in isolated pockets of Mississippi, or Arkansas, or New York City.

India's experience is also different from the experience farther West (from Mesopotamia to Greece) in that it never had a system of slavery, although people are still reportedly sold on the open market in the North-west as well as South, from the Panjāb to Kerala as recently as 1981.[13] Various modes of production occur simultaneously throughout India in different historical periods. It was possible for many people to cling tenaciously to older modes in remote villages and jungles in a way that could not be matched today among the Amerindians in New Mexico or Arizona because of the

13 The writer has read such accounts in New Delhi newspapers as recently as May 1981. There is slavery also in isolated pockets of the United States.

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spiderweb of highways. India passed through something like primitive communism, a patriarchal mode, perhaps the Asiatic mode (wisely left undefined by Kosambi), a feudal mode, and today the bourgeois-capitalist mode. Within the last mode is the stirring also of a socialist mode such as nationalization of banks and the creation of state farms.

As compared to Europe, India in its earlier periods had a much easier time providing food for its people. Maharashtra had forty staple foods available while Europe had only ten. A balanced diet without killing living creatures was possible if we add milk, curds, butter, and cheese. These productive luxuries, Kosambi believes, explain the rise of vegetarianism and the famous doctrine of *ahimsā* or non-killing, a prominent feature of Hindu religion.

Another feature of Indian religious practice, the *holi* spring festival, now somewhat deteriorated, developed because in "prehistory the diet was poor, life hard, procreation none too easy. Obscenity was then necessary as a stimulus."[14] At the Karangā festival in Bangalore, the chief participant dresses as a woman. The sacred groves of the mother goddess involved in the festival are today forbidden to women, but originally prohibited to men during matriarchal periods. The shift from matriarchy to patriarchy, depending heavily on productive change, affected many religious practices. The change in production came about in the increased use of metal tools replacing stone and wood. Within the use of metals themselves, a great shift occurred as a result of iron replacing bronze, especially in plough agriculture.

Village gods, never totally extirpated in India, become changed into a few standard cults such as those of Hanumān, Ganeṣa, or Vetāl, prince of the goblins. The shift became possible through the relative prosperity created by enrichened agriculture which in turn portended the entry of the brahmin priest. Original cult places having stone images covered with red pigment are overlaid with more recent and universalistic deities. A striking exception to this is the goddess Lummini- Rummini; she has survived at the Buddha's birthplace for 2500 years Other primitive survivals are to be found throughout Hinduism. Yet during the unification period when villages began to share a common purpose, higher gods appear riding different animals and birds. According to Kosambi, the divine family and entourage is an historical phenomenon marking the emergence of a unified society out of different tribal elements. The *purāṇas*, which claim immemorial antiquity, were written to order between the sixth and twelfth centuries to record specially fabricated myths that had developed in the relatively-isolated villages. The

14 *Ancient India*, p. 47. Desire for population control may prove to be the strongest argument against obscenity.

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purāṇic state is followed by a higher one with more abstract theology and a feudal court of gods. And this in turn is overtaken by philosophical treatises and *kārikās* (commentaries) which have come down to us today and generally taken to be relatively immutable by the nationalistic religio-philosophers such as Radhakrishnan.

Religious movements followed the geography of large scale food production. They were rooted in the Indus river valley between 3000 and 1750 B.C. Then followed the development of the Gangetic basin which required the domination of the jungle and needed caste as the basis of a new social organization. This eastward expansion was complete by 700 B. C. Next came the thrust into the lower peninsula from central to southern India as iron tools came into use. The brahmins wrote the *purāṇas* to make the aboriginal rites respectable while in the meantime the savage chiefs became kings and nobles. The caste system became common; a person expelled by the group had no place in society and became an outcaste. According to Kosambi :

> Caste division and brahmin cunning kept the country superstitious, helpless in the face of foreign aggression. Nevertheless caste did protect the poor at times even under feudal oppression. The only form of protest possible for a disarmed peasantry was mass refusal to cultivate the overtaxed land. While there still remained unsettled land or uncleared forest, they could just go elsewhere.[15]

When the cultivable land became saturated in the later stages of feudalism by about 1000, the frontier escape was impossible and peasants began to organize locally. By the nineteenth century, caste had developed into political groupings which the British encouraged to keep India divided. Today Indian religions are under increasing pressure because hierarchical isolation by groups and domination by brahmin is out of place in the productive system of India today. Machines seem to run by scientific law cannot justify caste hierarchy and feudal religious practices.

Kosambi's explanation of the composition and development of the Bhagavadgītā or Song of the Blessed Lord (Kriṣṇa) is of particular interest. The Gītā, dated the third century, is the result of a productive system having passed beyond Indus cultivation. Kosambi compresses its content as follows :

> The Pandu hero Arjuna felt revulsion at the impending slaughter of kinsmen and lay down his bow just as the two armies had begun their movement to join battle. His charioteer...the dark hero of the Yadus (Kriṣṇa)...successfully exhorts him to do his duty. (Following this fratricidal advice)...

15 *Ancient India*, p. 2. In recent times in the United States local cults remained until railroads and highways universalized them into such groups as the American Baptist and Southern Baptist Conventions.

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> Krishna, now proclaiming himself the all-god, expounds every contemporary system of philosophy in turn as his own... Since all the views come from one god, there is no polemic, though Vedic *Yajna* (vedic fire and blood sacrifice) and ritual in general are slighted with a passing sneer. The pure life, non-violence, absence of greed and self-seeking are extolled. When puzzled Arjuna naturally asks "Why then do you ask me to kill ?" the god neatly glides away to the next point of his exposition, leaving the direct question unanswered.[16]

Finally, the divine character, Kriṣṇa, reveals that he is the creator and destroyer of all things, indeed has already devoured all members of the armies about to fight. The ostensible moral of the Gītā is that so long as you have faith in Me, all sins are forgiven. Therefore if duty calls, kill your brother without passion.[17] Such calculated treachery, Kosambi maintains, is also expounded in the *Arthasastra*,[18] a work that makes *The Prince* of Machiavelli read like a boy scout manual.

Why was the Gītā interpolated into the Mahābhārata ? Because the lower classes (castes) were the audience of the recitations of the heroic lays of ancient war. The epic served as a vehicle of propaganda for any doctrine that the brahmin wished to insert. Interpolation was even better than rewriting old *purāṇas* (ancient, tradition) or faking new ones. And second, why was Kriṣṇa chosen to expound the new gospel ? Because the Kriṣṇa cult was rising in popularity and was associated with the syncretic Nārāyana. The god who sleeps in his chamber in the midst of waters, Nārāyana may be traced to the Sumerian flood-creation myth and later appeared among the Jews as Noah. Kriṣṇa was required because Indra (until then chief of the gods) had lost lustre as a result of intervening Buddhism which had denied *Yajna*. Buddhism brought a new conception of morality and social justice linked with an advanced agricultural (late bronze, early iron) age. Indra, king of the gods, was king only during the pastoral bronze age society. The ascendency of Kriṣṇa begins around 800 B. C. in the Panjāb. He became increasingly useful for syncretic movements, particularly in his messianic aspect. The Deccan Yādavas, for example, traced their geneology to Kriṣṇa in order to raise the chiefs of a local clan above the surrounding people.[19]

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16 *Ancient India*, p. 207.

17 "Social and Economic aspects of the Bhagavad-Gītā", *"Myth and Reality Studies in the Formation of Indian Culture* (Bombay : Popular Prakashan, 1962), p. 18.

18 "The Art of Government" attributed to Kautalya and believed to be pre-Buddhistic (321-296 B C.). See *Kautilya's Arthasastra* trans. R. Shamasastry (Mysore : Sri Raghuveer 1951).

19 *Myth and Reality*, p. 27.

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Kriṣṇa is a synthesis of the following life-like and god like features: (1) a mischievous and beloved shepherd lad and (2) a virile husband of many women (local goddesses) each in her own right spending the night with the "husband" thus easing the transition from local religion. This *Aufhebung* may also be seen in the marriage of Siva and Parvati which was supplemented by the hermaphrodite[20] just to prevent any separation. The Naga cult was absorbed by placing the cobra around Siva's neck. Earlier Siva was placed on Nandi the Bull, and earlier pastoral divinity. Syncretic elements are everywhere present in Hinduism.

Hindu religious sentiments had by the eleventh century locked up enormous piles of precious and semi-precious metals in the form of images in monasteries and temples. It was no surprise to realists then that King Harśa of Kaṣmir attacked and looted these religious institutions. The metal was needed to fight his local barons. Yet during the reign of another Harśa (ca. 600-640) of Kannauj it was bearable to worship Gauri,[21] Siva, the Sun, as well as Buddhist images while his enemy Narendragupta-Sasanka of Bengal raided Magadha in search of metal and cut down the Bodhi tree at Gaya while wrecking Buddhist foundations wherever he could. Samkara (eighth century) engaged in intense polemic with rival schools. This signified that the age of synthesis and merging of the gods was past. The crisis in production was too acute.

Returning to the Gītā we note that its function from the fourth to the sixth centuries and during the Gupta period of expanding village settlement was centralization of religious functions. But by the end of the reign of Harśa of Kannauj, tax collection had become a miserable profession in that commodity output per head and cash trade had dropped. Luxury trade had declined markedly and with it a flagging of accumulation of gold, silver, and jewels. After this time the Hari-Hari cult (with its image of half Siva and half Viṣṇu) could not remain fashionable. The declining economy found the followers of the cult too divided in their interests. Syncretism turned into the *smārta-vaiṣṇava*[22] struggle instead.

Again under Akbar, when Mughal prosperity was at its height, Akbar dreamed of a religious umbrella over all his people under *Din e-ilāhī* (Persian form of "religion of God"). Yet his successor

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20 A god-goddess with one female breast etc.

21 A cult in which sexual relations with another man's wife is enjoined and approved by Tāntrikas of Bengal. See A. B. Keith, A History of *Sanskrit Literature* (London : Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 263.

22 The traditionalist or Vedantist vs. Vaisnava doctrines, including that of the followers of Rāmānuja, Mādhavas and others (later) snch as Vallabhas and Caitanyas.

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Aurangzed tried to augment his falling revenue by a tax on unbelievers (*jizyā*). According to Kosambi :

> Fusion and tolerance become impossible when the crisis deepens, when there is not enough of the surplus product to go around, and the synthetic method does not lead to increased production.[23]

Marriages of gods and goddesses or their fusion worked earlier because the conjoint society produced more after differences between matriarchal and patriarchal forms of property were conciled. Extermination or enslavement were alternative actions, but they would have seriously curtailed and strained production. During the hard times of the feudal period the Gītā served a most ueful function. It was able to do this by an innovation, called *bhakti*, or personal devotion.

At the end of the period of great empires in India, the new state had to be feudal, according to Kosambi. With feudalism came the chain of personal loyalty, binding retainer to chief, tenant to lord, and baron to king or emperor. The same relationship is found among the samurai in Japan onward from the Kamakura period.[24] Indian loyalty was not abstract, but served land ownership, military activity, tax collection, and the conversion of local produce into commodities. This system was only possible after the sixth century and was based on the key notion of *sāmanta* which meant neighboring ruler until 532, but by 592 meant feudal baron. These new barons were personally responsible to the king, and part of the tax gathering mechanism. Earlier the *manusmriti* had no *sāmantas*, but administered everything himself directly or through agents who had no independent status. Feudalism from below consisted of a class of people at the village level who had special rights over the land (cultivation, occupation, or hereditary ownership). To hold such a society together the best religion is one emphasizing *bhakti*, personal faith, in spite of visible flaws and perhaps perennially useful in the marriage relationships. Marco Polo relates that in the thirteenth century the siegneurs in India actually threw themselves on the king's funeral pyre. Later this was wisely replaced by *sutee*. No earlier tribal chief could expect such loyalty.

By the twelfth century the peasantry was paying not only for the vast palaces, but for the ornate temples, indicating the great wealth for which India has been justly famous.

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23 *Myth and Reality*, p. 31.

24 "All feudal ethics, such as loyalty, filial piety, moral integrity, faithfulness, propriety, righteousness, incorruptibility, and a sense of shame, are totally and completely in the service of the landlord class." Kuan Feng and Wu Ch'uan chii, "Comments on Comrade Wu Han's Theory of Ethics [1966]. *Chinese Studies in History*, Vol. III, No. 2 (Winter 1969/70). Noted also in French and Spanish feudalism.

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The productive system is, in a sense, the "lower" reality upon wl ich social relations, religion, philosophy, law, and education rest. Y there is also, as historical materialists have always maintained, a reaction of the "higher" reality on the "lower."[25] A dramatic ex in India is the reported refusal of Hindu and Jain vegetari- a' to kill animals even to prevent starvation. The major difference between idealistic and historical materialistic accounts is the relative emphasis put upon the primacy of "lower" or "higher." Comparative ethnology did much to create a more objective atmosphere in de ermining whether the base or superstructure is normally executive ir its impact. Even when religion and philosophy are alleged to live a life of their own, the power of the base is a constant reminder that drastic change from this quarter may occur at any time. Circumstances declare whether it can be resisted and for how long. Historical materialist predictions may still be in the stage of infancy, but they appear to be vastly superior to those of "introjective idealism."[26]

One might have thought that M. N. Roy, The Bengali, communist, non-marxist, humanist (1889-1954) would have produced a work on Indian religion or philosophy. An historical materialist account of Indian religion might have proved considerably more valuable than his popularizing the development of progressive European thought, as he did in *Reason, Romanticism, and Revolution* (1952). This job had already been done more than adequately by George Plekhanov in his trailblazing *The Development of the Monist View of History* (1895). The work was left to Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, another Bengali, who launched a major work on Indian religion entitled *Lokāyata, A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism*[27] Although much of the inspiration for this volume comes from European historical materialists, the subject-matter itself is treated in a highly original and suggestive way. It is a pity that Kosambi

25 The *locus clsasicus* is : "...According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the *only* determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase... [also of great importance are]... political forms..constitutions...juridical forms...religious views..." Engels, Letter to J. Bloch, London, September 21 22, 1890, *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels Selected works* (Moscow : Foreign Language Publishing House, 1958), II, 488.

26 See Sagdor Ferenczi. "The Problem of Acceptance of Unpleasant Ideas—Advances in Knowledge of the Sense of Reality", *The Theory and Technique of Psycho-Analysis* (London : The Hogarth Press Ltd., 1950), p. 373.

27 (New Delhi : People's Publishing House, 1959), pp. 696.

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did not know this work which appeared six years before his *Ancient India* (1965) and three years before *Myth and Reality* (1962). Chattopadhyaya has re-thought Indian religious history with the help of ethnology, mythology, and historical philology. Archaeology is not as important to him as to Kosambi, but then Kosambi was himself an ethnological and archaeological field-worker in the Deccan.

According to Chattopadhyaya the two basic trends in Indian culture are Vedic and non Vedic. In the non Vedic tradition the predominate feature is Tantrism which puts supreme emphasis upon *prakriti* or the female principle,[28] having its origin in pre Vedic agricultural practice. Much of the account of Tantrism, its origin, meaning, and effect, consists in an explanation of early agricultural practices which are magical. This approach is influenced much more by Sir George Thomson[29] and Joseph Needham[30] than by the more idealistic and literary one of Lynn Thorndike in *A History of Magic and Experimental Science* (1927) where he speaks of Tantrism as "a sort of magical pantheism of which the higher thoughts were never appreciated by the Chinese, while the lower aspects appealed to their love of mystery."[31] The account of Tantra written by Sir John Woodroffe is perhaps one of the best known today, yet it contributes little but obfuscation. The approach is again from the twigs instead of the roots. Chattopadhyaya, on the other hand, looks for the roots with the help of the comparative as well as the genetic method. Woodroffe in *S'akti and S'akta*[32] demonstrates how a mind trained in jurisprudence and idealistic philosophy can prove that Tantra is not lascivious, nor feministic, nor identifiable with material force. Indeed as one pursues Woodroffe's account one is led to believe that Tantra is not really identifiable and hence its origins escape analysis. Woodroffe does not represent the exception, but rather the rule in idealistic accounts. According to Professor Nalinaksha Dutt :

> It is a pity that a religion (Tantrikism), with the highest monastic philosophy and the noblest ideals, recommended such ways (sexual union etc.) for the quick realisation (sic) of abuses than in the proper utilisation of the ends."[33]

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28 *Lokāyata*, p. 269. Chattopadhyaya's other works include *Indian Philosophy, A Popular Introduction* (New Delhi : People's Publishing House, 1964) and *Indian Atheism* (Calcutta : Manisha, 1969).

29 See his *Studies in Ancient Greek Society, The Prehistorical Aegean* (London : Lawrence and Wishart, 1949).

30 "History of Scientific Thought," *Science and Civilization in China* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1956).

31 Vol. I : "From Homer to Omer Khayyam." (Baltimore : Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1962), p. 509.

32 (Madras : Ganesh & Co., 1965) [1918].

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Now according to Tantra the universe was created by sexual urge (kāma) resulting in the union of the female with the male. The erotic sculpture on the temple of Jagannatha at Puri give vivid illustrations of an art form with Tantric influence. Ritual practice in Orissa attempted to establish harmony between cosmic and human lust. It was that was illustrated on the temple.[34]

What interests us more, however, is the origin of Tantra in agricultural practice. The emphasis upon *prakriti*[35] is pivotal. The connection between agriculture and magic is known to the *Atharva Veda*; and in the *Taittiriya saṁhita* the following *mantra* (verse) appears :

> The furrow annointed with ghee, with honey, approved by the all-gods, the Maruts, full of strength, swelling with milk, do thou, Of furrow, turn towards us with milk.[36]

To annoint the furrow with ghee is a form of magic, the function of which is to create the illusion that we control reality. The illusion will then result in real control. Yet magic is not completely worthless at this period, for it led to effort and activity which in themselves might help bring about what is desired.

Chattopadhyaya hypothesizes that agriculture was the discovery of women and furthermore, that agricultural magic was exclusively the province of women and it was women who carried on tantric practices.[37] In order to adjust religions to the patriarchal conditions, these functions were transferred to men, but even then, the male as male, could not discharge these functions without assuming the features of the female. According to the *Acarabheda Tantra* one should :

> Worship the five principles (*panca tattva*), the sky-flower (*khapuspa* and *kula* women. That will be *vamacara*. The

33 Dutt, "Distinction between Tāntrikism and Mahāyānism", *The Age of Imperial Kannauj*. The History of Culture of the Indian People, Vol. IV, ed. R. C. Majumdar (Bombay : Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 2d. ed., 1964), p. 267. Tantrikas would probably reply that this was precisely the proper utilisation.

34 One need not confine himself to Puri, but go on to her neighboring towns and see ample evidence of the same Tantric influence at Lingaraja Temple, Raj Rani Temple in Bhubaneswar, and the Black Pagoda at Konarak which the writer saw in 1967.

35 This notion, also crucial to Sāmkhya philosophy, usually considered to be the oldest of the Indian *darsanas*, is later pursued by Chattopadhyaya. See *Lokāyata*, Chap. VI.

36 Keith's translation in *The Vedas of the Black Yajus School*, Harvard Oriental Series, 18, 19 (Cambridge, Mass., 1914), p. 316.

37 It seems that Chattopadhyaya has temporarily forgotten that many of these practices required the cooperation of men. See also Robert Briffault, *The Mothers* (2d. ed. London : 1952), III, 3 and Joseph Needham, *op. cit.*, II, 134.

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> ultimate female force is to be propitiated by becoming a woman (*vama bhutva yajet para*).[38]

Furthermore, the *yogasadhana* of Tantra is a psychophysical practice whose purpose is to enable one to realize his womanhood. The "jewel of the lotus" about which modern Buddhists chant is *padma* as *bhaga* or *yoni*, that is, the female organ. In its reduplication it is referred to as the seven lotuses or the seven seats of femininity. The Tāntrika representation of this organ is the triangle as it also is in other cultures. The frenzy induced by tantric practice is to awaken the female in the male or to destroy the male in the female. One transforms himself into a woman to increase the productive activity of nature.[39] Female fertility is linked up with the fertility of the earth. The "assimilation of the fruit-bearing soil to the childbearing woman is universal."[40] This ancient belief has two major aspects : first, that the plant-producing activity is viewed as depending magically on the reproductive capacity of the female body; and second, that the reproductive capacity of the female body is magically dependent upon the earth. Even in recent times Indian peasant women evoked the primeval belief, according to Chattopadhyaya :

> During the Gorakhpur[41] famine of 1873-74 parties of women at night time, stripped themselves naked, went out of their houses, and taking the ploughs with them, dragged the same across the fields.[42]

The word *tantra* itself has its root in *tan*, which means to spread and extend the human family. Tantra then, means propagation; *Santana* or *tanaya* means children. After this fruitful pursuit, can we longer believe with H. P. Sastri and others like him that *tantra* is an outgrowth of Mahāyāna Buddhism ? Sastri naturally wondered why the lofty principles of Buddhism should get entangled with such superstitious dross as to be found in Tantrism. The answer is given by Chattopadhyaya. First, early *tantrism* is associated with the despised castes and professions. Second, *tāntrikas* believed in equalitarianism among men and women, including the rejection of traditional marriage morality. Third, manual labor of the lower castes keeps them anchored to the earthy material world and thus aware of the relationship of this world to human well-being. In marked contrast is the delusion resulting from the omnipotence of thought encouraged in idealistic or Mahāyāna Buddhism.

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38 Quoted by Chattopadhyaya, *Lokayata*, p. 278.

39 *Lokayata*, pp. 278 286.

40 Chattopadhyaya, *ibid*, quoting Briffault, *op. cit.*, iii, 59. For pictorial illustrations of this see Ajit Mookerjee, *Tantra Art* (New Delhi : Kumar Gallery, 1966) Section 6.

41 A town in Uttar Pradesh near the birthplace of the Buddha.

42 *Lokāyata*, p. 291, quoting JRAS, xiii, 921.

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II

A Christian Meditation on the Asian Roots for Justice

Frank Podgorski

During Our Age, cries of intense pain echo and re-echo in our ears. El Salvador, Brazil, and Chile, Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos, China and Poland all strive to awaken us to the mammoth problem of human suffering and human exploitation now asserting itself with ever more sophisticated techniques of injustice. Despite the repetition of beautiful and idyllic decrees by various Committees of the United Nations, the fundamental Rights of Humankind remain honored far more in the breach than in reality. Is it not sobering to learn from statistics that today there is more suffering and deprivation of human rights than ever before in history? Within this context, a host of different religions and religious perspectives exist; indeed, in spite of, or perhaps because of such harsh realities, religions and religious values remain a functioning and foundational element of contemporary experience. Judaism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, Marxism, Confucianism, Tribal Religions still contribute to the formation and creation of human values and perspectives. Sometimes, one wonders how this can still be possible in Our Age. Do not the very cries of human pain and suffering overwhelm and demand that these religions search for answers far more profound than merely those which maintain our unsatisfactory *status quo*, those which Karl Marx called "opiates"? Are there not other creative "seeds" or germs of hope hidden within the heritage of our ancient religious traditions?

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* This article developed out of a series of presentations given at a Global Seminar on Justice held at Seton Hall University in June of 1982.

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Religions derive answere from their foundational fonts or sources; within these roots, various Traditions proclaim that real and genuine answers to the human quest may still be found. Yet our contemporary thrust in the direction of conversation, dialogue, communication, and mutual understanding between religions has also taught us that many of our most traditional and cherished concepts tend to expand and reveal previously unforeseen dimensions when inter religious communication actually begins to take place. With this awareness in mind, let us turn to the rich spiritual fonts of Asia to search to see if some of these classic Religious Traditions may perhaps help us to appreciate more fully the human dilemma and perhaps even contribute to an understanding of how to free and liberate that most unique resource of all, human potential.

Ahimsa : India's Path to the Sacred

During my first visit to India several years ago, a some-what humorous incident introduced me to India's unique consciousness of the "sacredness" of all forms of life. As I was settling into the small room that would be home for the next several months, a huge multi-legged spider-like insect appeared on the wall before me. Automatically and without the slightest thought or hesitation, I brushed this insect from the wall and was about to complete my task of obliterating it when my Hindu host exclaimed: "Oh, so it really is true that you Westerners do not at all believe in *ahimsa* (non-violence) !"

Ahimsa (non-violence) is a very basic and foundational pan-Indic value; it is rooted in the *Vedas* and the ancient *Jaina Sutras*. The word *ahimsa* is derived from the verbal root *ham* (to kill). Yet the addition of *a*, the alpha-privative, does far more than merely negate this verbal action in the usual translated sense of "non-killing" or "non-violence"; rather it bespeaks and teaches profound reverence, respect, and even awe before the mystery of all that is and of all that constitutes life. *Ahimsa* is the primary and elementary Hindu value, the very key, the doorway which opens and expands into an articulation of what the Hindu has come to esteem as virtue. Whatever is, whatever exists (*sat*), must be allowed and encouraged to be, to become what it really is in its fullest potential, to evolve. to unfold, and to articulate truthfulness (*satya*), the meaning and reality of existence. This celebrated sermon, preached by Mahavira in the sixth century B. C., was already echoing a hallowed tradition found in the ancient *Jaina Sutras* as well as the *Vedas*. This same esteemed teaching has resounded throughout the entire history of India. Indeed, even to this very day in some parts of India, Jains, the followers of Mahavira, traditionally wear gauze masks to cover their faces lest they inadvertently swallow an insect thereby destroying a precious form of life. Thus it is important to realize that at the very moment that the rishis were concentrating on trying

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to fathom the cosmic order (*ṛta*) and attempting to formulate the norms of *dharma*, the appropriate religious forms with which the Hindu ought respond to the mystery of existence, already the pregnant value of *ahimsa* was being preached as the foundational and elementary Hindu value. All life and all that is living is "sacred" and is to be reverenced with unconditional awe. *Sat* (Being), whatever is, must be allowed to evolve and unfold our world.

In the course of history, this seed or germ would grow and expand in an extraordinary fashion. At a somewhat later date, the Sāṃkhyan and Yoga Traditions evolved and developed with precise details their extraordinary and unique formulations of asceticism, spiritual practices, and rigorous disciplines. A precise psycho-spiritual journey from superficial external Ego-identity to a radically more spiritual self-understanding was spelled out with precision.[1] The foundational key and the very first step on this Yogic journey was *ahimsa*, the acquisition of a basic sense of reverence and respect before the sacred mystery of life.

> Patanjali set down five self-restraints or five *yamas*, the first of which is *ahimsa* or complete non-violence in thought, word, and deed... One has to conquer by an effort of the will the animal urge to violence of any kind... *Its positive aspect is love since where there is no violence in thought, word, or deed, there can only be selfless love which seeks the good of others.*[2]

In describing this prime virtue, Vyāsa and Vachāspati Misra, the traditional Yogic commentators, introduced the metaphor of light.[3] From the obscurity and darkness of human pain and suffering, from the complexities and confusion of the human condition, from that state which was described as metaphysical pain and suffering (*duhkha*)[4] *ahimsa*, a bright spark of goodness, ignited, suggested, and gave promise of an expansion into the brilliant illumination of that "saving wisdom" (*vyaktāvyaktajñavi jñāna: Sāmkhya-Kārikā LXVII*) whereby the Yogi could both attain "personal salvation" as well as contribute to the expansion of a more positive spirit within society.

For articulating the essential spirit of Hindu religiosity, the *Bhagavad-Gita* is clearly our key text. Its tone and theme is so personalistic that some Westerners have even referred to the *Gita* as a kind of New Testament of Hinduism. At first glance, the debate between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna over whether to fight the Great Battle

1 Frank Podgorski, "Sāmkhya-Yoga Meditation: Psycho-Spiritual Transvaluation," *Journal of DHARMA* II, 2 (1977): 152-163.

2 Clement Vaz, *Yoga* (Bombay: World Conference of Religion for Peace, 1979), pp. 7-8.

3 Rama Prasada, *Patañjali's Yoga Sutras* (New Delhi: Orient Reprint, 1978), pp. 155-156.

4 *Sāmkhya-Kārikā I.*

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seems to contradict our thesis that the notion of *ahimsa* is gradually expanding into an articulation of a fuller Hindu understanding of the "sacredness" of all life. Indeed, Kṛṣṇa does prevail and certainly Arjuna does finally march into battle with both the intention and the *dharma*—duty of slaying his enemies. However, it is far more common to interpret the *Bhagavad Gita* as an extended metaphor rather than as literally an actual battle. Most commentaries point out that the *Bhagavad Gita* concentrates on the central question of probing the meaning of human acts and actions. Up until this moment in history, i.e., c. the fourth century B.C.E , no Hindu text not even the Great *Upanishads* had attempted to discern the value of human acts. Arjuna, the symbol of humankind, then is troubled over the central human question of whether acts or actions have any lasting meaning; the Great Battle is viewed as a metaphor for Arjuna's inner psycho-spiritual conflict on this point. Do human acts have ultimate value and meaning? Kṛṣṇa's answer is the celebrated *naiskarmya* doctrine, perhaps the most original and unique teaching of the *Gita*. In an extraordinary moment, Arjuna is taught :

> [Human acts] work alone is your proper business, but never the fruits [which the work may produce] : let not your motive be the fruit of works nor your attachment be to [mere] workless-ness. BG II : 47.
>
> ..... In success and failure, be the same then and get busy with your works. Yoga means the "sameness and indifference." BG II : 51.
>
> Those wise men who are controlled-and-integrated by the soul, *who have renounced the fruit that is born of works*, these will be freed. BG II : 51.
>
> Not by leaving works undone does a man with freedom from works, nor by renunciation alone can he win perfection. BG III : 4.
>
> Therefore detached, perform unceasingly the works that must be done, for the man detached who labors on the highest *must win through* [to salvation]. BG III : 19.

A whole new broadening spirit now enters our discussion. Through detached selfless actions, acts performed without any desire for the fruits of these acts, Arjuna learns that salvation or spiritual liberation may be achieved. Ordinary acts and actions can now make sense and have meaning for the Hindu; they can even contribute to freeing an individual from his partial and limited way of seeing and acting. *Ahimsa*, that ancient respect for the "sacredness" of all observable life, has thus grown into an intuition of a more enduring sense or level of life. Life is so "sacred" that it perdures even in other forms. This is the Supreme Calling and Invitation which Kṛṣṇa is extending to Arjuna. Through detached and pure selfless acts, Arjuna is invited to respond in a commitment of love and personal dedication to Kṛṣṇa. Thus did India come to learn of a

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"sacredness" of life which both includes and yet transcends reverence for every observable form of life.

Yet it is only in most recent times that India actually attempted to apply this Gospel of Kṛṣṇa to the social realm. Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948) taught: *selfless acts reveal a hidden, powerful dynamic; this dynamic is invincible because it is spiritual.* Gandhi's hermeneutic of the *Bhagavad Gita* is clearly world-affirming and certainly not world-fleeing; deliberately he fostered non violent selfless actions designed to awaken and call attention to social injustices and inequities; this very unveiling, he believed, would inevitably lead to the correction of such abuses This social conscientization became Gandhi's practical application of the venerable principle of *ahimsa.*

> I ... justify entire non-violence, and consider it possible in relations between man and man and nations and nations; but it is not "a resignation from all real fighting against wickedness." On the contrary, the non violence of my conception is a more active and more real fighting against wickedness than retaliation whose very noture is to increase wickedness. I contemplate a mental, and therefore a moral opposition to immoralities I seek entirely to blunt the edge of the tyrant's sword, not by putting up against it a sharper-edged weapon, but by disappointing his expectation that I would be offering physical resistance. The resistance of the soul that I should offer instead would elude him. It would at first dazzle him, and at last compel recognition from him, *which recognition would not humiliate him but uplift him.*[5]

In making this practical application, Gandhi was thus linking *ahimsa* with two cherished and ancient Hindu principles : *satya* (truth, truthfulness), the complete and full articulation of reality or existence, can be achieved only when joined with the moral effort of dedicated asceticism (*tapasya*). *Satyagraha*, the "truth-force" or "soul-force," is merely the natural assertion of a basic and fundamental law of our species: through the living expression of this powerful principle, a rectification of society and social injustice cannot fail to take place. Non violence, itself, then can be dynamic and very powerful: willingly-accepted conscious suffering is able to unlock a powerful ' soul-force" or "truth force" which challenges the "tyrant's sword" at a more profound level.

> The truth that moral force is a higher power than brute force will be proved by people who march unarmed... As Louis Fischer put it, "When the Indians allowed themselves to be beaten with batons and rifle butts and did not cringe, they showed that England was powerless and India invincible. The rest was merely a matter of time."[6]

5 M. K. Gandhi. *Non-violence in Peace and War* (Ahmedabad : Navajivan Publishing House, 194 -1949), Vol. 1, p. 44.

6 John Ferguson. *War and Peace in the World's Religions* (New York: Oxford University Press, (1978), pp. 37 39.

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For India then, *ahimsa* means far more than simply abstinence from murder and killing. *Ahimsa* bows before and dedicates itself to the "sacredness" of life in its entire mosaic of expressions both observable and unobservable; it also challenges to a far more profound respect and reverence for human society in its multiple forms. Injustice, violence, and the deprivation of rights can never be tolerated or justified in the name of good order or an acceptable *status quo*; *ahimsa* is that more powerful spiritual force of willingly-undertaken compassionate selfless acts which is capable of overcoming all such disorder. India's meditation and contemplation of this principle eventually led to Independence in 1947; India's far greater challenge of today is to apply and expand her understanding of this spiritual force into the realization of a just society. One wonders what new perceptions of the mystery of life would result if this powerful life affirming principle of *ahimsa* could be released on a more universal level.

Karuna (Compassion) : A Suggestion from the Buddha

To those acquainted with the principal teachings of the Lord Buddha, our contemporary experience of Buddhist monks being intimately involved in the complex socio-political struggles of South-east Asia may at first seem a bit surprising. Didn't the Buddha, himself, preach a spiritual path to world-negating Nirvana characterized specifically by non-attachment to the social order? Indeed, this is true but it is also necessary to recall other dimensions of the Buddha's teaching. First, the prime goal of the Buddha was clearly to find a viable answer to the intense and complex problem of human suffering (*duḥkha*). Secondly, the Buddha, himself, refused to accept and confirm the established caste system of India which seemed to breed injustice and the deprivation of fundamental human rights. Thirdly, Buddha's Enlightenment Experience itself did not end in the emptiness of total silence, the logical conclusion of literally following the tenets of the Four-fold Truth and the Eight-fold path. Rather, the Buddha, himself, out of compassion for others still entangled within the suffering and pain of human confusion and misidentity, determined to cross-over to the Deerpark and preach the Initial Sermon that invited all to remove the blinding cankers of Egoism (*asmitā*) from their eyes. This same Buddha then travelled to Varanasi (Benares), the spiritual capital of India, to proclaim the good-news of his message. Indeed, the entire rest of the Buddha's days right up until his extraordinary "*Mahaparanibbhana* departure" was dedicated to the preaching and the spreading of this message to others. How then can it be claimed that this Lord Buddha who

Cf. also M. K. Gandhi, *All Men are My Brothers* (Admedabad : Navajivan Publishing House, 1960); J. Thekkeindedath, *Love of Neighbor in Mahatma Gandhi* (Alwaye: Pontifical Institute, 1973).

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manifested so much concern and care and compassion for others was completely antisocial, that original Buddhism is as social in its very nature and roots ?

Karuna or compassion for the needs of others led the Buddha to rise from his Enlightenment Experience and begin to unroll the famous Wheel of Dhamma (*Dhamma-Cakra*). Indeed, precisely because of his compassionate identification with the human condition, i.e., his complete sharing and experiencing and understanding of all that it means to be human, the Buddha's quest resulted in a real answer for human beings whom he viewed as being locked in a state of intense metaphysical suffering and pain (*duḥkha*). Admittedly, Theravada Buddhism, the initial expression of the Buddha's teaching in monastic-like wandering communities, did accent and emphasize the individual in quest of *Nirvana*. Yet even within this earliest form of Buddhism, an expansion and extension of the Buddha's teachings to society or the collectivity as a whole may be noted. The Samgha, the monastic communities, were never totally isolated from the support and interaction of laity and society. Moreover, the *Bodhisattva*-ideal arose very quickly and soon became a model especially for Mahayana Buddhism. The *Sutta-Nipata*, a very early scriptural section of the *Nikayas*, attests to this almost Franciscan-like model of the Buddha who is described as the One who out of compassionate concern for the needs of others both constructs a Saving Raft (*Dhamma*) and then crosses-over to the Other Shore.

Yet it is only with the impetus of Ashoka Maurya (274-232 B. C. E.) that this paradigm of the *Bodhisattva* begins to have a real impact on both the soul and soil of India. Ashoka, a warrior converted to Buddhism, attempted to create a Holy Buddhist Empire in Northeast India, an Empire which he hoped to found on the aplication of Buddhist principles. Hospitals, orphanages, schools, universities, monasteries, houses of retreat, and an immense variety of public works were constructed with the precise aim of generating and then reinforcing a Buddhistic spirit of humaneness and compassion. The model of the Buddha's altruism now became a very popular ideal originating especially from the Mahayana monasteries. A *Bodhisattva* became understood as one who although capable of attaining *Nirvana* nevertheless out of loving compassion for suffering humanity postpones his personal penultimate state of *Nirvana* precisely so that he may participate in the mission of awakening others to both the dilemma of the human condition and the healing medicine prescribed by the Buddha. This outgoing model of the Buddhist missionary was now ratified by the Council of Rajagraha and reinforced by Ashoka, the Emperor. Implicit in this compassion and concern for humanity is the growing Buddhist conviction that "life as such" in spite of its enigmas and unanswerable

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questions remains something to be cherished and handed-on with reverence. Life, indeed, is far more than merely the paradoxical individual upon whom the Buddha began to meditate. As Professor Akira Ichiwaka explains :

> The *Bodhisattva* may be seen as a personification of the principle that life is seamless, that the relatedness of things demands more than the glorification of the individual... More to the point here, the *Bodhisattva* ideal implies a mutual-help society of believers taking care of and, in turn, being taken care of by their brethren."[7]

This interrelatedness and more universal understanding is well illustrated by a common prayer which developed at a much later age within Jodo Shin Buddhism, a Japanese form of Mahayana Buddhism.

> I am a link in Amida Buddha's golden chain of love that stretches around the world. I must keep my link bright and strong. I will try to be kind and gentle to every living thing and protect all who are weaker than myself. I will try to think pure and beautiful thoughts, to say pure and beautiful words, and to do pure and beautiful deeds, knowing that on what I do now depends not only my happiness or unhappiness but also those of others. May every link in the Buddha's golden chain of love become bright and strong, and may we all attain Perfect Peace.[8]

Reflection within these early communities took an even more practical and exact orientation when the germ of *karuna* (compassion) grew into the more precise ideal of *metta* (love for the other). According to the Doctrine of the Illimitables, certain teachings are universal and desirable for all. The foremost is *metta* (love) which calls us to cherish every other without discrimination; all others should be greeted with out going cheerfulness, unselfishness, and personal care and love. Moreover, even such customary distinctions as family-relationships or regional or group or national identities are to be transcended and ought not create a hierarchy of preferred, privileged relationships. The ideal of *metta* knows of no such bounds; rather all are to be loved indiscriminately. As the *Sigalovada Suttanta* explains, *metta* invites all to cultivate gentleness, generosity, courtesy, benevolence, mercy, honesty, cooperation and service simply out of care for the needs of others. Such extraordinary outgoing love (*metta*) was the logical extension and expansion of the Buddha's own doctrine of *karuna* (compassion): this initial Buddhist translation of *karuna* into practical *metta* had as its goal the transformation of society. Indeed, *metta* articulated the real

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7 Akira Ichiwaka, "Compassionate Politics: Buddhist Concepts As Political Guide." *Journal of Church and State* 21 (1979): 252 253.

8 Anon. (ed), *Buddhist Services and Gathas* (San Francisco: Buddhist Churches, 1970), p. b.

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Buddhist hope of transforming an unjust society into a Buddhist Kingdom of Love. As Professor Winston L. King has aptly remarked: "*metta* is loving one's neighbor with a vengeance."[9] If with realism, we must regret that this Buddhist Kingdom of Love has not in fact evolved either in Asia or elsewhere, we must also candidly note that neither Christianity with its grand ideal of love for all others nor the Chinese Mohist dream of Mo Ti with its parallel aim of indiscriminate universal love can claim any greater success than Buddhism in the sociopolitical realm. However, it is extremely interesting to observe that three such widely-separated cultures should converge in articulating a similar goal for Humankind.

Thus *karuna* (compassion), that spiritual germ lived and taught by the Buddha in the sixth century B. C. E., grew into a universal principle which challenged and challenges the injustices of society. This ideal has influenced monarchs as different as Ashoka of ancient India and U Nu of contemporary Burma; despite its inability to answer many of the fundamental mysteries of life then, Buddhism does offer a precise path and plan which any society wishing to reform and improve humanity must consider. It may be summarized as :

> Buddhism aims at creating a society where the ruinous struggle for power is renounced; where calm and peace prevail away from conquest and defeat; where the persecution of the innocent is vehemently denounced; where one who conquers oneself is more respected than those who conquer millions by military and economic warfare; where hatred is conquered by kindness, and evil by goodness; where enmity, jealousy, ill-will and greed do not infect men's minds: where compassion is the driving force of action; where all, including the least of living things, are treated with fairness, consideration, and love; where life in peace and harmony, in a world of material contentment, is directed towards the highest and noblest aim, the realization of the Ultimate Truth, Nirvana.[10]

Jen : China's Intuition of Sacred Immanence[11]

In dramatic contrast with India's search for Transcendence, China's primary spiritual intuition has always manifested a decidedly "this-worldly" in orientation. From even before the time of Confucius (551-479 B. C. E.) to our very day, the Chinese mind has so

9 Winston L. King, *In the Hope of Nibbhana: An Essay on Theravada Buddhist Ethics* (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1964), p. 151.

10 Walpola Rahula, *What the Buddha Taught* (New York : Grove Press, 1959), pp. 88-89.

11 Portions of this were presented at the Inter-Religious Seminar on Religious Experience held in Rome on April 20-22, 1979; a much more developed and detailed study may be found in Frank Podgorski, "Self Cultivation: A Chinese View of Religious Experience" in Thomas Mampra (ed.), *Religious Experience : Its Unity and Diversity* (Bangalore: Dharmaram Publications, 1981).

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concentrated on the human dilemma that it may aptly be described as "more than five thousand years of exploring the nature of Man." Within this laboratory, China has uncovered a profound understanding and appreciation of the integral depths of the human. So respectful and reverential is this insight that some theologians have even attempted to explain this as a Chinese discovery and version of the "sacred immanence" of All Humanity.

When ancient China began to explore and probe the meaning of "Man and the world," an initial problem startled the Chinese mind at the very outset. What word or concept could possibly symbolize the richness of the basic experience of being human, of simply being Man? What ideogram or visual-picture could do justice to all that it means to be human? *Jen*, the symbol chosen, originated from the simple pictograph of a man; an immediate implication of this selected symbol was that a single person in total isolation is an anomaly and an impossibility; solipsistically and isolated by himself, a single individual is not even considered to be human. Rather, *jen*, the ideogram chosen, doubles the root-pictograph thereby suggesting that the human is unthinkable unless it be understood in terms of relationships with others. Thus this very elementary ideogram hints at the Community and the humanness and humaneness that China would come to explore with such thoroughness in the centuries ahead.

Like a visionary architect, Confucius etched a blue-print of a world-view that centered on human growth and development. All depends on the potentiality and perfectibility of Humankind. Yet as the foundational ideogram *jen* emphasizes, Man is by nature neither isolated nor alone : rather three pivotal pillars emerge to spell-out the Confucian vision, viz., Man (*jen*), Cosmos (*Ti*), and Heaven (*T'ien*), all interrelated and interconnected in a wondrously harmonious Whole. All three must be stimulated if one is over to cope with the mystery of existence; similarly and viable plan for growth and development must touch all three poles. Accordingly, the Chinese Classics[12] unfolded such plans for integrated wholistic growth and spiritual learning. Similarly Chinese thinkers from Mencius to Chuang-Tzu and even down to our century have never ceased searching for paths to this "Oneness." How do we grow

12 The Chinese Canon came to be specified as the *Five Classics* and the *Four Books*. The *Five Classics* are : (1) *Ch'un Chiu* (*Spring and Autumn Annals*), (2) *I Ching* (*Book of Changes*). (3) *Shu Ching* (*Book of History*), (4) *Shih Ching* (*Book of Poetry*). and (5) *Li Chi* (*Records of Ceremonials*). The *Four Books* are: (1) *Lun Yu* (*Analects*). (2) *Ta Hsueh* (*The Great Learning*). (3) *Chung Yung* (*Doctrine of the Mean*), and (4) *Meng tzu shu* (*Book of Mencius*).

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humanity to its fullest potential, has always been the Chinese question.

Confucius sounded a note of optimism, a hope grounded in a unique understanding of the nature (*hsing*) of humanity and the value of existence. "Whatever is" has its own nature and unique identity and yet every nature seeks its own perfection and fulfillment. All Existence in every particular shape and form is part of a huge gestalt-like living Organism. Harmony will characterize this Organism, this Macrocosm, this Oneness, only when each entity comes to recognize its proper identity and role. When this occurs, the Whole Organism will expand to its full potential and simultaneously each microscopic cell will awaken to a sense of mutual interdependence. The key to growth then is the stimulation of each cell within the Organism. For the human being then, self cultivation became the very means of awakening to the fullness of personal identity and the profundity of all Existence.

As Confucius observed the chaos of his age, he searched for the cause of such disorder. If society be in crisis, he concluded, it is simply because human beings, inhibited from authentic growth, have settled for other less satisfying goals. "Whatever is" contains within itself a foundational orientation towards its fullest perfection; when that development is impeded, frustration, disorder, and chaos enter. All that is needed, then, is that each person become sensitized to this spontaneous, natural thrust towards expressing what is genuinely good for both the individual and the Community as a whole. Suggesting Mahatma Gandhi's goal of necessary social conscientization, Confucius determined to stimulate these spontaneous inner promptings; indeed, development of just such a sensitivity became the primary goal of Confucian spiritual learning and self-cultivation. Thus in spite of the chaos of the Age in which he lived, Confucius attested to an extraordinary faith in human perfectibility.

If Confucius pointed to this latent human potential, then it is Mencius (371-289 B. C. E.) who refined the ways for cultivating this acknowledged human goodness. Mencius detailed and specified the innate human drives as four; these roots or seeds or beginnings lie dormant within all. All are naturally endowed with these qualities at birth; nourishment and care is all that is demanded for the cultivation of these germs or roots.

> The feeling of compassion or commiseration is the beginning of humaneness or benevolence (*jen*); the feeling of shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness (*i*); the feeling of deference and humility is the beginning of propriety (*li*); the feeling of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom (*chih*). Men have these Four Beginnings just as they have four limbs. Having these Four Beginnings, but saying that they cannot develop them is to destroy themselves... If anyone with these

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> Four Beginnings in him knows how to give them the fullest expansion and development, the result will be like fire beginning to burn or a spring beginning to shoot forth.[13]

A human being is thus pictured as similar to a child with limitless potential, Although by nature, children seem naturally to love their parents as by instinct, these beginnings and roots have to be carefully nourished and cultivated. Such cultivation implies the extension and expansion of this goodness outward towards others, towards family and community, towards all of society, and even towards the entire Cosmos and Heaven. Self cultivation is thus an ordered discipline and training which begins from within and expands outward. Just as correction may often be necessary lest a growing child wander and stray, so also disciplined self-cultivation is essential lest these common natural spontaneities be challenged by competing self-aggrandizing desires. Harmony depends on leading or educating this natural human spontaneity to appropriate acts and actions; this is the naturalness, the authentic *jen*, which is capable of uniting Man, the Cosmos, and Heaven within an interdependent organismic Whole.

How then is spontaneity to be encouraged? Surprisingly, the Confucian answer is through proper *li* (ceremonies, rites). The Confucian Teachers were descendants of the *Ju*, those philosopher-administrators who served as official advisors and societal organizers for the Court. Foremost among the responsibilities of the *Ju* was the creation of proper *li*. With the possible exception of *jen*, no other word is more fundamental to the Confucian perspective. Prior to Confucius, the meaning of *li* had been restricted to specific rituals and formal ceremonies which functioned to manifest the "holy." Confucius expanded and extended *li* to include every possible type of human action; yet simultaneously his very adaptation of the word *li* suggested that the "holiness" or "sacredness" connected with a ritual could be extended to include every conceivable human action.

Contemporary scholarship has recently begun to recover this more profound sense of Chinese *li*.[14] *Li* were never intended as simply ceremonies or rituals of public worship nor were they ever meant to be merely codes of conduct governing everything from polite manners to the appropriate emotions to be displayed on a variety of occasions ranging from the exchange of greetings to the way in which one responds to a friend to the customs of mourning to be observed at a funeral. Thus *The Records of Ceremonial* (*Li Chi*) must not be seen as only an elaborate catalogue of human conduct or a detailed code of social-ethical rubrics; while it is cer-

13 *Mencius 2A: 6*

14 Wei ming Tu, "The Creative Tension Between *Jen* and *Li*," *Philosophy East and West* 18, 1 (1968).

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tainly that, it is really meant to be so much more. For an awakened Confucian, all of life and indeed all of Existence is "one, vast spontaneous and holy rite."[15] The Confucians never embraced that radical distinction between the sacred and the secular that has muddled too much of Western Theology. Rather from the Confucian perspective, the Community of Mankind, the human community is its the sacred meetingplace, the cross-roads, the intersection of a trul "holy rite." Within this "sacred Community," the growth, development, and the great awakening of Man are truly sacramental moments.[16] *Li* stimulate and energize this process of growing awareness. As they encourage the outward growth of natural human goodness, they simultaneously transform moral sensibility and consciousness; they awaken each person to a more complete self understanding, to a fuller realization of a specific vocation and responsibility within this vital and dynamic organismic Whole; in a word, they nurture the genuine growth of *jen*. So powerful and so effective are *li* that they are sometimes described as having an almost "magical"[17] quality of stimulation and inspiration abou them. To illustrate this, the traditional practice of invoking a variety of mythic models such as kings, dukes, rulers, princes, sages, and especially the Noble Person may be cited. A *chun-tzu* (a spiritually noble person) radiates a certain naturally transformative power; he has so fused *li* with his own personal development that the almost alchemical result is invariably "virtue" (*te*), that distinctively human contribution to the dynamics of transforming Existence, to the stimulation of the entire Tripartite Organism of Man, the Cosmos, and Heaven. So powerful and so effective and, indeed, so "magical" is the *chun-tzu* that :

> he is able to give full development to his nature. Able to give full development to his own nature, he can do the same to the nature of other men. Able to give its full development to the nature of other men, he can give full development to the nature of creatures and things. Able to give full development to the natures of creatures and things, he can assist the transforming and nourishing powers of Heaven and Earth Able to assist the transforming and nourishing powers of Heaven and Earth, *he may with Heaven and Earth form a Trinity*.[18]

Yet how may such a developed spiritual personality be fostered? With what attitude should one respond to the promptings of *li* ? The Confucian answer is "total sincerity" (*ch'eng*), an all encompassing meta virtue capable of transforming and leading Man to authenticity.

15 Herbert Fingarette, *Confucius: The Secular as Sacred* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972), p. 17.

16 Frank Podgorski, "An Ancient Chinese Model of Celebration," *Jeevadhara* VI, 35 (1976): 429-432.

17 Fingarette, *op. cit.*, passim.

18 *Doctrine of the Mean* (*Chung Yung*) *XXIII.*

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> Sincerity is the way of Heaven, and to discover how to be sincere is the way of Man. There has never been a person who was completely sincere who did not move others. Nor has there ever been a person who was not sincere and yet could move others.[19]

Total sincerity (*ch'eng*), if fully unleashed, will sensitize and awaken each person to the deep communion which inherently links nature, *jen*, to a clear identification with the societal Community and ultimately Heaven in a mutually dependent, cross-fertilizing, interconnected "Oneness." Within the center or "heart-mind" (*hsin*) of every human being, an elevating linkage with all of Existence awaits discovery. Everyone is able to awaken to the discovery that he is far more than a solitary individual; each can discover genuine and authentic solidarity and identity with every other form and level of Existence. It is to just such an awakening that the Confucian Tradition seeks to invite and motivate.

Within the Confucian literature, the paradigms and lists of schemata for effecting this human enlightenment are multiple and often overlapping. Perhaps the dialectics of this awakening may best be understood in terms of a journey, a journey both inward and outward. Mencius enjoyed drawing lessons from observing the patterns of plants; just as seeds must first establish and root themselves in the rich nutrients of the soil and only then push outward and upward to give forth fruit, so also ought each individual first establish identity within his own center and only then push outward and upward in anticipation of bearing spiritual fruits. Accordingly, the human journey consists in the gradual discovery of layers and levels of the inner self. Initially, every human being wonders at the fact of Existence and marvels at the discovery of life. Yet, beyond this phenomenal Ego, each person slowly uncovers a deeper and more interior self, a stillness at the very center. Disciplined self-cultivation, probing self-reflection, and necessary self-correction all challenge during this inward journey; en-route, *li* challenge, motivate, and contribute to the process of self-discovery. By journeying within, the human being becomes aware of the seeds of *jen* or the natural inclinations to goodness that lie within the rich soil or stillness of his "heart-mind" (*hsin*) Now with this deeper understanding having been uncovered, the real test of *jen* begins. Maturity and growth depend precisely on the outward movement to others and to community to share and fully express the richness discovered within.

As a more sensitive and more enlightened human being now deliberately moves outward, each awakens to a variety of communities in which he both participates and helps to form Family, friends, society, the cosmos, and even Heaven all invite to a fuller self-understanding of the mystery of the human. In a different way, each

19 *Mencius 4A: 12.*

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community challenges and leads to the discovery of new layers of the self and an expansion of consciousness. As the sense of personal identity widens, absolute sincerity (*ch'eng*) is again the critical virtue. Each human being's emerging sense of participated solidarity within this gigantic living Organism of Man, the Cosmos, and Heaven demands that each new level of consciousness be verified, tested, and probed by a variety of appropriate actions. That which would later become known as the Neo-Confucian principle of the "unity of knowledge and actions" began to assert itself.

Self cultivation and sacred immanence seems a helpful way to describe this Confucian approach to human development. In the West, immanence has usually been explained as the exact opposite of transcendence; yet such a perspective often fails to explore or appreciate the "indwelling presence" which it boldly proclaims. The great value of the Confucian vision is that it persistently probes, explores, and experiments with this growing understanding of immanence. Thus Confucian analysis was not content with merely a phenomenological description of the human; rather it recognized and probed those roots of Man (*jen*) which showed themselves to be the very foundations or beginnings of an ever-expanding "holy bondage" or "Sacred Unity" weaving together Man, the Cosmos, and Heaven in a Sacred Oneness. Respect, reverence, and awe before this mystery of the human and a sensitivity to the expansive potential of each person became the only appropriate response to such a discovery.

The Tension of Reality

Reflection on these ancient but enduring classical seeds of spirituality, *ahimsa* with its profound respect for the mystery and power of life as such, *karuna* with its proclamation of love, compassion, and care for the needs of others, *jen* with its orientation to expansive growth and development, cannot but fill us with awe and wonder before the beauty of such universal ideals. These paradigms, in fact, do offer real and viable answers to the human dilemma. Moreover, the transformative and creative energy of such lofty ideals cannot possibly be confined to Asia; rather they speak of a hope and dream which is clearly universal. Certainly it is instructive that all three models begin by meditating on and then discovering hidden but deeper dimensions of shared phenomenological experience; and yet all three end by attesting to and challenging to what is perceived as the unbounded potentiality of the human. However, for each, real tension and reality begins when these seeds search for exact paths of growth and maturation. *Ahimsa's* development of the dynamic life force, *karuna's* extension to society as a whole, and *jen's* evolution of the New Man are goals still very much awaiting achievement. Legion, indeed, seem the blocks to such human maturation.

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One unhappy result which we must candidly admit in our day is that injustice and the deprivation of basic human rights is at least as characteristic of Asia as it is of the West. Need we recall the sobering United Nations statistic that we now witness more suffering and injustice than ever before in the history of our world? Despite this paradox then, we are compelled to ask if there are any hopes or lessons to be drawn from our meditation on these Asian seeds of justice. Can conversation, communication, and dialogue between the East and the West on these and similar values perhaps stimulate some sparks or signs of hope?

The very fact that East and West have begun to converse and discuss such matters is already a sign of hope even though these discussions are really but feeble first steps. Intercultural communication cannot help but clarify shared experiences and ideas thereby opening a path for a deeper appreciation of common values. *Ahimsa*, *karuna*, and *jen* all testify to the sacredness of life-as-such even while admitting that life in itself is essentially a mystery. In the West, the Judaeo-Christian-Islamic Tradition is also deeply committed to the limitless value of life. Yet in our day, we live in the reality of a world threatened to death by nuclear war, a world structured with economic laws and a system which breeds injustice,[20] a world torn apart by the vicious competition of self-aggrandizing individualistic forces. What could possibly compel such a world to pause and reflect on itself before rushing head-first into catastrophic life destroying suicide? Perhaps only genuine and authentic *chun tzu* (persons of noble spirit) real prophets, those members of each tradition who have been truly formed and transformed by their *expansive maturing spiritual values*. Perhaps these prophets ought form the agenda for United Nations conversation. Moreover, it is imperative that such "spiritual prophets" learn to dialogue and communicate with others formed by more individualistic and Egoistic values. Did not Mahatma Gandhi and then Martin Luther King learn to translate *ahimsa* and *satyagraha* into powerful spiritual force which spoke to and challenged the injustices of their respective nations in spite of its hostile preconceptions?

A key or a litmus-test seems to center around the ideal of transformative growth and development. All our traditions began with the frank admission that humanity is in need of radical change and improvement. To the extent that Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and the Judaeo Christian Islamic Tradition have stimulated

20 James B. McGinnis, *Bread and Justice* (New York: Paulist Press, 1979); Jack A. Nelson, *Hunger for Justice* (Mary knoll, New York: Orbis Press, 1980); Willy Brandt (ed.), *North-South*: A Programme for Survival (London: Pan Books, 1980; Dietmar Mieth and Jacques Pohier (eds.), *Christian Ethics and Economics*: *The North-South Conflict* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1980) Concilium 140.

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expansive growth and development, this maturing of the human nucleus or seed, these Traditions may be said to have been more or less successful at various points in history. A rich variety of saintly persons from each of these Traditions attests to the fact that no one of these paths has been entirely without fruit. Yet reality demands that the admission that injustice and selfishness and suffering dominate and characterize our world of today even in spite of the noble aspirations of these venerable Traditions. It would thus seem obvious that if any of our intercultural conversations are to be in any real sense effective, then today's "prophets" must learn to address our broader and more-encompassing dilemma of global injustice with concrete and viable practical suggestions rather than mere mystical world fleeing dreams. Suffering and a real sharing and true empathy with all that it means to be human seem critical here. Because Confucius and the Buddha profoundly experienced human suffering and the paradoxical human dilemma, they were impelled to search deeply for viable and realistic answers for their day. Similarly, the suffering and crucifixion of Jesus Christ, his identity with the total human paradox, opened and expanded the Christian principle of love. Any real contribution to our modern dilemma will have to come from "prophets" who have both suffered and understood the human condition and who also have been truly formed and transformed by their respective Traditions.

An encouraging sign of Our Age would be the small groups and pockets of people from various walks of life who are beginning to be sensitive to the mammoth dimensions of structural social injustice on a global level. Recently, Conferences on Religion and World Peace have highlighted this issue in Delhi, Tokyo, Munich, New York Rome, London, and Ottawa. Admittedly, fear of nuclear devastation has stimulated activity among the peace makers. Yet with realism let us also admit that the peace-makers and the justice-seekers still seem but miniscule glimmers of light within a world shrouded in darkness. If ever these "prophets" are to become effective, if ever they are to become the leaven for the bread of the world, then these *chun-tzu* (noble spirits) must learn to imitate the spirit that Thomas Merton so admired in Mahatma Gandhi. Merton wrote :

> The radical difference between Gandhi and other leaders, even the most sincere and honest of them, becomes evident by the fact that Gandhi is chiefly concerned with truth and with service, *svadharma*, rather than with the possible success of his tactics upon the people, and paradoxically, it was his religious conviction that made Gandhi a great politician rather than a mere tactician or operator.[21]

21 Thomas Merton, *Seeds of Destruction* (New York : Farrar, Strauss and Cudahy, 1967), p. 161.

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III

Three Vital Problems Regarding Yoga

U. A. Asrani

I am highly indebted to the Editor of the '*Darshana International*' for opening at my request, a 'Readers' Forum' for solving some long-standing Yogic Problems. Though this prestigious journal, has many aspects for its purview, it has Philosophy, as its first mentioned aspect, and Religion is also one of them. Before I mention the Problems, let me therefore make a request to all readers of the problems.

We are likely to get caught in endless discussions, as regards Yogic texts, their respective credibility, and interpretations, and as regards Prophets of Religious Creeds. Such discussions have not borne any fruitful results, for the last several centuries. Consequently, I request the readers now, to restrict their attention, *only to the Scientific Point of View.* That is to say, that while we maintain all respect for accredited yogic texts, religious prophets and learned interpreters, we give greater preference and credence to experimental tests of results, social surveys, and instrumental tests, wherever available.

Thus for instance, since inspite of our best efforts, the After-Death-State, is still a Great Mystery, we voluntarily restrict our attention to the fruits of Yoga, in the present life only. Again, we have by now proofs of Reincarnation memories, in Deep-Hypnotic-Trance States also (Muses and Young—Consciousness and Reality pp. 58 70; and 'Mountain Path' Tirruvanamalai October, 1970 pp. 238-240) we accept as more reliable, the wider, more openly observed, and more indefatiguably confirmed, observations of Dr. Jan Stevenson of Virginia University.

No doubt Intuitions of Mystics, have also a Value, as regards veracity and utility; but unfortunately, all mystics and prophets have

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no common meeting ground on Yogic problems. It is better therefore, to restict our attention to such solutions only, as can be experimentally observed. It is also true on the other hand, that scientific experimentation, is not a static subject; it is constantly advancing. We will say, in that case, quite distinctly : We know this much scientifically, in this matter, at present, and no further.

Such a restricted scientific procedure, is rather novel in a journal, which deals with a variety of subjects. I propose giving therefore, three Yogic problems below, along with my scientific solution in each case, as far as I can comprehend I request the readers to kindly give their comments in the *same scientific spirit*--giving greater preference to experimentally obseved or observable facts.

Problem I--WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF HUMAN LIFE ?

As against, mere lower animal life, from which man has evolved according to the Theory of Evolution. Lower animals also procure their food somehow and procreate their species. Merely living in houses, clothing ourselves, or cooking our food, can not be the sole purpose of Man's Existence. Some birds build very complicated nests. Nature provides fur coats to animals, living in cold climates; and some dogs have been observed, preserving their extra food, for the morrow, in loose earth.

Man has been called, the Noblest creature of the whole Creation. After untold billions of years, Nature has evolved Man, as the first animal, living not merely by instincts, but endowed with a brain, with a discriminating faculty; discriminating between, right or appropriate, and wrong or inappropriate. Armed with this faculty, Man, has within a few thousand years, built up a very rapid Culture, which perhaps with the old evolutionary procedure, might perhaps have never been accomplished at all.

We brush aside the answer to this problem, that Man should with his discrimination faculty, so live, that he should have no future rebirths; because this is not a universally recognised human desire. Some very sincere souls, in fact desire to be born again and again, in order to serve the Motherland, or Humanity. The Boddhisattwas of Mahayana Buddhism, discarded the individual Salvation Concept of the Arahats of Hinyana Buddhism and the Jains. They aspired to be born again and again, until the whole of humanity, achieves the Ideal of Perfect Buddhahood. Again, how can we prove definitely, that a particular Mahatma, had no future rebirths at all. Cases of Xenoglossy (Ian Stevenson, July 1980) show the possibility of retaining memories of a former birth, 150 years earlier.

The proper scientific procedure, is to ask Nature itself to provide the solution of this problem. A frog is regarded *physiologically*, similar to man; but Nature provides in its eyes, the capacity to observe only such movements, as would help it to catch its prey, or protect itself from its enemies; it needs no others, for its existence.

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Nature provides man with the powers of discretion and decision, for ensuring the rapid advance in Culture, which it expects from him. Thus apart from texts, philosophies, interpretations and intuitions of mystic authorities, the only answer, which Nature provides to this problem is :- That Man should utilise these new faculties, for the Survival of the Human Race, and its further more rapid advance.

Man's personality, and his future Destiny, depend not only upon what environments, fortunate or unfortunate, which may happen to fall in its way, but also upon the discriminating reaction, which has been built up in his mind, by his nurture, and training in childhood, and the social and psychological atmosphere, that he happens to find around him. Even, whether he acts selfishly or unselfishly, depends upon, how far his Ego has been built up by these factors. The Ego is also not inborn in an infant. It is also a Complex, as it is called by psychologists (Jung recognises the Ego, as a Complex), reared up in an infant, by the above mentioned-*human* situations.

My scientific studies indicate, that the skin-encapsulated Individual, is not a real Entity at all; but the whole Universe is completely and complexly inter-related, Man should therefore use his discrimination, for living in such a way, as to benefit the whole Universe, and not merely his Individual body or Ego. He should not be governed by his Complexes, not by his Ego Complex-either; but while playing the part of the Individual in society, he should always be conscious of his Cosmical Entity, and his Evolutionary Obligation.

He should try yo build his Destiny, in this new Evolutionary manner. I personally think that, that yoga is no yoga at all, if it does not enable a person, to alter his Destiny or Personality, so as to help the Cultural Evolotion of Man. He can do so, by gradually eliminating his complexes. It is the complexes, that otherwise, fix up his destiny. In the terms of the recent American Psychologist, A. H. Maslow, he should become self-actualising atleast to some extent, considering his inherited strength. He should be Creative; and he should leave the world, after making some Creative Contribution to the Welfare of Humanity, at large. That is the Purpose of Human life, as divulged by Nature itself. I would like to have comments on these findings of mine, as regards The Purpose of Human Life.

Problem II— MAN OF REALIZATION, OR A PERFECT YOGI

Nature and the study of human psychology give the following answer. A man of realisation should have no personal desires, or Vasanas. He should have no urge even for further Samadhies. With something, yet to achieve, there will be an achievement cum ego complex, in case of success, and a deficiency complex, when there is

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fa lure. Complexes produce uncontrollable emotions in the mind, they sit tight, like unexploded dynamite, in the Unconscious layers of the psyche. A perfect Yogi should be self controlled always. He sh ld be conscious always, of his general Identity with the Cosmos. H should not be worried by the gradualness of the wearing out of th Ego-Complex, planted in the psyche, in early infancy. Worry an hurry are also complexes.

Problem III— WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY FOR A PERFECT YOGI TO BE CELEB TE OR A SANNYASIN

I have added this problem, because, the usual notion in the p blic mind is, that controlling sex is very difficult. A celebate or a Sannyasin, is a man, who has actually controlled it; hence such a person must be a perfectly controlled Soul. Sankara himself, has gone on record in his Introduction to the Aittareya Upanishad, that living with a wife is a sufficient evidence of a lurking desire. Perfect Self-Control is not possible in Grihastha or married life.

But facts, and experience of actual life situations, give another aspect of this problem. Sex-perversions are not uncommon among celebates or Sannyasins; but granting even un-perverted *physical* chastity, there are other aspects to be considered. If a person becomes a Sannyasin, but sex, as a complex i e. as an uncontrollable emotion, remains, or an uncontrollable fascination for the opposite sex continues, there will always be a conflict in the mind—The mind following always the sex attraction, and the ego always trying to control it. Such a mind with constant struggles within it, can not be regarded as peaceful, what to talk of its being perfect; it can not be even efficient in practical work. The writer's personal experience shows that even sublimating the sex urge, in social service also does not *completely* suffice. It is only the ascent of the Kundalini, atleast upto the Ajna Chakra (between the two eyebrows) that can *integrate* or actually utilise the sex energy. There is a vast difference between Sublimation and Integration. Otherwise, even chaste celebates will have to live through constant internal struggle.

On the other hand, sex-emotions are natural in every *healthy* body; and there is no sin attached to doing natural acts like eating food, or drinking water. Procreation of progeny, is also a demand of Nature. To procreate other sages like himself or herself is a fairly worthy aspiration for a Jnani husband or his Jnanin wife.

There are also, in the experience of the writer, Tantric ways of performing the procreation act, in a manner, so as to give *extreme* satisfaction to both partners, and yielding as a result a mind free from sex as-a-Complex. The husband feels that his wife is the only She in the world—whatever other accomplishments or fascinations, other ladies may have. Similarly the wife feels that her husband is the only He, in the world, whatever other qualities, strength of body, or beauty of the body, other men may have. The matter is only of technique of life before marriage, and the technique of the sexual act, so as to give *extreme* satisfaction to both partners—not merely a relief to the male. It has nothing to do with body strength or tonics or drinks consumed. But this experience of the writer, has to be experimentally confirmed, more widely.

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IV

The Concept of Health, Illness, Sickness and Disease

Joseph Wayne Smith & Kevin White

1. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT

In this paper we shall advance definitions of the concepts of health, disease, illness and sickness as these terms are applicable to human beings. Our account will be an explicitly normative one: this is to say that ineliminative reference will be made in the definiendum of our definition to at least one normative concept. We are thus opposed to a position such as that of Christopher Boose (1965, 1976, 1977) which takes health to be merely the absence of disease, and diseases to be recognizable solely by natural science and not evaluative decision (Boose, 1977, p. 543). For us natural science is not as the empiricist sees it, as free from evaluation and normative considerations. But rather than repeating arguments from Hesse (1980) and Feyerabend (1975, 1978) we shall begin with this assumption and explore its implications for medical practice.

In our assessment the traditional biomedical concepts of health, disease, illness and sickness are in need of rational reconstruction. Thus our account does not seek to be totally in accordance with our preanalytic intuitions about health, disease, illness and sickness. Following Greaves (1979) we agree that the failure of Western medicine to deal with many of the problems which it is currently facing, none more important than adequately dealing with the day-to day problems of patients in a clinical context, requires a fundamental reappraisal of medical concepts. This we will commence to do here.

We advance the following meterial conditions of adequacy which definitions of the concepts of health, disease, illness and sickness should meet :

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(MCA 1) An explication should capture most of our clearest intuitions about the extension of the explicandum, and where it does not. suggest good reasons for why it need not.

(MCA 2) An explication should be capable of acting as a decision procedure for areas where our intuitions are so vague as to be unreliable in their assessment.

We shall not seek to justify in detail these principles here. Rather, they seem to us presupposed by much of contemporary analytic philosophy and formal semantics. It follows from (MCA1) that we may reject an existing explication of the concepts of health, illness, sickness and disease, if in fact clear counter examples to the explicatum exist and the author has not suggested reasons for proposing that such alleged counter-examples are not in fact counter-examples. In the following section we will argue that no purely biological explication of our target concepts will succeed. Since the terms 'health' is usually defined in terms of the notion of 'disease' and sickness and illness are generally considered to be derivative concepts, our critical fire here will centre around explications of the former concepts.

2. SOME INADEQUATE EXPLICATIONS OF THE TARGET CONCEPTS

Mario Bunge (1979) in his systems philosophy attempts to give a purely physiological and mathematical rigorous analysis of the concepts of health and disease, not merely for whole multicellular organisms- but also for cells of organs of a multicellular organism. He offers both a qualitative explication of the concept of health and a quantitative explication, from which the concept of disease may be analysed. Here we will concentrate upon his qualitative definition of health, which we shall demonstrate that it is materially inadequate as an explication. It is as follows (Bunge, 1979, p. 86) :

(D1) Let b be a biosystem in an environment E. Then : b is healthy in E=df when in E, b possesses all the properties and can discharge all of the following functions listed in Postulate 3.1.

Postulate 3.1 however deals with the self assembly of systems in general and such a reference renders (D1) meaningless Postulate 3.2 however, advances thirteen conditions which constitute, Bunge believes, necessary and sufficient conditions to distinguish terrestrial biosystems (or living things) from all other things. Hence it follows that on Bunge's account, all living things are healthy, for if any of the conditions listed in Postulate 3.2 are not satisfied, logically we are no longer speaking about a *living thing*. But whatever 'health' means, it is clear that a living thing, may without contradiction, be classified as being unhealthy. Hence (D1) is materially inadequate. So too must be Bunge's quantitative concept of *degree of health*, and disease, which also make reference to this problematic notion.

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Campbell, Scadding and Roberts (1979) have advanced an explication of the concept of disease which may be summarised as follows :

(D2) An organism b in an environment E has a disease=df b has a set of characteristics by which it differs from the norm of its species in such a way as to be placed at a biological disadvantage.

The difficultics with (D2) hinge upon the notions of "norm of the species" and "biological disadvantage". Let us take the latter concept first. The most popular contemporary analysis of "biological disadvantage" is through sociobiological accounts of the lowering of inclusive fitness. On this account (D2) is both too broad and too narrow. It is too narrow insofar as any intuitively regarded "disease" such as minor infections which do not affect genetic fitness are thereby not diseases. Of course the hard line anti-scientific sociobiologist who views everything in the universe as affecting inclusive fitness asssessments would reject our counter-example. This is done, as Gould and Lewontin (1979) have argued, at the price of making sociobiology utterly vacuous. It is too broad, insofar as voluntary celibacy and a lifestyle spent away from genetic relatives studying medical sociology (and hence having no impact on their inclusive fitness, and hence one's own) comes out to be a major disease. This violates (MCA1).

The second difficulty with all definitions along the lines of (D2) is with the concept of normality. There are, as Jiri Vacha (1978) has explained, at least seven distinct senses of the term which can be isolated: (1) *Commonness, Usualness* in a statistical sense of lying within the range of variability of a double value of standard deviation on either side of a normal Gaussian curve; (2) *Averageness*, that which has the highest frequency of occurrence; (3) *Typicalness*, that conforming to some standard of typicality; (4) *Attaining adequate performance*; (5) *Attaining optimal performance*; (6) *Attaining ideal performance* and (7) *A naive conception based upon a number of the above conceptions.* Most medical accounts of normality make use of either (1) or (2). But this is problematic.

The difficulty with statistical concepts of normality as explications of disease (and consequently health) is that there are quite plausible counter-examples to them, leading us to believe that they violate (MCA1). The examples in question are such that the majority of a population are inflicted and yet the inflictions cannot be ruled out as diseases in any non arbitrary way. Consider for example populations affected by epidemics of the plague or by parasitic infections. The statistically based analysis of disease makes it logically impossible to classify entire populations (meant in a statistical sense) as diseased. This is *ad hoc* and inconsistent with our basic practices of disease description.

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Christopher Boorse (1975) (1976) 1977) has advanced the following definitions of our target concepts :

(D3) An organism b is healthy at time t = df b is not diseased at t.

(D4) An organism b has a disease at time t=df there exists an internal state of b which :

(a) interferes with the performance of some natural function contributing to species-typical survival and reproduction capacities) characteristic of the organism's reference class (this being a natural class of organisms of uniform functional design);

(b) is not in the nature of the species to possess.

(D5) A disease d is an illness = df d is serious enough to be incapacitating and is :

(a) undesirable for its bearer;

(b) a title to special treatment; and

(c) a valid excuse for normally criticizable behaviour.

On this account the key explanatory notion is that of a *normal function*. Insofar as a statistical account of normality is adopted by Boorse, the position stands once more open to more sophisticated counter-examples, especially since Boorse takes the functions of part of an individual's body to solely be contributions to individual survival and reproduction. Once more a philosopher, sociologist or biologist obsessed with the pursuit of truth to such a degree as to neglect inclusive fitness maximization, must be regarded as diseased.

Further difficulties arise also with the analysis of 'functions' in the explication of the concept of disease. For Boorse a function is something which contributes to a goal or an end. We shall not discuss the enormous philosophical difficulties facing functional analysis here (cf. Hull, 1982) but assume that we have a relatively clear understanding of what it means to say that something contributes to a goal or end. Now on Boorse's account of disease it is not possible for an organ to be non-diseased, and yet to lose its function. As Margolis (1976, p. 247) has pointed out, this is quite possible: an organ such as the eye may lose its function for seeing in a post-nuclear world of underground life; alternatively with increasing technological innovation in artificial reproduction, human sexual organs may completely lose their function of reproduction. Boorse's account of our target concepts is thus far from satisfactory.

3. AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLICATION OF THE TARGET CONCEPTS

We advance now on alternative explication of our target concepts. In particular we are interested in defining the idea of the state of health and of disease of a society, as a social entity in its own right. The reasons for this will be detailed shortly. Our explications are as follows :

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(D6) An individual human In or a human society Sn is in a state of health=df *In or Sn respectively, is in a state of biological, mental and socio-cultural well being.* A society Sn is in a state of health if and only if its social structure is not a causal mechanism (following Harre's (1970) account) for the production of biological, mental and/or socio-cultural diseases in its constituent individuals.

(D7) An individual human In or a human society Sn, is in a diseased state=df there exists a set of causal mechanisms (possibly a singleton set) acting as causal agents to produce an impediment or underdevelopment of the capacity of In or Sn to achieve biological, mental or socio-cultural well-being, *sufficiently important so as to require help.*

(D8) In has an illness=df In is in a diseased state and this is manifested to some observer (including In him/herself) by virtue of the symptoms of the disease.

(D9) In or Sn is sick=df In or Sn is in a diseased state or In has an illness.

The most important definitions to clarify and defend here are (D6) and (D7). Definition (D6) is the well known and much criticized World Health Organization definition of health. Our account differs from it not only in recognizing that societies can be ascribed the property of health. Now the most obvious objection which can be made to this account is that it is far too broad. On this account, general problems of living, stresses and many existential, philosophical and religious difficulties become diseases. This however does not indicate that our account necessarily violates (MCA1), for we propose that there is in fact good reason to revise our commonsense intuitions. The fact remains that people do face medical practitioners with problems of living, and frequently the purely biological problems with confront the medical practitioner are ultimately caused through problems of living. To illustrate this, the housewife who is really unhappy with her social role and may, because of stress, have stomach pains, would on a purely biological account of illness be treated physico-chemically : the problem is the physico-chemical nature of her stomach. But whilst this is true, it does not answer the question of why those particular physico chemical activities leading to stomach pain occurred in the first place. To answer this question will involve, very frequently confronting social problems of living. Since medical practitioners do face these problems in day to day practice at an increasing rate, the concepts of health, disease, illness and sickness need to be flexible enough to deal with this.

The next difficulty is of course this idea of well being. How is it to be understood ? Is it not a vaguer concept than even that of health ? We think not. To speak about the well being of a human subject is to judge that present subject's biological, mental and socio-cultural activities against *standards of perfectability.* Such standards

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of perfectability do not explicitly provide an account of human nature, but rather given that there exists a general human essence (this being those characteristics necessary for a being to be classifiable as human at all (Salmon, 1982), such standards outline how such a nature may be perfected.

To expand on this point consider the counter-example to the statistical analysis of normality where we considered an entire population inflicted by parasites. We intuit that the possible infections, discomforts and so on, caused by the parasites constitute a disease state because we have some idea of what it would be like to be in a better state than this, that is, in the absence of parasites. We have an idea, albeit approximate, of a norm of perfectability. This is in turn determined by an appeal to various biological theories about the nature of the specific parasites and their action upon the human bio-system.

If there are such things as 'mental illnesses' we can also readily deal with them on the basis of our definitions. A human subject who sincerely believed that he/she could contract an expanding universe at will, perform miracles and other feats, would be judged to be mentally-ill, if such beliefs were demonstrably false. We have reason to believe that this is so because of independently accepted physical theories about the nature of the universe and the limits of human action Consequently ascriptions of health or sickness must be made accross the backdrop of a metaphysical *weltanschauung* incorporating our best and most comprehensive theories of the world and of human nature in a systematic, coherent and unified metaphysical framework.

From this perspective a rigorous distinction between normative assessments on the one hand, and factual assesssments on the other, is reviewed as implausible. First, our norms or standards of perfectability are valueladen insofar as they refer to scenarios of what individuals *ought* to be like to be in states of flourishing. Second, our account of health closely approximates an ethical naturalist definition of goodness proposed by Rodney Allen (1975). For Allen any simple value judgement of the form "X is good" means that X fulfils at least one of the general logical conditions of the satisfaction of human interests, such as truth, beneficiality, co-operation, justice, skill, safety and so on. If any of these evaluative concepts failed to be applicable to the world, then many of the interests of human beings would be frustrated and the satisfaction of human interests could not occur to the same extent as it otherwise could We could just as easily say here that Allen's human-interests are just those phenomena which satisfy norms of perfectability. The ideas then of moral goodness and our idea of health as human flourishing are intimately related. Hence medicine and morality on our analysis go hand-in hand.

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This proposal enables us to render more plausible our proposal that a society may be healthy or diseased. Insofar as a society fails to conform to rationally justified norms of perfectability, it may be judged to be unhealthy, diseased and morally bad. Contemporary capitalism under virtually all neo-Marxist analyses can be readily viewed as a diseased social system, for its social structure is taken as the ultimate causal mechanism responsible for not only the alienation of human beings, but the destruction and putrefication of the environment. Disease metaphors and the neo-Marxist 'diagnosis' of the 'ills' of capitalism also readily go hand-in-hand.

To expand our account further will require significant work in Philosophical anthropology, biology, metaphysics and other disciplines. We have merely the broadest sketch of a theory of health consistent we hope with general intelligibility. But then again in a field where central concepts are engulfed by extreme vagueness some illumination is better than none. Thus we maintain that our explications meet both (MCA1) and (MCA2).

4. CONCLUSION : METAPHYSICS, MORALITY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE

According to Mark Siegler (1981, p. 630) abstract accounts of health such as our own fail to come to grips with the actual nature of day-to-day medical practice. To our account he would ask : how does one decide whether certain of a patient's complaints transgress medical boundaries and should be seen as educational or political problems ? But posing the question in this way precisely commits a *petitio principii* against us : the very point of our analysis is to make fuzzy the boundaries between biology and politics. If the aim of an adequate medical science is to treat and prevent disease and promote health, it is the job of the medical practitioner to become better acquainted with politics, sociology, philosophy and the humanities. The medical practitioner should make people aware of their defective and unhealthy life styles, as well as their defective and diseased social systems if this be the case.

But, it will be argued, this will involve the medical practitioner in costly time consuming endeavours and adopting a critical role, it will be said, places the medical practitioner in a quite precarious position of making moral decisions. This, so our critic will continue, does not occur if the concepts of health and disease are defined as purely physiological concepts. The argument is however quite defective. To take the latter course of action is to opt for solely physio chemical modes of treatment. Consequently absurdities such as treating someone with drugs for depression (which basically only temporarily eliminate the symptoms of the problem) when what is needed is an understanding talk about the person's problems and mode of life. The medical practitioner does not surrender his/her morality when the white gown is donned; they remain human beings

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subject to moral assessment. As such the precarious position of making moral decisions is part of the human condition. We have also proposed that general science, sociology and metaphysics are also inescapable fields of study for the medical practitioner. As medicine stands at the frontier of increasingly shaping the evolutionary destiny of the human race, a concern with the wider cultural domain will be inescapable as well. The concepts of health, illness, sickness and disease, must reflect this inevitability.

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V

Beyond the Linguist and Conceptual : A Comparison of Albert Camus and Nagarjuna

Robert Trundle Jr, & R. Puligandla

It seems to be taken for granted in the West that the contemporary French novelist and thinker, Albert Camus, was not a *bona fide* philosopher.[1] It is the authors' contention, however, that Camus has not only made a significant contribution to Western philosophy, but is also strikingly reminiscent of the second-century Madhyamika school of Nagarjuna. Their similarities are the more significant because they bridge considerable temporal and cultural gaps. Their fundamental points of agreement are : 1. that an essential characteristic of the human condition is man's search for an absolute (e.g., the real) in what is merely relative (e.g., views of reality). Thus, we will explicate Camus' position that, "that nostalgia for unity, that appetite for the absolute, illustrates the essential impulse of the human drama."[2] by reference to the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna. For Nagarjuna has not only "shown that the thirst for the real is at heart the quest for being,"[3] but has further given the most cogent demonstration of the relativity of all views of reality. 2. that the attempt to construct an absolute and exclusive *view* of reality, i.e.,

1 See Thomas Hanna's excellent commentary in "Albert Camus : Man in Revolt," (*Existential Philosophers ; Kierkegaard to Merleau-Ponty*. ed. by G. A. Schrader, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967), p 332.

2 Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*. (tr. Justin O'brien, New York: Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, 1955). p.13.

3 R. Puligandla, "How Does Nagarjuna Establish the Relativity of All Views," (The *Maha Bodhi*, Volume 81, Nos. 5-6, May-June, 1973), p. 159.

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seek the absolute in the relative, results in logical absurdity. 3 and, in tangency to point two, that dogmatic metaphysical systems which claim to be absolutely and exclusively true fail to establish their claim. The failure accrues to the obfuscation of *views* of reality with reality itself; to the confusion of the merely perceptual conceptual with the non-perceptual and non conceptual.

To begin with, then, both Nagarjuna and Camus assert the failure of dogmatic metaphysical systems to provide the knowledge which they claim. The inadequacy and inconsistency of both the atman and anatman schools of the Indian tradition led to the Madhyamika dialectic of Nagarjuna. The Madhyamika school, which embodies the heart of the teachings of the Buddha, does not construct another metaphysical system; nor does it add anything to the propositions of other systems. Rather, like Kant, Nagarjuna's dialectic shows that there was something wrong not just with this or that system, but with Reason itself. In a word, the Madhyamika dialectic reveals the total conflict in Reason. The conflict in Reason ultimately resulted, of course, from mistaking the relative, i.e., *views* of reality, for the absolute, i.e., reality itself. Nagarjuna's awareness of the difficulties and dilemmas of both the atman and anatman systems of philosopoy led to the dialectic.

By comparison, it was Camus' consideration in the *Myth of Sisyphus* of what he saw as the most serious philosophical problem, which led to his differentiation between reality and *views* of reality, i.e., between the absolute and the relative. It was in the *Myth of Sisyphus* in which he dealt with whether life is worth living in the absence of absolute values and judgments, "All the rest," Camus says, "... whether or nor the world has three dimensions, whether the mind has nine or twelve categories ... come afterward."[4] What significance can other philosophical problems have at the moment one finds life unbearable? Camus notes that many persons tacitly assume that without the possibility of being able to derive judgments and values from views of reality which can be shown to be absolutely true, life must be unbearable. "That nostalgia for unity, that appetite for the absolute, illustrates the essential impulse of the human drama."[5] Hence, Camus holds that much of Western philosophy is obsessed with the goal of constructing absolute and exclusive views of reality. It is our contention that Camus, like Nagarjuna, holds it to be logically impossible to construct an absolute and exclusive view of reality. This does not, however, lead to a nihilistic denial of reality, to a "philosophy of despair," or to a denial of the efficacy of common sense and everyday experience.

The epistemological status of Camus' position may be summarized in three respects: 1. It consists of both *views of* reality, e.g.,

4 *The Myth of Sisyphus*, *op. cit.* p 3.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 13.

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possible ways of looking at the world, and a discussion of views of reality. 2. his *views* of reality are admittedly relative. Thus Camus recognizes alternative views of reality when he states that :

> Having started from an anguished awareness of the inhuman, the meditation on the absurd returns at the end of its itinerary to the very heart of the passionate flames of human revolt,[6]

only to qualify that very view :

> But Oriental thought teaches that one can indulge in the same effort of logic by choosing against the world, [i.e., not being disturbed by the very "human" nostalgia for the absolute]. That is just as legitimate and gives this essay its perspective and its limits.[7]

Camus does not attempt to conceptually "make everything clear" by formulating an absolute and exclusive view of reality. In his novels, he tries to relate many views of reality. "It is a moving experience to watch the horizon of Albert Camus develop through his novels *The Stranger*, *The Plague*, and *The Fall*..."[8] comments Michael Novak. In short, Camus was never adverse to adopting a view of reality to the extent that he wants to act and live in the world. Yet, he never confuses his *views* of reality with reality. He holds the latter to be conceptually inexplicable and ungraspable. Further, he does not hold that because there is no absolute view of reality that all views are false. Nor does he thereby nihilistically deny reality. Camus admits that "the absurd considered as a rule taken as an absolute of life is therefore contradictory."[9] To acknowledge the absurd, according to Camus, is merely to call attention to the fact that, "There is no longer a single idea explaining everything, but an infinite number of essences giving a meaning to an infinite number of objects."[10] The perception of the absurd is not itself a view, but is simply one's keenly becoming aware of the nature of views. That it has colored so many thoughts and actions on the continent between the two wars only adds to the force of its power and validity.

3. Camus' discussion of *views* of reality is strikingly reminiscent of the Madhyamika teaching of Sunyata. The Madyamika school of Nagarjuna establishes that it is neither proper nor logically justifiable to regard any metaphysical system as absolutely valid.[11] One

6 *Ibid.*, p. 47.

7 *Ibid* , p. 47.

8 Michael Novak, *Philosophy and Fiction*, (*Philosophy Today, No.* 2. ed. by Jerry H. Gill, Toronto : The MacMillan Company, 1969) p. 216.

9 Albert Camus, *The Rebel*, (Tr. by Anthony Bower, New York : Vintage Books, 1956). p. 9.

10 *The Myth of Sisyphus*, *op. cit* . p 33.

11 B. K Matilal, *Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis*, (The Hagu : Moulton & Co. N.V. Publishers, 1971), p. 148.

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can so regard any system only on pain of contradiction. The *prima facie* similarity of this epistemological stance to Camus' is quite unmistakable. Thus, Thomas Hanna observes :

> Camus mentions the logical impossibility of making *universal* judgments about anything without ending in contradiction; on the level of logic, any effort to grasp absoluteness always leads to paradox.[12]

It seems clear that Camus held it to be logically necessary that absolutist systems of thought result in self contradiction. Hence it seems that he sought to rest his position on a deductive truth rather than on a mere inductive generalization (by considering a few views in *The Myth of Sisyphus*, viz., a Platonic Aristotelian view Existentialism, Rationalism, etc.). Furthermore, there is a peculiar sort of tranquility and subtle optimism in Camus' work. This suggests that he recognized a mode of existence *devoid* of the tension of the absurd. Both Camus and his work were uniquely free from the *anxiety* so characteristic of the so-called existential literature with which Camus is often identified. In short, Camus offers a refreshing alternative to the predominant Western supposition, implicit or explicit, that we have no 'reason' to live or are totally without justification for what we do if there is no rationally (conceptually) apprehendable *absolute* upon which to base what we do. For "... if I recognize the limits of the reason, I do not negate it, recognizing its *relative* powers,"[13] says Camus. Furthermore, "...there is no depth of opportunities for action, in the relative."[14] he adds. Nagarjuna concurs that "... we do not speak without accepting, for practical purpose, the work-a-day world."[15]

Like Nagarjuna, Camus recognized an ultimate reality beyond the relativity of concepts. It could neither be rationally explicated, nor, as Camus would say, "made clear." Nevertheless, Camus notes that "our epoch is marked by the rebirth of those paradoxical systems that strive to trip up reason as if it had truly forged ahead."[16] Similarly, "Nagarjuna exposes the relativity (i. e mutual dependence) of all concepts and thereby claims that they cannot be considered real from the absolute point of view."[17] Camus was aware of a difference between systems of thought regarding reality and reality itself. These systems—(*views* of reality) are relatively true and

12 Hanna, "Albert Camus: Man in Revolt," *op. cit.*, p. 354.

13 *The Myth of Sisyphus*, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 147

15 Nagarjuna, "Vigrahavvavartani : Averting the Arguments," (*Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning*, by Frederick J. Streng, Nashville : Abingdon Press, 1967), p 224.

16 *The Myth of Sisyphus*, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

17 Matilal, *Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis, op cit* , p. 148

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efficacious. Ultimate reality is non-conceptual and not within the grasp of everyday experience :

> Nothing can be predicated of it, and one cannot even speak of it literally ... Dogmatic, speculative theories try to reach the unconditioned by unduly extending empirical principles; they come into necessary clash with each other ... the categories of thought, causality, substance, identity and difference, good and bad, etc., are certainly not applicable to the ultimately real, being relative; but the Madhyamika does not deny their utility as patterns of explanations in the empirical region. It is the dogmatic theorist with his insistence upon the sole truth of his particular conception of the real who makes empirical activity impossible.[18]

Ordinary experience is on that plane of existence in which one is concerned with making sense of what one does. It is on that plane concerned with the useful and with getting things done. While Camus holds that "to will is to stir up paradoxes,"[19] Nagarjuna recognizes"... that action which is a result of having willed; that is considered [by tradition] as physical or verbal."[20] Absolute reality must *ipso facto* be that which is devoid of both the verbal and of willing.

Pursuing some of the *prima facie* affinities between the positions of Camus and Nagarjuna will illuminate the spirit and logic of Camus' position. For Camus' outlook has unique overtones explicable neither in a philosophical vacuum, nor merely in the context of traditional Western thought. Both Camus and Nagarjuna recognize a reality that is non conceptual and inexplicable in terms of logic and language. It is a reality *beyond* names and forms. Views of reality entail conceptual activity. But the very nature of reality precludes our describing it. Hence,

> Nagarjuna sharply distinguishes between reality and *views* of reality. A view of reality is constituted of concepts and statements and is consequently a conceptual linguistic entity. On the other hand, reality is non-conceptual and extra-linguistic ... But in one's thirst for the real one overlooks this distinction and identifies constructions (views) of reality through names and forms with reality itself.[21]

Western scholars have not only tended to confound reality with *views* of reality, but in addition to falsely conclude : 1. that those who

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18 T. R V. Murti. *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism : A Study of the* Madhyamika System, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1960) pp. 333 334

19 *The Myth of Sisyphus, op. cit.*, p 16.

20 Nagarjuna, "Mulamadhyamakakarikas," (*Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning. op. cit.*), p. 201.

21 Puligandla, "How Does Nagarjuna Establish the Relativity of All Views," *op. cit.*, p. 159.

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assert the relativity of views of reality, e.g., Camus and Nagarjuna, must *ipso facto* nihilistically deny reality, reason, or common-sense experience.[22] 2. that this entailed that all views of reality were false.

Actually, as Camus says, this criticism belies an "all or nothing" position with regard to *truth*. It supposes that without eternal and immutable truths apprehended by reason, there is no truth in any sense whatsoever. This Western "mind", notes Camus, says, "I want everything to be explained to me or nothing."[23] Yet, says Camus, "in psychology as in logic, there are truths but no truth."[24] Camus refuses the Western "leap" to eternal Reason :

> That which is true is true absolutely, in itself; truth is one, identical with itself, however different the creatures who perceive it, men, monsters, angels, or gods ... That geometrical spot where divine reason ratifies mine will always be incomprehensible to me. *There too, I discern a leap* [25]

Yet, Western thinkers, judging Camus' or Eastern thought, by their own "all or nothing" criterion, have held that Camus' thought and *a fortiori* Eastern thought result in a nihilistic affirmation of "nothing," or by *symmetry* a nihilistic denial of "everything." Thus,

> The Western critics, having correctly observed that the Indians, while attaching ultimate ontological status and significance to the eternal, assigned only a secondary ontological status and significance to the empirical world, go on to mistakenly proclaim that the Indians therefore regard the empirical world as unreal and illusory.[26]

It is worth quoting here Professor Eliade's denial of a common Western belief : "'It is not at all the case that the discovery of cosmic illusion and the metaphysical quest of Being express themselves, in India, by a total devaluation of life or belief in a universal vacuity.'"[27]

> Contrary to widespread misunderstanding, neither scepticism nor nihilism follows from the relativity of all views. Scepticism would follow from it only if "relativity of all views" means "falsity of all views."[28]

Perhaps the widespread misunderstanding has its source in a sort of "philosophical ethnocentrism" in which Western philosophers see as

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22 See Richard Robinson's "Did Nagarjuna Really Refute all Philosophical Views ?", (*Philosophy East and West*, Volume XXII, No. 3, July, 1972), p. 331.

23 *The Myth of Sisyphus*, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

24 *Ibid.*, p. 15.

25 *Ibid.*, p. 34.

26 Puligandla, "Time and History in the Indian Tradition," (*Philosophy East and West*, Voluume 24, No. 2, April, 1974), p. 175.

27 *Ibid* , p. 175.

28 Puligandla, "How Does Nagarjuna Establish the Relativity of All Views ?," *op. cit.*, p. 164.

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false and inferior what is not a part of their own philosophical heritage. Professor Nikolai P. Anikeev of the Academy of Science's Institute of Philosophy in the USSR correctly calls our attention to a "philosophical condescension" in the West : "The allegation that Indian philosophy is inferior is encountered in most of the general courses in philosophy in the West, where Eastern philosophy is totally excluded as a subject of study."[29] Anikeev aptly observes that ordinary "Wes ern philosophy regards that the results of *all experience* can be communicated through verbal or logical means."[30] He juxtaposes this to Indian philosophy which "denies the possibility of communieating the experiences of mystical intuition,"[31]

"Logical and discursive thought as a process of meaning is a selective process,"[32] simply because thinking is always thinking about something and not everything. Views of the world and the mundane thinking of everyday affairs is not absolutely denounced by either Camus or Nagarjuna. Thus, although "it limits the awareness according to habits of apprehension "[33] on the one hand, it is recognized by Nagarjuna to permit meaningful communication on the other.[34] Similarly, Camus says that he wants "to remain in this middle path where the intelligence can remain clear,"[35] and that he sees "no sufficient reason for giving it up."[36] Camus does not deny the efficacy of conceptual activity or logic. While he merely observed that "the absurd effect is linked to an *excess* of logic,"[37] Nagarjuna's "critical dialectic served to reduce the logical procedure to absurdity when it attempted to express Ultimate Truth."[38] Thus, Nagarjuna says in "An Analysis of the Holy Truths" that

> The teaching by the Buddhas of the *dharma* has recourse to two truths : the world-en sconced truth and the truth which is the highest sense.[39]

But while both Camus and Nagarjuna hold that the ultimate truth cannot be conceptually apprehended, Nagarjuna *does* assert that,

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29 Nikolai Petrovich Anikeev, *Modern Ideological Struggle for the Ancient Philosophical Heritage of India*, (Calcutta: R. K. Maitra from R. D. Press, 1969), p. 14.
30 *Ibid*, p. 11.
31 *Ibid*, p. 11.
32 Streng, *Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning*, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
33 *Ibid*., p. 97.
34 *Ibid*., p. 97.
35 *The Myth of Sisyphus*, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
36 *Ibid*., p. 30.
37 *Ibid*, p. 96.
38 Streng, *Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning*, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
39 "Mulamadhyamakakarikas," *Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning*, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

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> The highest sense [of the truth] is not taught apart from practical behaviour, and without having understood the highest sense one cannot understand *nirvana*.[40]

This clearly shows that Nagarjuna recognized a "truth" applicable to practical behaviour and consequently of the efficacy of reason and experience. Indeed, such recognition is the very basis of Nagarjuna's proclamation of the ultimate truth :

> ..... the analogical use of words and the logic of convergence are used for expressing certain characteristics of Ultimate Reality. In summary, these symbolizing mechanisms are especially suited to apprehend and express Ultimate Reality as an eternal essence. This essence is apprehended through any particular phenomenon (or concept), since Ultimate Reality by definition, pervades every particular expression. On the other hand, no expression is adequate to bear the fullness of reality which must be finally known by a non-symbolical means : intuition.[41]

The denial that reality can be conceptualized, and hence described, does not entail nihilism (denial of reality), or affirmation of the illusoriness of the empirical world. Camus' denial of the absolute truth of any view of reality neither implies a denial of common-sense experience, nor the "falsity" of views of reality. Rather, Camus denies the possibility of conceptually "reconstructing" this reality. It is confrontable only in silence and non-conceptual experience. Thus Camus says that,

> So long as the mind keeps silent in the motionless world of its hopes, everything is reflected and arranged in the unity of its nostalgia. But with its first move this world cracks and tumbles : an infinite number of shimmering fragments is offered to the understanding. We must despair of ever *reconstructing* the familiar, calm surface which would give us peace of heart [42]

Thus, there is a remarkable resemblance between Camus' position and Nagarjuna's. As Thomas Hanna observes, "Camus mentions the logical impossibility of making *universal* (absolute) judgments about anything without ending in contradiction."[43] Camus astutely recognized Western man's propensity for elevating truths, which are certainly necessary in everyday life, to absolute truths. He refers to this as an "absurd procedure." In his "nostalgia for an absolute," man sees a world in which only relative truths can be conceptually apprehended, as absurd. Nevertheless, both Camus and Nagarjuna recognize the efficaciousness and worth of views of reality. Those who *expand* the merely efficacious to what Camus

40 *Ibid.*, p. 213.

41 Streng. *Emptiness : A Study in Religious Meaning*, *op. cit.*, pp. 137 138.

42 *The Myth of Sisyphus*, *op. cit.*, p. 14

43 "Albert Camus : Man in Revolt." (*Existential Philosophers : Kierkegaard to Merleau-Ponty*, op. cit.) p. 394.

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sometimes calls the "universal," violate their own "sacredly" held principles. They turn away from their own cherished principles. Thus, says Camus,

> Reason bears a quite human aspect, but it also is able to turn toward the divine. Since Plotinus. who was the first to reconcile it with the eternal climate, it has learned to turn away from the most cherished of its principles, which is contradiction...[44]

Ironically, those who violate their own principles accuse those who avoid such a violation of being nihilistic, destroying the notion of Truth, and fostering immorality and despair.

Camus says that "reason" turns away from the most cherished of its principles, which is contradiction. But he also says that his examples of paradoxical systems of thought "are not interesting in themselves but in the consequences that can be deduced from them."[45] The consequences that can be deduced are : 1. that elevating the relative to the absolute results in suffering on the practical, social, and political planes (as discussed in Camus' *The Rebel*), and logical absurdity on the intellectual plane (as discussed in Camus' T*he Myth of Sisyphus*). 2. and that "facing up" to the relativity of views (which is seen as an absurdity *vis-a-vis* our "nostalgia for the absolute") allows for an openness to a more profound, non conceptual absolute reality. Thus the "nostalgia for the absolute" may be satiated only if we do not seek it in any view of reality. It is the person who elevates a *view* of reality to an absolute who violates his *own* principles. But how, we may ask, could Camus' assertion that views "are legitimate only in precisely so far as they are approximate,"[46] be logically defensible, given his *own* denial of any absolute truth ? If all views are relative, is not Camus' view itself relative ? We have discussed the distinction between reality and *views* of reality. We will now differentiate them from Camus' and Nagarjuna's more fundamental discussion of views of reality.

The truth which is relative is that predicated of *views* of reality. Camus and Nagarjuna are discussing views of reality and this discussion does not itself constitute a view of reality. Hence, the charge that they are themselves offering views of reality is unwarranted. It is often said that the teachings of Camus and Nagarjuna are 1. based on a necessary truth, and is therefore devoid of empirical significance and can say nothing about reality; 2. and if they are saying something about reality, then they are saying something contingent, and therefore is potentially falsifiable. These are not cogent objections. For they are not offering a *view* of reality—a view of

44 *The Myth of Sisyphus, op. cit.*, p. 36.
45 *Ibid*, p. 14.
46 *Ibid*, p. 15.

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reality exhibiting a scema of the nature and constitution of reality, viz Hegel, Kant, Aristotle etc. What they are saying is not itself such a schema. Specifically, in order to refute the claim of Camus and Nagarjuna concerning the relativity of views of reality, one must formulate a view from concepts, e.g., C, without dependence on other concepts, e.g. non-C. But the very interdependence and relativity of concepts must already be assumed in such a formulation or construction. The position of Camus and Nagarjuna that all views of reality are relative follows from the mutual dependence and relativity of concepts. Thus,

> given any concept whatever, say C, what does it mean to say that its meaning is such-and-such ? There are only two possible answers: 1. The meaning of C is explicated through C itself, and 2. The meaning of C is explicated through some non C concepts. The former is trivial, tautologous, and unilluminating, since all it says is that C means C. On the other hand, the latter is non trivial, significant, and illuminating, but it is so precisely because C is now stated in terms of concepts other than C.[47]

In a word, one can only say what something *is* in terms of what it is *not*.

In summary, Camus both denies the falsity of varying views of reality, and the absolute and exclusive truth of any one. This is precisely what Camus means when he says that he wants "to remain in this middle path where the intelligence can remain clear."[48] But what is it, he questions, that leads one to claim the absolute and exclusive truth of one's view of reality ? "That nostalgia for unity, that appetite for the absolute illustrates the essential impulse of the human drama,"[49] observes Camus. It is "in one's thirst for the real [that] one overlooks this distinction and identifies constructions (views) of reality through names and forms with reality itself,"[50] notes Nagarjuna. But reality is that which is absolute, and thus not relative to or mutually dependent on anything. Reality is unlike views of reality in being extra-conceptual and non-linguistic. Since it is *beyond* any perceptual conceptual activity, one may not say what it is. Like the Taoist notion of the Tao, one must stand mute before it :

> The Tao (Way) that can be told of is not the eternal Tao :
> The name that can be named is not the eternal name.
> The Nameless is the origin of Heaven and Earth;[51]

47 Puligandla. "How Does Nagarjuna Establish the Relativity of All Views ?" (*The Maha Bodhi*, op. cit.,) p. 161.

48 *The Myth of Sisyphus, op. cit.*, p. 30.

49 *Ibid.*, p 13 .

50 Puligandla. "How Does Nagarjuna Establish the Relativity of All Views ?" (*The Maha Bodhi*, op. cit). p. 159.

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In the intuitive confrontation of Reality one is not concerned with getting things done, and hence need not assume certain relative and efficacious truths. "Beginning to think is beginning to be undermined,"[52] notes Camus. But Camus realized that in the presence of the extra linguistic and non-conceptual reality, one does not think. "To will is to stir up paradoxes," he notes. But in the silent confrontation of reality one does not will. "From the outset, then, Camus was aware of a realm of human experience that lay *beyond* the reach of words, outside all conscious elaboration."[53]

Camus had a rare outlook that appreciated both the contemporary existentialist concern for commitment, and the Eastern recognition of man's limits with regard to philosophical and everyday commitments. He appreciated both the value of reason and action, and the value of non-action and silence. He recognized the usefulness and worth of views of reality, and a more profound reality beyond their limits. "The truths that come within my scope can be touched with the hand,"[54] he metaphorically noted. Yet,

> Immersed in the light, the sea, the wind, he could merge with the natural world, escaping the limitations of his life, exulting in a sense of power and wholeness, an experience that he knew was as real as it was temporary. *It neither negated his sense of the impermanency of life nor was cancelled out by it.* It was a dimension of experience that enriched his awareness of the value of being alive, physically alive in and to the world...
>
> Silence was a dimension of existence; the silence of his mother, the silence of the earth those things to which obscurely he acquiesced.[55]

51 Lao tzu, "Tao-Te Ching," (*A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*. tr. and compiled by Wing Tsit Chan. Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1972) p. 139.

52 *The Myth of Sisyphus, op. cit.*, p. 4.

53 Germaine Bree. *Camus and Sartre*, (New York : Dell Publishing Co., 1972) p. 63.

54 *The Myth of Sisyphus*, op. cit., p. 66.

55 *Camus and Sartre*, op. cit., p. 67.

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VI

Multidimensional Sociology and Vedantic Man : An Alternative

A. K. Sharma

The most fundamental issue of sociological analysis is, as I understand it, to define and decompose the complexity of human act in relation to sociological energies that shape it, for the purpose of guiding actor—individual to produce functional activities leading to collective welfare. Here the sense of collective welfare is relative and current. This conjures away the long history and tradition of social processes. And this is assumed that the collective welfare in relative form is the key to individual happiness. Social theorists belonging to various disciplines: functionalists; conflict theorists, structuralists; ethnomethodologists; phenomenologists; social—existentialists; structuralists; and symbolic—interactionists have contributed in the study of society. They all vary in their approaches in orientation to sociological nature of man, and in their approaches to specific sociological problems. This has been an obstacle in the task of building a general theoretical framework that can efficiently interpret sociological data of diverse kinds nnd weld into a single suggestive explanatory framework. As Sorokin has recently expressed, after an intensive review of work on sociological theories of today :

> Each of the theories examined makes a small contribution to our knowledge of social change; hardly any of them greatly enriches our understanding of the most essential aspects, forms, principles, relationships, uniformities, causes, and consequences of social changes of the past as well as of the present. They are all either too abstract or too fragmentary. All as pedestrian, and Alexandarian rather than classical, enlightening, and imaginative.[1]

[1] Sorokin, P. A., *Sociological Theories of Today*, Harper and Row, New York, 1966, p 634.

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However, there seems to be a recent tendency among some sociologists to develop creative growth through syntheses of sociology. The emergence of tentative synthesis is well construed as, in the work of Sorokin :

> Despite the considerable variety in the surveyed sociological theories, they are mutually exclusive or contradictory only on some of their wrong points; on a number of their points they are mutually complementary rather than exclusive.[2]

Two other claimants of multidimensional sociology, today, are Adam Podgorecki and Maria Los.[3] According to Maria Los, no vision of human nature and of the iron law of history can claim ultimate scientific superiority on these matters at present. The scientific levels are in use simply because they are more convenient than open appeals to political or religious ideologies.[4] This is also true that the stress on one—dimensional sociology makes one 'obligatory' version of the image of society, and therefore has not only theoretical but political character too. On the other hand the multidimensional integral theory frees man from the political appropriation and maks him to see more clearly. The gains of such a convergence are fourfold : (1) Due regard to both man and his exterior social reality i e.. conceding the possibility of dehumanizing tendencies of social-systems, and of humanizing of such systems by hypothetical actor, and therefore preparing a ground for understanding of man-society relation This is to consider man not as a social robot, nor a supra-systemic existence; (2) This new approach cedes a unique model of social change, supposedly universal and all time, and replaces it by a more dynamic and accomodative framework to reflect the changes in nature of man and of society; (3) The building of integral system of sociology and knowledge of multidimensionality of sociology eke out tremendous information about the social context of man by accounting for and allowing valid, the methods of 'empathy', 'intuition', 'residues', 'derivatives', and in short 'trans-rational' or 'non-rational' as adjuncts to the rationalistic mechanistic conception of social reality; and (4) This reduces the emphasis on predictability of human-act and accepts the possibility of impossible, with regard to human and social action. This allows for both the social physics of Compte and impossibility of prediction by Popper. According to Compte the consecutive social states are necessary result of the preceding and indispensable mover of the following as in every form of social relations there are mechanisms

2 *Ibid*. p. 646.

3 Podgorecki, Adam, and Maria Los (eds), *Multidimensional Sociology*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979.

4 Los, Maria, "Multidimensional Sociology". in Podgorecki Adam, and Maria Los (eds), *Multidimensional Sociology*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979, pp 118-38.

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for the emergence of other and higher forms of relationships.[5] On the other hand Popper presents that the prediction of future course of human history is impossible. It is because the course of human history is strongly influenced by the growth of human knowledge and the growth of scientific knowledge can not be predicted by rational or scientific method.[6] Among others Spengler, Martindale; Toynbee, Parsons, Marx, and Rostow can be mentioned as believers of social change from a start X to Y. Parsons, however, accepts that the evolution is not inevitable.[7] The central point is that while some sociologists believe in an uninterrupted growth of human societies, some as Popper and Sorokin allow for the uncertain course of future society. From the viewpoint of multidimensional sociology the two views are two extreme coordinates at the same dimension of conception of social change. For example this is maintained that the two seemingly opposite theories of dialectical materialism of Marx and functionalism have common conceptual model — system model. The two theories say different things about the same and are analogous to opposite values on dimensions of exploitation/reciprocity, conflict/consensus, and development/stability.[8]

In the context of emergence of multidimensionality in sociology it is worth reviving the traditional Indian framework of analysis of human action and society particularly because such a framewoek is highly consonant with the multifaceted nature of man society relation and deals with something more fundamental. The salient aspects of such a frame work are as follows :

1. **Pregiven Life-world**: According to this postulate the taken for granted world is pregiven and the existence of man is fortuitous. As he grows in the life-world, he is supplied the language, culture, the social structure, the matrix of typifications, the knowledge which is socially relative, and the recipes for interpretation and action. However, the man is active and is free to choose the path of wisdom or ignorance that will affect his position with regard to his authentic self but not the course of social dynamics.

2. **Subjectivity of Consciousness**: The perception of world is subjective and depends on the mental state of the subject. Therefore the existence and the form of appearance of phenomenological world are contingent upon the position of the actor in transmigratory state in which there is continuous cognition and no break in the

5 Giddens, Anthony, "Positivism and its Critics". in Bottomore, Tom and Robert Nisbet, *A History of Sociological Analysis*, Basic Books, 1978, pp. 237-47.

6 Popper, K. R., *The Poverty of Historicism*, Boston, 1957.

7 Parsons, Talcot, *The Evolution of Societies*, Prentice Hall, 1977.

8 Wiater, J. J. (ed), *Polish Essays in the Methodology of Social Sciences*, D Reidel Publishing Company, 1979, pp. 133-56.

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knowledge. The meaning of transmigration, here, is migration from the state of a unit element within the phenomenological matrix to complete disappearance of duality and realization of pure consciousness that connotes becoming of pure consciousness.

3. **Mystry of Social Dynamics:** According to postulate of mystry of social dynamics the society as a part of cosmos in which the man lives is always in a state of flux. The forces of creativity and cooperation, dissolution and conflict, and conservation and persistence interact and create newer mystic forms incessantly. However, the forms are mystic only with regard to previous analysis of trends and normal in existential sense as they make the normal, conventional. and natural life-world of the hypothetical actor.

4, **Voluntaristic Nature of Theory:** The conservative Indian theory of human action is voluntaristic as it involves the normative structure of action and considerations of 'ought' and 'ought not'. With regard to man and his action there are three generalized, mutually exclusive, interacting and ubiquitous tendencies: tendency to know, tendency to act meaningfully, and tendency to chose bodily comforts and inactivity.[9] The three fundamental impulses and impulsivity of man are always in a state of balance and increase in any one of them leads to suppression of the other two and vice-versa. The normative constructs of the theory regarding inter-subjectivity relations are ontological, non-formal, and descriptive. They can be obtained only from the intensive reading of the epics and the mythological literature in general. The human actor in authentic mode of intersubjective relations recognizes and allows for 'authentic act' of alter both 'in-order-to' and 'because' motivated behaviour. The Sanskrit words for the same are *Swa-Dharma* and *Para-dharma* approximated by self-righteousness and *other righteousness*.

In the similar manner the society progresses in fundamentally three distinct phases: the phase of intellectual creativity, the phase of goal directed meaningful action, and the phase of comforts and inactivity Nevertheless, in each phase of the social change there is scope for knowledge oriented, action oriented, and comforts and inactivity oriented personal behaviour. This is also maintained that the key to human happiness lies in the knowledge, performing the socially spontaneous act.[10] But in the stage of wisdom, the goal of transmigration, the act is existentially neutral for self, and consequential and active for others and social dynamics. Such a mental state can be construed from the symbolic acts of Arjuna; in *Geeta* and Janak in *Ramayana*, where the fight of Arjuna and life of Janak are meaningfully active for the world but phenomenologically neutral for self.

9 *Bhagavada Gita*, Chap,-14.
10 *Ibid*, Chap. 5.

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5. **Validity of Knowledge and its Means :** There are six means of valid knowledge. They are: perception, inference, comparison, ve bal testimony, presumption and non apprehension. Of these, the means known as perception refers to the instrument of valid perceptual knowledge, which in the terminology of Vedanta, is nothing but pure consciousness It is immediate and intuitive.[11] The consciousness is three fold — as associated with object, with the means of knowledge, and with the subject or knower. But this is said that as the water of a tank, issuing through a hole, enters in the form of a channel in a number of fields, and just like them assumes different geometrical shapes, so also the luminous mind, issuing through eye etc. goes to the space occupied by objects. Now as a sociologist I do not intend to elaborate on the nature of cognition in Vedanta, because such a philosophy struggles over the sociological surface and I am not equipped to do justice to that. The point is that the onus of action for modification in life world does not lie with the act but with the cognition of hypothetical actor. Further, the Vedanta says that all means of valid knowledge prove the unreality of entire universe i.e. cosmic illusion, that is other than Brahman. True, there are four Vedantic ends of life: righteousness, search for meaning, satisfaction of bio-social needs, and liberation (dharma, artha, kaam, and moksha), it is liberation that is the supreme human end and the liberation is through knowledge. This is not to reduce the importance of the other three, but the central thing is that the spontaneity of social participation that need not be modified, is of no consequence with regard to one's experiential self and the only matter of direct concern is the instrument of valid knowledge.

6. **Inevitability of Cosmic Processes :** According to this last tenet of Indian social philosophy there is a dialectical conception of bond between individual action and societal processes. As per the sociology of knowledge there is a spontaneity of human action and a positivistic — mechanistic-atomistic construction of social action. This self generated social action by individual actor interacts and in certain cases may modify the social scene. But there is also a high degree of independency of social-flux.[12] Dialectically though the array of individual actions make the world history there is denial of contingency of later on the choice of 'a hypothetical actor'. This leads, in a spiritual sense, to inevitability of cosmic processes and a subjective sense that in the life world 'forms interact with forms' and the actor is existentially 'outsider'. The only matter of his direct concern is his freedom, immediacy, happiness, and his pure consciousness.

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11 *Vedanta Paribhasha*, The Ramkrishna Mission, 1972, Chap. 1.
12 *Bhagavada Gita*, Chap. 11.

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In sum, the multidimensional conception of human action from my conservative Vedantic stand point entails a nominalistic conception. The hypothetical actor is both an outsider as well as an insider at the same time. He is an insider as far as the spontaneity of his social action is concerned. This action can, however, be modified, if the individual does consciously decide to change the balance of tendencies to know, to act, and to satisfy the bio-social needs and inactivity. He is outsider when his act is phenomenologically neutral to himself, caused by the valid perception which is the most valued end of a man. In the absence of valid perception he is a total insider in the cosmic illusion but still with voluntaristic nature.

What are the conclusions of such a conception of man in contemporary Indian society? In which phase of social change the present day Indian society be characterized? And why and what of social progress? Let me unhesitatingly say that these are the absurd questions. A man in India is born in a life world different from that of any other man. And depending on his biographical situation there is a spontaneous social act. What makes difference between man and man is the mental state. As far as the question of 'ought' is concerned, the man should realize the pure consciousness through valid knowledge of his true self and act in socially spontaneous manner. This is the path of happiness, knowledge and subjective—objectivity. But there will also be men in search of meaning, passionate and active purposefully, and also men of inactivity and who tend to emphasize bio-social comforts. A genuine, authentic man is neutral for himself and active for life world. There is no need to modify spontaneity of social act. A genuine communist, to finish in metaphorical epigram, can come only from revolutionary working class and is Vedantic proletariat. The middle class saviours are all hypocrite. I may be motivated either by tendency to find 'meaning' or by motives of satisfying some bio social need. The contemporary social forms are at guillotine as the previous were.

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VII

Religion in a Changing Culture : Contributions of the Chicago School

Creighton Peden

Religions are attempts by humans to better understand and cope with the complexities which confront them. Religious world views serve by providing a cohesive picture of the structure of reality which enables those in that culture to integrate the facets of their understanding about life into a larger whole. The world view also reinforces the rules for practical living which have proved successful in the particular culture. In this way religions provide a cultural support structure for assisting individuals and groups. This support structure functions adequately so long as the religious perspective is flexible enough to allow for the evolving of new understandings about life, including the emerging of new rules for practical living.

As the scientific method had come to dominate the developing views of reality in modern cultures, religions tied to a pre-scientific world view have found it increasingly difficult to perform their primary coping role. Because this problem of adjusting increasingly confronts all world religions, we can benefit from closely considering a group of religious thinkers in the United States of America who provided a most promising approach for altering the Judiac-Christian tradition so that it might serve our scientifically developing culture. This group of thinkers taught at The University of Chicago and are known in U.S. thought as the "Chicago School." All shared, to varying degrees, the philosophical orientation of pragmatism and each was actively involved in the movement attempting to apply the scientific method to the study of religion. These comments will focus on three key originating members of the Chicago school—Shailer Mathews, George Burman Foster, and Edward Scribner Ames.

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The Chicago School as a distinct influence has its foundation in the work of Shailer Mathews. He contended that modern persons live in the most extraordinary intellectual transition the world has ever known, due to "the scientific struggle for freedom in thought and belief."[1] What the modern person requires is a religion that is in "harmony with what have been shown to be the facts of the universe."[2] These "facts" now point to the concept of evolution as a necessary symbol for understanding religion and culture. A religion in harmony with the facts of the universe will be based on attitudes and convictions which enable the individual and the group to relate themselves to those activities which meet their needs. When religion is conceived as a way of meeting human needs, the crucial issue is not one of truth but one of pragmatic efficiency. As Mathews explains, "The efficiency of religion will be measured by the efficiency of its patterns to integrate human life with those elements of the known universe capable of satisfying personal needs."[3]

Mathews attempted to adjust Christianity so that it can serve as an efficient modern religion. Instead of viewing humans in a covenant or pilgrimage relationship with a supernatural father-king-God, a more adequate foundation for Christianity is "to hold that human life is conditioned by a relationship to an eternally creative environment in the midst of which are continuing forces that have produced personality."[4] The name of God is given to those elements of the environmental activity which demand and permit appropriation of the concept of personality and which can be seen in the intelligibility of all nature.

If God needs to be understood by modern persons as the personality-producing activities of the Cosmos, what is to be the role of Jesus? Mathews employed what he designates as a "pattern" theory in the study of religion. The pattern of a past group will not have the same authority for today, when this pattern is understood as an analogy. What is necessary is the development of a new and more relevant pattern for these basic attitudes which will serve not merely as an analogy but will represent the reality which the individual and group experience. An example of "pattern" is seen in Mathews' treatment of the death and resurrection of Jesus. He asserted that the basic attitudes and convictions involved can be explained today

1 Mathews, Shailer. *The Faith of Modernism*. New York: Macmillan, 1924, p. 23.
2 Mathews. Shailer. *Is God Emeritus?* New York: Macmillan, 1940. p 28
3 Mathews, Shailer. *The Growth of the Idea of God*. New York: Macmillan, 1931. p 215
4 Mathews, Shailer. *The Atonement of Social Process*. New York: Macmillan, 1930. pp. 186-87.

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in terms of the theory of evolution. In his life and death and resurrection, Jesus embodied the end of human evolution and revealed the meaning of that process from which humans have come, of which they are a part, and from which they suffer. Mathews' criterion for developing contemporary patterns was that they must be more than meaningful, for they must be in accordance with our understanding of what is actual.

To suggest that Mathews' method and general position are scientific is an over-statement. He was not trained technically and never became involved in a technical understanding of the patterns which he adopted from science. His theological approach was rather a mixture of evolutionary and social optimism, historical criticism, and some metaphysics of organism. The important contribution of Mathews' is his emphasis on evaluating religion, and in particular the Christian religion, in terms of how adequately it helps "meet social as well as individual needs."[5] His cosmic emphasis was never fully integrated with his stress upon the social adequacy of religion, but even side by side they indicate the direction which the Chicago School was to introduce to U. S. religious thought.

When George Burman Foster came to the University of Chicago in 1895, President W. R Harper praised this young man still in his thirties as "The greatest living thinker in his line."[6] Dean William Ferm of Harvard Divinity School agreed that no other theologian was "anywhere near his equal."[7] Even though held in such high regard, the tone of Foster's contribution is modest. He claimed only to be a student of the issues, engaged in investigation with no original contribution of his own. His general thesis rested on a rejection of both supernaturalism and naturalism. On the one hand he rejected the supernatural world view in which orthodox Christianity developed. On the other hand he rejected the naturalism of modern science which assumes that the categories of law and cause exhaust reality, negating the religious demands of mystery, dependence, and teleology. Foster explained that "it is for this reason, indeed, that we conceive it to be the modern thinker's foremost duty to disengage religion from supernaturalism and science from naturalism."[8]

Foster employed the religio-historical method used in the study of comparative religion and applied this method to the popular contention in his day, i.e., that while all other religions offered partial

5 Mathews, Shailer. *The Faith of Modernism.* p. 24.

6 Nash, J. V. "A Twentieth Century Emancipatior," *The Open Court*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 6, p. 330.

7 Hoover, Mrs. L. G. "A Timeless Life," *The West Virginia Review*, 1928, p. 149.

8 Foster, G. B. *The Finality of the Christian Religion.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1906, p. 207.

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and limited testimony to the God human relationship, the Christian religion offered the complete and final testimony. His finding, published in *The Finality of the Christian Religion*, resulted in "the final testimony position" being destroyed. A part of his study included the most exhaustive and frank discussion of miracles of any writer of his period. Like Hume, Foster declared that "no tradition for them can be believed when we consider that no observer in Biblical times possessed the knowledge and the scientific accuracy to pronounce upon such matters."[9] Although many theologians relinquish some Biblical miracles, Foster included in his rejection the Resurrection—based on the contention that no historical fact can be the true object of faith.

Considering his rejection of the final testimony position and miracles, how does Jesus fit into Foster's view? He stated that we must strip Jesus of the messianic adornment and the old world-view of his age and get to the eternal values exhibited in Jesus' life. The most interesting feature of Foster's Jesusology was his emphasis upon the human Jesus as the expression of the personal life of God. This emphasis Foster claimed fits the modern view of reality which focuses on divine immancency as an omnipresent principle of the order of nature. Previously God had been conceived of as a static cosmic power external to humans. Now God and humans are both seen as no longer fixed but in a process of becoming. Insights into the personality of Jesus provide perspective into the becoming personality of God. These insights afford humans the possibility of developing their own personalities in accord with the principles or will of the personality of God. Foster viewed Jesus as giving emphasis to the infinite worth of the human personality, calling humans to become persons who embodied the moral values and religious fulfillment which Jesus felt himself. As Foster explained :

> To know Jesus is not to know his words, but to know the unity of his moral thoughts which are the creation of a will that is one with the eternal will... The dignity and worth of his person as simple human moral personality, as embodiment of the eternally good, are incomparably greater than that ontological substance or entity in which his greatness consisted according to the trinitarian and christological dogmas of an unmoral ecclesiasticism. It is for this reason that serious minds are no longer practically concerned with the forms in which the church sought to exhibit the worth of his person..[10]

While rejecting supernaturalism in religion, Foster did contend that religion is important to culture in the development and support of the highest values and ideals. For modern persons God and

9 *Ibid*, p. 22.
10 *Ibid.*, p. 404.

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religion have not evolved as an original expression of their contemporary cultural needs but belong to the Church as an institution dedicated to retaining an outmoded historical tradition. What is needed is for modern humans to develop a religion which supports the highest values and ideals of contemporary culture, always keeping in mind that the values and ideals are forever in a process of becoming. It is questionable whether our culture has evolved to the point of supporting Foster's religion without supernaturalism. Nevertheless, Foster remains a key figure in the Chicago School for destroying the claim of Christianity as the final and complete revelation of God and for demonstrating the appropriateness to the study of Christian traditions of the religio historical method used in the study of Comparative Religion.

In considering key figures of the Chicago School, we have looked at a Professor of Comparative Theology in the Divinity School (Shailer Mathews) and a Professor of Philosophy of Religion in the University (G. B. Foster). We now focus on a most interesting person, Edward Scribner Ames, who served as Professor and Chairman (1931 35) of the Department of Philosophy. For Ames "religion is the consciousness of the highest social value:"[11] it is "the quest for the largest and the fullest satisfaction of felt needs "[12] He contended that striking differences between the old order and the contemporary age require a new religion for modern times. The old order presented a dualistic view of rality, dividing things into the supernatural and the natural. The new views reality monistically, so that whatever is religious or spiritual is seen as part of the natural process. The old dogma of the utter sinfulness and depravity of human nature is rejected and replaced by the conviction that it is possible to remake humankind by reconditioning and training inherent, natural impulses. There is no need for humans to rely on some supernatural force for salvation, for they can save themselves by creating a life committed to their highest values. As Ames explained, "The greatest difference between the old and new world lies in the fact that the old was the creation of the uncritical judgments of naive men, through immediate sense impression and unconsciously formed customs and fancies, while the new world has been examined, measured, and tested by more reflective thought."[13]

Ames wanted to adapt Christianity to the new epoch so that it can demonstrate various essential traits of a satisfactory higher

11 Ames, E. S. "Religious Values and the Practical Absolute," *International Journal of Ethics*, July, 1922, p. 350.

12 Ames, E. S. *Religion*. New York : Henry Holt, 1929, p. 9.

13 Ames, E. S. "Religious Values and Philosophical Criticism," *Essays In Honor of John Dewey*. New York : Henry Holt, 1929, p. 25.

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religion. The first trait will give emphasis to the social nature and importance of religion, with the understanding that religion should provide a structure in which relationships can develop, where one can participate in the shared life of other persons. Another trait of higher religion is that its values are inclusive and give unity to all experience. Ames was careful to indicate that an adapted Christianity will indicate that religious experiences are part of the natural process of every human and are not available only to those elected or blessed by some supernatural deity who allows them to break out of the natural order. It is because religious experiences are part of the simple and fundamental life processes that science can be of help to religion. What higher religion does is to provide a unity to experiences, a unity in the direction of the ideal and noble possibilities of life. Religion provides this unity by orienting humans with a "cosmic emotion." In this emotion the individual feels in the presence of an order and reality which includes him but which extends beyond him. The result of this cosmic perspective is an additional trait which is a confident attitude toward reality and experience and a disciplined optimism. This confidence supports the conviction that humans share in their deepest selves a sense of the right and the good. Even though life's experiences are often difficult a disciplined optimism enables us to understand that reality, when taken in all its variety, includes a moral order. The task facing Christianity or any higher religion, is to demonstrate how its good new relates to this confidence and disciplined optimism. When it is able to meet this task, Christianity will then serve as the high religion for the new epoch which can infuse the individual with, in Ames' words, "the deep and abiding conviction that the universe is friendly at least and that any appearances to the contrary are unreal and negligible."[14]

The higher religion Ames sought for Christianity was to be based on a view of God as finite and limited to being the ideal spirit seeking the realization of good in the experiences of the world. As humans reach the level of "cosmic emotion," they realize that reality demonstrates a basic order of intelligence. One way of describing this intelligence, according to Ames, in its highest manifestations was by the term "love." "God" is the conception humans project to symbolize the ideals, such as love, for which they strive. By limiting God to the idealized reality of personal and social experiences, Ames presented a functional conception of a deity. Since no one can empirically prove that there is an actual, objective reality corresponding to the subjective idea of God, Ames attempted to re direct consideration away from this impossible problem by contending that "The question, 'is the idea of God true?' means, 'Is the idea of God

14 Ames, E. S. *Religion.* p. 49.

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of value in actual experience'?"[15] What Christianity must do in order to be an adequate modern religion is demonstrate the functional value of God as the unification of humankinds highest ideals by concerning itself with the process of understanding God in light of the changing circumstances and experiences of the new epoch.

Just how does Jesus fit into Ames' functional view of God? Ames contended that one must apply the empirical method also in determining who Jesus was and what his contribution is. An application of this method will lead to a rejection of a literal interpretation of miracles, including the resurrection, as "striking evidence of how much of the primitive age of child wonder and savage credulity still survive in the world."[16] Instead of viewing Jesus from the Greek infested idea of Divinity, Jesus should be viewed as the spiritual son of God—God being the unification of the ideals of love and intelligence expressed in nature. Jesus, as a noble person, reveals these same ideals; therefore, modern Christianity will function most adequately if Jesus as the Christ is presented as an imitable type for persons in all ages, and especially in the new epoch where the old world-view is no longer valid. By presenting Jesus in this manner, Christianity will call people to a salvation which involves a commitment to restructuring the mores and traditions of society in order that a more adequate way of life can be implemented.

Scribner Ames's primary contribution was redirecting philosophical theology towards a discussion of values—values that are inclusive and give unity to all experience. By emphasizing an empirical test for religious ideas and values, he helped make Christian thought more intelligible in an increasingly scientific age. Ames was unique in the Chicago School in that he was able to perform this function not only as a philosopher, but also as a preacher whose church for forty years was considered "so liberal that many conservative people feel at home in it."[17]

Conclusion: In terms of philosophical theology, these three figures indicate that the Chicago School cut a new path for U. S. religious scholarship by rejecting supernaturalism as irrelevant and scientifically invalid. While a tempting to retain limited but valuable insights of orthodoxy, *the School* insisted upon correcting or rejecting inadequate theological doctrines that did not conform to the intellectual requirements of a new era. The "Truthfulness" of religion, especially of Christianity, is evaluated in terms of the

15 Ames, E. S. "Theology from the Standpoint of Functional Psychology." *American Journal of Theology*, Vol. X, p. 229.

16 Ames, E. S. *The Divinity of Christ*. Chicago: Bethany Press. 1911, p. 25.

17 Ames, E. S. "A Forty-Year Pastorate," *Christian Century*, October 2, 1940, p. 1199.

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success in providing satisfactory support for persons and cultures attempting to cultivate and nourish the better life. For Mathews religion will be more satisfactory if it directed persons to those personality-producing activities of the Cosmos. Foster, whose constructive theological efforts were more limited, indicated that a satisfactory religion will support the highest values and ideals of contemporary culture. Ames also called for a religion which will support the ideals of people in order to assist them in seeking the best in their society. These figures of the Chicago school viewed an intellectually satisfactory religion as one which conceives of nature as evolving and which assists humans in adjusting to this becoming process by enhancing the highest ideals and values emerging in culture. Their methodological approach for altering the Judaic-Christian tradition so that it might serve as an intellectually satisfactory religion in our scientifically developing culture continues to serve as a stimulating foundation for those philosophical theologians who seek to adapt religion to provide a better future for humanity.

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VIII

Gandhiji's Philosophy of God

Sibnath Sarma

Gandhiji is a unique personality in Indian history. It is difficult to characterise him as just a politician or a moralist or a social reformer or a religious man. Possibly he is all these rolled in one. It may not be very wrong to say that he is a moralist of rigorous self-discipline and a religious man to the point of God-intoxication.

Gandhiji believes in the essential unity of all religions. For him every religion teaches moral and non-violent life. In the true spirits of Hinduism, its catholicity and universality, Gandhiji believes in a religion not bound to narrow sects and creeds. He insists that nobody can live without religion. If religion is badly needed by some to live by, then others also must have been having it, albeit in a subtle and not too manifest manner. He puts it thus : "Whether by reason or by instinct; or by superstition, man acknowledges some sort of relationship with the divine..."[1] It can be added here that socialism, if pressed to explain for its insistence on fellow feeling, can satisfactorily do that if the essential oneness of mankind as the expression of the same Ultimate Reality is accepted. The strong sense of cohesion, the gregarious feeling, charity etc. are marks of there being a universal meeting point of all of us. "All life is one, all life coming from the same universal source, call it Allah, God or Parameshvara".[2] Religion is the adhesive. It is only its opposite that alienates.

For Gandhiji God is the first principle of the universe. God is that indefinable something which we all feel but which we do not

1 Bharatan Kumarappa, (Ed), *My Religion*, M. K. Gandhi, Navajivan Publishing House, 1955, p. 3.

2 *The Collected Works Of Mahatma Gandhi*, The Publications Division, (hereafter to be referred to as CWMG), vol.64, 1976, p 141

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know.[3] We do not know in the sense that we cannot exhaustively conceptualise it nor can we adequately describe it. But we describe it, nevertheless. God is so mysterious that contradictory statements which cannot be and are not true according to ordinary logic are true regarding Him and His nature. Gandhiji has said that all beings are in Him and yet are not in Him. He is in them and yet not in them. This is the description of God in the language of mortal man.[4] "He is a personal God to those who need his touch. He is the purest essence. He simply Is to those who have faith. He is long suffering. He is patient but He is also terrible. He is the greatest democrat the world knows. He is the great tyrant ever known. We are *not*, He alone *Is*"[5].

Gandhiji puts sober reason above authority and scriptures,[6] but he is vehemently against extolling reason beyond limits. He calls it hideous monster when it claims for itself omnipotence. Reason, within its limits is the greatest instrument at our disposal to know the Truth, but when it claims to comprehend the whole of Truth, it over-stretches itself. "Attribution of omnipotence to reason is as bad a piece of idolatry as is worship of stock and stone believing it to be God."[7] Thus truncating reason to its size, Gandhiji appeals, as many a prominent theologian does, to the immediate feeling of the supreme. The existence of God is like a geometrical axiom.[8] "God's existence cannot be, does not need to be, proved. He is. If He is not felt, so much the worse for us."[9] We can appreciate this point by borrowing a few words from Dr. Radhakrishnan : "To say that God exists means that spiritual experience is attainable. The possibility of the experience constitutes the most conclusive proof of the reality of God "[10]

Though Gandhiji's works are full of statements about the incapacity of reason to comprehend the supreme and the incapacity of language to describe feeling of the supreme, yet at times he argues the existence of God. Thus he says : "There is an indefinable mysterious power that pervades everything. I feel it, though I do not see it. It is this Power which makes Itself felt and yet defies all proof, because it is so unlike all that I perceive through my senses. It transcends the sense. But it is possible to reason out the existence

3 Bose. N. K., *Selections from Gandhi*, Navajivan, 1957. p 3.
4 CWMG, Vol-41, 1970. p. 123.
5 Bose, N. K., loc. cit.
6 Ibid., p. 260.
7 CWMG, Vol-31, 1969, pp. 496-7.
8 CWMG, vol-47, 1971. p. 399.
9 CWMG, vol-31, p. 440.
10 Radhakrishnan, S., Eastern Religions and Western Thought, Oxford University Press, 1940, p. 22.

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of God to a limited extent."[11] And Gandhiji proceeds to speak about villagers' knowing that someone rules the country even though they do not know him. Similar is the case with God who is the ruler of the universe.

Gandhiji appears to be subscribing to the view that mere change without something underlying the upholding it is not possible. He utilises this in the case of God. He says : "I do dimly perceive that whilst everything around me is ever changing, ever dying, there is underlying all these changes a living Power that is changeless, that holds all together, that creates, dissolves and recreates. That informing power or spirit is God."[12] Gandhiji is fond of what may be called the cosmological argument for the existence of God. Though it shares the same fate of being inconclusive with the other arguments, it is not entirely worthless anyway. Gandhiji argues : "Though I may not be able to reason out the existence of God, I must accept the experience of and the belief of mankind in the First Cause."[13] "If I exist, if our parents and their parents have existed, then it is proper to believe in the parent of the whole creation. If He is not we are nowhere."[14] Here we need not argue with him regarding the soundness of the argument, for he admits that he has no argument to convince anyone. Faith, for him, transcends reason.[15]

As to the nature and attributes of God Gandhiji has said a great deal. At times he has even made contrary statements also. This of course is not a real difficulty so far God is concerned—the God we speak of being more or less our own making. "Mortal man can only imagine the Ultimate, the Impersonal..... To worship a book, to go to a church, or to pray with one's face in a particular direction — all these are forms of worshipping the formless in image or idol."[16] The question why Gandhiji makes contradictory statements about God, in these circumstances, does not arise.

For Gandhiji God is the only Reality and all that exists.[17] He is the great intelligence, the living Truth that animates, illumines and sustains the universe.[18] He is the upholder of justice.[19]

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11 CWMG, vol-37, 1970, pp. 348-9.
12 Loc. cit.
13 CWMG. vol-36, 1970. p. 209.
14 Bharatan, op. cit., p. 33.
15 CWMG. vol-37, p, 350.
16 CWMG, vol-41, pp. 125 6.
17 CWMG, vol-40, 1970. p. 349.
18 CWMG, vol 56, 1973, p. 56.
19 CWMG, vol-70, 1977, p. 164.

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In the Ashrama Bhajanavalis Gandhiji appears to have been much influenced by the Upanisads. The way he interprets the Upanisadic sayings can put his name in the list of immortal saints of the Vedānta school.

God is the only Being which is felt in the heart, which is sat, chit and sukham—which is the state reached by perfect men and which is the super-state. I am the immaculate Brahman which ever notes the states of dream, wakefulness and deep sleep, not this body, the compound made of the elements—earth, water, space, light and air.[20] God is beyond the reach of thought and speech and yet by whose grace all speech is possible. God is described by the Vedas as neti neti. The saints call Him God of Gods — the unborn, the unfallen, the source of all.[21] These and such passages undoubtedly make Gandhiji an Advaitin. To this point we shall come as we proceed.

On the formlessness of God Gandhiji lays much stress. He says that he has always believed in a formless God [22] The idol-maker and the idol-breaker cannot lose sight of the fact that there is something which is beyond all form, unthinkable, impersonal, changeless.[23] Also, Gandhiji does not speak of any real attributes of God. God is beyond all qualifications. We should know Him as without form and quality and then "heap upon Him as many epithets as we choose, for that is the only language which He has given us."[24]

This is strict monism and reminds us of the controversial point in Spinoza that attributes are those that the understanding perceives of substance as constituting its essence. For Gandhiji also, it is we who heap on God the attributes. Either we must not speak of Him, or speak of Him with such qualities. To say neti neti is no description, it is equivalent to silence. So far so good, but there are passages galore where Gandhiji describes God with personality. Of course, he sometimes uses the saving proviso of 'as if,' for instance, when he says : "Though God is without form and impersonal He acts as though He had form and body."[25]

We have quoted Gandhiji earlier saying that God is and we are not. In an equally strong strain he deifies the universe : Every nook and cranny of the universe is filled with Brahman, that is the sole agent of all action. "...From the Imperishable unmanifest down to the perishable atoms everything in the universe is the supreme and

20 CWMG, vol-44, 1971, p. 386.
21 Ibid., p 387.
22 CWMG, vol 55. 1973. p. 255.
23 CWMG, vol. 41. pp. 125 6.
24 CWMG, vol-30, 1968 p. 3 8.
25 CWMG, vol-41 p 107.

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an expression of supreme."[26] Should we say tha it is the Vaishnava Gandhiji speaking here ? At the same time he is not ready to admit the ultimate separateness of devotees as some Vaishnavas would argue for. He is all for ultimate merger and oneness of the devotee and the deity.[27]

Of all of Gandhiji's thoughts, his complete identification of God and Truth is possib y philosophically the most significant. He avers that God is Truth and nothing but Truth.[28] Gandhiji narrates as to how this concept grew in him from phase to phase in course of fifty years. In the beginning he described God as Truth and sought Truth in love. But there being no one sense of love nor of ahimsa in any language — he found that the one and only thing very vigorously pursued and cherished by everyone in the universe, atheists not exempted, is Truth. Hence he identifies God with Truth and makes the terms convertible.[29] This appears to be a practical standpoint aimed mainly at silencing the atheists. But he has a philosophical point to make in this regard. For him the statement that Truth itself is God is a perfect statement so far as human speech can express anything perfectly. We come to the same conclusion if we consider the etymological meaning of the word "satya". It is derived from the root "sat" which means to exist eternally. That which exists eternally is satya. Truth it can be nothing else And this Truth he calls God.[30] If we were to add a few words to it we might say that the universe as such with its nature whatever — so far explored by men and many more of its unexplored aspects — makes the ultimate and unchanging Truth, the Reality of the universe. It cannot change, though the universe may change due to its own inherent nature. Whether God is there or not, self is there or not — all these queries cannot be satisfactorily answered. But God is there if God is there — such statement cannot be false. So the Reality of the universe, whatever we know of it and much more of it that is yet to be known and all that which we shall possibly never know makes the universe-in-itself. That is the Truth and Gandhiji calls it God.

But once it comes to describing Truth Gandhiji speaks of all sorts of things as he does in the case of God. Truth is incomprehensible. Even as absolute definition of God is impossible, so is that of Truth.[31] "If you would swim on the bosom of the ocean of Truth you must reduce yourself to a zero.[32] Truth, for him, is the voice of conscience.

26 Ibid., pp. 120 1.
27 Ibid., p. 126.
28 CWMG, vol 62, 1975, p 262.
29 CWMG, vol 48 1971, p. 404.
30 CWMG, vol 49, 1972, p 32/.
31 CWMG, vol 65, 1976, p. 398.
32 CWMG, vol 48, p. 405.

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Truth is not an abstract Reality of the universe, as it is for some philosophers. It is the living Truth that Gandhiji believes in.[33] God-realization is Truth realization and viceversa. He admits that there are many ways of reaching God.[34] At many places he lays stress separately on prayer, ahimsa, grace of God, service to mankind etc. for God-realization.

With these Gandhian ideas in mind we are tempted to make a kind of generalization and see if we can put him in some established school of philosophy.

Gandhiji is much influenced by the Gita and Gita teaching and he accepts to be advaitic.[35] As Gandhiji never accepts the ultimate distinction between God and man, he is decidedly not a dualist or a pluralist. He says : "I believe in the essential unity of man and for that matter of all that lives."[36]

His stress on a formless God, God without personality, ultimate identity of God and man, unqualified nature of God etc. surely make him an Advaitin of the type of Samkara. Even he admits the saving supra consciousness. His stress on non-rational aspect of religious consciousness and his view that the God we worship is a creation of our imagination makes him almost a thoroughgoing monist. I say 'almost' because there are points in him contrary to the Suddhadvaita standpoint. He speaks of the world being created by God—intead of its being a superimposition or vivarta. He speaks of God's grace, prayer etc. as fully capable of giving salvation which, according to Suddhadvaita, are only subsidiary to the saving awareness of the Absolute. God is a giver of salvation for Gandhiji—whereas in Suddhadvaita one has to toil and earn it. It is we who are in ignorance and it is we who are to cut it, no external agent is of any avail in the last analysis.

Thus it is evident that there is a confluence of Suddhadvaita and Visistadvaita in Gandhiji. Is there any justification for it? We can suggest one : Gandhiji always talks of intellect's incapacity to realise God. Hence his idea of God must have arisen from an immediate awareness of Him. But such God-awareness does not last for a long time. Occasionally he must have had such awareness. Afterwards, when he would talk from that standpoint, his God is a formless Absolute. But what about the world? We have its experience and it must be grounded in the Ultimate Reality. Can it be different from the Ultimate Reality in that sense? Thus he would shuttle between the two Upanisadic standpoints : 'sarvam khalvidam

33 CWMG, vol-50, 1972, p. 36.
34 CWMG, vol 61, 1975, p. 19.
35 CWMG, vol-41, p. 477.
36 Bose, N. K., op. cit., p. 25.

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brahma' and 'neti neti brahma'. The same formless absolute when conceived by our discursive intellect makes the personal God. Isvara is Brahman conceptualised; Brahman is Isvara beyond all determinations.

These days we live in a kind of spiritual vacuum. Man has conveniently managed to forget the source of his being. We have raised artificial barriers of race, religion, language, sex and all that. Mutal distrust has reached its nadir. Hatred in the name of religion is rampant. To live peacefully together we need a thorough restructuring of our society.

An attitude of tolerance towards other faiths is essential. We are all human beings, equally imperfect and limited, living in the same universe—such an attitude has become a must for us all.

Hence the message of Gandhiji has its relevance even today and will continue to have relevance as long as man does not love other men as brothers and as long as religion is practised in a narrow sectarian manner. Gandhiji's philosophy of God can form the basis of a global dialogue among various faiths that men live by.

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IX

Remotion And Incarnation

John King Farlow

"..... in so far as theology takes over and uses categories which form an integral part of our discourse about that which is spatiotemporally determined (the categories of our 'ordinary conceptual scheme' as Strawson puts it)—such as substance and its correlates—then thus far theology remains and must remain unintelligible." (Micheal Durrant, *Theology and Intelligibility*, p. 196).

"There is no more reason here to think that the claim 'Christ as God existed before the days of Herod, but as a man did not' involves a contradiction than there is to think this of the following claim about our cartoon figure : 'The figure as a rabbit existed before the tone sounded, but as a duck it did not'." (R. T. Herbert, *Paradox and Identity in Theology*, p. 98).

Durrant's despair and Herbert's desperate example typify the extreme difficulties which theists create for themselves by insisting that Space and Time are deformities to be kept away at all costs from the *perfect* Godhead, except in the enigmas allowing for the Incarnation. What I shall attempt in the two parts which follow is, *first*, to show that the Divine perfections and some centrally Biblical stories can be set forth (without loss of dignity) in spatiotemporal terms *Second*, I shall offer some acts of 'remotion'—(removal of some finite elements). Using such medieval tactics the traditional religious reader may begin removing some of the spatial features of the Gospels without too much of the old, (alleged) unintelligibility.

PART I: INCARNATION

For all time there have existed three intelligent, powerful and knowledgeable persons whose bodies consist of material particles of types $D_1 \ldots D_n$. These Divine — Persons have always been clearly aware of each other's existence, able to transmit instant messages to

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each other's existence, able to transmit instant messages to each other, loved and cared for each other, remained free from all jealousy, competition, hatred and deceitfulness towards each other. They are physically, psychologically and socially interdependent on one another and on nothing else.

Since time t_a the D-persons have acted on a joint decision to create and maintain in existence a large group of dependant persons whose bodies consist of particles of types $A_1 \ldots A_k$ D-persons can observe and affect the properties and relations of Angel-Persons at any time. A-persons can only learn about the existence of D persons or much affect some of D-persons' properties and relations if D-persons agree to allow this. A persons can only under-stand themselves and other A-persons and greatly affect some of the properties and relations of themselves and other A-persons, if D persons agree to allow this.

Since time t_m the D-persons have acted on a decision to create and maintain a much more fragile and dependent Material-World whose contents consists of bodies and waves of types $M_1 \ldots M_m$. Divine-Persons, insofar as they consist only of $D_1 .. D_n$ elements, can move about anywhere as they please without affecting the properties and relations of the $M_1 \ldots M_m$ world, except insofar as the three D-persons jointly elect to alter the qualities and relations of the M-world. D-persons may or may not choose to disclose themselves to A-persons or M persons.

Since time t_{m+1} the three D-persons created and maintained by joint decision a vast number of living, sentient organisms in the M-world. Many of these organisms are variously aware of themselves and of some of their fellows, and of some of the other constituents of the M-world. A-creatures have very great knowledge of what goes on in the M-world and great power to affect the M-world, subject to the permission of D persons. But A-persons are free to move about in the M world without disturbing its properties and relations : A-creatures may or may not chose to disclose themselves to M-organisms.

Since time t_{m+l+h} the three D persons created and maintained by joint decision a large number of human souled-organisms whose constituents are bodies of type M and associated ψ-entities of types $\psi_1 .. \psi_h$. (It may usually be said that only one ψ entity is normally confined to a body cluster of M_1—M_m entities. But for many purposes it seems psychologically useful to view ψ entities as clusters of ψ parts)

M+ψ-beings have considerable but limited knowledge of themselves and other M+ψ—beings and other M beings. These limitations are due to the wishes of D beings, A-beings and other M+ψ-

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beings—also to the relatively weak knowing equipment of M+ψ beings. They cannot directly and completely observe any D—, A— or ψ beings. They can only affect very seriously the properties and relations of A-beings with the special aid of D beings and/or A-beings.

From a limited M+ψ person's standpoint, it is usually best to look upon the Divine-persons as co-eternal, but standing in special orders of dependence. D-Son is the co-eternal product of D-Father's eternal Self Knowledge and D Holy Ghost is the Coeternal product of D-Father's and D-Son's eternal love for the perfections of each other.

An A being is never the single product of a special relation between a being composed of $A_1 \ldots A_k$ elements and a being taken from the $\psi_1 \ldots \psi_g$ cluster. Nor can a being be constituted from some member or members of the $A_1 \ldots A_k$ cluster and one or more of the $M_1 \ldots M_m$ elements. Nor can there exist a being composed of elements from all of the $A_1 \ldots A_k$, $M_1 \ldots M_m$ and $\psi_1 \ldots \psi_g$ clusters, but with no connection to a Divine-Being.

At time t_j the Divine-persons decided that the personal identity of the Divine-Son should henceforth be the product of a special (unique) set of relationships between (I) the original D-Son, (II) a cluster of M-particles and (III) *either* (PSI) a ψ-being or ψ-cluster *or* (DI-PSI) a particular closeness of (I) and (II) that would in many ways make it seem *as if* there were a ψ being involved.

Across the eternity of time it is to be expected that some M-particles will come into being for a finite time from t_i and pass away forever; that many M particles will come into being for an infinite time from t_m onwards in association with a ψ being or a ψ-cluster; that some M particles will come into being at time t_j, and exist forever in certain forms of association with the Divine Son, although some M particles will be temporarily separated in some ways from the Divine Son after His Death on the Cross; that other M-particles will be temporarily separated from ψ-beings at their physical deaths but restored for Judgement and Eternity.

So far, so good? We have a generous amount of difficult Christian theology translated into the Space-Time language of a fairly comprehensive Materialism. Instead of different kinds of spirit and matter, we have different kinds of matter. A Jesus who has exemplified the highest kinds of love and excellence as a Divine +Material being associates himself with human M-particles (and possibly a human ψ being) and lays down his M-life to redeem the group of M+ψ beings. An extraordinarily more nobel type of material being takes on human material form as a way of becoming God Man and paying by death the price of mankind's moral redemption. Some may refuse to believe that any person's self-sacrifice

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can redeem the misdeeds of others. Some may believe that only a perfect being's generosity could remove or help to remove the guilt of others. *But*—and here are the crucial questions—why should it matter whether Jesus was in whole or part a totally non material, non-spatial being of any kind? Why should He only be able to redeem us if He was a pure and single spirit from all eternity, and not a Being whose personal identity involves special associations between a composite Divine Being and some incredibly awesome material particles from time ever onwards?

Some would say that it is not *Divine parts and spatial components* which would prevent such a Jesus from being perfect enough to redeem us : it would be His *temporal* features in our Science Fiction story. "A *Perfect* Being must be utterly unchanging and immutable and stable and secure—He must be outside Time!" In the context of this essay with its central concern for *space* and intelligibility. I must content myself with replying that to be a perfect being it must be utterly unchanging in certain *forms*, immutable in *respect* of certain virtues and values, stable and secure in *ways* that oppose rather than aid evil. (That is how we usually evoluate the perfection of *persons*. See John King Farlow and William N. Christensen, *Faith and the Life of Reason*, pp. 112-119).

Others have argued matters the other way around. Talk about God and spirits is unintelligible because all spatial criteria of personal and objectual identity have been removed I do not think that this correct, but if spatiality is the needed speciality, I have arranged the Science Fiction story so that spatially existing individuals are left in sole possession of the cosmic field for purposes of moral agency.

As physics becomes no less strange than metaphysics to the average intelligent person, we seem to reach the following principle : an individual's existence is sometimes to be granted simply because it will play a systematically gratifying role in a chain of causes and effects. Why must measureable *spatial* location always be needed for system or gratification? What if we were raised (successfully) to believe in the materialist version of Christianity which my Science Fiction story proposes? What if our materio clergymen were much more successful at providing popular predictions about weather, stock markets, marriages, ways to end wars and famine, etc.. than they would even dream of trying always to be right now? And what if big leaflets mysteriously rained from the skies today explaining that the Father's and the Holy Ghost's existence was far more causally efficacious to reward honest prayer than we realized, *but* that their existence was totally non material and non-spatial? Evidence would be offered: for three days Mother Theresa and the Archbishop of Canterbury might pose questions publicly from Jerusalem and

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public answers would be returned from the sky. How many would insist that the excellent answers must be the work of a sulphuric Devil or of U. F. O.'s on the grounds that no person, not even a Divine Person, would not have to be spatial to be real ?

Or again, let us say that a human being is granted a long conversation with what seems to be God. The man sees nothing, but hears voices in return to his own remarks. At first he appears to be talking to three separate D-persons, each in complete agreement with the other two. But as the conversation continues, he comes more and more to feel that he is conversing with one person with three distinct, though each perfectly admirable-personalities. (Compare Bernean psychiatrists who view patients as Adult-Parent Child) Finally he is struck by the appearance of a figure of M-particles whenever he hears the second D person speak. The complete personhood of the 2nd D-person seems to consist of an association between the disclosed M-body *and* the undisclosed 2nd D-elements, *and* (possibly) a ψ-being which seems like a bridge between them. As the conversation continues, it seems less and less likely that two of the D-persons (Father and Holy Ghost) occupy and positions in space, although they can make their interest felt by patterns of affecting M-things in space which stimulate a ψ-person. The 2nd D person, it appears, can disclose his presence as a partly M-being by disclosing his M-body or simply by acting upon the human conversationalist's M-body and his ψ component.

PART TWO : REMOTIONS

So far, then, we have taken some major steps on the path of remotion — of removing some of the originally spatial blemishes. We have considered the possibility of experiences which would make us speak of (1) God's self disclosure not as three collections of D-particles, but simply as three closely related, intelligent causes of events in M space (one figure); (2) God's self disclosure not as revealing a three distinct non-spatial agents, but one personal being with three closely related, but also three easily distinguishable personalities, having supreme powers and perfections. (3) We can think of the angel's self disclosure to men not as showing collections of A-particles, but simply as distinct, intelligent causes of M-events and/or ψ events which a man can perceive. (Some people might not be able to be sure whether the same angel is responsible for a whole pattern of effects, and yet have very good reasons for believing or doubting that this is the case) (4) We can think of recently dead M-persons' ψ beings encountering each other with special new means of perceiving and discriminating each other as ψ beings *or* with capacities to identify one another be effects. (5) We can think of M+ψ persons' experiencing death, loss of all features except ψ features, then being brought into association with still more beautifully patterened and more strikingly-powered clusters of M particles.

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(6) We can think of Angels' being judged as their present clusters of A-particles, then rewarded with more rarified and beautiful clusters and particles or punished with weaker and uglier A-components. Or we can think of them as non-material beings all along whose powers and happiness are profoundly affected by Judgment. (For M+ψ persons A-beings are epistemically individuated by their effects.)

(7) We can think of Heaven, Hell or Purgatory as places where ψ persons dwell for a while or forever in association with something very like their old M-clusters (bodies), or considerably altered M-clusters or no M-clusters at all.

(8) We can think of the Water and Wine of the Communion Service as being sometimes canonically altered by the addition of M-particles from the Blood and Body of Christ OR of M-particles (and /or ψ-beings) which are brought into something like the some special association with the spirit and body of Christ as Christ's body has been brought into with His spirit.

(9) We can conceive of other Sacraments as rather similarly altering the relations between the spirit and body of Christ and the spirits and bodies of human beings.

Some of these nine plodding steps of remotion may allow one to remove Christian doctrines further away from the purely Materialist sort of Science Fiction Creed found in Part I of this little essay. Both the Materialist Creed and the nine steps of remotion are set before the reader not as final solutions, but as initial or intermediate challenges. Let the reader come up with his own materialist version of theology which meets the spatial-identity critic's complaints head-on. Then let the reader begin to show how gradual and (one hopes) intelligible steps of remotion can begin to reintroduce a little more 'philosophically respectable' version of the Old Time Religion.

Perhaps it will be an Old Time Religion really closer to early, concrete, Hebrew theology and less close to the higher obstructions of much later Greek metaphysics.

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X

The UNESCO Approach to Interrelations of Cultures : Principles and Practices

John Somerville

My first experience in the systematic practice of cultural interrelations began in 1935 and extended to 1937 as a project of post-doctoral research sponsored and funded by Columbia University. I had learned the Russian language, and the project was to examine Soviet philosophy from within the Soviet Union, as that philosophy was actually developing, in terms of theory and practice. My report was the book, *Soviet Philosophy : A Study of Theory and Practice.*[1] After World War II and the establishment of UNESCO I took part, as author, in three of its intercultural projects: Philosophic Foundations of Human Rights,[2] Interrelations of Cultures,[3] and Inquiry into Freedom.[4]

This paper will examine the UNESCO approach to intercultural relations in terms of its stated principles, and, by way of contrast, some of the most important facts of contemporary intercultural relations which are unfortunately contradictory to the UNESCO principles. The functional meaning of the UNESCO approach was well expressed in its inquiry into "tensions affecting international understanding." One of the Basic Documents guiding participants in this project states that the obligation it recognizes is to study "the distinctive character of the various national cultures, ideals and

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1 New York, Philosophical Library, 1946; reprinted, Greenwood Press, West-port, Connecticut.

2 London, Wingate, 1949.

3 Paris, UNESCO, 1953.

4 *Enquete sur la liberte*, Paris, Hermann, 1953.

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legal systems, with the aim of stimulating in every country the sympathy and respect of nations for each other's ideals and aspirations, and the appreciation of national problems." This approach, it adds, "implies, moreover, looking upon each culture as a component part of world civilization."[5]

Again, in the UNESCO project called Philosophical Analysis of Current Ideological Conflicts there is set down as part of its "central aim" to clarify, in relation to such conflicts, "the divergencies of usage and interpretation; to analyze the normative foundations of these divergencies; and to search for potential sources of reconciliation." In this connection it is emphasized "that all possibilities of reconciliation should be discussed in an unbiased manner before a particular disagreement is judged basic and irreducible."[6]

In other words, the UNESCO approach is a positive rather than a negative one. It stresses actual and potential agreements rather than differences, and commendation of respective achievements rather than condemnation of respective shortcomings. It does not fail to recognize shortcomings, but it also recognizes that a constant dwelling upon the sins of our neighbors is neither conducive to peaceful relations with them nor to wholesome morality in ourselves.

In approaching our problems in these terms we will readily recognize certain large facts. No culture, nation or regime is without mistakes, sins, shortcomings, imperfections, absurdities and inconsistencies. We cannot place the major emphasis upon such things and at the same time claim that we are devoted to the strengthening of peace in accordance with our obligations as members of the United Nations and UNESCO. The chances for world peace and human survival—none too strong at best—do not depend, for example, on proving that one of the two nuclear super-powers is a sinner in politics or in culture. We are all sinners by historical definition. To speak with entire precision, the chances for human survival depend primarily on whether the sinners who happen to be nuclear superpowers can marshal enough intelligence, forbearance and common sense to refrain from destroying one another and the rest of the world as well. That is also a way of stating the meaning and purpose of the United Nations; it is the irreducible minimum of what they are united for.

At the same time we recognize that the United Nations, at the very founding of the organization, was forced to draw a certain line. Nazism and Fascism were the only ideologies explicitly excluded from the area of mutual acceptability among the member states,

5 John Somerville, *The Philosophy of Peace*, revised edition, pp. 311 12. New York, Liberty Press, 1954.

6 Ibid., p. 32.

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which otherwise represented the greatest possible diversity. These were excluded not because it was presumed that the others were without sin, but because there is one sin which will not allow for the possibility of wor'd peace : the deliberate value preference of war over peace. the teaching of the principle that war alone brings out the worth and dignity of a people or an individual. When Hitler wrote in *Mein Kampf*,' Mankind has grown strong in eternal struggles, and it will only perish through eternal peace,"[7] and adds, "... might alone makes right,"[8] he was not only laying the groundwork for World War II; he was excluding the ideology of Nazism from any possibility of entrance into a United Nations dedicated to peace. Mussolini did the very same thing when he wrote in his *Doctrine of Fascism*, a work as basic to his ideology as *Mein Kampf* was to Hitler's : "Above all, Fascism, the more it considers the future and the development of humanity, quite apart from political considerations of the moment, believes neither in the possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace. War alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy, and puts the stamp of nobility upon... peoples."[9]

Thus it was precisely in regard to the evaluation of war itself, military war, as something morally superior to peace, as something which *alone* gives true nobility to life, and which *alone* creates what is called right, that Nazism and Fascism set themselves apart from all the other ideologies that played significant roles in the drama of modern history. It was no accident that in World War II and the founding of the United Nations there was an alliance of liberal democracy and Marxist communism against Nazism and Fascism. In terms of the war problem it was an alliance of those who believed that war was sometimes a necessary evil against those who believed that war was always a supreme good. That common bond, the value preference of peace above war, was and is, in theory and practice, far more important than any of the differences that then divided or now divide liberal democracy from Marxist communism. When wars can be fought with weapons capable of putting an end to humankind as a whole, and thereby to all cultures and all ideologies, it is self-evident that military conflict fought out with such weapons has become the common enemy of all of us, the most dangerous enemy that any of us could possibly have.

One reason this fact has not yet played its proper role in the decision-making processes of so many contemporary political leaders

7 New York, Reynal & Hitchcock, p 175, 1941.
8 Ibid., p. 949.
9 In Somerville and Santoni, eds., *Social and Political Philosophy : Readings*, p. 431. Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1963.
10 See John Somerville, ed., *Soviet Marxism and Nuclear War*, p. 151. Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1981.

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can be seen in the language they habitually use. That is, when nuclear combat is called war, it does not seem possible that it could end the human world, because war has pervaded all human history, has always been a part of human culture, and the world has never been destroyed. Psychologically, it is much easier for people to think in that manner than it is for them to reason that, since we now have weapons which can in fact end the human world, a conflict fought out with such weapons should not be called war, nor thought of as war, but should be given a new name that would more accurately express its new character. I have suggested omnicide, as the logical (and terminal) extension of the series of such nouns as suicide, infanticide, homicide, genocide.

The overall subject of our section is Dialogue and Conflict of Cultures. What we have been saying is that a realistic approach to this subject today will recognize that the most urgent objective must be not the prevention of war in general but the prevention of nuclear omnicide in particular. We might survive war, but we cannot survive omnicide. Someone could win a war, but no one could win omnicide. There is such a thing as a just war, but there is no such thing as a just omnicide. There can be a war of liberation, but there cannot be an omnicide of liberation. A human being could argue that there is, on occasion, a right or even a duty to wage war, and still be considered a sane human being, but if a human being argues that there is a right or a duty to wage omnicide, he will have to be considered insane by any human definition. We human beings, for the first time in history, have created the practical possibility of omnicide, and now we must make ourselves face the reality of that possibility in order to prevent ourselves from implementing it in practice. The extreme urgency of this problem can be felt in the single fact that at the 1982 United Nations Special Session on Disarmament it was impossible to obtain agreement to a resolution proposed by the USSR condemning nuclear war as a crime against humanity.

These facts define the objective context, the historically given conditions of the kind of dialogue that must now take place between contemporary cultures in order for human history to continue. The most difficult aspect of our problem is that contemporary cultures are in very sharp competition with one another, a competition that has not only an ideological dimension but a military dimension, which today means a nuclear-weapons dimension. The most portentous dialogue that has actually taken place between cultures since the end of World War II, the dialogue on which more depends than was the case with any preceding dialogue in history, began as anti-communist "cold war," became, for a short time, "detente," and now has returned to anti-communist "cold war". This dialogue has

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been carried on not only in popular media like the press, radio and television, but in the most dignified scholarly, ecclesiatical, governmental and diplomatic surroundings, by personages of the highest rank and authority, all of whom have to pretend that they are not only sane, but wise, prudent and virtuous. All this has given rise, in certain psychological circles, to a discussion of the need for a new concept, a concept of "normal madness," a concept which expresses the fact that being out of touch with reality where it concerns the ending of the human world has become normal, habitual and official.

Scientifically or rationally speaking, this reaction of psychologists is in no way strange. For the objective reality is that we all know perfectly well that the two nuclear super powers which are necessarily engaged in cultural-political dialogue possess arsenals of omnicidal weaponry capable of annihilating all humankind. In these uniquely fateful circumstances it is not only the UNESCO approach but the most elementary demand of sanity that the dialogue between the two nuclear superpowers should, in tone and substance, be the very opposite of quarrelsome, provocative, resentful or insulting. These negative qualities, which define the "cold war," are of course precisely those which most easily lead to physical conflict.

Has any positive step been proposed at any authoritative, decision making level that would ameliorate this enormously frightening situation, and lay a basis on which we could build further? Such a step was indeed proposed at the U. N. Special Session on Disarmament in 1-82. I wish I could say it was proposed by the government of my own country, but the fact is that it was rejected by my government, entirely in the spirit of the cold war. At that U. N. Special Session the government of the USSR pledged itself not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and proposed that other governments follow its example, pointing out with incontestable logic that if there is no first use of the omnicidal weapons there will be no use of them at all. It also pointed out that, while its own pledge of no first use was being made unilaterally, it was a pledge only of no *first* use.

I feel that every government in the world, beginning with my own, ought to make that same pledge, as the necessary accompaniment of negotiations for the reduction and eventual abolition of nuclear weapons, an accompaniment without which such negotiations might at any instant be rendered meaningless. Any government which today clings to the policy of first use of the weapons capable of ending the human world, ending all nations, ending all cultures, must be considered a government that has no right to membership in the United Nations or UNESCO. Sane people have the clear duty to remove such a government in accordance with the reasoning of the

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American Declaration of Independence in 1776, and, as we today must add, in order that human culture and human history may continue, and that the possibility of human progress may be preserved. I think this World Congress of Philosophy whose overall theme is Philosophy and Culture, could at this moment make no better or more necessary contribution to world culture. in the spirit of UNESCO, than to emphasize and re-emphasize that our supreme need today, which must have priority over all other needs, is to prevent omnicide.

This most urgent planetary need has two functional aspects: (1) the need to prevent a first use of nuclear weapons, and (2) what could become equally important, the need to prevent a second use in the form of retaliation against the first user. For the human world could not be ended by one nuclear strike; it could be ended only by a series of nuclear exchanges. This means that two infinitely fateful moral facts have now emerged on the stage of human history: (1) The government that now makes first use of nuclear weapons will be guilty of the most enormous crime that could be committed against humanity—a crime so unspeakable it never even had a name. (2) The government of the nuclear power against which the nuclear attack was made will then be forced to decide whether the human world shall be ended or shall continue. No government could ever face, or ever has faced a moral dilemma of such agonizing depth and scale.

If the victim of the nuclear attack decides to fight back with conventional weapons, with strategies and tactics that do not end the human world, it will have to suffer initial defeat, and risk foreign domination and occupation for an unpredictable period. But its national life would continue, and it would have a chance to regain its sovereignty. History shows many examples of temporarily conquered, occupied or dispersed nations which won back their freedom and independence, however hard or long was the struggle. On the other hand, if the victim of a nuclear attack retaliates with nuclear weapons, and all-out nuclear combat takes place, it must expect the result to be omnicide—the annihilation not only of the belligerents and their allies, but of all humankind. The inevitable question poses itself: In both logical and ethical terms, can self defense include the use of weapons that utterly destroy the defenders themselves and the entire human family? Obviously not, and it is equally obvious that no wrong done to any part of humankind could justify a retaliation which annihilates everything human. I believe that Marx, Engels and Lenin, as well as Jefferson, Franklin and Washington, were they alive today, would agree with this answer, not because they were all revolutionaries, but because they were all sane.

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Book-Reviews :

James D. Redington, S. J. : *Vallabhacharya on the Love Games of Krishna*, pp. 492. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, Varanasi, Patna, Price Rs. 140/— 1983.

Dr. James D Redington S.J. is Assistant Professor of Theology at the Georgetown University. Washington. D. C. He studied for two years in the Sanskrit Department of the Bombay University. He obtained M.A., and Ph.D. degrees in Sanskrit language and Hindu Philosophical religious literature from the University of Wisconsin. Dr Redington is a Roman Catholic priest of the Society of Jesus, is personally and professionally interested in the Hindu-Christian dialogue and has specialised in Hindu Bhakti.

Dr. Redington's present work is a full translation from the Sanskrit of an important traditional commentary on the six of the Bhagawat Purana (Chapters 29-33 and 35) which narrate Krishna's Love games with the Gopis. The Commentary is the Subodhini of the Founder Sri Vallabhacharya. The translation is preceded by an introduction which explains Vallabhacharya's fundamental viewpoint on the love games, and several doctrines which became central to his system. All Krishna's games in the Bhagavata, including the love games, are meant to be perfect expressions and fulfilments of the moods and sentiments. Sarvatmabhava (Total love) and Constraint (Nirodha) are the two most important doctrines that find expression in the love games.

The whole book is divided into: Preface, Introduction Part I Fundamental Themes of Krishna's Love Games, subdivided into A. Life of Krishna as Fulfilment of Sanskrit Aesthetic Theory, B. "Eligibility" for the Mood of Love, and Experiencing Krishna in terms of any Mood. C. The Meaning and Importance of the Tamasphalaprkarana. D. Total Love (Sarvatmabhava) : The Prerequisite for the Love Games, E Constraint (Nirodha) : Krsna's Salvific intent. Part II : Notes on the Translation : A. The Structure and Style of Vallabha's Commentary, Special Note : Vitthal's Interpolations; B. The Three Constituents of Existence : Satva, Rajas and Tamas, and Their Derivative Attitudes, C. Text Critical Note. Then appears translations of six chapters. In the end Appendix, Bibliography and Index.

This is a very good work and translation of six chapters of Bhagavata Purana. With every stanza we have introduction in the beginning, then the translation of each stanza and just after translation commentary has been provided which has made the book a valuable contribution to Vallabh's Commentary in English. The book will find a large number of readers in India as well as abroad. James D. Redington has done a great service to help the promotion of Vallabh's literature and Commentary.

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Winthrop Sargeant (Translator): *The Bhagvadgita*, Edited by Christopher Chapple, pp. 738, Published by State University of New York Press, State University Plaza, Albany, New York 12246 (U.S.A.) Price Paper $ 10 95 Cloth $ 39.50 (1984).

We have before us a new translation of the Bhagavadgita by a Westerner Dr. Winthrop Sargeant. In the first 38 pages the editor has divided the whole contents as follows: Foreword by Swami Samtananda Ji has been provided, Translators's Preface, The Language of the Bhagavad Gita, The Setting of the Bhagavad Gita List of Abbreviations Used in the Vocabularies, Epithets Used in the Bhagavad Gita. Then starts Translation of each shloka which has been very ably translated. The style is very simple and covers several aspects: The whole shloka is analysed and divided into 4 different parts. The first line is the original Sanskrit line, then just below Roman versions has been provided and in the third line the English translation of each part has been provided. All the Sanskrit words which have appeared in the shlokas have been nicely explained in English making the meaning of all the used Sanskrit words very clear to the readers. And in the end English poetic translation of each stanza has been provided. In this way all the shlokas of the Bhagavad Gita have been thoroughly explained and this great book has been thoroughly produced.

This is a rare book in English language which has been translated stanza wise by great Western scholar. Even those who are fully ignorant of Sanskrit, the original language of the Bhagavad Gita can with the help of this book understand this great work. Every Sanskrit word have been very well explained and the whole idea is made clear. Each and every Sanskrit word has been thoroughly explained and meanings given. The translation of each stanza is unique and full of scholarly tinch and can very easily be grasped by non-Sanskrit knowing students of the Bhagavad Gita. It is a very good attempt to translate Bhagavad Gita in such a way that without knowing Sanskrit one can understand fully well the whole contents of the Bhagavad Gita. Though this great work has been translated in almost all the world languages and several translations have appeared. We can say without any hestitation that this is one of the best translations which we have come across.

We admire the efforts of great scholars who have made this ancient work very attractive, simple and congratulate them on their marvellous production.

This translation is an ideal translation in all respects. Parallel English stanzas for each shloka have been provided. Word meanings of each and every Sanskrit word has been provided. Every Shoika has been divided into four parts and each part has been thoroughly explained and all the Sanskrit words have been clearly explained, making everything as clear as it can be. All English knowing people who have no background of Sanskrit can pick up fully well this great work, i.e. the Bhagavad Gita. Swami Samatananda Ji has written a Foreword to this work which gives an insight into this great work The Editor of this book also deserves congratulations for bringing out such a nice work on the Bhagavad Gita. The whole work deserves our great admiration. The publishers also deserve our thanks for bringing before English Readers such a nice translation of the great Hindu Traditional work. We are quite confident English knowing readers will be attracted to this work.

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I

The Action of Non-attachment

David Appelbaum

The most important philosophical problem raised by the *Bhagavad Gita* is that of non-attached action.[1] Acting with attachment means relating to the action so that it *belongs* to me, or that it is *mine*. Although the *Gita* recites the adverse consequences arising from attached action, it never furnishes a coherent analysis. It is essential to be explicit at the beginning. An action is mine, or belongs to me, initially in the same way a thing can be said to be mine. What does it mean to say, for instance, that I *have* a horse? *Having* in this case, involves the entitlements of owning a piece of real property, the control over what the horse does, and the responsibility to administer to its well being. But, *having* an external possession does not yet show the inner dynamics of having things like inclinations, capabilities, feelings, wants, ideas, memories, motives, ends, or actions, If we turn to the lucid work of Marcel on the phenomenology of *having*, three relevant aspects of having deeds that are mine emerge.[2]

1 Minor notes this fact: 'The key to right action, however, as has been noted again and again is that the actions are performed must be performed without concern for the results.' ('The *Gita's* way as the only way,' *Philosophy East & West*, 30, no. 3 (July 1980: 339-354)). Compare: R. K. Garg., 'The Gita Principle of Detached Activism', *Prabuddha Bharata* 74 (July 1969): 310-314; J. T. F. Jordens, 'Bhagavadgita: Karma Exercised', *Millawa-Milla*, the Australian Bulletin of Comparative Religion" (1964): 22-30; B. Kuppuswamy, 'The Concept of Work According to Gita', *Prabuddha Bharata* 69 (November 1964): 465-469.

2 See especially, 'Outlines of a Phenomenology of Having,' in *Being and Having*, tr. K. Farrer, (New York, Harper & Row, 1965); and *Metaphysical Journal*, tr. B. Wall. (Chicago, Henry Rangery, 1952) Richard Zaner provides a perspicious summary of Marcel's ideas on having, in *The Problem of Embodiment* (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1971) pp. 21-35.

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(1) My action is *at the disposal of me*, in the way that I have the po to do with what I will over the things over which I have authority. Having acted implies having been able to act, having the power or force to undertake to act. This empowerment lies at the nexus of my claims to the disposability of whatever I do :

(2) My action is something I have essentially *to myself*; it is no one else's. Keeping the act to myself is connected to my authorship of the deed, and an aspect I need to guard by concealment. By concealment, I keep *myself*, the haver, apart from *it*, the act; I stay hidden inside while the action remains outside. This tension of rer aining hidden constitutes another part of my having my deeds; and

(3) I need to be acknowledged as the haver of my action. Because I keep what I do in concealment, I live in need to disclose myself to the other person as the one who has something. But in the realm of acknowledgement lies the threat of loss; my action can be stolen, misattributed, reversed. So my *needful acknowledgement* imperils my continuing to have as my own that which I have undertaken.

This is a short analysis, but let *disposability*, *concealment*, and *needful acknowledgement* be the important attributes which make an action belong to me. It is clear that the *Gita* furnishes a point of view for acting without the actions belonging to me, but *acting* nonetheless.[3] It is important to put aside temptations to read a quietism into non-attached action. How then are we to approach the *Gita's* understanding ? I plan to use sequentially five clues which the text offers. Building on the analyses contained in these passages, I want to suggest a way of coming to action without yet appropriating it as my own. A main support I rely on, parenthetically, is Husserl's study of kinaesthesis.

> *Clue 1.* '*Sense-control*'. He who draws away the senses from the objects of sense on every side as a tortoise draws in his limbs into the shell—his intelligence is firmly set. (2:58)[3A]

Interpreters of the *Gita* generally agree that an ontological dualism takes precedent, wherein each and every phenomenon is the manifesting conjunction of the two real constituents of the world, *purusa* and *prakrti*. *Purusa* can be understood as the activity which confers recognition while *prakrti* is the set of conditions governing recogni

3 It is important to emphasize that the way to non-attachment through *inaction* is blocked. Cf.

> But do not let yourself be attached to inaction either (2:47), and
>
> For no one can remain absolutely inactive even for a moment. Everyone is made to engage in action, however unwillingly, By way of the *gunas* born of *prakrti*. (3:5)

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tion, or, as de Nicholas suggests, the 'field of knowledge.'[4] The governing conditions, further, should be thought of as internal to the activity of recognition, and not simply as material conditions. This is made clear at 13:5 6 :

> ...the (five) gross elements, the sense of I (*ahamkara*), understanding (buddhi), the unmanifested (*avaykata*), the ten senses and the one (*manas*) and the five sensory realism; desire, aversion, pleasure, pain; the bodily aggregates (*samghata*), knowledge (*ceta*), will (*dhrti*) : this, in brief, is the field with its modifications.

Purusa and *prakrti*, moreover, are not related as mover to moved. In fact, *prakrti* is ceaselessly active already, set in continuous motion by the *gunas*. In it is contained the realm of cause and eff ct; it is the cause of effects and the effect of causes. By contrast, *purusa* enters in a moment of ontological simultaneity as an element irreducible to any governing condition.

> The supreme spirit in this body is also called :
> Witness and Consenter, Sustainer,
> Enjoyer, Great Lord, Supreme Self. (13:22)

The activity of *purusa*, on the other hand, is, through recognition, to make concrete the constellation of elements which has the possibility of becoming a situation. Those elements could, in some sense, enter into a range of other possible situations. By making tangible just these elements in this arrangement, *purusa* confers real recognitional contact with what is given. *Purusa* is the touch of that which brings tangibility to a presented manifold, and conveys it into its actual presence.[4A]

The simultaneous play of *purusa* and *prakrti*. in giving rise to all phenomena, devolves in stages through our human reality. Ending with a state of low ontological value, these then ascend through increasing weight and contact to knowledge and liberation (*moksa*) The *Katha Upanisad* outlines the scale of being :

> Higher than the senses are the objects of sense. Higher than the objects of sense is the mind (manas); And higher than the mind is the intellect (*buddhi*). Higher than the intellect is the Atman [5]

That which confers ontological weight, concreteness, is the tangible contact with which a given faculty (e.g., *manas*) meets the potentiable situation. Conversely, what contravenes against this activity of making real an assemblage of elements is the abstractness with which it is met. Abstractness is abstractedness, the gravitation of a faculty toward interpretative habits governing its use. The stronger the attraction of a representational reference, a symbolic 'counterpart' of

4 I have taken translations from de Nicolas, *Avatara* (New York, Nicolas Hays, Ltd., 1976), pp. 79 163.

5 *op. cit.*, Chapter 5, pp. 189-233.

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the potentiable situation, the less ontological force there is to meet that situation for what it is, and render it concrete. The situation thence remains possible, but not tangible. It has no life. Thus, the degree to which *purusa*, through the intermediate faculty, relies on interpretative and representational custom, to that extent is it lost to its role with respect to being, i.e., to remain in touch with the situation. In this case, *purusa* has lapsed into an unmotivating involvement with the conditions governing its expression, *prakrti*.

The singularity of the *Gita's* approach is that it begins with what, in human experience, is most deadened, most laden with abstraction, most reactive—sense experience. The narrow range of sense experience is an expression of the passive acquiescence to interpretive habit. Customarily, a stimulus attracts the attention away from the situation, forcing one to turn to a representation of the occurrence.[6] The submergence of the attention in the mechanism of response is what Berkeley notes in making the *esse* of sense experience its *percipi*. The object of the senses arises with one's reliance on representation; so does the objectifier, the *cogito*. The familiar world of things, standing opposed to 'me', requiring the mediation of my instrumental body in order to be possessed, is here borne into existence. This is the world of *having*. Into this world, the *Gita* injects the clue of 'sense-control.' It recalls us to the fact that where the attention is passively drawn to the impression, the resultant impression seems to be a message from 'without'; with this, the message theory of sensation, as Marcel calls it, arises.[6A] In its passive mode of operation, the attention, missing contact with the situation, necessarily depends on representations and reconstructions. An active mode, however, is experienced at the level of sensation. As an experience, sensation bears the signature of existence before the internal 'organ' monitoring the process, *indriya* or coenesthesis, as Marcel calls it.[7] Non-objectified sensation, sensation no longer a message deciphered from a distant source, is the language of tangible contact.[7A] It is to this language that the clue of 'sense control' urges that we direct our attention.

> *Clue 2.* '*Fruits* (*phala*) *of action*'. To action alone has thou a right and never at all to its fruit; let not the fruits of action be thy motive; neither let there be in thee any attachment to inaction. (2:27)

Clue 1 has concretely located the place of non-objectified sensation, and has indicated the method of passing from ordinary, habituated avenues of sense experience to more tangible ones. Control in this context refers to the attention one confers on the incoming impression, and has no reference to its content, the given. In actuality,

6 In this senses, *purusa* could be compared to the role feeling plays in Whitehead's idea of the emergence of an actual event.

7 3:10; cf. The *Gita* 3:42

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de-control is a more descriptive term, since the sedimented habits of perception, which 'control' one's contact with the impression, are released to a more open, unbounded receptivity. Now, if time were spent entirely in inaction, clue 1 would suffice for disclosing a way toward increasing ontological bearing. For, active attention to sensation calls the tangible into existence, and begins to be in touch with the one who in reality exists, the I, myself. In deeper levels of sensation I sense that I am. Clue 2, however, reminds us of the paramount need to go over to action. Transforming stillness into movement does not annihilate sensation nor the trace it leaves of myself; but it does introduce a new factor, kinaesthesis. Kinaesthesis in a general way is the body's perception of its own movement, internal and external. If we wish to encompass action in a search for being, developing the *Gita's* suggestions about kinaesthesis is essential.

Husserl, in the 1920's and 1930's, also is concerned with kinaesthesis. In it, he recognizes an intimate relation to power and disposability. He says :

> The 'I can' works directly on or with kinaesthesis, and brings about sensational and hence objective changes only indirectly.[8]

Kinaesthesis is to be distinguished from sensation (*Empfindung*), which, for Husserl, already bears the shadow of the object.[9] How kinaesthesis further relates to sensation of a non-objectified form remains unclear Dorion Gairns reports that

> what Husserl means by kinaesthesia is not the bodily sensations accompanying movement or muscular tension, or the inner sensations, but rather something volitional or quasi-volitional that remains when one abstracts from such sensations.[10]

Husserl suggests that kinaesthetic experiences or 'flows' (*Ablaufe*) are the functional correlates of sensations, in the way, for example, that the sensation arising from my touching the pen is correlated with a complex kinaesthetic pattern potentiating my moving the pen to write. This still is vague. We also are told that while sensation is capable of objectification, kinaesthesis is not. The flows are organized among themselves into fields which enpower movement

8 Merleau Ponty distinguishes between primary & secondary attention so that reactive attraction is contrasted with intentional Placement of the attention. Such a distinction derives from Husserl's discussion of sedimentation of the pre reflective, non-objectified life world. See Merleau Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, tr C. Smith (New Jersey, Humanities Press, 1962) p. 130.

9 *Metaphysical Journal*, p. 220.

10 Ib.d., p. 19.

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which are coordinated with each sense organ; there is a visual field, an aural field, a tactile field, etc.

Most important is the form of the kinaesthetic flow. Zaner, in amplifying Husserl's thought, suggests it to follow an 'if-then' pattern.[10A] For instance, with regard to my action of writing, the elemental kinaesthesis has the form, *if* the pen is grasped and moved in this manner, *then* a mark is made on the paper. Or, alternatively, *if* the hand is tightened, *then* the pen is held. The essence of Husserl's 'I can' thus resides in an effortful striving to *cause* changes in the object world or my own organism by means of marshalling the potentiating force of a kinaesthetic field. The flow itself is a potential effector, a possible karmic unit; it is a means of carrying out rudimentary or well-formed desires, urges, impulses, or inclinations, which arise successively from the impressions given by the situation. In this guise, kinaesthesis, whether felt or not, is the empowerment underlying all movement. Its form is that of mechanism: *if* a muscular event occurs, *then* something changes. Bodily experience, at this level, is highly intricate clockwork, but work nonetheless utilizing nothing more then the law of cause and effect.

Returning to the clue about the 'fruits of action', we see that to act in the world is to engage the efficacy of effortful striving, beginning at the level of primitive causes. Through kinaesthesis one's body is an instrument of changeful intervention in the world. To act is to activate some potentiating 'if then' structure, correlated somehow with a sensation. The second observation of this clue then tells us that our customary focus in action is not on this potency, but on what it seeks to accomplish. We repeatedly enact the logical error of affirming the consequent, the truth of the 'then'—clause. Accordingly, we fail to recognize the conditional nature of everything we do, how it derives from a bodily potentiation which is an integral to the action as the attainment. We fail to acknowledge the correlation of the action to our objectified sensations, and the sedimented interpretations governing them. Not having a view of the matrix from which action arises, we ignore the influence of our deep-set habits (*samskaras*) determining our deeds. Ignoring the genesis of action and its determined basis, we are led, in a way that will be made clear, to presume ourselves the author of our undertakings. We find ourselves in the position of believing what we do *belongs to* us and us alone. Clue 2 thus points out a fundamental misapprehension with respect to action: that we systematically attribute to the mechanical nature of our strivings the signature of our own identity.[11]

11 Cf. Erwin Straus' extended discussion of sensing as a mode of perceiving in *The Primary World of Senses*, tr. Needleman (N.Y. MacMillan, 1963), Part IV, pp. 189-396.

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Clue 3 *'Sacrifice'* Save work done as and for a sacrifice, this world is in bondage to work. (3:10)

Knowledge as a sacrifice is greater than any material sacrifice ... (4:33)

Clue 2 has described the Husserlian notion of kinaesthesis, and has shown it to supply the underpinning for all action. It also has diagnosed our mortal error with regard to action; not recognizing the antecedent conditions of our undertaking, we identify the result with the action. Furthermore, by not seeing the form of primitive strivings, we mistake mechanism for intention. We come to regard ourselves as causative agent, rather than as the place from which mechanical thrusts issue. Because of this confusion, action becomes a problem in that my identity has entangled itself in the engine of the act. What clue 3 gives us is the means of extrication,

In the *Gita's* context, sacrifice is seen concretely as the work by which to approach action. Its meaning derives from the *Agnihotra*, the burnt-offering of the Vedas, in which the object of sacrifice, being combusted, is consumed by the heat and light of the sacrificial fire. When, as clue 3 suggests, the conditions governing one's knowing are brought to sacrifice, that meaning is transformed. 'Heat' becomes the friction of the resisting inertia (*tapasya*), the momentum of sedimented ways of constructing the object of knowledge. 'Light' becomes the attentive presencing to the ongoing, objectifying experience. (*Manaskara*). Rather than by renunciation, one works towards sacrifice by countering habits of perception and interpretation with an activated attention directed toward the level of bodily occurrence. The work of sacrifice is, therefore, the work of combusting the abstractedness of ordinary experience, for the sake of embodying the concretely tangible. It is the work of returning the attention to the habitat, the living body, and of participating in its processes, in stillness and in movement [12]

Sacrifice is thus the kindling the flame of the inner *Agnihotra*.[13] Mustering touch, one offers up the settled habits governing sense- and actional-experience. Burnt away, these abstractive sheaths cease to intercept the full impression of reality, falling on the body's skin, which can serve to contact the one who is receptivity, I myself. This moment-by-moment sacrifice, which invites the return to an unadorned sense of existence, speaks in the voice of *purusa*. In the sacrificial moment, the way is cleared for the knower to end his entanglement in the field, and to recognize the actional world of which it is co-creator.

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12 In Darwin Cairns, *Conversations with Husserl & Fink* (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1976) p 4.

13 *Empfinding* consisting of 'reflections & shadows' (*Abschatturgen*), of objects.

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Clue 4. '*Not-doing*'. The man is united with the Divine and knows the truth thinks, 'I do nothing at all.' ...(5:8)

Mustering the body around its tangible presence, as clue 3 dictates, is the pivotal step toward discovering the *Gita's* method of non-attached action. Hitherto, one has been able, at the level of primitive willing—kinaesthesis—to ascribe a partial karmic interpretation to action while ignoring its dharmic context This has produced a two fold result : (a) affirmation of the result of action as primary, and (b) attribution of first-person authorship on the basis of the causal structure of kinaesthesis. Put another way, action is doubly misconceived along the following lines :

(1) In failing to recognize the form of kinaesthesis, I ignore the karmic antecedent to my act. I fail to acknowledge what necessarily *proceeds* and *generates* that part of the action-complex I mistakenly identify as the whole: and

(2) In failing to discern the impersonal nature of the form, I lapse into the customary assumption of deriving the result from *my* identity. I fail to notice that in which the causal structure is embedded, and from which it actually arises, its dharmic matrix.

Clue 4, however, suggests that the unitary experience provided by returning the attention to the tangible works a basic change in one's understanding of action. Recurring to kinaesthesis, one meets the *Ablaufe*, whose causal form is :

If these muscles A are moved, *then* change B occurs. The flow, moreover, is evident not only at the moment of the action, but, apparently, is there ready-to-hand. Already present, the flow persists independently of one's decision or impulse to act on it. Husserl infers from the observation that kinaesthesis is involved in locating a *remembered* actional object, as, for example, when I remember how it is to swing a baseball bat.[14] Kinaesthesis then enjoys a wide field. Memory, deliberation, anticipation, anterior evaluation : the entire actional complex relies on the *Ablaufe*. More importantly, kinaesthesis antedates and postdates my doing something in the sense that it is at any time available for potentiation. How does potentiation occur ? Primarily in the matter of selecting some effortful striving for activation, the applying force to form. Thus, it begins to seem that *my* participation in the actional complex is quite like the pouring of an energy into a ready-made outlet. To the extent that I am able to register the experience of a container being filled by a substance distinct from it, to that extent am I able to separate the inpouring movement of *purusa* from the receptivity of *prakrti*.

A closer scrutiny, moreover, discloses not a single kinaesthesis, but a constellation of them :

14 *op. cit.*, p. 64.

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If these muscles A are moved, then change B occurs.
If these muscles C are moved, then change D occurs.
If these muscles E are moved, then change F occurs.

That is, the embedding matrix of action appears as a set of ready-to-hand *Ablaufen* This discovery clarifies the nature of selection. If a range of causal leanings are already available, choice is in reality neither of ends nor of means, but of the complex, of a certain karmic tendency. Where one thinks solely in terms of ends and means, a karmic debt is incurred; that is, one remains oblivious of the mechanical connection binding result to antecedent and antecedent to result, thereby running the risk of entanglement in the unsensed clockwork of the act. This matrix can, furthermore, furnish an understanding of the dharma of the act, its context of meaning; for the meaning of any particular kinaesthesis is given only against the background of its competing and alternative flows (the 'field.')

If this view opens up the perception that my role is selectively to energize causal propensities ready-to-hand for me, I am less prone to presume myself author of the attainment. While this in itself does not resolve the question of how action is generated, it does seem that neither the consequent nor the antecedent *belongs to* me, nor does the causal connection binding them. The result is not something I 'do'. My part seems rather to consist, in a fashion not fully obvious, in marking that a given kinaesthesis has been *touched off*. In a way that need not imply haphazardness random selection, I observe that a specific means-end complex is hit upon whose action changes the face of the world. Nor does it seem that *I* actually touch of a primitive striving. By the fact that effort is applied (in the passive voice), it is more accurate to say that the potentiating force goes to the kinaesthesis in a kind of pre-established harmony. The *Gita's* action operates in a Leibnizian universe. This conjunction, when I am able to behold it, is as close as I am able to come to witnessing the marriage of *purusa* and *prakrti*, the one that motivates and the one that is ready to be moved. Witness to this, I am able fully to view action in a new way nothing of myself is engaged in what I call 'doing', Rather my place concerns itself with beholding that which occurs : the wedding of the primal forces under the canopy of my flesh.

> *Clue 5.* '*Concentration* (*dhyana*)' Let the yogin try constantly to concentrate his mind remaining in solitude and alone, self-controlled, free from desires, and longing for possessions. (6:10)

Clues 1 through 4, having laid bare the phenomena on which the *Gita* moves, it remains for clue 5 to consolidate a way towards non-attached action. More than offering homilies, it formulates an ontological approach which, when embodied, allows one to near the mode of, non-possessing action. Concentration (*dhyana*) is the means of returning the attention to the tangible, away from interpretative abstractedness, toward the kinaesthetic matrix. In the language of clue 1, *dhyana* is the shift in *manas* from a passive to an

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active mode, from a substantive to a verbial understanding of 'mind'. *Manas*, activated, operates in harmony with *buddhi*, the intellect.[15] Activated, it is able to touch the lived body as it is actionally.

Having the structure of kinaesthesis in view, one can confront the tripartite idea of having. Having, it will be recalled, involves (1) disposability, (2) concealment, and (3) needful acknowledgement. How, according to the *Gita*, can I act in such a way that the action does not *belong* to me? With regard to disposability, we have seen the focus of potency shift from an identity I call myself to the meeting of a potentiating force with a potentiable structure. No longer is it that I stand as the agent empowering the act, but rather as the witness to that joining which is empowerment, of *purusa* and *prakrti*. I am the one who, in keeping touch with the actional conjugates, allows the birth of the act. Second, with regard to concealment, the action is not an event I can keep to myself, since, while having a genesis is the habitat of my body, the components are not personal nor private. Their existence is both 'within' me and 'without', or neither. As over against some other place of genesis, say, in another person's body, I have no special claim. The fact that the conjunction of actional components takes place nearer me confers on me no special privileges, duties, nor responsibilities with respect to it. This troublesome conclusion raises difficulties about the *Gita's* proposals which I will not consider. Finally, regarding my needs to have the action acknowledged as my own, I no longer require any insurance against the action's being lost to or stolen from me. When the act no longer belongs to me, I have gained a freedom relative to its occasion; this freedom allows participation without involvement. I am not remote from the action. Far from it. I am as near to its source as is possible. Being near, I witness with tangible evidence that the source is not *in* me; rather, the place given me by the location of my body provides a vehicle for the source of all actions. Action in this final stage of recognition becomes an expression of the blending of a bipolar reality, and I, the first attendant on it.

I do not now want to address the objections that, through the *Gita's* method, the meaning both of action and of myself as agent has been bent out of shape, and that, in this sensa, the problem of non-attached action skirted altogether. It may be that its objective, *moksa*, pushes the analysis necessarily beyond the ordinary sense of agency. If this is so, what is more important to ask is whether the method encompasses a means of verification, or whether the tangible evidence of sensation and kinaesthesis attests with sufficient strengsh to an approaching reality.

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15 The faculty to which is customarily ascribed the mistaken affirmation of the consequent (& the erroneous basis of personal identity it entails) is the *ahamkara*.

16 It is not identical with renunciation, e.g., 3:4.

17 Cf. Coomaraswamy, '*Atmayajana*: Self Sacrifice', in *Selected Papers* 2 ed. R. Lipsey. (Princeton, Bollinger Sevier LXXXIX, 1977) pp 107-147.

18 In Cairns, op. cit., p. 5.

19 Cf. *Katha Upanisad* 3.3—3.6.

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II

About the Category of "System"*

Reni Ivanova Avramova

The concept of "System" belongs to a specific group of cognitive means used in modern science. The peculiarity of this type of concepts demonstrates itself in the fact that they participate simultaneously in rational processes, carried out on three hierarchical levels of the theoretical reproduction of the objective reality—the philosophical, the general scientific (interdisciplinary) and the private scientific level of analysis.

A significant example of the existence of this trend is the real pluralism in the conceptions of systemness. It expresses not a principal impossibility to find out the specific type of relation, given with this concept, but the different racourses, in which this relation is analysed. In the first decades of the appearance of systems movement this fact was deemed as an imperfection, immaturity or backwardness of systems approach and its categorical apparatus. But today, after more than half a century existence of independent systems elaborations, the same circumstance is derived as a non-trivial cognitive situation. According to its peculiarities the system research performed in different science spheres, form let us call it conditionally, an epistemological pyramid of systemness with a hierarchy of cognitive levels. The foundation of this pyramid is the philosophical view of the same relation, within the frames of which systemness is realised as a moment of the general interdependence among separate things and expresses an aspect of dialectics of unity and diversity. After philosophy, according to the cognitive level of expressing the system relation, the general theory of systems, cybernetics, the information theory, etc., take their stand.

In this way the concept of "System" helps to create a threefold unity in the scales of scientific cognition as a whole and reveals its

* Some philosophical aspects of the problem.

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merits of an integrative concept in modern science. But just in this merit is put the exceptionally complex cognitive situation in defining the concept of system, because the illustrated theoretical multigradedness possible in the interpretation of systemness, imposes, even with abandoning the requirement for a strong defining of the concept of "System", to distinguish the sense which is put in, and the different cognitive contents, born by its philosophical, general scientific and private scientific interpretation. Unfortunately the specificity of the three levels in cognition of a system is often ignored, the concept is chiefly used in its multidisciplinary scientific sense, and the most that is not elaborated, and is even rejected, remains just the philosophic analysis of systemness. This article is an attempt of a philosophical view upon the category of system, which must prove the necessity of a philosophical rationalisation of the system relation as a universal characteristics of the objective reality and the mental constructs in which it is reflected.

In our endeavour to defend the philosophical character of a concept we usually lean against the philosophical tradition in the history of its genesis. But the positive implications derived as a result of such an approach are still not sufficient proof of the concept's philosophical status in contemporary science. First, because the syncretism of the ancient thought could serve as a basis for each science to find in it the prototype of its terms, and second, because in the development of cognition a transformation of the concept's significance often ensues, as a result of the cultural-historical changes that provoke new disciplinary distinctions. In spite of this it is worth mentioning that the concept of system is both a new and an old representative of the conceptional apparatus of dialectics and scientific cognition as a whole. New, because the terminological rebirth of this category during the last decades is mainly due to the emergence of the general theory of systems and the success of cybernetics, and old, because the roots of its genesis lead us as far back as for example to the ancient Greek philosophy, where "Systema" and the same rooted word "Systasis" correspond to: combination, organism, arrangement, organisation, bringing in order, constitution, union".[1]

The first system ideas of the world have a definite ontologic sense and appear together with the first attempts for a theoretical dismembering of the being. In the genesis of this category the regular process of transition from the mythologic concept to the scientific one is being displayed, by transferring the dismembering scheme of one object upon another. In this way Cosmos is not only the poetic name of the world, as it is taken from mythology. Its

1 A. P. Ogourtsov, Stages of interpretation of the systemness of scientific knowledge, 1974, M., 1974, p. 186.

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conceptional contents expresses the idea of an internal order and structural organisation of this harmonic whole, which in spite of the dialectical transitions remains indivisible, eternal, absolute. After the enlightment of the unity and wholeness of the existent, the ancient thinkers come across the necessity to discover the explanatory mechanism of this wholeness. The solutions which they offer, possess the cognitive virtues of finding out the system-forming principle of Cosmos. On the concrete interpretation of this principle depends the countenance of the whole ontological system of every philosopher in ancient times. And as the way of structurising the being directly reflects in the view of unity and variety, of the general and the different, of the whole and the parts, from here the philosophical significance of the system notions becomes explainable.

In the cosmogenic theory of Plato the structural dismemberment of being is presented like numerical interrelations. The metaphoric transition of a definite method of structurisation, characteristic for any separate sphere of reality or cognition upon the being as a whole is in this case not only a manifestation of rational immaturity compensated by intuitive enlightenments and imagination of the ancient thinker. This transition bears in itself the rational idea of the separate structures extrapolation in a given system by which the unity of the new formation is created.

The atomistic conceptions of being build up a system model, uniting in itself the fundamental idea for partition and connection of the elements, realized by the unity of two opposite material reasons of the existent—the existence (the atoms) and the non-existence (the void). The contemporary system comprehendings hardly could require a more adequate retrospect into the dawn of philosophical thinking. The system notion has up to this day preserved th idea of "the last", "the indivisible", "the elementary", of course in respect of the scales of a given system quality. Along with this the mechanic Democritean transition of the qualitatively homogenuous (the atoms) towards the qualitatively unhomogenous (the complex bodies), realized singly by means of nearing the indivisible particles, because "they are not in a position to either suffer an influence or to change"[2], is a peculiar challenge towards the contemporary science on account of its comprehending of the universality or the limit of the system relation.

In the modern historical system investigations exists an opinion[3], according to which the aim and the final cause in Aristotle's cosmogony may also be interpreted as a system-forming principle,

2 R. Radev. History of antique philosophy, S., 1981, p. 265.

3 A. P. Ogourtsov. Stages of interpretation of the systemness of scientific knowledge. In System research, 1974, M., 1974, p. 200.

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offering a teleologic argumentation of the systemness of being. The name of Aristotle occupies a peculiar place in the history of systems ideas also because of the fact, that the philosophy accomplishes the regular transition of the ancient Greek thought from systems ontology towards system epistemology. In this way still in the dawn of philosophical cognition the necessity of a relative distinction between the two spheres of systematic thinking is shown. It means that revealing of systems relations in the objective reality has not always as its prerequisite or result the elaboration of system principles in cognition. One can speak of systems epistemology in a narrow sense only then, when the object of analysis are "the mental determinations... in their derivation, in their construction".[4] (become a special object of analysis). In this sense Aristotle's conclusive schemes represent a brilliant attempt of antiquity to understand knowledge as a system creation, for revealing its unity and its wholeness through formulating universal regularities, valid for any mental process.

The naturalist philosophical idea of systemness is most brightly represented in the philosophical conceptions of the XVIIIth century French materialists. The very idea reveals the fact, that if philosophy pretends to be a science for the most general causes of being, it must create a system picture of the world in its most general contours. According to the felicitous Hegel's remark this is "its endeavour to achieve a universal unity, however not an abstract unity, but a concrete one..."[5] "The different properties of these matters, their various combinations and the acts, which are a sequel of them, constitute for us substances. From the difference of these substances emerges different lines, genders, systems, which the things occupy and whose sum is that one which we call nature."[6]

Kant overcomes in some respect the limited, ontological-naturalist interpretation of the objective systemness in French materialism, but comes to just the opposite end—an interpretation of systemness on a purely subjective level. "Under system I understand the concord of various knowledges, united by one idea, and the idea of mind is a concept of the form of something whole."[7] One can single out from these and from a number of similar statements, united by the general statement about the lawgiving powers of mind, ensuring the synthetic unity of the test data through apriori forms, two moments shown up to be especially worthy. First—the requirement for systemness, raised as an immanent feature of every theory pretending to have a significant scientific character. Later on, in the spirit

4 G V. F. Hegel, History of Philosophy, V. 3, S., 1983, p. 555.
5 Ibid., p. 606.
6 Ibid., p. 616.
7 E. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, S., 1967, 9, 736.

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of Kant's postulate, Hegel will declare in his "Phenomenology of Spirit": "The true form in which truth exists may only be its scientific system."[8] Together with this basic requirement, which Kant directs towards the scientific cognition and which he turns into a methodological problem, the great German philosopher accounts both the moment of dismembering, diversity, that is always present in a system, and the taking down of this variety up to a definite order, up to a unity. In this way the main contradiction lying in the basis of systems becoming is fixed. It is a pity that in "Critique of Pure Reason", where the exposition itself is presented by some authors as a Kant's unity in variety[9], the contradiction of the system is mentioned only as a fact, and the whole a priori-construction of thinking-forms preserves a definite anti-dialectical element. Kant's theoretical system is static. devoid both of the idea of the system development and of the idea of systemness in this development. The pressure of the last two moments is connected with the dialectical stage in understanding a system relation. It is prepared by Ficht's idea of synthesizing the Self and Non-Self being limited by themselves, and Schelling's unity of the absolute, but manifests itself at the brightest in Hegel's idealistic principle of the identity of being and thought.

A number of specific peculiarities of the system are revealed by Hegel in defining the idea. With its unfolding and selfmovement from the abstract towards the concrete—from the poorest, deprived of all definitions of the category of being, up to the richest in contents "absolute idea", the thinking marks necessary moments of its system unity. "The idea is a concrete in itself and a developing one, is an organic system, a wholeness that contains a richness of degrees and moments."[10] Notwithstanding that dialectics of system through the prism of idealistic misinterpretation is only a concept dialectics, in a philosophy, where the course of knowledge movement is also a movement of being itself, the system—from a system of the essence, of the notion, becomes also a system of reality as far as the latter is understood as thought. The whole richness of stages and moments of the idea, though veiled by mysticism reveals the real levels of variety of the world, shows the endless contradictory interlacing of ties between separate structures and uncovers the specificity of systemness. understood as the "world existent in itself and for itself, that puts down the elements as moments in itself".

The following quality jump in the development of systems conceptions required their "materialisation"—i.e. proving of the objective status of systems interaction as established for things which

8 G. V. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirits, S., 1979, p. 12.
9 R. Garrett, The Poetry of Philosophy, Vol. 14. No. 2, 1983, p 135.
10 G. V. F Hegel, History of Philosophy, Sc, 1965, V. I,

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are independent from us. One of the forms of this materialisation was historically accomplished with Marx's discovery of the supreme type of systemness — the social one. Such a discovery has its significance not only in rehabilitating the objective character of the system, but is also equivalent to the penetration into material essence of the social quality, by presenting it under the form of social relations. The materialist interpretation of systemness results also in derivation of an initial methodologic requirement of marxist epistemology formulated by Engels as it follows: "Thought may unite the elements of mind only in the case when in them or in their real prototypes unity had already previously existed."[11]

Deviations of this principle may occur even with authors who accept the independent existence of an outer material world. With the latter admittance they create a true theoretical foundation for the ontologic contents of the system concept. For it is quite natural to come to the idea of objectivity of relations among the relative things, after we have admitted the objective existence of things themselves. But the problem of the ontologic status of the system, independently from whether we shall examine it as a relation, or property, or shall present it in the synthesis of both, cannot be solved only with this admittance. The interrelation of different objects creates in definite cases a system unity, basing itself upon the mutual conditionality of the elements, but in other cases these same elements unite in a way which results into an aggregate of indifferent things.

A similar difficulty confronts N. Kramer and G. Smith with the idea of the indisputable division of the empirical world between systems and aggregates. In support of this division an absolutely relative and indefinite criterion is adduced — the immediate or indirect interconnection of all elements of a given totality, the independence even of one of them being enough to turn the system into an aggregate.[12]

We think that in this way the first step towards the idealistic distort of systemness is being made if we endeavour to define the objective interaction reflected by this category by means of the shown criterion. The universal nature of the objective interaction does not allow to derive an absolute criterion giving the ontologic reasons for such a division. And After the objective reality does not offer such a criterion, it must be looked for in the ideal reality of thinking. So the existence of the system interrelations in the object is put in dependence on the cognitive subject, and from here the systemness is turned into a characteristic which the object achieves or does not

11 K. Marx, F. Engels, Works, V. 20, p. 41.

12 N. J. T. A. Kramer and J. de Smith, Systems Thinking, Leiden, 1977, p. 14.

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achieve only when it is involved in the cognitive process. "We see from this example that it is somewhat arbitrary whether we call something a system or not... Therefore we suggest that a system can only be defined as an object of research or observation... This means that we can label certain known objects as systems if they fulfill a system's requirement."[13]

From the so shaped understanding of a system the final conclusion could be drawn (of course if it is not explicitely marked that a system is treated as a methodological technique in the construction of the object, and not as a notion reflecting real characteristics of the object of research), that in regard to the object in itself, a systemness is not necessary to exist like such.

According to us, in spite of its logical precision, the shown definition does not contain a criterion to define the objective contents of the system relations with the aim to distinguish it from a similar type of objective dependencies. Because if systemness is examined as an existence of objects in the form of a system, such a difference between systems and aggregates (non-system objects), already supposes that system is interpreted as a property or relation adherent only to a definite class of objects. This however deprives a part of the existent things of their structural definiteness, after it refuses to acknowledge them the property of systemness. It follows that the object is deprived of its material being, because out of the structurality and the interaction it is not possible to reach up to a qualitative definiteness. It is just here where the basic ontological sense of the category of a system manifests itself — to give an idea of the unity understood as an ability for interaction and realisation of the interaction, as a result of the qualitative definiteness is realized.

The first and most universal structurality of being shows itself in the objective contradiction which divides the existing into the given and its negation, and the most general relation of wholeness is the relation between the opposites whose intertransitions conditions the system unity.

Of course if we want to affirm the universality of the system dependence, it is not necessary to unify it. The system is created as a result of different kinds of changes, namely "the essence, the quantity, the space",[14] or said in another way by the periphrased Aristotle's words, the modes of systems are so many as are the modes of movement and change.

In this case a system may be defined as any dependence among initial components, which becomes the reason for upcoming of a new

13 Ibid.
14 ARISTOTLE. Physics, p. 153.

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quality, different from the qualitative specificity of each of the starting components. Such a definition is very similar to the well known definition of A. Hall and R. Fagin,—"The system is a multiplicity of objects along with the relation among the objects and their properties"[15], but it puts into it a certain concretisation with accounting the moment of transition from one type of formation in to another. From the position of this definition the system relation will vary within the large interval from the aggregate up to the organic system, and the type of system will be defined by the type of this dependence — spatial, temporal, causal, functional, etc.

The appearance of a new quality which accompanies the creation of every system formation is not always connected with quality changes in each one of the starting elements. Such one can and necessarily ensues only in the process of the genesis of organic wholes, in which "every relation supposes another one and along with this is also a prerequisite"[16], and "the elements change up to such a degree which makes impossible their existence out of the frames of the whole".[17] The new quality notes in this case only the creation of a new formation as a result of a realised dependence between starting components which so far had not been in such a dependence. That is why if reality is not understood as a system one, this means that it will be interpreted as a non active, dead substance, as far as the single, unique manifestations of this substance will be cut off from the necessary minimium of active surroundings, through the interaction in which they achieve their quality definiteness.

SUMMARY

The concept of system belongs to a specific group of cognitive means used in modern science. Concepts of such type can be interpreted on Three different levels—the philosophical, the general scientific and the private scientific level of analysis. Unfortunately the specificity of the three levels in cognition of a system is often ignored, the concept is chiefly used in its multidisciplinary scientific sense, and the most that is not elaborated and is even rejected remains just the philosophical analysis of systemness. This article is an attempt of a philosophical view upon the category of system, which must prove the necessity of a philosophical rationalisation of the system relation as a universal characteristic of the objective reality and the mental constructions in which it is reflected.

15 A. HALL, R. FAGIN. Definition of the Notion of System. In: Research of the General Theory of System., M., 1969, p, 252.

16 K. MARX, F. ENGELS. Works, V. 46, Part I, p. 205-206.

17 N. MIKHOVA. On some aspects of the relation between the parts and the whole. In : Problems of the laws and categories of dialectics and logic. S., 1965, p. 278.

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III

IBN Sina's Contribution to the Philosophy of Religion

V. C. Narayana Das

Students of philosophy often tend to ignore the important role played by a number of Islamic thinkers of medieval age in reviving and preserving man's philosophical heritage and transmitting the same to the later generations. These thinkers deserve our special attention, specifically because they made their appearance at a time when the intellectual activity became almost stagmant all over the West. "They", as Muzzaffar Uddin Nadvi points out, in his *Muslim Thought and Its Sources*, "held the torch of learning at a time when other nations of the world were shrouded in the darkness of ignorance". It was at this crucial stage of history that philosophers like Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina took up the task of reviving the ancient wisdom and providing their contemporaries with convincing answers to their intellectual and religious problems.

Philosophy, or *Falsafa* as it is called in Arabic, in its technical sense seems to have taken shape in Arabia only after the appearance of Islam. But, even among the pre-Islamic Arabs there was philosophy, in the etymological sense of the term, for, they were true lovers of wisdom. But this wisdom was not to be found in the form of a systematised body of knowledge. The ancient Arabic literature was full of proverbs, wise sayings, anecdotes and fables designed to enable men to cultivate a virtuous and courageous life. However, the advent of Islam which wrought a real revolution in all aspects of Arabian life had its impact upon their intellectual life also.

The revelation of the word of God through Prophet Muhammad and the subsequent establishment of a religious community marked also the beginning of theological and philosophical thinking. This seems to be a natural development, because, while religion is based

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upon the revelation of God, the truths of revelation have to be interpreted and rendered intelligible. The desire for a rational understanding of faith seem to be quite natural to human mind. This leads to the rise of theology as a systematic codification of the revealed truths from the standpoint of faith, and philosophy from the standpoint of reason. From this point of view, we may regard philosophy of religion as a natural response of human reason to the contents of religious faith.

Philosophizing had begun in Islam even from the Seventh Century A.D. Imran ibn Husain al Khuzai and his disciple Hasan al Basri were the earliest known Islamic thinkers. Wasil Ibn Ata, a disciple of Hasan al Basri founded the Mutazilite School of thought, which was an attempt to rationalize certain cardinal principles of religion, related to the Unity of God, orign of Quran, free will, creation, vision of God, criterion of moral goodness and evil etc. This school of thought had practically came to an end with al-Ashari's refutation (A.D. 912/913) of their doctrines followed by the establishment of a sound orthodox system of theology. For a long time philosophy could not take roots in Arabia, because it was seriously doubted whether a rational approach to religion could be reconciled with faith in the revelation of God. It was Abu Yusuf al Kindi, known as the first philosopher of the Arabs who was responsible for giving a permanent place for philosophy in Islam. Al Farabi was another great thinker who followed Al Kindi. However, it was due to the works of the great physician and philosopher, Abu Ali al Hosein ibn Abdulah ibn Sina, that the Islamic philosophy attained a real completion. "In him", says Phillip Hitti, "Arab Philosophy and Medicine reached its apex."[1]

Historians of Philosophy seems to agree with the observation of Goichons that "Avicenna is the first philosopher of the Arabic language who created a philosophical system which is really complete and whole."[2] Similarly, F. C. Coppleston consider him to be the most notable philosopher of the middle ages.[3] The thirteenth century British Philosopher, Roger Bacon, considered Ibn Sina to be the greatest authority on Philosophy after Aristotle.[4] What follows is a brief account of the contribution of this great thinker to the Arabian Philosophy.

Ibn Sina's metaphysical views are expounded in his works, entitled, *Kitab Shifa al Nafs* (The Book of the Healing of the Soul), and *Kitab al Isharat Wa'l Tanbihat* (The Book of Directives and

1 Hitti, Philip. K., *Makers of Arab History*, London (1968), p. 204.
2 Goichons, A. M., *The Philosophy of Avicenna and Its Influence on Medieval Europe*. Tr. M. S. Khan Delhi (1969), p. 15.
3 Coppleston, F. C. *Medieval Philosophy*, London, (1972) p. 110.
4 Hitti, Philip, K., op. cit. p. 218.

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Hints). He had also written an abridgement of *al Shifa* entitled, *Kitab Najat al Nafs* (The Book of the Salvation of the Soul).

Philosophy has been defined by Ibn Sina as the science of all existence as such and principles of all the separate sciences, where by the human soul attains the highest perfection, as far as it is humanly possible. As in the case of all ancient philosophers, his concept of philosophy was broad enough to include all kinds of possible knowledge within its scope. He was a true philosopher in this very sense. According to one of his own confessions, he had mastered the totality of all possible knowledge by the age of eighteen.[5] He was a great encyclopaedist and unquestionable authority in all matters of his age. The present study, however, has to be limited to his metaphysics which is only one aspect of his philosophy.

It must be remembered that the Islamic philosophy as a whole is indebted to the Greek thought. Ibn Sina was no exception to this. He did make use of a number of ideas from the philosophies of Aristotle and Neoplatonism. But this indebtedness did not amount to an exact copying or imitation of the Greek thinkers. As T. J. De Boer points out, "It was not his concern to commit himself wholly to the spirit of any system. He took what was to his liking, wherever he found it."[6] What he did was a blending of Greek science and Eastern Wisdom in his own unique way, in order to construct an entirely new system of philosophy, which would satisfy both the intellectual curiosity and religious aspirations of his age. To this end, he made use of Aristotlean concepts such as, the First cause, Unmoved Mover, Active Intellect, Logic, Form and Matter. Similarly, he also used the Neoplatonic ideas like the doctrine of the Ineffable One and emanation, in such a way as to suit to his own specific purpose. This procedure enabled Ibn Sina, on the one hand to substantiate the unity of God on rational grounds and on the other hand, to explain the contents of Islamic faith as a coherant system of truth.

Ibn Sina discussed his philosophical views under ten theses. The first five were concerning the theory of knowledge and related problems. sixth and seventh on the First Cause, eight and nineth on the unity of existence and individual immortality, and the tenth on Prophethood and its necessity for mankind.

Ibn Sina's whole metaphysics begins with his analysis of the concepts 'possible' and 'necessary' beings. According to him, the existence of an absolutely Necessary Being naturally follows from the

5 Ibid p. 202. See also the article, "Philosophy", by S. Pines, in *Cambridge History of Islam*. Vol. 2B Cambridge (1970) p. 805

6 DeBoer, T. J., *History of Philosophy in Islam* Tr. Edward R. Jones, London (1933), p. 132.

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very concept of the 'possible beings.' He did not argue like his predecessor Al Farabi and other philosophers that the existence of God as creator can be proved from His creation. Instead, his endeavour was to deduce the existence of a First and Necessary Being from the possible character of all that exists and conceivable in the world. He therefore makes a sharp distinction between the 'possible being' and the 'necessary being,' and argues that a duality of existence and essence can be discovered in all things except God. In all beings, except God, existence is superadded to their essences. A possible being, therefore, may exist or may not exist, regardless of the fact that its essence is conceivable. For example, a particular man is a possible being who may or may not exist, regardless of the fact that the essence of man, or manhood is eternal. Ibn Sina thus demonstrates that in the case of every possible being existence is an accident that happens to the essence. But this is not the case with God. He is a necessary being, and as such, in Him essence and existence are one and the same. In his *al Najat*, Ibn Sina defines his concept of the necessary being thus: "That which exists necessarily through itself is such that, if it is said not to exist, there follows a repugnance (logical contradiction)[7]." Hence, to deny the existence of a necessary being is inconceivable without a self contradiction. Now, there are obviously possible being in the world. But, if they really exist, they require specific causes for their existence. These causes are also possible beings who require further causes and so on ad infinitum. It is, therefore, logically necessary that there exists a necessary being for which existence and essence are identical, in order to account for the existence of all possible beings. Hence the existence of all possible beings logically implies the existence of an absolutely necessary being. Ibn Sina, therefore, concludes that the existence of a necessary being plainly follows from the possible character of all beings. Moreover, since the necessity of this necessary being transcends all other possibilities, it is beyond all plurality and change. This one, absolutely necessary and immutable being is the absolute Reality, the God or Allah as revealed in the Koran.

Once the existence of the First cause is established, the next important task of philosophy is to account for the existence of the world. Thinkers of all ages have confronted the difficulty in reconciling the world of multiplicity and change with the one immutable God. Ibn Sina could find a solution to this problem with the help of the Neo-Platonic concept of emanation. The Neo-platonists had tried to explain the existence of the world and man as emanations of the one Ineffable Reality. Ibn Sina thought that the origin of plurality cannot be traced back to God who is absolute unity, in spite of the fact that He is the ultimate cause of everything. Hence he argued

7 Quoted by F. C. Coppleston, op. cit., p. 112.

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that out of the First One, only one can proceed. According to him, this second one that proceeds eternally from God is the World Spirit. It is in this world spirit that the multiplicity has its origin. Now, the world spirit generates a third spirit, a soul and a celestial sphere. The whole creation is conceived by Ibn Sina as a cognitive process. Thus the World Spirit, when it thinks of its own cause give rise to a spirit, and when it thinks of itself gives rise to a soul. But since soul is only a possible existence in itself, there emerges from it a body also. This first body is the outer most celestial sphere. The third spirit which was generated by the world spirit again gives rise to a fourth spirit, a soul and a celestial sphere, exactly in the manner in which the world spirit produced them. This three-fold process of creation goes on till the rise of the Active Spirit, or the Active Intellect (*aql i-faal*) which is the tenth and last spirit. It does not produce any more pure spirits, but produces and directs the earthly beings and human souls. The whole process of creation takes place in the substractum of matter. Ibn Sina conceived matter as the pure possibility of all that exists.

According to this view, the world is an eternal creation, coeval with God. It cannot take place at a point of time, because it would mean that God who was creationless till then had suddenly became a creator. Concept of creation in time would, therefore, affect the immutability and perfection of God. Moreover, a creation conceived as eternally proceeding from God render it as necessary. God is Creator, not because He was forced to create, or willed to create, but only because He is what He is. It is His eternal nature to be Creator. The orthodox reaction against Ibn Sina, is quite understandable at this point, when we realize that according to the religion of Islam world is the result of God's creation in time in accordance with His will.

Regarding human nature, Ibn Sina developed a dualistic theory. According to him there is no essential connection between the body and the soul. They are not inseparable aspects of man. The body is produced by the combination of material elements under the influence of stars. But the soul comes from the Active spirit. The soul is an individual substance from its very origination, and develops this individuality throughout its life in the body. Ibn Sina's favourite proof for the existence of soul was man's immediate awareness and certainty about his own self. He believed that the self (represented by the pronoun "I") as referring to the soul and not to the body.

Ibn Sina considered the speculative faculties of man to be the most important aspect of his soul. The knowledge of the world is gained by the rational soul through the medium of external and internal senses. Reason is the highest of all intellectual powers. At first human reason is a mere capacity for thought, but gradually

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becomes elaborated into a finished readiness in thought. This happens through constant mental activity and under the guidance of the Active Spirit. The illumination by the Active spirit can gradually lead one to the intuitive vision of Reality. Hence, the true knowledge of the soul comes into it from the Active Spirit whenever it is ready for the acceptance of it. Only by a patient discipline of one's own moral, intellectual and spiritual aspects of life can he elevate himself into the conjunction with the Active spirit. According to Ibn Sina, man can realize his true essence only when his rational soul becomes successful in mastering its own lower aspects and comes to know the higher realities by means of the spiritual enlightenment.

In spite of his emphasis upon the unity of existence in God, Ibn Sina was a defender of individual immortality. He rejected the Aristotlean view that the soul had no existence apart from the body. According to him, at the time of death the soul departs from the body and continues to exist in a more or less close contact with the World Spirit. The eternal blessedness of the pious deserving soul consists in this reunion with the highest spirit. However, those who fail to attain a certain degree of goodness and rationality during their bodily existence shall have their share of misery as a necessary consequence of the evil condition of their souls. Ibn Sina, however, rejected the idea of the resurrection of body, which formed an important element in the orthodox faith.

No doubt, Ibn Sina's philosophy of religion was not acceptable to all. Much of his ideas were not in harmony with the orthodox Islamic faith. Faithful to his task as a philosopher, he was not ashamed to be a critic of his own religion even at the cost of being condemned to be a heretic. Even the very rational approach to the contents of faith was repugnant to many. Al Ghazzali's famous work, *Tahafut al Falsafa* (Refutation of Philosophy) was directed chiefly against the metaphysical views of Ibn Sina. Ibn Sina was even accused of having left behind him a testamentary treatise in which he tried to justify some form of hypocricy. It was also alleged that he had expressed his belief that it was wrong for the philosopher to observe the religious rites which had no meaning for him.[8]

The fact, however, remains that the true purpose of Ibn Sina was to furnish the world with a comprehensive theory of universe which would satisfy both the religious and rational aspirations of man, and to this end he proved himself to be the best expression of his age. In the words of Amir Ali, "He was the truest and most faithful exponent of the philosophical aspirations of his time."[9]

8 Macdonald, Duncum B , *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory*, New Delhi (1973), p. 198.

9 Amir Ali, Syed, *The Spirit of Islam*. London (1935), p. 427.

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IV

How A Comparative Methodology of Science is Possible ?

Dimiter Ginev

In the recent years many attempts at construction a general picture of science have been realized, i.e. the assignment of such general parameters which are common to all types of sciences: natural, formal, social, applied, humanities, etc. But these attempts are carried out in metascientific disciplines which investigate mainly the external aspects of science. Let us give some examples in this respect:

(a) in the sociology of science the analysis of "age structure" intrinsic to the different types of science,[1] or the study of social conditions of disciplinary differentiation in the humanities, social and natural sciences[2];

(b) in the scientometrics—the comparison of scientometric data obtained from the analysis of different sciences;

(c) in the theory of scientific communication—with respect to the specification of the networks of informal communication in the different scientific disciplines,[3] or the analysis of the formation of coherent social groups in the development of natural, formal and social sciences[4].

1 Cf. Merton R. and Zuckerman H. "Age, Aging, and Age Structure", *The Sociology of Science*, Chicago-London, 1973.

2 Parsons T. and Storer N., "The disciplines as a differentiating force", *The Foundations of Access to Knowledge*, New York, 1968.

3 Griffith B. and Miller A., "Networks of Informal Communication Among Scientifically Productive Scientists", *Communication Among Scientists and Engineers*, Lexington. Massachusetts, 1970.

4 Griffith B. and Mullins N., "Coherent Social Groups in Scientific Change ("Invisible Colleges" May Be Consistent throughout Science), *Science*, v. 177, 1972, No. 4053, p. 959 966.

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However the question of the general picture of science remains open in the methodology of science, where the old (positivistic) view that only one methodological conception could be valid for all types of science is still alive and influential. The idea for a pluralistic methodology in the contemporary philosophy of science is chiefly defended by Paul Feyerabend. But his "epistemological anarchism" is only a negative programme which is confined to the assertion that "there is no guarantee that the known forms of rationality will succeed and that the known forms of irrationality will fail."[5] According to us, the creation of a pluralistic methodology means the creation of a comparative methodology, i.e. comparison of different types of science on the grounds of a number of internal (cognitive, epistemological) parameters. Our view of a comparative methodology is opposed to the above mentioned positivistic "monomethodological" view, for we think that there is not an universal methodological conception. Each type of science has its own system of methodological norms, or to put it with Lakatos' words, its own "code of scientific honesty". For this reason the comparison of different types of science leads to the comparison of different methodological conceptions as well. Hence, the comparative analysis is carried out on two levels: methodological, i e. comparison of types of science and metamethodological, i.e. comparison of methodological conceptions. On both levels this analysis has specific functions. Here we will try to point them out.

The first problem which arises with respect to the creation of a comparative methodology of science is the choice of an appropriate basic unity of comparison. This unity should be a concept which includes all essential epistemological parameters determining the general picture of science. The concept of *scientific position* will be introduced here as such an unity. It can be interpreted in three plans :

(i) genetic — the historical origin of the different scientific positions;

(ii) diachronic — the forms of their development;

(iii) synchronic — the interpretation of scientific positions as temporally invariant typological constructions of the assential epistemological parameters.

In accordance to these three plans of interpretation three kinds of comparative analysis on the methodological level are possible. Here only the problems of synchronic analysis will be discussed.

The essential epistemological parameters are the following :

5 Feyeraoend P., "Changing Patterns of Reconstruction", *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 28 (1977), p. 368, footnote 1.

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(I) ontological picture of the world (the frame of basic categories) : (II) specific style of scientific thought; (III) structure and empirical interpretation of scientific theory; (IV) the character of main procedures of knowledge (explanation, prediction, comprehension, classification etc); (V) the character of the so called metatheoretical structures (such as discipline matrix, research programme, scientific tradition, intertheoretical field, conceptual population etc.); (VI) the character of scientific communication and the structure of scientific community. All these parameters are determined by the peculiarity of the research object. The consideration of the first five of them is in competence of the methodology of science, while the last is an important topic of the sociology of science.

Eleven fundamental scientific positions can be distinguished and each one of them is realized in a certain class of scientific disciplines:

1. Dynamic-naturalistic position — realized in most natural sciences.

2. Statistic-naturalistic position — realized in two sub-classes : (a) disciplines in which the statistic interpretation is due to "hidden parameters" and (b) disciplines with inherent statistical interpretation (besides the quantum mechanics here are also some psychological disciplines).

3. Structure-functional position — realized mainly in social as well as in some economical sciences.

4. Cultural-interpretative position—realized in most humanities.

5. Historico modelling position — realized in three subclasses : (a) historical natural sciences (e g. historical geology); (b) historical social and human sciences (e.g. historical linguistics, historical geography etc.); (c) the special historical disciplines (history of society, history of science, history of culture, history of art and so on).

6. Normative position — realized in the disciplines with prescriptive character (normative economics, theory of law etc.).

7. Formal position — realized in the logical and mathematical disciplines.

8. Populative position—realized in disciplines with the so called populative object (the different ecological disciplines, populative genetics, some linguistic disciplines etc.).

9. Evolutive position — realized in disciplines as a cosmogony and theory of evolution.

10. Projective position — realized in disciplines which investigate the processes of creation and design of the artificial environment (theory of architecture, ergonomics, theory of design).

11. Constructive-engineering position — realized in the technological disciplines or more exactly, in the so called by H. Simon, "sciences of artificial".[6]

6 Cf. Simon H., *The Science of the Artificial*, Cambridge, 1969.

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These eleven positions are only "ideal types". It is worth while mentioning that some complicated forms of combination among them exist in the real scientific practice. The interrelations of the scientific positions could be illustrated as intersected sets. In this respect it is very important the coincedences on one or more parameters among the different positions to be established. On this ground a specific "positional taxonomy" can be constructed with which a new view of the problem of interdisciplinarity will be given.

It is necessary to be indicated that most of the fundamental sciences are "many-positional", i.e. the different disciplines of them belong to various scientific positions. For example, one group of the biological disciplines belongs to the dynamic-naturalistic position (biochemistry, molecular biology, biophysics); second group — to the statistic-naturalistic position (quantum biochemistry, classical genetics); third group — to the populative positions (ecology, populative genetics) and at last the fourth group is included into the evolutive position (classical theory of evolution, synthetic theory of evolution). Besides there are such biological disciplines which are "interpositional", i.e. belong to two scientific positions (e.g. evolutionary ecology or evolutionary biochemistry). As a matter of fact these interpositional disciplines are located in the domains of intersection among the scintific position. Another very typical example of a many-positional fundamental science is linguistics whose disciplines are distributed into eight positions.

Let us now outline the peculiarities of the comparative analysis of knowledge. Since the fundamental positions are eleven with six parameters, the initial objects of comparative analysis are 66. Each one of the six parameters determines a special field of comparison :

(A) Comparison of ontological world's picture. Here the analysis is dealing with comparison of the interpretations of such principle categories as time, space, causality, necessity etc. A non-trivial difficulty in this field is due to the fact that in most scientific positions many of the principle categories are "hidden" and the integral ontological world's picture is implicit. In this respect it is necessary a preliminary reconstruction of the implicit ontology in order the comparative analysis to be realized.

(B) Comparison of styles of scientific thought. The main feature of the cognitive style is its value orientation. Therefore, the comparative analysis here will be carried out as regards different value systems which include ideals for optimum scientific theory, selective criteria for preferable research topics, standards for completeness of scientific research and so on. The analysis in this field is complicated because there is not a direct correspondence between the scient fic position and the style of scientific thought, resp. its value system.

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(C) Comparison of theoretical structure and their empirical interpretations. The aim here is a reconstruction of the different types of scientific theory which are corresponding to the differe t scientific positions. The comparative analysis is based on the following items: (a) relationships between conceptual apparatus and mathematical formalism; (b) criteria for confirmation, verification and falsification of theory; (c) procedures of reducing the theoretical terms to the observational language; (d) the possible logical operations with empirical facts; (e) criteria for ad hocness; (f) uniform or non-uniform character of the theory (whether the laws of the theory are invariant in the sense of E. Wigner or not); (g) the usage of modal operators and (i) the kind of dependence of the theory on the "background knowledge" (in the sense of Lakatos)[7].

(D) Comparison of knowledge procedures. Each scientific position has its own system of such procedures. The items of comparative analysis in this field are: (a) type of explanation; (b) interrelation between explanation and prediction; (c) interrelations between explanation and comprehension; (d) procedures of classification and typologization; (e) building of models etc.

(E) Comparison of the typical metatheoretical unities relevant to the different scientific position A special problem in this field of comparative analysis is the formation of inter-disciplinary research programmes.

(F) The comparative analysis of the types of scientific communities and connected with them types of formal and non-formal scientific communication belongs, as it has been already pointed out, to the sociology of science. Here an interesting perspective is the building up a comparative sociology of science based on the comparative methodological analysis. The task of this sociology will be the investigation of the optimum magnitudes of the empirically measured parameters inherent to each scientific position and how these magnitudes are determined by the specificity of the epistemological parameters. Among the empirically measured sociological parameters the following could be pointed out: the necessary "critical mass" of scientists for carying out a certain type of research; the density and compactness of the communicative networks, the different parameters of the system of division of scientific work and so on.

Let us now consider in detail the functions of the comparative analysis of scientific knowledge. On the methodological level these are chiefly connected with the explanation of the scientific type of rationality.[8]

7 Lakatos I., "Changes in the Problem of Inductive Logic", *The Problem of Inductive Logic*, Amsterdam, 1968, p. 375, footnote 2.

8 Stephanov A. and Ginev D., "One Dimension of the Scientific Type of Rationality", *Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science*, (in print).

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Another important function on this level is the reconstruction of the different types of scientific language. Each position has its own language which could be described through three quasilinguistic categories: syntax, morphology and modality. The prefix "quasi" has been used because the meaning of these categories we have in mind is not the same accepted in linguistics. By syntax we mean the formal aspect of the scientific language. So, the syntax depends mainly on the structure of the mathematical apparatus exploited by the construction of the theories. The morphology is the interpretation (the empirical one in particular) of various sorts of terms in the scientific language. And the modality expresses the linguistic fixture of the results of scientific activity, such as descriptions, explanatory or reconstructive schemes, norms and rules, formal constructions, projects etc. According to the domination of a certain fixture it can be spoken about scientific language with descriptive, prescriptive, interpretative, reconstructive and so on modality.

On the metamethodological level the functions of the comparative analysis of scientific knowledge consists of establishment the area of validity of the different methodological conceptions. Here such questions are explored as, "Is Sneed-Stegmuller's model applicable to theories which are outside the scope of mathematical physics?"; "Is Popper's criterion of demarcation valid for humanities?" etc.

The investigation of the relevance of the existing methodological conceptions provides valuable base for a compatibility and eventually synthesis of these conceptions as well as for a creation of new methodologies especially with respect to these scientific positions which now are without established methodological framework (e.g. populative or projective positions).[9]

In conclusion it should be underlined that the multimethodologism which laid the philosophical foundations of the comparative analysis is constructive[10] i.e. the aim of this pluralistic programme is the discovery of the most fundamental structures of our scientific knowledge in order the general picture of science from methodological point of view to be obtained.

9 Ginev D., "Towards a Comparative Analysis of Scientific Knowledge", *Abstracts of 7th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science*, Salzburg, 1983.

10 Ginev D., "Rezension — Abriss der Methodologie der Wissenschaften", *Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Philosophie*, 1983/1, S.119-124.

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V

The Relativity of Scientific Views of Reality

Robert C. Trundle Jr.

We will argue that the contemporary position in the philosophy of science that science enables us to know how the world really is (metaphysical and epistemological realism) is in principle untenable. We shall seek to show that scientific views may be understood and warranted only in terms of their efficacy in realizing the mundane purposes of man. Our position will be based on an examination and application of Nāgārjuna's notion of the relativity of concepts, statements, and views of reality.[1] Let us therefore discuss the contemporary philosophy of science after explicating Nāgārjuna's position.

Nāgārjuna's position concerning the relativity of concepts follows from the Doctrine of Dependent Origination (pratityasamutpāda). The latter has both conceptual and ontological interpretations. The ontological interpretation is that everything arises and

1 Nāgārjuna (c. 200 A. D.) was the founder of the Mādhyamika school of Buddhist philosophy. He authored, among other works, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*, on which we base our position. He has had a profound influence on both philosophy and religion in the Indian culture. Professor Heinrich Zimmer calls Nāgārjuna one of the subtlest metaphysicians that the human race has produced (*Philosophies of India*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, p. 510). Although little or no implication for the philosophy of science have been drawn from Nāgārjuna's position, his thought has had an increasing impact on western philosophy as evidenced by the flurish of recent discussions and translations in philosophical journals. Among the most authoritative works on his philosophy in western literature are T. R. V. Murti's *The Central Thought of Buddhism* and F. J. Streng's *Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning*. I am particularly indebted to Professor R. Puligandla, physicist and philosopher, for my insights.

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ceases to be in dependence upon other things. Everything exists conditionally. Therefore there are no self existent things. The conceptual interpretation is that all concepts arise and cease to be in dependence upon other concepts. Every concept is relative and mutually dependent. Hence no concept has meaning in terms of itself alone. And thus can be no concept which has self-meaning. Thus, for example,[2] there are only two ways any concept, say C, may be explicated. First, we may seek to explicate the meaning of C through itself. But this procedure would be trivial and tautologous since it results in our saying that C means C. Secondly, we may explicate the meaning of C through non-C concepts. This procedure is non-tautologous and significant since C is now stated in terms of concepts other than itself. No one can choose the first alternative to meaningfully understand a concept. For the intelligibility of a concept requires our bringing it in with other concepts. But the conceptual interpretation of Dependent Origination is logically connected to the ontological interpretation. For concepts have referents or entities to which they refer. And since concepts are relative their referents are also relative. This means that the impossisibility of concepts having self-meaning implies the impossibility of their referents having self existence. For referents are always grasped in terms of the relations between concepts. Thus there can be no meaningful talk of entities in the world apart from concepts which are mutually dependent and relative. And the relativity of concepts logically entails the relativity of their referents.

If the meaningfulness of concepts depends on their relation to other concepts, then statements formulated through concepts are also intelligible only insofar as they are relative to other statements. Hence the statement that such and so are physical entities is understandable inasmuch as it is possible to understand that such and so are non-physical entities. If the one is not intelligible, then neither is the other. Either both are intelligible or neither is. And the physical and non-physical entities to which the statements refer must be relative and mutually dependent as are their respective concepts. For the concepts of physical and non-physical entities are graspable only in terms of their respective mutually dependent concepts.

If statements formulated through relative concepts must themselves be relative for their intelligibility, then so must be views of reality which are formulated through statements. A view of reality is a conceptual linguistic construction purporting to explicate reality. But that no view of reality could be exclusively true follows from its being relative to other views. Thus, for example,[3] Parmenides

2 Ramakrishna Puligandla, "How Does Nāgārjuna Establish the Relativity of All Views ?" (*Maha Bodhi*, Vol. 81, Nos. 5 and 6), p. 161.

3 Ibid., pp. 159 160.

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propounded a view of reality in which it was held that reality is one and unchanging. Heraclitus opposed Parmenides by arguing that reality was flux and pure change. Nāgārjuna would hold that the proponent of each view is wrong in arguing that his particular view of reality is absolutely and exclusively true. For taken by itself each view, a construction of statements and concepts, is meaningless. But brought in relation to one another each view is meaningful. Thus the concepts "change" and "many" of Heraclitus' view are not intelligible taken in isolation. They cannot be meaningfully explicated without bringing in the concepts of "unchanging" and "one" of Parmenides' view. And Zeno's reductio ad absurdum argument which seeks to show that the assumptions of Heraclitus' view lead to contradiction have no force for Nāgārjuna. Nāgārjuna would hold that one could demonstrate with equal force that the assumptions of Parmenides' view also result in contradiction. The reductio ad absurdum argument, often used by Western thinkers to show the exclusive truth of the opposing view, is unwarranted for Nāgārjuna. For here one seeks to establish the truth of view P by assuming not-P and deriving a contradiction. But by showing that not-P leads to contradiction one cannot thereby claim that P is true. For assuming that P alone is true also leads to contradiction. One would then contradictorily hold that both P and not-P are exclusively true. Nāgārjuna shows the relativity of concepts constituting the view of reality and consequently the relativity and mutual dependence of the view. He thereby shows that the view is false from the standpoint of its proponent who claims that the view is absolutely and exclusively true. But Nāgārjuna shows the relativity of the view without affirming either its falsity or its truth. Nāgārjuna's procedure is the dialectic called "prasanga." It shows the relativity of concepts and statements and consequently the mutual dependence and relativity of views of reality formulated through statements and concepts.

Nāgārjuna's demonstration of the relativity of views of reality is to be confused with neither skepticism nor nihilism. He is not a nihilist since he does not deny reality. Rather he denies the absolute and exclusive truth of any view of reality. Nāgārjuna distinguishes names and forms (nāma and rūpa) which make up views of reality from reality itself. He holds that such terms as "true" and "false" are predicable of views of reality and not of reality independently of views. Reality simply is. It neither embodies names or forms nor itself is embodied by them. Further, Nāgārjuna is not a skeptic. For by distinguishing between reality and views of it, it does not follow that Nāgārjuna is skeptical of the usefulness of experience and reason. Rather he recognizes them with respect to the experienced world of phenomena. Views of reality, whether of the

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everyday world, science, or philosophy, are pragmatically warranted with regard to various realms of experience. The truth of views of reality is therefore relative, phenomenal and mundane. If a view is disregarded it is not because it is proven to be absolutely false, but rather because it is inapplicable for our purpose. Thus the Newtonian principle that nothing goes clean out of existence may be affected by developments in quantum physics. Yet Newtonian dynamics will still be useful for engineers in constructing buildings. An automobile driver is justified in acting as though he lived in a Newtonian universe. And surveyors are warranted in assuming, for practical purposes, the truth of an earth-centered astronomy. What is not justifiable or logically possible is to say what reality is like apart from relative concepts. In sum, Nāgārjuna would argue that views of reality are relative to other views as statements and concepts are mutually dependent on other concepts and statements. What justifies a view of reality is not its showing the nature of ultimate reality, but its efficaciousness in realizing various purposes such as travelling in space, building bridges and so forth. Nāgārjuna therefore rejects, not the usefulness of relative truth, but the pretensions of conventional wisdom, science and philosophy to be exclusively and absolutely true.

We have thus far discussed the Doctrine of Dependent Origination and its implication for Nāgārjuna with respect to the relativity of concepts and their referents. We have argued that this entails the relativity of statements and views of reality We have thus distinguished a view of reality which is a linguistic conceptual entity from reality itself which is not. It has been shown that this leads neither to skepticism nor nihilism. Rather Nāgārjuna recognizes the pragmatic value of views in dealing with experienced phenomena. This means for Nāgārjuna that the truth of views is of a lower mundane sort and not of an absolute exclusive kind We have argued that this in turn means that concepts, statements and views can neither intelligibly be taken in isolation nor have self-existent referents. Views of reality cannot therefore be taken as absolutely and exclusively true.

What has the relativity of views to do with the contemporary philosophy of science ? We have summarized Nāgārjuna's position. Let us now apply it to a widely accepted perspective concerning recent work in the philosophy of science. We shall begin with an outline of what most contemporary philosophers and scientists perceive as the task of scientific views of reality. We shall then seek to show that this task is misguided. It belies the very conflation of reality with views of it which Nāgārjuna sought to distinguish by his dialectic.

Let us begin with a quote from Frederick Suppe's *The Structure of Scientific Theories* which was an outgrowth of an international

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symposium on the structure of scientific theories held in Urbana, Illinois, March 26 to 29, 1969;

> Philosophy of science today...increasingly subscribes to the position that it is a central aim of science to come to knowledge of how the world *really* is, that correspondence between theories and reality is a central aim of science as an epistemic enterprise and crucial to whatever objectivity scientific knowledge enjoys... This has led to an emphatic belief that an adequate philosophy of science must embrace a "hard-nosed" metaphysical and epistemological realism wherein how the world *is* plays a decisive role in the epistemic efforts and achievements of science.[4]

We may say at the start that how the world really is for science, is at bottom, a foregone conclusion. It is a foregone conclusion since a necessary presupposition for the intelligibility of all scientific inquiries is that every event has a cause. Such an assumption is necessary to predict and to manipulate phenomena. And an elliptical way of expressing the statement that every event has a cause is through the concept of "determinism". How the world really is for contemporary science must therefore be, in the most fundamental sense, deterministic. If we can thus show in light of Nāgārjuna's dialectic that it is absurd to say of the world that it is unqualifiedly deterministic we shall show the misguidedness of recent philosophy of science. We shall seek to show that the contemporary philosophy of science is mistaken by showing that "determinism" is a conceptually necessary feature, not of the world itself, but of scientific views of the world. Further we will seek to reject the recent perspective of many philosophers and scientists by showing the relativity of scientific views and by examining the structure of scientific theory itself. Scientific theories or deterministic views of reality are formulated for our purpose of understanding and manipulating phenomena with the view of realizing some end. The end may be constructing buildings, curing cancer, or travelling to stars. It is therefore we who treat phenomena deterministically for this reason. Insofar as phenomena are intelligible and manipulable through scientific theory, we may suppose for our purpose that phenomena are deterministic. But let us recall that we do not first know that phenomena are deterministic and then construct views of it. Rather we have no way of knowing what phenomena are like a priori and apart from a view of it. And how we view phenomena is in part a function of our purpose and of the concepts, statements and views we formulate in light of our purpose. If our purpose is to manipulate phenomena, say, construct buildings, then we must assume that things do not occur randomly, without reason, and unpredictably. But this assumption, which leads to the supposition of determinism, is a presupposition

4 *The Structure of Scientific Theories*, Ed. F. Suppe (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1979), pp. 648 649.

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of our view of reality. It is not a concept predicable of reality apart from our view of it. The concept of determinism was adopted in the first place to manipulate phenomena. Nāgārjuna would remind us that we do not look into reality apart from our concepts. Rather we organize our experience in a certain way in terms of certain concepts, say, "determinism," with respect to our purpose. Again, the notions of "determinism", "truth," "validity" and so forth are predicable of statements and views of reality and not of reality itself.

If "truth," "falsity," and "soundness" are predicable of relative statements and views of reality and not of reality itself, then no view can reveal any absolute truth about the world itself. Hence the proponent of one scientific view of reality could not claim the absolute and exclusive truth of his view. The proponent of Newtonian physics, which relies on Euclidean geometry, could not exhaustively explicate the concept of "straight line" without bringing in the concept of Einsteinian physics, which rests upon non-Euclidean geometry, of a line which is other than straight. Each physics applies its geometry to physical space and time. But neither physics can meaningfully explicate its concepts, say C_1, C_2, C_3... C_K, without bringing in non-C concepts, say non-C_1 non-C_2, non-C_3... non C_K. Thus if the scientific view is formulated of C concepts, it may state that "x is a straight line." But this statement is intelligible only insofar as it is possible to understand 'y is a non-straight line" with respect to a scientific view formulated through non-C concepts. If one of the statements formulated through C concepts is intelligible, then the other constructed through non-C concepts must also be intelligible. Indeed, one set of concepts relies for its meaningfulness on the other set of concepts. Either both statements and set of concepts are understandable or neither is. Nāgārjuna would argue that if concepts are relative and mutually dependent, then so are statements constructed of concepts. And if scientific views are formulated through relative statements and concepts, then scientific views must themselves be mutually dependent and relative. And what is relative and mutually dependent cannot be absolutely and exclusively true.

But the relativity of concepts, statements, and views logically entails the relativity of the entities or referents in the world to which those views refer. Thus one scientific view will have concept C_1 which has referent R_1, and another scientific view will have concept non-C_1 which has referent non R_1. Our saying that R_1 and non R_1 are relative means that they are not mutually exclusive and self-existent entities. Rather they are entities which can be understood with respect only to the relation between C_1 and non-C_1 concepts. The referents, say substance and non substance, could not be independent of one another since then C_1 and non-C_1 to which the

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referents correspond could then have no relation. And if C_1 and non-C_1 had no relation, we could not unpack the meanings of non-C_1 and C_1. C_1 and non C_1 would then have no meaning and we could not intelligibly speak of entities to which they refer. But if referents were self existent and independent of other referents, then they would have to be independent of interdependent concepts. They would then exist before and after their respective concepts were adopted and abandoned. But if this was the case how could we account for the fact that "black holes" are referents of relativistic physics, and had no existence in pre-relativistic physics? But this non-existence could not occur if concepts have self-existent referents. Referents which are self existent imply concepts which have self-meaning. But we have argued that a concept can be explicated through itself only on pain of being trivial and tautologous. If a concept is not to be explicated in a tautologous manner, then it must bring in concepts other than itself. If it does this, then it is relative and mutually dependent. And what is mutually dependent and relative can correspond, not to what is absolute and independent, but only to that which is itself dependent. Hence the relativity of concepts, statements, and views logically entails the relativity of their referents. To think otherwise is to think that independent self-meaning concepts have self-existent referents. But as we have shown there can be no talk of referents independently of concepts, and there can be no meaningful explication of a concept, say C, without bringing in non C concepts. The relativity of concepts therefore precludes the intelligibility of the notion of self-existent entities. If there can be no self-existent entities, then there can be no intelligible talk of one set of entities to which a view refers being alone real and existent. And if no scientific view can have referents which are alone real, then no scientific view can alone show what reality is like.

We have discussed the relativity of scientific views, and of "determinism" as a relative concept in light of Nāgārjuna's dialectical logic. Let us now examine the logical structure of scientific views with respect to Nāgā juna's position.

Scientific views yield theoretical state descriptions or predictions, say b_2, which follow logically from an initial theoretical state description, say b_1, taken with a set of substantive axioms, say A_o, and the rules of logical deducibility, say $\vdash_L$, in the vocabulary of some theory, sat T_o. This may be summarized by the deductive schema $b_1 \wedge A_o \vdash_L b_2$ Thus it is not mere reports of sense perceptions that make phenomena intelligible, manipulable, and predictable. Rather it is taking our observations in the form of empirical state descriptions, transposing the latter into theoretical idealizations (b_1), and taking b_1 with some set of scientific laws (A_o), which make phenomena predictable and manipulable. But the concepts of

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empirical state descriptions as well as those of their theoretical idealizations (b_1 and b_2) and laws (A_O) are relative concepts Further the laws themselves say "All matter is such that it can neither be created nor destroyed," have the logical form $(x)(Sx \rightarrow Px)$. Such laws cannot be definitively verified or falsified empirically in terms of any amount of transpositions of theoretical state descriptions (b_2) into empirical state descriptions. Thus, how could any scientific view be absolutely and exclusively true if its substantive axioms cannot be definitively verified and its theoretical concepts are relative and mutually dependent? Finally, the very theoretical concepts and laws in the vocabulary of a theory T_O that we impose on phenomena will depend on our purpose and physical location with respect to the world we observe. If our purpose is to construct buildings and if our physical location to phenomena is the everyday world about us, we may assume the theoretical concepts and laws of Newtonian physics. But what sense would it make to say of our theory that it alone is true of phenomena? The theory is justified not by showing what reality is really like, but by its usefulness with respect to realizing our purpose, namely constructing buildings If scientific views are not able to explicate and manipulate phenomena with respect to our purpose, then they are deemed inapplicable with regard to the circumstances in question. What justification could there be for holding a theory other than its efficaciousness and explicative power with respect to phenomena which we seek to manipulate for various purposes? Our analysis is consistent with Nāgārjuna's notion that the truth of all views of reality are of a lower mundane sort. Nāgārjuna does not reject the usefulness of experience and reason, but only the pretension that views of reality formulated through reason and experiences can reveal ultimate reality. Such views are not absolutely and exclusively true, but relatively true and useful in the mundane realm of experienced phenomena.

We have thus far discussed the logical structure of scientific theories, the relativity of scientific views, and "determinism" as a relative concept which is presupposed for the intelligibility of scientific inquiries. Let us in closing expand upon what is meant by view, or system of knowledge about phenomena, in light of Nāgārjuna's distinction between reality and views of it.

Our knowledge of phenomena is always relative to some perceptual-conceptual (categorial) framework, say Newtonian physics, behavioral psychology and so forth. That is. it is through the categorial activity of the mind that we apprehend a classifiable, understandable, and knowable world of objects, processes, properties, and relations.[5] Consequently we construct sets of propositions linked

5 Ramakrishna Pulgandla, "Determinism and Freedom in Indian Philosophy: A Comparative Analysis." This was the lead paper

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by rules of inference which comprise the various systems of knowledge about phenomena Thus knowledge as a set of propositions must be free from contradiction and be comprised of a coherent orderly connection among its components. Again, these logical connections binding a set of propositions are the rules of inference and they are part of the categorial framework. They are themselves formulated by man for the intelligibility of the system of knowledge. But the rules of inference are no more inherent in phenomena independently of man's conceptual activity than are the empirical and theoretical propositions they bind together Such laws and propositions are not, as Newton thought his laws of nature were, built into the very fabric of the cosmos itself. Now freedom from contradiction is a necessary but not sufficient condition for truth, since no proposition in the system should be self contradictory and no contradiction should be derivable from the conjunction of two or more propositions whithin the system.[6] But the principle of non-contradiction was not bestowed upon man by phenomena. Rather it is man who formulates it and requires all knowledge claims to be in accordance with it. The principle of non-contradiction is therefore an epistemological and not an ontological principle, since it pertains to propositions which always arise in some view of reality formulated by man with respect to his purpose. The principle of non-contradiction does not pertain to referents or entities in the world apart from man. Indeed, what cognitive significance could an entity have independently of man's concepts and principles? We do not demand that a tree abide by the principle of non contradiction. Rather we demand of our statements about trees that they conform to the principle of non-contradiction. And thus it is misguided to ask what phenomena are like apart from man's relative concepts and views. It is phenomena which comprise the very referents which correspond to relative concepts. Nāgārjuna would argue that where there are no relative concepts there can be no intelligible talk of phenomena. Nāgārjuna would question how the world could be conceived apart from a relative view of it And what, he would ask is to determine the acceptance of a view other than its efficacy with respect to realizing a purpose?

In conclusion, the application of Nāgārjuna's insight to scientific views of reality shows that science will never demonstrate what the world is really like. Science cannot reveal ultimate reality. We have argued that scientific views of reality are formulated through relative and mutually dependent concepts and statements. State-

presented by Professor Puligandla, a physicist and philosopher, at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, San Diego, March 1979.

6 Ibid., p. 12.

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ments and concepts which are relative make up views of reality. Hence scientific views of reality are themselves relative. Consequently they are dependent for their clarification and intelligibility upon other views. And if scientific views of reality are mutually dependent, then no particular view can be exclusively and absolutely true. This in turn means that no scientific view can alone say how the world really is. For Nāgārjuna the world is neither rational nor non rational. Rather it simply is, and is never ultimately graspable through names and forms which comprise views of reality. The truth of contemporary scientific views belongs to the mundane practical realm. We have therefore concluded that, for Nāgārjuna, scientific views are warranted only in terms of their usefulness in realizing the mundane purposes of man.

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VI

Nature and Status of Soul in Kant

R. P. Singh

The present paper is an attempt to clarify the nature and status of soul in Immanuel Kant's philosophy. The paper mainly deals with Kant's concept of "transcendental consciousness" and brings out it's various implications concerning his epistemology and ontology. The present paper, however, does not claim to be a comprehensive and a systematic exposition of Kant's epistemology and ontology except that of his "transcendental consciousness."

The common structure of "soul" Kant designates as "transcendental unity of self-consciousness."[1] It consists of the "forms of intuition" (space and time) and the "forms of understanding" (the categories) which, in Kant's analysis, are not static forms but forms of operation that exist only in the act of apprehending and comprehending sensible intuitions. The forms of intuition synthesize the manifold of sensible intuitions into spatio-temporal order. By virtue of the categories, the results of the spatio-temporal order are brought to universal and necessary relations of cause and effect, substance, reciprocity and so on. And this entire complex is unified in the "transcendental apperception" which relates all experience to the "thinking ego" and thereby it gives experience the continuity of being "my" experience.

What Kant calls the "highest" synthesis, that of transcendental apperception, is the awareness of an "I think" which accompanies every representation. Kant says, "It must be possible for the "I think" to accompany all my representation: for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible or atleast would be nothing to me."[2] The "I think can be

1 Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason; Translated into English by N. K. Smith, The MacMillan Press Ltd. London, 1973, p. 153.
2 Ibid., p. 152 3.

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regarded as continuous, active and present in the series of representations only if the representations are given in a unity with one another through it. Kant writes," That relation comes about, not simply through my accompanying each representation with consciousness, but only in so far as I conjoin one representation with another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them. Only in so far, therefore, as I can unite a manifold of given represention in one consciousness. is it possible for me to represent to myself the identity of the consciousness in these representations."[3] For Kant, the awareness of "I think" or the "transcendental apperception" is the ultimate basis for the unity of the subject and, hence, for the universality and necessity of all the objective relations The awareness of "I think", according to Kant. "cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation."[4] Kant says, "The principle of apperception is the highest principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge."[5]

In Kant's view, the activity which lies in the "transcendental consciousness" is an "apriori" activity because, "since universality and necessity of the rule would not be grounded apriori, but only on induction, they would be merely fictitious and without genuinely universal validity."[6] Kant accepts Hume's premise that "...all our perceptions are different from each other, and from everything else in the universe, they are also distinct and separable, and may be considered as separately existent, and may exist separately and have no need of anything else to support their existence "[7] In conformity to this premise of Hume, Kant says, "Appearances do indeed present cases from which a rule can be obtained according to which something usually happens, but they never prove the sequences to be necessary."[8] But without universality and necessity, scientific knowledge, for Kant, is impossible. In Kant's analysis, to ask what are the conditions which make scientific knowledge possible is to ask what are the conditions which make "synthetic apriori" judgements possible. As synthetic, it amplifies the concept of predicate and is thus more than a mere tautology. and as apriori, it expresses universality and necessity. What we seek in science, according to Kant, is such an implicative knowledge with the characterstics of universality and necessity.

3 Ibid., p. 153.
4 Ibid., p. 153.
5 Ibid., p. 154.
6 Ibid., p. 223.
7 David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature: Book one, edited by D. G. C. Macnabb, FontanaKollins 1978, p. 283-84.
8 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason: Translated by N. K. Smith The MacMillan Press Ltd. London, 1973, p. 125.

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From Kant's point of view, scientific knowledge is impossible within the frame-work of Hume's philosophy because the means, through which sensible intuitions are organized, cannot be furnished from that. Kant shows that universality and necessity in scientific cognition are more than the products of sensible intuitions, or, in otherwords, they are applicable to sensible-intuitions without "arising"[9] from them. And he establishes this point in the "transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding"[10] in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. On this basis, Kant regards Hume's philosophy as an abdication of the transcendental necessity in scientific knowledge. Hume's attempts of attributing general ideas to the force of customs and habits are, for Kant, tantamount to a denial of the "apriori" activity which he (Kant) assigns to the "human intellect".[11] Whereas, for Hume, whatever appears to be necessary in the sphere of "Matters of fact," can be accounted for by the "laws of association" based on customary transitions, habits etc., for Kant, "... it is, after all, we ourselves who are responsible for the formation of general concepts. Conceptions are something which the mind *produces* actively, and it is precisely in this respect that they differ from perceptions. In so far, therefore, as we exercise our power of entertaining general ideas, we must be said to have gone entirely beyond the state of mere acceptance of the given. Or to put it in another way, our ability to render the given intelligible to ourselves, and to describle it, under the guidance of general words, is an expression of genuine intellectual activity."[12] Kant, therefore, writes, "...the order and regularity in the appearances, which we entitle nature, we ourselves introduce. We could never find them in appearances, had not we ourselves, or the nature of our mind, orginally set them there."[13]

Kant, thus, introduces a radical change in the interpretation of the epistemological-situation. He places the "transcendental consciousness" at the centre of the cognitive process and claims that it is not really the objects which determine the "transcendental consciousness," but it is the "transcendental consciousness" which determines the objects.

On this basis, Kant rejects Hume's thesis that the "self" is nothing but "a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which

9 Ibid., p. 41.
10 Ibid., p. 151.
11 H. W. Cassiren: Kant's First Critique; George Allen & Unwin Ltd. London 1968, p. 55.
12 Ibid., p. 55.
13 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason; translated by N. K. Smith. The MacMillan Press Ltd. London 1973, p. 147.

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succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity,"[14] Kant considers Hume's attempt to "catch myself"[15] as a gross mistake because the "transcendental consciousness is a logical presupposition of all knowledge and it can never be given in actual and possible sensible intuition." Therefore, it can never be an object of knowledge and. "All that can be said about that 'I' (and therefore also about transcendental apperception) is simply that it is an expression of the necessary unity of consciousness, a unity that manifests itself in the fact that all that is said, thought, and represented must necessarily always be able to be combined with an 'I' is not to speak of an act, a process or a thing, but about the fundamental logical condition of having concepts like 'judgement', 'assertion' and 'consciousness."[16]

It may be pointed out that Kant through his conception of "transcendental consciousness" does not commit solipsism because he grants the undoubted existence of things as appearances. According to Kant. the "ground"[17] of an appearance is the "things in themselves,"[18] which are "unknown," because "we can never be acquainted with these, but only with the way in which they affect us, we must resign ourselves to the fact that we can never get any nearer to them and can never know what they are in themselves."[19] In Kant's analysis, "...appearances are only representations of things which are unknown as regards what they may be in themselves".[20] The thing-in-itself, according to Kant, acts on our senses and thereby furnishes the materials for our cognition, but the thing-in-itself transcends the logical validity of the categories of understanding because it can never be given in the actual and possible sensible-intuition. And it is the concept of "noumenon" which as "limiting concept,"[21] attempts" to curb the pretensions of sensibility"[22] from being extended to the thing-in-itself and limits "the objective validity of sensible knowledge."[23] Thus, the Kant, it is the thing in itself

14 Hume: Enquiries concerning Human understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals; edited by L A. Selby Bigge, Third edition revised by P. H. Hidditch, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1975, p. 302.

15 Ibid., p. 301 2.

16 Justus Hartnack: Kant's Theory of knowledge; The MacMillan Press Ltd. London, 1968. p. 55.

17 H. J. Paton: The Moral Law: Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Hutchinson University Library London, 1969, p. 119.

18 Ibid., p. 119.

19 Ibid., p. 111.

20 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason; Translated by N. K. Smith. The MacMillan Press Ltd. London, 1973, p. 173.

21 Ibid. p. 272.

22 Ibid., p. 272.

23 Ibid,. p. 272.

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which provides the manifold of sensible-intuitions which are organized be the categories of understanding. And it is the "transcendental consciousness" which makes "the possibility of apriori knowledge arising from it."[24]

But Kant does not confine his conception of the "transcendental consciousness" to the sphere of logic or epistemology. The "transcendental consciousness" is not only a logical concept but also an ontological Being. And this is what creates "transcendental idealism" in Kant according to which even the outer appearances are mere representations which exist in us. But if they exist in us, how can we call them as "outer"? In Kant's analysis, appearances are outer only in the sense that they consist of representations which relate to their objects in "space". in which all things are external to one another. But since space itself is in us, so the outer appearances are not "transcendentally" outside us but only empirically so.

In Kant's analysis, the categories of understanding, which arise out of "transcendental consciousness" have their validity to the sphere of phenomena. And if they are applied to something which can never be given in sensible-intuition, then cease to be valid and there arises a "transcendental illusion", A transcendental illusion, according to Kant, is unavoidable and "it carries us altogether beyond the empirical employment of categories and puts us off with a merely deceptive extension of pure understanding",[25] In this context, Kant relentlessly criticises the "rational psychology" for its erroneous application of the categories to the "transcendental consciousness". That the categories, however different from the things which they condition, are still objects *for a subject* follows from the centrality of the "transcendental consciousness" and it is a logical to identify the "transcendental consciousness" with one or more of the categories.

Kant's concept of "transcendental consciousness", as a pure subject and never as a predicate, rejects Descartes' concept of "mind" which is a substance in as much as the "body" is a substance. In Descartes' philosophy, there is a cleavage between "mind" and "body". And this cleavage is effected immediately by his method of radically and evacuating "doubt",[26] which enables him to suspend belief in the existence of everything represented in "mind" as an object, while it compels him to assert the existence and activity (thinking) of his own "mind". He, thus, makes his assertion", I think, therefore, I am",[27] and establishes dualism from the outset.

24 Ibid., p. 153.
25 Ibid., p. 298.
26 Rene Descartes: Discourse on Method and Meditations; Translated into English by F. E. Sutchiffe, Penguin Book 1979, p. 53.
27 Ibid., p. 53-54.

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But Kant, while accepting Descartes' premise that "I" is the "thinking ego", rejects Descartes' claim that "I" is a substance. In Kant's analysis, the Cartesian premise "I" is a substance is erroneous because the category of substance can be applied to "an object given in experience as permanent."[28] But in that judgement, "we have not taken as our basis any experience; the inference is merely from the concept of the relation which all thought has to the 'I' as the common subject in which it inheres. Nor should we, in resting it upon experience, be able, by any sure observation, to demonstrate such permanence. The 'I' is indeed in all thoughts, but there is not in this representation the least trace of intuition distinguishing the 'I' from other objects of intuition."[29] The "transcendental consciousness," according to Kant, is always a subject because it is that which "thinks" and hence it can not predicated of anything. But from the fact that "soul" is a subject, it does not follow that it is also a permanent substance. Kant, therefore, criticises the categories of understanding and prevents them from presenting the "transcendental consciousness" in the sphere of inter-objective relationship.

Thus the "transcendental consciousness", in Kant, is pure subject and it "regulates" the apriori concepts which "constitute" the knowledge of phenomena. But it transcends the logical validity of the apriori concepts and consequently remains unknown and unknowable.

28 Kant: Critique of Pure Reason: Translated by N. K. Smith, The MacMillan Press Ltd. London, 1973, p. 334.

29 Ibid., p. 334.

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VII

Time, Space, and Consciousness

Gerry O'Donnell

No one likes to be tormented. Yet reflection on Time, Consciousness, and Ultimate Reality can be very tormenting. The following enigmas are inevitable, especially when a comprehensive account of Ultimate Reality is sought through analysis and induction rather than through synthesis and deduction.

Alpha : "If everything is at least weakly intelligible, then everything has identity. That which has an identity is what it is and so cannot change. Thus Time must be explained as a series of newly-created worlds and of created and uncreated minds with 'misleading' memories. The worlds do not change while they briefly exist, so they all have identity. Minds 'remember' the series of created worlds as a series of changes in one world. Thus Time And Change must be of such an unexpected nature that my thinking is shot through with illusion (Maya)".

Beta : "If my thinking and moving require even a finite and small span of Time and Space, then I do not see how I could ever complete a thought or action in the supposedly real physical Universe. In order to think for a minute or walk for three yards, I must cross an infinitely divisible span and thus think infinitely many thought-parts and walk infinitely many step-parts, so Zeno said. But, alas, I must do all this in a finite amount of Space and Time, as Zeno did not see. And as Zeno did not see, there is the problem of stepping infinitely many step-parts of Space within a Finite Time, or of thinking an infinite amount of thought-parts, as a physical organism within a finite amount of Space where Relativity allows no sense to talk of my 'staying absolutely still'. Nor, as Zeno did not see, can I make sense of co ordinating actions in Space and Time. I cannot even think and act in the same place and Time! For how can one co-ordinate a locus in a spatial series with one in a temporal

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series, when not only is each series infinitely divisible, but each can only be arbitrarily divided into an infinity of arbitrary units ?"

Happily, the following account of Space, Time, and Consciousness renders redundant the sophistical assumptions that all as in Space and that for every mind Time is fundamentally linear.

All that exists can be put into three categories : Space, Time, and Consciousness. Space has three dimensions: length, breadth, and width. Time has two categories: Potential Infinity and Actual Eternity. Such an Infinity is divisible into finite parts : Actual Eternity is not. Consciousness, which is the interpreter of events in the Spatio Temporal Universe, is either a Reflecting, Reflexive Consciousness or a Non Reflecting, Non-Reflexive Consciousness.

The Infinite Time Category is usually apprehended by finite awareness as linear, like a line emerging from what was earlier to disappear into what will be later. As such, it has three parts: the past, the present, and the future. Consciousness, strictly speaking, be it Finite or Eternal, can exist only in a "present". Consequently, for it to be aware of Time periods in which it does not exist, it must somehow disassociate itself from the "present". It must sever its connection with Absolute Reality, and by doing so shatter the unity of Absolute Reality. This severance is alienation. For Consciousness must, as it were, stand back from, and reflect on, its involvement with Absolute Reality rather than spontaneously react to it. The consequence of this alienation is the Reflecting. Reflexive Consciousness, which has now become a 'Subject". Its area of knowledge is the Spatio-Temporal Universe, which has now become its "Object".

Furthermore, the Finite Consciousness believing itself to be the standard by which everything else is judged, can recognize only finitude in the phenomena of the Universe. Infinite distance is arbitrarily divided into finite lengths : Potential Infinite Time is similarly treated. Events begin at one point in Time and end after a certain "time distance" at another point in Time. Thus. Time iiself, which is essentially non-linear, becomes distorted when given the linear character of Space.

Thus not only does the Finite Reflecting, Reflexive Consciousness refute the unity of Eternal Absolute Reality by postulating a Subject-Object dichotomy. it also distorts Time itself by imposing on it a spatial characteristic.

The function of the Finite Consciousness, with itself as the final and absolute judge, is to assess the significance of events in the Spatio-Temporal Universe. All phenomena possess value only in so far as they affirm its existence and acknowledge its supermacy. Because of its essentially bounded nature, the Finite Consciousness is

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aware of the spatial limitations of solid objects and places absolute significance upon them. For it sees its own finitude reflected in them. And in much the same way that it fragments Time and Space into measured lengths, it imposes quantity and division onto qualities also; and so men speak of what is fast, faster, fastest: blue, bluer, bluest; and the like with all other properties.

Man thinks that because he recognizes and labels such quantitative distinctions he creates order from chaos. When, in fact, all he does is simply recognize the inherent order of the Universe. The Universe itself is oblivious to man's opinion of it and remains unchanged whether or not man is there to observe it. Contrary to his conceit, man is not the measure of all things.

To the Finite Consciousness, then, all qualities and things are relative to its own needs and desires, their worth determined entirely by its will. Nothing is judged on its own merits or appreciated for itself alone.

It is, however, in the moral order that the effects of the relativity of values are most deeply felt by mankind. "Least good" is bad when compared to "most good". And if Finite Time is introduced into the moral equation then a "future good" may be sacrificed for a "present good", because the present is "here" and "now" and the future a mere hypothesis.

In the Category of Finite Time, Space, Temporal passage and even Morality are relative to a preferred stance, as are quantity and quality. For it is by judging the relative value of objects and ideas that the Finite Consciousness centres itself, or "finds" its place in the Spatio Temporal Cosmos. Without being able to judge the relativity of things external to itself the Finite Consciousness could not exist. For it depends on things that are not of itself in order to define its own reality. It is, short, fundamentally false.

Therefore, actions based on the judgment of this false Consciousness, or false sense of self, can never obtain the whole truth. In other words, it has fallen into error. Error leads it into unrealistic acts. Unrealistic acts produce unhappiness, or at best a temporary and, therefore, a merely relative form of happiness.

On the other hand Consciousness in the category of Eternal Time has none of these difficulties. It remains unified, not broken by a Subject-Object division. Neither does it "stand outside of itself" and reflect on its involvement with reality as does Finite Consciousness. Since it does not have a distinct and separate sense of self it does not seek to justify its existence in its own eyes by judging the actions, dimensions and qualities of all else. When observing a quality, like the colour blue, this Consciousness does not compare it to other shades of blue to see which is "better". Instead it judges

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and appreciates each quality according to its own merits. Neither is it aware of a "present", let alone a "past" or a "future", because it is unaware of Time itself as a distinct and separate part of Universal Reality. In fact, to the Eternal Consciousness, Time, Space, and Thought itself are assumed to be inseparably united. It must, furthermore, be unaware of all "facts" as such.

The Eternal Consciousness need not store "information" as the Finite Consciousness must do. For it can respond to any situation without knowingly seeking a parallel example from the past or by using the present response as an infallible rule for the future. Quite simply, it cannot do this because it does not have a separate sense of self that distorts Space and Time for its own ends.

The Eternal Consciousness is like a pane of glass through which the light of existence shines. Its purpose is best fulfilled when the glass of Consciousness is purified of self-centredness so that the light of existence may pass through unobstructed. Conversely, Finite Consciousness obtrudes itself upon the window of Consciousness and vainly tries to control the light of existence for its own ends. By doing so, it deludes itself into believing that it is the indispensible orderer and — by extension — the creator of events in the Universe. The Eternal Consciousness is under no such delusion. It "sees" itself not as an orderer, much less as a creator, but merely as a medium through which the light of existence flows.

Although the goal of each kind of Consciousness is similar, in that they both seek happiness, their means are not alike. The Finite Consciousness is active; it believes that happiness is the result of the order that it imposes on the Universe. The Eternal Consciousness is passive; it "believes" that happiness is the result of unselfish conformity to the inherent order of the Universe. Finite Consciousness competes against the Universe, while Eternal Consciousness accepts the Universe with perfect understanding.

Eternity, being non-divisible, is a perpetual present, an immediate and everlasting "now". Consciousness in the Eternal Present is not detached. Its unity is not divided by any awareness of fissures between the past, present and future. Consequently, it is totally involved with Reality. Its judgment, being unimpaired by detached reflection, acquires knowledge in much the same way that a thirsty body "knows" that it wants water. This it does, intuitively or instinctively. And because Consciousness in the Eternal Present exists in harmony with all that is real, the results of its spontaneous acts can only be limitless joy and limitless wisdom.

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VIII

Through Mind to Consciousness: New Thoughts on Yoga and Psychoanalytic Theory

Lauren Pfister

A multitude of yogic practices have become one of the most recent and pervasive influences transplanted from their rooting in Indian philosophy and life into the environment of the Western world. Though there are those who would insist that Europeans have merely hidden some of the "eccentric" phenomena similar to yogic practices under their sleeves[1] — and done so as early as the times of Augustine of Hippo[2] — in the last decade yogic practices have gained a public eye and have become a habit of behavior for some.[3]

Initial scholarly contact with the stories surrounding yogins' *siddhis* were often relegated during the nineteenth century to studies of the occult. The "mystery of mysticism," "parapsychology," "occultic powers": this rhethoric accompanied descriptions of any one of a variety of yogic texts. Bertrand Russell, for example, reduced mysticism to an emotion, criticizing any claims to experiences (as those of the yogin) as being merely subjective.[4] At the turn

1 cf. Flagg, William J., *Yoga or Transformation* (New York: J. W. Bouton, 1898). This is a study which draws parallels from a huge array of sources, disclosing many eccentric details. It falls short of a disciplined comparative study.

2 Hans, Jacob, *Western Psychotherapy And Hindu Sadhana* (Great Britain: International Universities Press, Inc., 1961), p. 174.

3 Riepe, Dale, "Indian Philosophical Influences on Recent American Thought and Lifestyles," *Review World*, 1979, pp. 9-21.

4 Coward, Harold, "Mysticism in the analytical psychology of Carl Jung and the yoga psychology of Patanjali: A comparative study" *Philosophy East And West*, XXIX, 3, July 1979, pp. 323-324.

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of the twentieth century, William James provoked a new interest through his empirical studies in religious experience. Walter Stace, in his *Mysticism And Philosophy*, reinterpreted mysticism as a mode of perception. circumlocuting the pejorative and reductive criticism of those like Russell,[5] and gaining a new credence for the study of mystic experience.

Overcoming the incredulity of sceptical observers, scholars and adherents of various yogic practices have not unconsciously employed psychological terminology in order to gain consideration. Parallels presuming the congruence of psychoanalytic interpretations of experience and the philosophico-experimental claims of yogic meditation are becoming more and more numerous.[6] In view of these works, an evaluation of the legitimacy of such an approach is quite appropriate. By isolating the concept of "mind" as put forth from the Sāṁkhya-Yogic tradition, it is hoped that we will be able to set a foundation for a critique and provide rationale for certain alternative approaches.

The 'Mind' In Sāṁkhya-Yoga Texts

The unification of the two traditions which grow out of Patañjali's *Yogasutra* and Kapila's Sāṁkhya philosophy has often been taken for granted. The latter is conceived as providing the metaphysical groundings for the former's practical pedagogy. A more pragmatic justification posits that, for the sake of theological expediency, the two systems were joined to "satisfy the theists and to facilitate the propagation of the theory of the universe expounded in Sāṁkhya."[7] Dasgupta specifies seven differences evident in the comparison of the two positions, the most profound being the atheistic presuppositions of the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* and the clear admission of the existence and pre eminence of *Īśvara* in the *Yogasutra*.[8] Though

5 Stace, Walter, T., *Mysticism And Philosophy* (London : MacMillan. 1961), p. 15.

6 A very slim number of examples include J. Jordans' *Jung And Yoga* and S. M. Sreenivasachar's *The Unconscious In Yoga And Psycho Analysis*.

7 Hiriyanna, M., *Outlines Of Indian Philosophy* (Bombay: George Allen & Unwin. Ltd.. 1973). p. 268. Swami Prabhavananda in *The Spiritual Heritage of India* (Hollywood : Vedanta Press, 1969), pp. 208 264, treats the two schools as separate spiritual traditions.

8 Dasgupta, Surendranath, *Yoga As Philosophy And Religion* (Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), pp. 163 165. The seven include (1) the question of God (Īśvara). (2) the means to reach *kaivalya* (*Sāṁkhya* emphasizes a 'steady perseverance in philosophical thinking' while the *Yogasutra* specifies numerous other means of attainment which are equally effective. (3) a slight difference in the conception of *avidya*. (4) a difference in the

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these distinctions are developed with more thoroughness by commentators on the various sutras, we will presuppose concurrence of the basic tenets of the two schools and will utilize insights gleaned from both the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* and *Yogasutra* in the subsequent presentation.

Linguistic precision is a goal difficult to achieve in the analysis of terms surrounding the concept "mind." Differing schools of thought have incorporated the terms *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra*, and *citta* in their discussion about the functions of the mind. A summary description of the four terms is presented in the following fashion by various Vedantins.

> Manas represents the indecisive state of antaḥkaraṇa or mind as found, for instance, when we cannot ascertain whether an object is this or that. Buddhi stands for antaḥkaraṇa in its state of assertion, as when we decisively know a thing as 'this.' Ahaṁkāra is the state of antaḥkaraṇa having some reference to the self, as in the judgment 'I am happy.' Citta is antaḥkaraṇa in its state of remembering, i.e. referring to a past event.[9]

In contrast to this systematic psychology, Patanjali's is sometimes considered to be simplistic.[10] Possible justification for this lack of technicality may be found in the generic use of the term *citta* as the inclusive terms for the whole of mental phenomena including *manas*, *ahaṁkāra* and *buddhi*

Textual analysis bears out the fact of the far more frequent employment of *citta* in the *Yogasutra*. *Buddhi* is found only twice, mentioned in the light of theoretical arguments which support the presence of the *puruṣa* as the source of consciousness in the mind.[11] *Citta*, on the other hand, occurs nineteen times and is referred to in several other sutras. By it comes the definition of yoga: *citta vṛtti nirodhaḥ*, "the stilling of mental modifications"[12] The importance of the mind, consequently, cannot be overstated concerning yoga. The practical means by which the stilling can be achieved,[13] the

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course of the evolution of the categories. (5) slight variations in the conceptions of *dharma*, *lakshaṇa*, *avasthapariṇāma* (6) the atomistic universe and (7) perception.

9 Datta, D. M. *The Six Ways of Knowing* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., (1932), p. 48

10 Swami Rama *et. al.*, *Yoga And Psychotherapy*: *The Evolution of Consciousness* (Honesdale, Pennsylvania: The Himalayan International Institute of Yoga Science And Philosophy, 1979), pp. 71-73.

11 *Yogasutra*, IV, 21 22. All future references to the *Yoga-sutra* will be abbreviated "YS".

12 YS, I, 2.

13 YS, I, 33, 37; III, 9, 11, 12 (*Pariṇāmas*)

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theoretical implications,[14] the experiential tangents,[15] and the final state of release (*kaivalya*)[16]—all are dependent upon the nature and function of *citta*. The presentation of these issues fill the major part of the *Yogasutra*.

The distractions which can hinder the *citta* from reaching its desired stillness include bodily illnesses as well as erroneous perceptions;[17] there is no simple, categorical division placed between *citta* and the body in which it resides in the empirical world. Emotional attitudes and habits of disengagement from extreme emotions aid in the skillful calming of its movements.[18] Ultimately, the yogin's goal involves the withdrawal of the sense organs from the external phenomena, in order to permit *citta* to focus, to bind itself, in concentration.[19] Only by this disciplined reversal of the perceptual path — a carefully trained, meditatively-sharpened talent — can the *citta* reach through inwardness to transforming quietude.[20]

All of what we have reviewed stirs no innate sense of contradiction when compared with a psychoanalytic theoretical structure. Patañjali, however, had more to claim for the *citta*. In virtue of the skilled practice of a maturing yogin, the *citta* can enter into another's body, or, having reached higher skills, can create other minds and bodies which it can control.[21] These powers are not the only expressions of the yogin's art, but they mark distinctions in the purpose, power and presence of the yogin.

More central theoretical considerations are involved in the sutra which states that *citta*, colored by the "knower" (*puruṣa*) and the "known" (objects-for-sight), leads to "all-apprehending knowledge."[22] The relationship between *citta* and *puruṣa*, mind and spirit, needs to be understood in detail before any synopsis can be drawn. Clear discussions of this issue and others are worked out in the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*.

The most fundamental elements of the universe are the material principle, *prakṛti*, and the principle of consciousness, *puruṣa*. *Prakṛti* is non-intelligent and yet intentional, functioning for the sake of the liberation of *puruṣa*.[23] Moved by an unexplicable relation with

14 YS, IV, 15-18, 21, 23.
15 YS, III, 34, 38: IV, 4, 5.
16 YS, III, 1-3; IV, 26-34.
17 YS, I, 30.
18 YS, I, 33, 37.
19 YS, III, 1-3.
20 YS, III, 9-12.
21 YS. III, 38; IV, 4, 5
22 YS. IV. 23. (Taimni's translation).
23 Kapila, *The Sāṁkhya kārikā of Īsvara Krsṇa* (Madras: Univ. of Madras, 1935), 57, p. 105. Any future reference to this text will be abbreviated "SK."

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puruṣa, prime matter (*prakṛti*) evolves several evolvent entities (*mahat*, intellect; *ahaṅkāra*, ego) which themselves proceed to further catalyze into being the sense organs, various subtle elements, and in conjunction with those subtle elements, the gross elements by which organic things are constituted.[24] The inner organs—intellect, self-consciousness and mind; *buddhi ahaṅkāra* and *manas*—function together to formulate the empirical self in the world of phenomena. These three organs are considered "principle organs" because they "ascertain (the nature of) objects (of sense)."[25] Even among them a heirarchy exists: the external organs, *manas*, and *ahankāra* operate together to free the *puruṣa*. They accomplish this by "present(ing) the goal of the Spirit (*puruṣa*) in its entirety" to the *buddhi*, the intellect. The buddhi is that organ which can uniquely work for the release of the *puruṣa*, while through it the *puruṣa* gains knowledge and experience of the world.[26] In the experience of the individual through whom the *puruṣa* attains enjoyment of the world, these three internal organs function simultaneously with the outer sense to produce experience.[27] The distinctions of the organs and their unique functions becomes evident only through the process of the enlightenment consequent to the liberation of the *puruṣa*.

Commentaries on the various sections assist in deciphering the intricate verbal descriptions. Dasgupta cites the fact that *buddhi* can mean *mahat*, *asmitāmātra* and *manas* "according to the aspects from which this state is observed."[28] If we utilize this information to assist us in drawing some distinctions, certain delineations are ascertainable.

(1) *Mahat* is the universal principle of "reflected" intelligence; *buddhi* is its extension in the individual person.[29]

(2) *Manas* is that part of the mind which is most closely associated with the collection of sense data.[30]

(3) *Citta*, as developed in the *Yogasutra*, sometimes denotes the full mental operations together, and can refer to the specific role of determination which is found in the *buddhi*.[31]

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24 SK, 3, pp. 8 10.
25 SK 35.
2 SK. 36, 37.
2/ SK 30
28 Dasgupta, op. cit, p 51.
29 cf. SK 22 23 26 Hiriyanna defines mahat as "cosmic *buddhi* illumined by Spirit" (op cit., p. 287.)
30 SK, 27
31 SK, 23. In the explanation of the YS III, 21 by Vachaspati-Misra, *buddhi* and *citta* are equated. cf. Woods, James Haughton, *The Yoga System Of Patañjali* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1977), p. 332.

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(4) Because it is the *buddhi* which has a unique role in the process of liberating *puruṣa*, it will receive our fullest attention.

Some commentators qualify the buddhi in ways which are inconsistent with the textual data we have just assimilated. The texts remind us that the *buddhi* (as *mahat*) is non sentient (*jaḍa*) and so cannot in and of itself generate experience or have consciousness ascribed to it.[32] Only as the *puruṣa* illumines/is reflected in the *buddhi* can it serve as a conscious subject in the world. This sense of "reflection" is at times manipulated to the point of covertly ascribing the state of conscious cogitation to the *buddhi* rather than its non-intelligent status. So in the *Yoga bhashya* commentary on the *Yogasutra*, a caveat is explicitly prepared for those who would intend to combine *citta* with inherent intelligence.[33] One must be surprised by Taimni's comments on *citta vrtti nirodha* when he discourses on the nature of *citta*.

> We should not...make the mistake of imagining *citta*, as a sort of material medium which is moulded into different forms when mental images of different kinds are produced. It is fundamentally of the nature of consciousness which is immaterial but affected by matter. In fact, it may be called a product of both, consciousness and matter, or *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, the presence of both being necessary for its functioning.

The very deception is openly promoted :

To sum up this survey, we can state the following :

(1) *Buddhi* is a "more refined product' of the primordial matter,"[34] *prakṛti*, which receives illumination from the *puruṣa*.

(2) The whole of *prakṛti* exists so as to allow and promote the final release (*kaivalya*) of the *puruṣa*. *Buddhi* is the specific organ which summons these powers, planted by *puruṣa* itself, in the yogin for this purpose.

(3) There is one natural *buddhi per* individual which reflects the illumination of one *puruṣa*. This is consistent with the important doctrine of the multiplicity of *puruṣas*.[36]

(4) The unique function of *buddhi* lies in its power to differentiate and judge. "Its function is to discriminate, to distinguish objects, enabling *puruṣa* to experience them."[37] At higher stages of meditation, the *buddhi* discriminates between "conditional and un-

32 cf. Hiriyanna, op. cit., pp. 283-284.

33 Woods, op. cit., p. 334.

34 Taimni, I. K , *The Science Of Yoga* (Wheaton, Illinois; The Theosophical Printing House, 1981), p. 8.

35 Eliade. Mircea, *Yoga : Immortality And Freedom* (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1973), p. 17.

36 SK, 18, pp. 49ff.

37 Prabhavananda, op. cit., p. 217.

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conditional truth, relative and ultimate truth, provisional and ultimate reality."[38]

(5) In its decisive function, *buddhi* operates in what could be conceived of as "will".[39] It is not however, mobilized by sense data only, but also by the *puruṣa*—and all the more so by *puruṣa* as one gains greater mastery of yogic practices.

The Question of Parallels

It is not in the scope of this paper to do a thorough review of the psychological tenets of various schools of psychoanalysis. Much work has already been done in this area; we will seek to cull the most pertinent information from sources which can assist us in getting to the crux of the comparison.

The two most famous psychoanalysts are certainly Sigmund Freud and his one-time disciple, Carl Jung. Freud's emphasis on internal conflict between id, ego and superego have penetrated into various aspects of the power and influence of the subconscious life, but generally he has not provoked and immense number of comparisons with yogic "psychology." Jung, with his postulation of the "collective unconscious," has stimulated just such a comparison; Jung's own studies in the literature of the mystics display his interest in the topic and justify the more comprehensive studies which assess his response and analyses of that tradition.

Jung's concept of self and consciousness are not easily summarized.

> A detailed description of the arising of the self in Jungian theory is rather complex and difficult. It is Jung's view that each of us share in three different levels of consciousness : the conscious level of the ego; the dreams, memories, and repressions which comprise the personal unconscious; and the predispositions to universal human reactions, the archetypes, which compose the collective unconscious. It is of course the notion of the archeyptes and the collective unconscious which is the trademark of Jung's thought.
>
> ...If one remains fixated on the conscious ego, its limited internal and external awareness will result in only a small portion of the stimuli available from all three levels of consciousness being included. In most ordinary experience there is only experience of the conscious level of ego awareness. Being grounded in the collective experience of mankind, and being present within the unconscious of each person, the archetypes are the psychological mechanisms which enable us to get out from the too narrow encapsulation of our conscious egos.

38 Mishra, Rammurti S., *The Textbook of Yoga Psychology* London: The Lyrebird Press, Ltd , 1972), p. 118.

39 Rama , op. cit., p. 93.

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> The archetypes are constantly trying to 'raise up' or 'reveal' some of the basic wisdom of mankind. But this requires the action of the thinking, feeling, sensing, and intuiting functions of the psyche.[40]

Archetypal forms are the result of a creative interplay in the full character of the human being. Jung sought expression through creative intuition, dreams and artwork in order to call upon these subliminal resources, to reveal their influence.[41] Meditative kinds of experiments were promoted to stimulate these expressions of the deeper levels of self.

One conclusion reached by Jung during his analyses of dreams in regard to the collective unconscious was what he named "individuation."[42] Upon the realization and awakening into conscious realms of deeper issues from the unconscious self, a person needed to gather together his new sense of himself or herself and seek to live according to the "law of one's individual inner nature." To evoke these inner laws one must strive; they are most often not easily accessible. One can learn to concentrate, observe one's thoughts and then assimilate the new interpretations into a more full, conscious life.[43]

In the midst of these symbolic analyses and assimilations of new insights, Jung identified a disparity between Western and Eastern mysticisms which remained central to his theses concerning human consciousness.

> Between the Christian and the Buddhist mandala there is a subtle but enormous difference. The Christian during contemplation would never say, 'I am Christ' but will confess with Paul, 'Not I, but Christ liveth in me! (The Buddhist) sutra, however, says: 'Thou wilt know that thou art the Buddha.'[44]

Jung sided with the nondestruction of the ego in the "transcendental unity of the self." To speak of a conscious enlightenment experience without an ego observer was contradictory to human experience.[45] In his mind, departure from ego consciousness could only create insanity.[46] Jung's analysis of yogic experience displays this criticism based on an internal contradiction and consequent reductionism.

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40 Coward, op. cit., p. 327.

41 Jacobs, op. cit., pp. 47ff.

42 Ibid., p. 54.

43 Ibid., pp. 117 118.

44 Coward, op. cit., p. 329. From C. J. Jung, *The Psychology Of Eastern Meditation*, Collected Works, Vol. 11, pp. 574-575.

45 Ibid., loc. cit.

46 Rama, op. cit., p. 121.

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> (So Jung) identifies...the yogic or universal mind with the unconscious mind...he states that if there is no ego there is nobody to be conscious of anything...the Self is a symbol in the unconscious...the image-creating mind is the matrix of all patterns...In Samadhi Jung sees nothing but a meaningless dream state...On the other hand the Eastern assertion about a formless mind, which is yet the source of all forms, seems justified to him because to the unconscious we cannot attribute any particular form...consciousness becomes in the end vast but dim. with an infinite multitude of objects, merging into an indistinct totality.[47]

One must now ask. "In what ways do the yogic and psychoanalytic perspectives support the same perspective? In what ways do they differ?" In relation to the conception of mind, consciousness and self/Self, we can isolate some preliminary conclusions.

First, though there are some methodological similarities which emphasize relaxation and interiorization, Jung's interest lies in uncovering sense data beneath the surface of waking consciousness. This sphere of the mind in yogic psychology is the *manas*. So it would appear that the very functions of the mind which are analyzed and trained differ. Psychoanalysts like Jung seek to guide the patient in the unfolding of the impressions of the *manas*, only to reincorporate them into a broader, conscious state of awareness; yogic practice models itself on the disciplined release and falling away of sense impressions so that the *buddhi* might be free to promote the release of *puruṣa*.

Second, Jung's sense of the operation of self and ego, the self and determinite will, appear to vary greatly with the yogic interpretation. Where the yogin conceives of the ego as "nothing more than a limiting and distorting obscuration which had to be removed if the real (self) was to be fully known."[48] Jung employs the ego as an instrument to release the impressions of the self in the unconscious. In this process, the ego is "loosened," delimited, nearly set aside, but only temporarily. Once the self is divulged and expresses itself from the unconscious, the ego is recrystalized into a broader more comprehending whole. As has been evidenced through his writings, Juug found it impossible to picture consciousness without an ego center. Yoga asserts that higher consciousness cannot be known without the dispersion of the *ahaṅkāra*.

Again, the very function and nature of mental life in Jung is preconceived in substantial terms, while the full understanding of the evolution from *prakṛti* of all physical and psychophysical items undercuts such an assumption by the yogin. The *buddhi* is only the

47 Jacobs, op. cit , pp. 165-166.
48 Coward, op. cit., p. 334.

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most subtle of material organs, innately non-intelligent, necessitating the "touch of life" from *puruṣa*. Mind is both physical and conscious for Jung; the concept of a "soul informing the brain with consciousness" is couched in symbolic terminology which bears no "scientific" weight for him. This stands in opposition to the medieval metaphysics of Christian, Jewish and Islamic thinkers from whom Jung had gleaned much of his symbolism for the collective unconscious. The mind is the organic source for intelligence and consciousness for Jung; the *citta/buddhi* is the organic instrument which can lead to true consciousness through its illumined state of intelligence (which is not its natural quality).

As if in a theoretical boxing match, Jung and the yogin stand in opposite corners concerning the locus of consciousness. Jung posits self in the unconscious while qualifying the ego state as conscious. The Self (*puruṣa*) of the yogin is the only true consciousness related to man, whose interplay with *prakṛti* leaves the illusion of an "I" in the *citta* of empirical experience. Here the terminological parallels are particularly deceptive; as if only shadow boxing, but on opposite sides of the ring, self and Self designate homonymously heterogeneous categories of beings. Jung is focusing his efforts on what must be identified as the empirical self; it is a self not fully conscious in the world, but one responsive to both individual and collective influences within various planes of human existence. The Self (*puruṣa*) of yoga is not at all an empirical self. *Ahaṅkāra* comes closest to fitting that concept. Self and only Self is capable of pure consciousness : a consciousness not prerequisite to the operation of the empirical self like a Kantian transcendental ego. Rather, it is a consciousness, if the term is even applicable, to an experience which undermines the whole of empirical existence and penetrates it.. only to drop it off in the end as a faded, autumn leaf. Eliade neologizes to capture the qualities of the process leading to Isolation, naming part of it the "cosmicization" of man,[49] admitting that this "macranthropic" state will itself disperse into what can only be seen as a *super*consciousness.[50]

The ideal state of ego is, for Jung, one which encompasses as much as possible of the self in a healthy balance. Ego perdures in a state of coexisting opposites. This, the yogin would urge, is only more of the same delusion of "I-ness".

Nothing close to the sense of *saṃsāra*, the cycle of rebirths, is ever seriously considered by Jung as an empirical reality. He perceives the concept as a symbol of consciousness, but not an actual capacity of the empirical self. Yogins can only reply that these per-

49 Eliade, op cit., p. 97.
50 Ibid., pp. 98 99.

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spectives become certain only when one has experienced the differentiations of beings through *samyamic* power, all of which are consequences of the various *pariṇāmas* (transformations) in the higher stages of *samādhi* Such feats as minds creating other mind-bodies and experiencing metempsychosis (which is not a yogic *siddhi*, but a karmic requisite for the unenlightened) can only be judged by Jung as dream states and illusions [51]

The organic functions and cosmological dimensions presumed by yoga and psychoanalysis are demonstrably noncongruent at many points. We would nevertheless want to argue with Stace that they both do pursue an analysis of perception. What they accrue to that pursuit are very different understandings of the nature of consciousness.

Psychoanalytic And Heteranthropic Consciousness

"Is unlimited consciousness of the fullness of reality psychologically possible?" Coward ends his research with this expanded restatement of his comparison between Jung and Patanjali.[52] Extrapolating from what we have already concluded, several questions arise in the light of his further query. Is *puruṣa* a psychological organ? What are the qualities of unlimited consciousness? Does fullness of reality include only the phenomenal world, or does it surpass it in kind?

Eliot Deutsch suggests some criteria for boundless consciousness:

> Consciousness is boundless when, without memory; it is attentive solely to reality. Consciousness is boundless when, as a power of being, as an essential feature of the self, it is without determinate content Consciousness is boundless when, unself consciously, 'I' am at one with reality.
>
> ...When boundless consciousness is objective, it ceases to belong to anyone, being an essential quality of being.[53]

Claims of the yogins concerning the state of *puruṣa* in *kaivalya* march these descriptions, so far as words could qualify it. So different is this quality of consciousness from the experience of the empirical self, we prefer to name it "imperience": that state of consciousness attained through the stilling of all mental modifications and the consequent isolation of the *puruṣa* To speak of the "experience of the *puruṣa*" leaves one open to confusing that experience

51 There appears a conscious effort on the part of some to not even mention this realm of the experience of mental life when dealing with the comparison with Western schools of thought. The reasons seem apparent enough; these concepts mark areas of complete incommensurability. cf Rama, op. cit.

52 Coward, op. cit., p 335.

53 Deutsch, Eliot, *Personhood, Creativity And Freedom* (Honolulu, University Of Hawaii Press, 1982), pp 35-36.

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with the one in which the yogin, while in *savicara samādhi*, still operates through the illumined *buddhi* and is not completely absorbed into *puruṣa* That final absorbtion eliminates a material locus for the influence of the *puruṣa*. *Puruṣa's* liberated consciousness stands outside of any normal experience in the empirical world; it should remain categorically distinct as "imperience."

From our analysis it is unjustifiable to refer to *puruṣa* within the framework of psychological rubric. That organ which best suits that class of descriptions is the *citta*, the holistic term for the basic mental functions covered by *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra* and *manas*. It must be emphasized that none of these functions are present at all in the liberated *puruṣa*'s consciousness. They all reintegrate with *prakṛti* and remain unproductive toward that *puruṣa*. We must insist that *kaivalya* and the boundless consciousness it obtains is psychologically (*buddhi* logically) impossible. Eliade sensed the need for these linguistic and categorical transformations when he approached the issue of "final liberation."[54]

> The yogin takes possession of himself through an 'undifferentiated stasis' whose sole content is *being*. We should be false to the Indian paradox if we reduced this 'taking possession' to a mere 'knowing oneself,' however profound and absolute. For 'taking possession of oneself' radically modifies the human being's ontological condition. 'Discovery of oneself,' self reflection of the *puruṣa*, causes a 'rupture of plane' on the cosmic scale; when this occurs, the modalities of the real are abolished, being (*puruṣa*) coincides with nonbeing ('man,' properly speaking), knowledge is transformed into magical 'mastery,' in virtue of the complete absorption of the known by the knower...The self-revelation of the *puruṣa* is equivalent to a taking possession of being in all its completeness. In *asamprajnāta samādhi*, the yogin is actually all Being.

Yoga wants to claim a point of developmental junction between the *buddhi* in empirical experience and the *puruṣa* in final liberation. In *The Synthesis Of Yoga*, Aurobindo appeals to a continuum by positing an *evolving buddhi*. Patanjali's *buddhi*, however, admits only of being "uncovered" or "dissolved"; it is not transformed.[55] Deutsch questions the nature of the connection between "bounded" and "boundless" consciousness.

> Explanatorily we are unable to account for one state or mode of consciousness in terms of the other or to reduce one to the other. Although in practice various conditions within bound consciousness may need to be realized in order to attain boundless consciousness, no causal (or other alleged 'internal connection') between the bound and the boundless is possible. If the boundless were merely an effect of conditions fulfilled

54 SK, 65, p. 115.

55 Eliade, op cit., pp. 94 95.

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in bondage. then it would be a member of that series and would lose thereby precisely its character as the limitless freedom which it is.[56]

The detachment of *puruṣa* from the instruments of *prakṛti* must be seen as a development from empirical experience through the macranthropic concentration. contemplation and meditation to the *heteranthropic imperience* of kaivalya Something other than empirical man is present, but it is. like the overcoming of the initial threshold of a rocket. a stasis from which the *puruṣa* is released.

If one carefully reworks the assumptions of psychoanalysis and yoga, dressing the comparisons with more precise terminology, points of congruence at the level of empirical perception could possibly be developed. Still, once the differing concepts of self and Self are clarified, defined and decorated with the cosmological principles they imply, an impasse will be met. Yoga entails heteranthropic release. Though it be proclaimed "consciousness," *puruṣa's kaivalya* remains categorically distinct from what we normally mean by that term even in its most comprehensive senses.

A final inquiry into the nature of imperience and its relation to psychoanalysis needs to be made. Having presupposed the multiplicity of *puruṣa*, each *puruṣa* supervizing and reflecting its consciousness upon one *buddhi* in the realm of experience, what reason is there to assume that one *puruṣa's* imperience will be similar or equivalent to another's ? The logical claim follows on the premise of the definition of imperience : "the unlimited consciousness of the fullness of reality." If the multiplicity of *puruṣa* is maintained, how could one's unlimited consciousness not include that of all other released *puruṣas* ? To distinguish them would seem to reintroduce a refined sense of "foci of imperience," a new level of individualtion inimical to the comprehensiveness and egolessness of the Unlimited. The *Yogasutra* proffers no answer: there is no ultimate unity of *puruṣa* under the aegis of *Īśvara*; neither is there any hint that the *puruṣa* will coinhere or develop in a final absorbtion of all commonly released *puruṣa*.[57] The possibilities involved in imperience at this level remain vague and militate against any sense of common or collective consciousness.

Some attempt to articulate a comparison between the collective unconscious and various stages of *samādhi*. These stages are grouped by some under the heading "transpersonal consciousness." thus designating a pyramidic heirarchy: the higher one goes in consciousness, the more that consciousness is shared in common.[58] Patanjali's

56 Rama, op. cit., pp. 91 92.

57 Deutsch, op. cit., pp. 36 37.

58 There is the clear understanding that a released *puruṣa's* dismissal of *prakṛti* in no way disturbs the *prakṛti* as it relates to other

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descriptions do not provide any positive statements to reassure us of this position; indeed, the above reasoning may couch arguments which jeopardize the feasibility of this interpretation of higher consciousness, and especially imperiences.

Puruṣa must be qualified in a way different from those in which psychological jargon is employed in the analysis of empirical experience. Its consciousness is beyond empirical experience; it is *heteranthropic imperience*. "Boundless consciousness" in no way matches the experiences of "bounded consciousness." Consequently, we have suggested a new category to keep us aware of the distinction of these claims made by yoga adherents. Following their position, we must insist that the fullness of reality which *puruṣa* imperiences is inclusive of and more universal than the waking experience of empirical consciousness. Because of the need for this critical distinction between experience and imperience, an alternative comparison between imperience and the pneumatological analyses of the medieval scholastics in the Western and Islamic traditions might also prove fruitful.

puruṣas in their various other stages of experience through their particular *buddhis*. cf. YS, II, 22.

59 Rama, op. cit., pp. 125 126.

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IX

Respect, Human Rights and Man's Search for Meaning

Segun Gbadegesin

In its Preamble, the United Nations Charter expresses the determination of the peoples of the United Nations "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small"[1] Even before this declaration, (but more prominently after it) human rights have come to occupy a special place in the attention of many governments and peoples of the world community. This is hardly surprising when one recalls the horrors and atrocities of the two world wars, the experience of which is still fresh in the memories of many nations. The significance of the United Nations declaration and involvement in the pursuit of effective human rights policies is the extent to which it has demonstrated the conviction of the world body about (i) the moral foundation of human right in the dignity of persons and (ii) the need for political strategies to effectively formulate and implement the necessary policies. In what follows I want to analyse and defend this moral foundation of human right by appeal to the idea of respect for persons, and then discuss the significance of a specific human right — the right of self-determination — for the effort to find meaning in our world.

The idea of human rights, as rights possessed by individuals *qua* persons, is derived from the belief that persons, in the normative sense, are bearers of certain properties to which respect is due. This respect is owed to persons irrespective of their status or station in life. An adequate understanding of the idea of human rights — its presuppositions and the force of its appeal—should therefore require

1 See Ian Brownlie (ed.) *Basic Documents in International* Law (Oxford: The Clarendon Press) 1967, p. 2.

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an account of the idea of respect for persons. Such an account will not only sharpen our understanding of the moral force of human rights, it should also help us see that there is a human right to respect and it is the basis of all the others, including the right of self-determination on which hangs the success of man's search for meaning.

The search for the foundation of human right in the idea of respect for persons is not an easy task. One of the main problems centers on the complexity of the idea of respect for persons itself. Even if one is to avoid getting hooked up by irrelevant details, one still should be sensitive to the fact that the adequacy of the concept as a basis for a defence of human right theories depends a lot on how it is understood and which of the conceptions is utilized. For instance, the foundation of universal human rights cannot be sought in an account of respect for persons which relies on some definition of personhood on the basis of which some may fail to qualify as objects of respect, and consequently be regarded as non right-holders.

Respect should be distinguished from attitudes and emotions which may be confused with it. Respect, for instance, is different from fear. One may fear a person without respecting him. Fear implies thought of injury or punishment; respect does not necessarily involve this. Fear may be present only when its object is around. A child fears the presence of his tyrant teacher or the mere mention of his approach. Respect, on the other hand, may be present even in the absence of its object. Respect is voluntary, a result of an independent judgment of the object's standing by the respector. Fear, on the other hand, is forced. The latter may be expressed on account of the other person's perceived power over oneself. Respect does not involve such perceptions. Of course, one may respect a person for his power, or abil ty to get things done, but this is different from fearing him for his power to cause injury to one.

To respect a person is to take him seriously, pay attention to him and stand back or give room to him as far as the ground of respecting him is concern. For instance, it is inconsistent to claim to respect a man for his competence in building design and refuse to take his advice on such questions seriously. But, of course, if one fears a person (for whatever reason) one is not likely to want to go near him, much less take his advice seriously. Though respect is different from fear, the latter is not to be construed as its opposite. Indeed some of the components of respect may be found in fear too, For instance, one is likely to stand back from, or give room to a person that is feared. The real opposite of respect is contempt. This is the reactive attitude which looks down on its object as something inferior and not to be reckoned with. Its outward manifestation is

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ridicule or expression of disgust at its object's miserable status or unfortunate circumstance.

There are, at least, three uncontroversial grounds of respecting persons.[2] First, a person may be respected on account of old age vis-a vis the respector. In many societies, the young are expected to defer to the elders who, it is believed, have gone through more years of experience and are, in virtue of this, thought to be more competent in dealing with the complex problems of social life. For this, they should be taken seriously in matters relating to the solution of individual and social problems. Different societies have different social conventions determining the appropriate ways of showing respect to elders, though such conventions are subject to changes ushered in from time to time by the impact of foreign ideas.

A second ground for respecting persons is good character. Courage, temperance, selflessness and devotion to duty are desirable traits of character which every person should endeavour to cultivate. It is, however, sometimes difficult to cultivate these traits because they require a readiness to avoid what one conceives to be advantageous to oneself. Morality and self interest are not identical and may even be opposed to each other. Habitual lying to make the best out of a situation may be judged to be to an agent's advantage, but he or she would be characterized as untrustworthy and dishonest. Good moral character requires a certain amount of self-denial and where a person shows a permanent disposition to deny himself the perceived (perhaps fake) advantages which sometimes come with viciousness, it is appropriate to respect him by taking him seriously as a good citizen and giving room to him in crucial matters.

A third and final uncontroversial ground for respecting persons is on account of competence in their specific pursuits. Thus respect is shown for highly competent teachers, skilled boxers, smart and diligent artisans, learned attorneys and judges and proven administrators. The basis of this respect is an appraisal of the skills essential for the various roles, and such a judgement, when positive, is translated into respect for the person so judged. His views on the requirements of his profession, or on the solution of problems within his area of competence are not treated lightly.

However, it is important to note that for this type of respect to hold, we often look for more than skill. The manifestation of ability itself may not be sufficient to command this respect. We are naturally inclined to look at the context of its manifestation and its relation to the standards relevant for that role or profession. A

2 For an account of respect for persons which takes proper cognisance of the basal reasons for respect, see Stephen Darwall, "Two kinds of Repect" in *Ethics* Vol. 88 No. 1, Oct. 1977 p. 36-49.

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person may have the skill or ability, and manifest it in the appropriate circumstance without showing adequate concern for the standards of the profession In some cases, some people combine ability with mischief. Someone may show a highly regarded competence in his profession even though he has no regard for the rules governing fair practices within the profession or among the staff. When this is known, people may be inclined to reappraise his ability. This seems to indicate that, in an important way, the basal reason for respecting competence or ability is not independent of respect for character trait. This is beside the fact that competence in certain skills are not distinguishable from excellence of character. For instance, courage is respected as a character trait, and a courageous soldier (manifesting the skill essential in his profession) is an appropriate object of respect.

These three bases of respect for persons—age, good character, competence in one's pursuit—seem to me fairly clear and relatively uncontroversial. I should now want to raise two issues :

(a) whether any of these basal reasons for respect for persons may be said to provide the moral foundation of human right and how; and

(b) in case the answer to (a) is negative, whether there is another basis for respect which may provide such moral foundation.

The answer to the first question above is clearly negative. The three types of respect discussed above are, on account of their bases, definitely restricted to classes of persons and many may not qualify for respect on any of these grounds. But human rights are general and of universal application and they cannot be based on such restricted notions of respect discussed above. Besides, we are looking for a moral foundation for human rights. Only one of the types of respect so far discussed can provide this foundation because only one of them is specifically moral in nature. Respect for competence in skill has more of a prudential than moral character. Suppose you do not take a competent building designer seriously, then what ? You cannot be accused of being immoral. Respect here is. to use a Kantian concept, a hypothetical imperative: in case you need to build, you have to take the advice of a competent building designer seriously. Respect for age seems close to being of a moral nature. Indeed, one can argue that it is immoral to disrespect elders and most African societies take this seriously. But, again, the hypothetical element of this ground of respect seems more prominent than its categorical element. Even the Biblical injunction is phrased in a hypothetical language : "Respect your father and mother *so that* you may live long in the land which your Lord has given you". But in case you do not *want* to live long anyway, you have an option. Respect for charact r is the only one that is specifically moral in

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nature, but the reason it cannot be a foundation for human rights theory is simply that it is restricted to the morally excellent persons But since not everyone is morally excellent, and human rights are claimed for all persons, respect for good character cannot provide the foundation for human rights.

Is there another basis for respecting persons then, and could the foundation for human rights be located in it? If one considers respect as a basic moral attitude, one cannot share the view that respect for age or for excellences (of character or profession) exhausts the bases for respecting persons. One is likely to maintain that even where no excellence is shown, there is the duty to respect persons as persons. The reasons for this position may vary with the understanding of what it is to be a person which supports it. I shall discuss three possible reasons — in increasing order of their appropriateness as foundations for human rights.

First, one may maintain that even where a person is neither excellent in character nor in his vocation, he must not be completely written off. One must not ridicule him as a social misfit. Rather one should desist from considering a person's life, action or character from an aesthetic or technical point of view. One must also consider them from a human point of view concerned primarily with what it is *for him* to live and do those actions in that manner. This is Bernard Williams' position. According to his useful distinction.

> (From the technological point of view, a man who has spent his life in trying to make a certain machine which could not possibly work is merely a failed inventor, and in compiling a catalogue of those whose efforts have contributed to the sum of technical achievement, one must 'write him off': the fact that he devoted himself to this useless task with constant effort and so on, is merely irrelevant. But from a human point of view, it is clearly not irrelevant: we are concerned with him, not merely as 'a failed inventor' but as a man who wanted to be a successful inventor.[3]

For Williams, then, what is involved in this account of respect is that "each man is owed an effort at identification : ... he should not be regarded as the surface to which a certain label can be applied, but one should try to see the world (including the label) from his point of view"

Williams is, in effect, claiming that there is another basis for respect besides the manifestation of excellences of ability or character. But from what he says, it does appear that his suggested basis can be treated as an excellence Someone who holds the view that nothing besides excellence is an appropriate object of respect may

3 Bernard Williams "The Idea of Equality" Joel Feinberg (ed) *Moral Concepts* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969) p 159.

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nevertheless grant that the failed inventor is an appropriate object of moral respect because, on Williams' characterization, he 'wanted to be a successful inventor" and he makes "constant effort". He is industrious and shows a tenacity of purpose. It seems these are excellences of character and as such are appropriate objects of respect. But also as such they do not provide the needed foundation for human rights. For we cannot assume that all persons will make such effort or show such tenacity of purpose.

But suppose no effort is shown by the failed inventor, then that basis for respecting him as a person is lacking. Does it follow that he is no longer an appropriate object of respect ? Or that he does not then deserve to be taken seriously, or to be paid attention to ? Perhaps then the appropriate attitude is contempt. No. That person could still be regarded as a rational being and a possessor of dignity. In the Kantian sense, dignity is possessed equally by all rational beings.[4]

It implies the possession of a rational will which belongs to everyone as a member of the *noumenal* world. Everyone is equally autonomous in this sense, and it is autonomy that makes persons (rational beings) the source of moral laws. Since the moral law is an appropriate object of respect, its source—rational being—is also an appropriate object of respect, Since every rational being is at least a potential source of the moral law, every such being is an appropriate object of respect regardless of what he or she wills as a member of the sensual world. Thus Kant, in a passage relevant to our discussion so far, categorically states that "we cannot deny the vicious person all respect as a man, for though by his conduct he makes himself unworthy of it, it cannot be taken away from him, at least as far as his quality of being a man is concerned."[5]

Two points are relevant here. In the first place, Kant's concept of autonomy, because tied with his concept of rational will, is a transcendental concept. The Kantian idea of respect owed to all persons in virtue of their possession of the rational will is then equally metaphysical, not owed in respect of any empirical characteristics about persons. This is how Kant is able to avoid tying respect to excellences empirically manifested.

However, it seems that the Kantian 'autonomy' can still be regarded as a sort of excellence with could be manifested by rational beings. For autonomy, as Kant understands it, is also a moral quality; it belongs to persons as moral agents Though as moral

4 Immanuel Kant. *The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* H J Paton trans. New York: Harper & Row 1964 p. 107.

5 Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue* James Ellington trans., (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964) p. 128.

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agents, persons are transcendental beings, they have to manifest this moral quality in actions in the empirical world. Autonomy is manifested when a person acts according to the dictates of practical reason. Such a person is autonomous; he is a rational being. But as we also know, one of the objective dictates of practical reason for rational beings is that they should respect persons as ends-in-themselves. A person who conforms his actions to this end dictated by practical reason is autonomous; and by the same reasoning, is an object of respect, because he is also an end in himself. One could say that he manifests the excellence of being a person.

Now if autonomy is manifested in the conformity of one's action to the dictates of practical reason, and respect is owed to persons on the ground of their autonomy, it would seem that persons who do not manifest autonomy (by conforming their actions to the dictates of practical reason) are not owed respect. But how would one determine that certain persons do not obey the dictates of practical reason? It might be said that those who are unable to universalize the maxim of their actions have not obeyed the dictates of practical reason, since their actions are not determined by objective rational ends. But persons are such ends, and any agent who does not treat persons as ends-in themselves has therefore not conformed his actions to the dictates of practical reason, and has, to that extent, not manifested his autonomy, and it should be reasonable to infer that he is not owed any respect.

But, as Kant also claims, the fact that a person has not manifested his autonomy and dignity in his actions does not mean that he does not possess them. A person who persistently shows a pattern of dishonesty may be properly labelled a dishonest person. He does not possess the virtue of honesty. However it seems Kant would not say the same of a person who does not manifest human dignity in his action. That person, for Kant, still possesses dignity and it cannot be taken from him. So, though the person who conforms his actions to practical reason shows autonomy and therefore excellence of character, the vicious person who shows no such excellence cannot be denied respect on that ground. But normally, respect due to excellence of character—say courage—is not owed to a person who does not have that quality. If, then, autonomy is considered as an excellence, it is, for Kant, an excellence of a different kind.

This leads to the second point. Kant states that though the vicious person, by his conduct makes himself unworthy of that respect due to persons, it cannot be taken from him. We have seen that the respect cannot be taken from him simply because it is owed to him in virtue of his transcendental autonomy, and his empirical character does not disqualify him from the possession of that quality.

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So judgment of worthiness is irrelevant for the Kantian notion of respect for persons. What is important is the possession of dignity, an essential part of human nature which no empirical characteristic can void.

Thus for Kant, the basis of respect is not the empirical and subjectively determined ends persons happen to have. Rather it is their dignity and autonomy. What ought to be respected then, is the fact that persons are rational beings who possess rational will in virtue of which they are autonomous agents capable of self legislation and, as such, ends-in themselves and members of the universal kingdom of ends. In a relevant passage, Kant observes that 'a violator of the rights of man intends to use the person of others merely as a means without taking into consideration that, as rational beings, they ought always at the same time to be rated as ends — that is, only as beings who must themselves be able to share in the end of the very same action.'[6]

Now if the Kantian notion of respect for persons is supported by appeal to the pricelessness of human dignity, and this dignity consists in man's autonomy, and autonomy refers to the capacity for self-legislation, then it is not obvious that "every man has a rightful claim of respect from his fellow men" since it is not obvious that every man has capacity for self legislation in the Kantian sense.[7]

Not every human being is capable of assenting *rationally* to the validity of the objective ends determined by the moral law. It is not just that they do not conform to the moral law, but in fact they are incapable of an autonomous legislation — due to natural and social impediments. So if, as Kant claims, "autonomy is... the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature"[8] and not every human being is capable of autonomy and rationality, then there are three alternatives for a theory of respect for persons and the idea of human rights.

First we may say that those human beings who are incapable of autonomy in the sense of ability for self-legislation are non-persons and are therefore neither appropriate objects of respect nor real claimants of human rights. I think this alternative has to be rejected as unattractive. A child is incapable of self-legislation in the Kantian sense even if it may be argued that he has a potential for it. But as a child, he is an appropriate object of respect and a claimant of human rights. Or consider the case of the incurable comatose or morons whose potentiality for autonomy or self-legislation is virtually nil. There is no obvious way in which it can be claimed that

6 Kant, *The Groundwork op. cit* p. 97.
7 Kant, *The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, op. cit* p. 127.
8 Kant, *The Groundwork*, p. 103.

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autonomy as self-legislation is inherent in their human nature. But no one will deny that they are entitled to respect for persons and are bonafide claimants of human rights.

Another alternative is to drop the idea of respect for persons as a basis for human rights. This will be on the ground that the former requires a distinctive notion of autonomy which is not required by the latter. That is, while all human beings have human rights, it might be claimed, not all are objects of respect for persons, therefore, respect for persons cannot provide the moral foundation for human rights. This alternative, it appears to me, ignores a vital point that is being raised here concerning the idea of respect for persons. What is being claimed is not that we have an adequate notion of respect for persons which happens to be at variance with the idea of human rights. Rather, the point is that a respect-for-persons theory based on the idea of personhood as autonomy/rationality is quite inadequate. Put differently, "personhood" in respect-for-persons does not require that distinctive concept of autonomy as rational self-determination. Or put in yet a different form, a theory of human rights requires respect-for-persons concept as its ultimate foundation, but the latter does not require the Kantian transcendental notion of personhood. The restriction of personhood to the class of rational beings ignores the fact that personhood is a normative concept. It denotes a class of "Things" you may not treat in certain ways. There are certain things you cannot morally do to persons, which may be done to non-persons. Hence the relevance of the concept to the idea of human rights. It follows from this normative dimension that the scope of the concept and the criteria of its applicability cannot be determined adequately unless one pays attention to some extra-rational properties.

This leads to the third alternative, which seems to me more acceptable. It requires finding a way of *complementing* the narrow Kantian conception of personhood and the shaky foundation it provides for human rights, with an account which emphasizes the empirical aspect of personhood. This includes, among others, the human capacity for feelings and emotions: the capacities to feel mental and physical pain, love and sympathy and the vital human needs and interests associated with these. Such a criterion will no doubt justify the application of personhood to children, as well as to handicapped adults. A child who has no rationally determined goals of his own nevertheless has the capacity for mental pain like adults just as the insane adult has capacity for physical pain and hence needs and interests like normal adults. This approach still relies on the conception of personhood as an evaluative term, providing a basis for the theory of respect and human right. Its distinctiveness is that it removes personhood from the transcendental realm and

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locates it in the system of nature with the result that human beings in virtue of certain empirically determined properties are regarded as persons and subjects of respect and rights.

There are, of course, some objections to this approach. One such is recently made by Professor S.F. Sapontzis in his "A Critique of Personhood"[9] Sapontzis argues for the elimination of personhood as an evaluative term applicable to all and only human beings and which therefore automatically accords them the moral status of right holder irrespective of their moral character. The argument is that personhood as an evaluation cannot be extensionally identified with personhood as description; for (among others) the reason that to do that commits us to deriving "ought" from "is", which is impossible. Furthermore, since respect is due personhood as evaluation, it cannot be extended to all and only human beings because respect is a moral status which is deserved only in virtue of moral virtue. Therefore the class of respectables cannot coincide with the class of human beings. While some humans will not qualify for respect, some creatures of nature and property (i.e. animals, pets) will qualify and therefore be subject of rights. Thus whereas a Kantian might move from autonomy/rationality to personhood, then to respect and then to human rights, Sapontzis moves from moral virtue, to respect and then to human rights (eliminating personhood).

One of the problems with this argument is the assumption that respect, and hence right (including human right), is a desert and therefore cannot be claimed or attributed to immoral human beings. This seems to me to miss the point of the talk about human rights, and it is a very dangerous position. Why, for instance, would it not be possible on the basis of this theory, to say that a group X— is composed of human beings who lack moral virtue and good moral character and therefore its members cannot be subject of rights? Indeed the significance of the concept of human rights consists, in part, in the recognition of the danger inherent in this type of position and the provision of the necessary remedies. For instance, Sapontzis himself admits that there are different moral systems, but goes on to say that there is just one moral goal. But the existence of several distinct moral systems already precludes, it would appear, the possibility of agreement about what makes an action morally right or what makes a person morally virtuous. A Kantian, for instance, might not agree that a Utilitarian has any moral virtue. If so, it would seem that on Sapontzis' account of respect, a Kantian may justifiably deny respect and right to a utilitarian — if moral virtue is the criterion of respect.

9. S. F. Sapontzis, *"A Critique of Personhood"* in *Ethics* Vol. 91 No 4, 1981 p. 607.

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But perhaps, by "moral virtue", Sapontzis does not mean what a Kantian might mean. He may mean what we recognise as good moral character. For in his view "To demonstrate that something merits respect, one must show that it possesses moral virtues, for example, kindness, courage, a sense of honor, or a sense of justice.[10] And perhaps a Kantian and a Utilitarian may not have much problems agreeing about what acts are kind, courageous, or honorable. Even then, however, Sapontzis seems to imply that respect for character (for courage, kindness, honor etc) exhausts the basis for respect. If my analysis above is correct, I think there is no justification for this restriction, which is the more serious, the more one contemplates the construction of right (not denied by Sapontzis) on the foundation of respect.

Part of Sapontzis' worry is that personhood in the evaluative sense is restricted to humans alone whereas he wants respect to extend to animals too. But since he regards personhood as an evaluative concept, the sort of restriction he is worried about need not be made and therefore his advocacy for the elimination of personhood seems to me baseless, If one complements the transcendental account of personhood with more emphasis on an empirical account, then it is quite in order to extend the notion of personhood as an evaluative term to other beings besides humans — to the satisfaction of Sapontzis. If one complements rationality or dignity, with the capacity for feelings (physical, mental, emotional), one is, I think, more likely to have a better account than Sapontzis presents. For instance attributing moral virtues to animals seems to me to be a very ambitious claim which requires much more justification than Sapontzis provides. Without such a justification, I do not think we can achieve the objective of extending respect and right to animals via the criterion of possessing moral virtue, whereas this may be justifiably done via the idea of having capacity for feelings plus the associated needs.

Sapontzis' problem with my empirical characterization of personhood might be that it is impossible to derive evaluative conclusions from descriptive premises : From the fact that X has capacity for feelings and emotions, he might argue, you cannot infer that X is a person (in the evaluative sense) or that X deserves respect or that X has rights. Without any attempt to undermine the problem raised by the recognition of the "is ought" dichotomy. I am convinced that the inference here drawn is without flaws and that it escapes any objections based on the "fact-value" distinction : To say that a being has some capacity for feelings and emotions and that therefore this fact deserves to be taken seriously in any deliberations concerning it, seems to me a flawless inference. The recognition of the

10 *Ibid.*, p 615.

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existence of such human capacities (for physical pain, love, self-respect, etc.) commits us to a recognition of those vital and basic human needs deriving from them (for the sustenance of these capacities). And as Tranoy has rightly argued, 'recognition of human needs would thus generate or give rise to a consequent recognition of human rights'[11].

So far, we have been concerned with exploring the philosophical foundation for human rights. We have been able to locate it in the normative idea of persons deserving respect not tied to their position or social condition in life, nor to their moral excellence or competence in rational activity. Rather, personhood is a normative concept ascribed to human beings in recognition of a variety of facts considered of normative importance : the fact that they have sensitivity to feelings and emotions, the fact that they have certain vital needs deriving from these, the fact that they have certain interests especially in the satisfaction of those needs, and the fact that in appropriate cases, they are capable of having goals and rationally ordering them. Given these facts, and others e g. that human beings live in community with others, with whom they have certain enduring relations, it becomes important that they should not only be free, but also helped, to fashion their lives and to pursue their fundamental interests and satisfy their vital needs. However abstract it may appear to be, human right is based on nothing more pretentious than these simple facts. But it entails a lot. Negatively, it entails a rejection of all forms of dehumanization, debasement and contempt of human beings qua—persons. Positively, it requires the formulation of effective policies towards helping those human beings, who have been victims of dehumanization through all forms of discrimination, in their struggle for liberation and self-determination.

There is, of course, a connection between human right so conceived and man's search for meaning in life. The struggle for self-determination is part of man's effort to live a life that has meaning. It is part of an effort to find meaning in one's world. Human right is not only relevant for self-determination, it is part of the latter's conditions, in the sense that without a political commitment to an effective human rights policy for its protection, the idea of self-determination will continue to be a mere political gimmick. If human right is relevant to the struggle for self-determination, then it is equally relevant to man's search for meaning; and a strong commitment to an effective human rights policy provides the required context for a fruitful uncovering of the meaning in one's life.

11 K. E. Tranoy, '"Ought" implies "can": A Bridge from Fact to Norm ?' Part II: 'From Human Needs to Human Rights' *Ratio* XVII (2) 1975 p. 148.

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The concept of the meaning of life may be approached from two angles.[12] In one sense, it deals with the question whether there is any meaning to be found in human life as such. Here the search for meaning in life is a search for the meaning of human life. To answer it affirmatively is to suggest that there is a positive basis for the existence of human beings as such. In another sense, however, the concept raises a personal question whether the life of a particular individual has meaning. This is independent of the question whether life as such has meaning. It would appear that the general question is more fundamental than the personal, and that the latter makes sense only after the former has been dealt with. But it is not necessarily so. In fact, if for some reason, one is unable to answer the general question, it does not then follow that the personal one may not also be dealt with. Even when both are answerable, the answers need not be identical. Both approaches and the questions they deal with are philosophically interesting, however I shall be concerned with the personal question since it has greater relevance to the question of politics and human rights.

"Does my life have any meaning?" "Is there any meaning to X's life?" These are not questions normally raised by all human persons all of the time. They are raised by, at most, a few persons some of the time. Indeed, it seems they derive their intelligibility from this very fact. They are intelligible questions when raised by (and about) reflecting human beings, about their lives, and when raised in reaction to their thinking about what constitutes meaning in life. This last point is important The qeestion whether a person's life has meaning looks like a first-order question, the solution for which depends on an adequate answer to a second-order question of what constitutes meaning in a life It is analogous to the question "Do you have a pen?" which presupposes a clarification of what a pen is; or the question "Does he have happiness?" which requires an answer to the basic question "what is happiness?"

These are all questions which can be adequately raised and addressed by human persons who are fortunate enough to possess and make use of at least a certain minimum level of reflective thinking. They are not questions which may be raised intelligently by children, mentally handicapped or the incurable comatose. But neither can they be intelligently raised by normal persons on account of those under-age and handicapped. For the condition of the intelligibility of the question is missing in their case. The question whether a person's life has any meaning makes sense when that person raises it, or it is raised by another person and both are active rational agents. It is a question that arises in the context of rational

12 Paul Edwards, 'Life. Meaning and Value of' in *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* 1967 (Vol. 4) p. 467-477.

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(thinking) activity and applies to agents capable of reflective thinking. This is just another way of saying that living is more than existence. The comatose, for instance, is existing (passively) but is not living, if by the latter we mean an activity that is both physical and mental. Notice, though that respect is still owed to them as persons (since personhood has not been defined in terms of mental activity) even if the question of meaning in life is inapplicable to these (under-age and handicapped) persons. Following from this respect owed them as persons, one can derive a right — the right to be treated with respect, sympathy and consideration. It is a recipient right, based on those facts about human persons which have been discussed above.

With respect to those (reflecting) human agents who may (and in respect of whom others may) raise the question, one may still ask: "who may answer the question adequately ?" Or, what comes to the same thing: "what is the best approach to answering the question adequately ?" The simple answer, in my considered view, is that the individual, in respect of whom it is raised is in the best position to answer the question. The question of the meaning in one's life cannot be separated from the activity of living itself. Discovering life's meaning presupposes living a life that has meaning. This meaning differs from person to person. It is the significance of life for a person and this is not something that others may decide on one's behalf. This does not mean that the individual alone can assess the value (moral, aesthetic, intellectual etc.) of what he takes to be the significance of his life or its meaning. Others may be intelligently involved in this. However the question of the value of a person's life is quite different from that of whether it has meaning:

Could one not, in all humility, say to another person, 'if I know you at all, if you are the sort of person I think you are, you are really wasting your life and you don't like it yourself. You don't get much out of the life you lead, you don't put much into it. The way you spend your time must seem rather futile and pointless to you, however unwilling you may be to recognise it" ?[13]

It is significant that the first intuition of the author of this question is to deny the adequacy of such a remark. For an answering the question, he observes that :

What one should have said was 'To me that way of life would be meaningless. I couldn't live that way. But this is not to say that the other person's life is meaningless.[14]

This response is adequate because to say what is suggested in the first remark above is to arrogate to oneself the knowledge of

13 I Dilman. 'Life and Meaning' *Philosophy* 40, 1965 p. 320-333.
14 *Ibid*, p. 321.

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what is or must be pointless, not only to us, but to others as well. It is to assume infallibility with respect to the knowledge of what makes any life meaningful : The danger of this assumption is obvious and cannot be exaggerated. It is indelibly stamped on world history in the practice of colonialism and apartheid, in which whole peoples have not only been denied the opportunity to lead a life that is not imposed on them but have also been forced to adopt conceptions of a meaningful life that turn out to be destructive of their being and self respect.

The idea of a human right of self determination is significant for its emphasis on the need for each individual and/or group to freely determine its own approach to the problems of life, to discover its own means of survival and, above all to develop, in practical terms, its own approach to discovering the ultimate reality and meaning of life. Where the right to self-determination is denied, then, all those values that go along with it are denied. There can be no adequate justification for such a denial. Values differ; each person or group has distinctive conceptions of the reality and significance of life. The world is a lot better-off by our consciously promoting a policy of respecting the various ways of life and world-views of different groups and actively allowing them to freely pursue their social, cultural and economic development in an atmosphere free from all forms of discrimination. Herein lies the significance of respect for persons and the idea of human rights based on it, for man's search for meaning.

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X

The Nature of Reality

(An Authorised Version of A conversation between Dr. Rabindranath Tagore and Professor Albert Eintein in the afternoon of July 14th., 1930. at the Professor's residence in Kaputh).

E. Do you believe in the Divine as isolated from the world. ?

T. Not isolated. The infinite personality of Man comprehends the Universe. There cannot be anything that cannot be subsumed by the human personality, and this proves that the truth of Universe is human truth.

I have taken a scientific fact to explain this. Matter is composed of protons and electrons, with gaps between them, but matter may seem to be solid without the links in spaces which unite the indivdual electrons and protons. Similarly humanity is composed of individuals. yet they have their inter-connections of human relationship, which gives living unity to man's world. The entire universe is linked up with us, as individuals, in a similar manner;—it is a human universe.

I have pursued this thought through art, literature and the religous consciousness of man.

E. There are two different conceptions about the nature of Universe:

(1) The world as a unity dependent on humanity.

(2) The world as a reality independent of the human factor.

T. When our universe is in harmony with man, the eternal we know it as truth, we feel it as beauty.

E. This is purely the human conception of the universe.

T. There can be no other conception. The world is a human world —the scientific view of it is also that of the scientific man. Therefore, the world apart from us does not exist; it is a relative world.,

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depending for its reality upon our consciousness. There is some standard of reason and enjoyment which gives it truth, the standard of the Eternal Man whose experiences are through our experiences.

T. Yes, one eternal entity. We have to realise it through our emotions, and activities. We realised the Supreme Man who has no individual limitations through our limitations. Science is concerned with that which is not confined to individuals, it is the impersonal human world of truths. Religion realises these truths and links them up with our deeper needs; our individual consciousness of truth gains universal significance. Religion applies values to truth, and we know truth as good, through our own harmony with it.

E. Truth, then, or Beauty is not independent of Man ?

T. No !

E. If there would be no human beings any more, the Apollo of Belveders would no longer be beautiful.

T. No !

E. I agree with regard to this conception of Beauty, but not with regard to truth.,

T. Why not ? Truth is realized through man.

E. I cannot prove that my conception is right but that is my religion.

T. Beauty is in the ideal of perfect harmony, which is in the Universal Being. Truth is the perfect comprehension of the Universal mind. We individuals approach it through our own mistakes and blunders, through our accumulated experiences, — through our illumined consciousness—how, otherwise, can we know truth?

E I cannot prove that scientific truth must be conceived as a truth that is valid independent of humanity; but I believe it firmly. I believe, for instance that the Pythogorian theorem in geometry states something that is approximately true, independent of the existence of man. Any way, if there is a reality independent of man, there is also a truth relative to this reality; and in the same way the negation of the first engenders a negation of the existence of the latter.

T. Truth, which is one with the Universal Being, must essentially be human; otherwise whatever we individuals realize as true can never be called truth, at least the truth which is described as scientific and which only can be reached through the process of logic, in other words, by an organ of thoughts which is human. According to Indian Philosophy there is Brahman, the absolute Truth which cannot be conceived by the isolation of the individual mind or described by words but can only be realized by completely merging the individual in its infinity But such a truth cannot belong to Science The nature of truth which we are discussing is an appearance, that is to say, what appears to be true to the human mind and therefore is human, and may be called Maya or illusion.

E. So according to your conception, which may be the Indian conception, it is not the illusion of the individual but of the humanity as a whole.

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T. In science we go through the discipline of eliminating the personal limitations of our individual minds and thus reach that comprehension of truth which is in the mind of the Universal Man.

E. The problem beings whether Truth is independent of our consciousness.

T. What we call truth lies in the national harmony between the subjective and objective aspects of reality, both of which belong to the super-personal man.

E. Even in our everyday life, we feel compelled to ascribe a reality independent of man to the objects we use. We do this to connect the experiences of our senses in a reasonable way. For instance, if nobody is in the house, yet the table remains where it is.

T. Yes, it remains outside the individual mind but not the universal mind. The table which I perceive is perceptible by the same kind of consciousness which I possess.

E. Our natural point of view in regard to the existence of truth apart from humanity cannot be explained or proved, but it is a belief which nobody can lack — no primitive beings even. We attribute to Truth a Super-human objectivity, it is indespensible for us, this reality which is independent of our existence and experience and our mind — though we cannot say what it means.

T. Science has proved that the table as a solid object is an appearance and therefore that which the human perceives as a table would not exist if that mind were nought. At the same time it must be admitted that the fact that the ultimate physical reality of the table is nothing but a multitude of seperate revolving centres of electric force, also belongs to the human mind.

In the apprehension of truth there is an eternal conflict between the universal human mind and the same mind confined in the individual. The perpetual process of reconciliation is being carried on in our science, philosophy, in our ethics. In any case, if there be any truth absolutely unrelated to humanity, then for us it is absolutely non existing.

It is not difficult to imagine a mind to which sequence of things happens not in space but only in time like the sequence of notes in music. For such a mind its conception of reality is akin to the musical reality in which Pythagorian geometry can have no meaning. There is the reality of paper, infinitely different from the reality of literature. For the kind of mind possessed by the moth which eats that paper, literature is absolutely non-existent, yet for Man's mind literature has a greater value of truth than the paper itself. In a similar manner if there be some truth which has no sensuous or rational relation to human mind, it will ever remain as nothing so long as we remain human beings.

E. Then I am more religious than you are!

T. My religion is in the reconciliation of the Super-personal Man, the Universal human spirit in my own individual being. This has been the subject of my Hibbert Lectures, which I have called "The Religion of Man."

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Books Reviews

Dr. (Mrs.) Aruna Goel : *Indian Philosophy Nyaya Vaisheshika and Modern Science*, pp. 218, Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, Bangalore and Jullundhur, Price Rs. 100/— (1984).

Dr. Aruna Goel has been a teacher of Sanskrit for a long time. At present she is a lecturer in Sanskrit in the Panjab University, Chandigarh. Many of her articles have appeared and she has delivered lectures on Indian Philosophy in various Indian and Foreign Universities.

The whole book has been divided into Nine Chapters, besides Introduction, Appendices, Bibliography and index. Dr. Goel examines the Nyaya Vaisheshika system in its historical, synthetic contexts as well as the impact on the existing knowledge of modern science. I. Historical Study of Nyaya System. II. Historical Study of Vaisheshika System. III. Theory of Pramanas (Epistemology). IV. Theory of Padartha (Categories). V. Nature of Physical World. VI. Theory of Causation. VII. Conception of Atman (Soul). VIII. Conception of Moksha (Liberation) and IX. Summing up.

The book has been divided into three parts : Part I. Presents the historical study of Nyaya System explaining its origin and its three stages of development. The historical study of Vaisheshika System traces its origin and growth and describes the main authors and commentators of this system. Part II. Comprise of six chapters : Theory of Pramanas (Epistemology), Theory of Padarthas (Categories), Nature of Physical world, Theory of Causation, Conception of Atman (Soul) and Conception of Moksha (Liberation). Part III. Presents a summary; an anthology, appendices and a select bibliography.

Dr. Goel has dealt scientifically and in a scholarly manner with the Nyaya Vaisheshika Systems of Indian Philosophy in its historical, critical and synthetic aspects. The author has critically examined the Nyaya and Vaisheshika systems and has related it with the modern science and has very ably presented the subject matter.

Dr. Goel's book is an important contribution in the field of Philosophy and science. She has tried to put the Nyaya and Vaisheshika philosophy on the map of science and has compared its various concepts with modern science. It is a valuable contribution both in the fields of philosophy and science. Dr. Goel deserves our congraulations on her publication.

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Dagobert D Runes (Editor) : *The Standard Dictionary of Philosophy* (Revised and Enlarged), pp. 360. Price $ 24 95. Philosophical Library 200 West 57th Street. New York, 10019 (1983).

We have before us the Revised and Enlarged Dictionary of Philosophy, edited by an eminent American Scholar who has contributed enormously to the fields of Philosophy and allied disciplines. Philosophical Library has done great work and service to the cause of philosophy and produced many important publications of great value. The present volume is one of the great reference books on Philosophy. As the editor himself has mentioned in Preface of this work that 'the aim of this dictionary is to provide teachers, students and laymen interested in Philosophy with clear, concise and correct definitions and descriptions of the philosophical terms throughout the range of philosophical thought. In the present volume are represented all branches as well as schools of ancient, medieval and modern philosophy.'

The first edition of the book appeared in 1942. This present edition is quite enlarged and full of details to cover different aspects of philosophy. It will be a welcome edition for all the students, research students and teachers of Philosophy. This will prove to be an assett to the world of philosophy.

Indeed one of the best books on Philosophy which is essential both for students as well teachers and all those interested in philosophy. The book gives clear, concise and intelligible meaning in simple language of all the philosophical terms used in this Dictionary.

This book is must for all the lovers of philosophy and fills a great need in the realm of philosophy. Indeed a great work which comprehends in it all the exhaustive knowledge of Philosophy in one volume of 360 pages. The work deserves all praise for the editor and Philosophical Library. One of the best dictionaries produced in the recent past. It serves the purpose of reference manual as well as introduction to Philosophy.

Hope The Philosophical Library will revise this great work from time to time and will bring out such important books.

V. V. Nalimov : *Realms of the Unconscious : The Enchanted Frontier*, pp. 320 Edited by Robert G Colodny, Translated by A. V. Yarkho Publisher: ISI Press, 3501 Market St., University City Science Centre. Philadelphia. Pa 19104 U. S. A. Price $ 29.50 in the United States and $ 32.50 in other countries (September 1982).

The author of this book is a reputed Russian scientist and scholar V. V. Nalimov who has to his credit two more important books *Probabilistic Model of Language* and *Faces of Science*, published

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earlier. The present book is an important contribution wherein the soviet scientist synthesizes the elements of semantics, science and mysticism into a startling new view of how the human mind perceives the world. According to Nalimov's view, the study of the unconscious covers all manifestations of consciousness not encompassed within logic. Broadly defined that means all features of the consciousness which cannot be assimilated or simulated by computers. Mr Nalimov develops a theory of the unreal using the major concepts of mathematics, physics, linguistics, psychology, psychiatry, history, philosophy, culturology, anthropology and theology. He has borrowed the methodology from Physics.

The whole book is divided into five sections : I Language, II. Time, III. Nothing. IV. Experiments, V. Remarks on the World Holisticity. This is one of the most scientific study on different aspects-Language, Time, Meditation, Symbols.

Prof. Nalimov says in the Preface of the book that an attempt is made to elaborate a probabilistic approach to the construction of a conception of the unconscious. The following considerations are basic :

1. We make use of the language of a probabilistic logic, which allows us to draw conclusions directly from fuzzy, probabilistically weighted concepts.
2. Conceptualization is made to sound arbitrarily metaphorical.
3. We juxtapose freely the entire range of knowledge accumulated by mankind, including mathemetics, physics, psychology, psychiatry philosophy, religious studies, culturology, anthropology, linguistics and theology. The right to compare the incomparable is supported only by the conviction that the source of everything lies in what we call the unconscious.
4. We report on experiments in which the authors act both as experimenters and as subjects.

The author has very ably discussed many things which will change the entire outlook of the world. The problems discussed, though they are philosophical but have been considered scientifically. The whole book has been divided into 18 chapters : Part I 1. Probabilistic World : A transition to another culture ? Can Western culture have a Second Mediterranean ? 2 Free Will in the Probabilistic World. 3. Probabilistic Approach to describing the evolution of Texts. 4. The language of the Numerical Vision of the world in ancient times 5. On the metaphorical nature of the language of Probabilistic concepts Part II 6. Time: A Dialogue with a Meta-observer, 7 Time as Grammar of Texts in the world: Contemporary concepts of Time vs Plotinus's On Time and Eternity. 8 Metaphorical Nature of the Concept of Psychological Time: Present-Moment-ness of Past and Future. Part III 9 Semantic Vacuum as the Analogue of the physical vacuum : Comparative Ontology of Two

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Realities — Physical and Psychic 10. How can we contact Semantic Nothing ? Part IV 11. Meditation, 12. Symbols. 13. Experimental Study of the Unconscious: Revelation of Semantic Fields underlying Words of everyday language, 14. An experience of Meditation Hermeneutics 15 On the Roads of Time. Part V 16. Belief in Re-incarnation as a Projection of the idea of Human Participation in the Indivisible integrity of the world. 17. Science and Religion: Is there Room for the Complemantarity Principle ?, and 18. Dialectics of the Open end: Comments on what has been said above.

Nalimov has very ably discussed all the topics with the scientific assertions and the previous studies on these subjects which he has considered. In Part IV he has dealt with Meditation and traced the historical background of meditation. He has discussed several questions which may be basic regarding consciousness, unconscious, and depth psychology.

The whole book is an interesting and scientific survey of different aspects of the realm of the Unconscious. The author has done great service to the cause of Philosophy, Parapsychology and Psychology and has based his studies on scientific investigation. His study is systematic and opens the vast vistas of the unconscious. It must be studied by all scientists, philosophers and other scholars as well to acquaint them with the recent developments in the different fields of study.

Prof. Nalimov has done an admirable work and brought to light many facts and theories which were unknown to many. We hope that Nalimov's contribution on similar lines will be forthcoming. His systematic study will provide a good introduction and methodology of studying such phenomena. His study is worth following.

Benjamin Preciado-Solis : *The Kṛṣṇa Cycle in the Puranas*, pp. 151 and 18 pages of Plates, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, Varanasi and Patna, Price Rs. 150/- (1984)

The author of this great work is Dr. Benjamin Preciado-Solis is a Mexican scholar specialised in Indology. Obtained M. Phil. (Philosophy) from the University of Guadalajara, Mexico and M A. Indian Studies from El Colegio in Mexico and Ph.D. from South National University on South East Civilization He spent a year at the Banaras Hindu University as a Ph.D. Research Scholar. He is at present Professor of Indian Studies at El Colegio de Mexico and is working on two books— Ancient Indian Art and another on the Evolution of traditional concepts in Indian Society.

Kṛṣṇa is one of the best loved figures in Indian Religion and literature. The stories of his life and deeds occupy a central place is Indian literary traditions. The present work deals with the main

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themes and motifs found in the Kṛṣṇa legend upto the 10 h century. The whole book is divided into five chapters : I *Vedic Antecedents* Viṣṇu, Nārāyana, Kṛṣṇa in the Rg. Veda, II Early Historical Evidence on Kṛṣṇa. III Kṛṣṇa as a traditional Hero, IV Some Basic Themes in the Legends of Kṛṣṇa and V The Kṛṣṇa legends in Iconography. He has presented in the Conclusion, Key to Map, List of Plates, Bibliography and Index.

The whole book is a scholarly contribution and is complemented by a collection of photographs.

It is really very creditable that such a nice book has been written by Mexican scholar. It is a scholarly contribution to the Kṛṣṇa cult. The author deserves our most heartfelt congratulations for bringing out such a great work on Indian theme and publishers also deserve thanks for bringing out such a book.

Jayantilal S. Jariwalla : *Gita The Science of Living*, pp. 434, Motilal Banarsidas, Publishers Delhi, Varanasi, Patna, Price Rs. 150/- (1984).

Jayantilal S. Jariwalla, Law graduate of the Bombay University, after practising at the courts for a year and obtained Diploma in Library Science and worked as Lecturer in Library Science upto 1943. From 1943 to 1960 he worked as Secretary and Librarian in the People's Free Reading Room and Library (Bombay).

Though a law graduate academically his real interest lay in Religion and Philosophy from the early childhood and his interest in Gita developed which he studied and meditated on for 40 years.

Though Several books have appeared on Gita, the present work is a fresh approach and interprets Gita and its thought in the context of modern times when living has become directionless for want of lack of Spiritual mooring An attempt is made to restore the Spirit to its status as life regulator by harmonzing the worldly and religious life on the one band and science and religion on the other.

The author's devotion to Gita and his forty years of long study has produced this book. He regards Gita not merely a religious book but a very practical guide advising man on almost every aspect of the science of living. He interprets it a different way than the other published books on Gita. He regards everyone of us as Arjuna with a problem of our own — some delusions into which we have fallen — and the Krishna in us lights the way.

The present book of the author aims at explaining to the common man that the Gita does not reject worldly life nor divorce it from the life Spiritual, but asks us to enrich and stabilize it by living spiritually in harmony with our spirithood. Every game has its rules and so too has the 'game of life' and there rules lie in playing

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the life-game spiritually by playing it more and more unattachedly in accordance with our spiritual urges, instead of playing it attached to the bodily level as per our likes and dislikes which — being not our true urges — destroy our basic equilibrium (serenity) as the spirit by making us laugh and weep in him.

According to the author religion too cannot be practiced in a vacuum, for it needs the raw material of 'actions' and 'experiences' to work in order to perfect the same into the finished product that is 'Spirituality'. This is the Karma Yoga of the Gita, The science of living, wherein the worldly and spiritual life blend, so that we achieve the fruits of both by becoming happy materially as well as spiritually.

The author has very ably discussed the main teachings of the Gita and interpreted them in his own way. The whole book has been divided into four Parts besides Preface as follows

Chapter I Introduction which consists of (1) Religion Vs. Science (2) Revolt of Modern Youth : The Generation Gap. 3. Vedanta : The Science of Religion. 4. The Vedanta and Evolution. 5. Gita : The Scripture Universal. 6. Self Knowledge : The Rational way to self control. 7. The Gita in action : work is worship. 8. Karma-yoga : Its implications and misconceptions. 9 A final summing up. In Part II. Gita Text has been explained chapters wise (18 Chapters) in English— 1. Arjuna's Melancholy 2. Samkhya Yoga 3. Karma Yoga 4. Self Emancipation Through Selfless action 5. Karma Samnyasa Yoga 6. Dhyana Yoga 7. Theory and Practice of Divine knowledge 8. Cosmic Evolutions and Dissolution 9. God in Man 10. Manifestation of spirit through matter 11. The Cosmic Revelation Divine 12. Bhakti Yoga 13. The field and its knower : Matter and Spirit distinguished 14. The Three Gunas of Prakriti and their working. 15. The World : A Tree inverted 16. The two Inborn Natures of Man. 17. Faith : The triple Drive to Action. 18. The general Summing up. Part III. Commentory on Gita Text The author has selected important verses of Gita and has commented on them. Part IV. Gita Summary has been provided. In the end he has provided under Appendix : The whole Gita Text in Sanskrit.

The book is written in a beautiful style and language is simple.

It is really a very practical and suggestive book on the Gita There will be no exaggeration if we say that this book is a very instructive and Practical guide for a common man to live his life spiritually in the real sense of the term.

The author Mr. Jariwalla has done an exhaustive study and produced this book. He deserves congratulations for making the book a useful guide for everyman. I am sure this book will definitely change the mode of living and will train people to live happily and peacefully according to Gita. Motilal Banarsidas publishers also deserve our thanks for bringing out this book to lime light.

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I

Atanas Stoykov— One of the Leaders in Contemporary Philosophy of Art

Alexander Atanassov

After the epoch-marking turn in science, made by the classicists of Marxism, the new philosophy and aesthetics supplied a large number of great, original theoreticians and critics in the same way as the socialism-born new art emerged, especially in the USSR, a series of superb creators. What concerns Bulgaria — a country with a multi-aged culture of art and a similarly old philosophic tradition — Dimiter Blagoev, the founder of the first Marxist party on the Balkans, wrote some works on the nature and mission of art, correcting in some aspects Georgi Plekhanov, and approached independently some of Lenin's postulations. At the end of the 30's his disciple Todor Pavlov published his fundamental works on "The Theory of Perfection" (written in the USSR) and "The General Theory of Art" which brought him a wide international reputation. His followers shaped out of this a whole scientific school.

In the conditions of socialism, when the high grades of education and culture became available to the widest social strata when the people's government opened up a wide scope for the realisation of all talents, in the field of philosophy and aesthetics in Bulgaria, a whole phalanx of explorers grew up. A special acknowledgment was gained by *Atanas Stoykov* — a disciple, friend and younger associate of Todor Pavlov. Stoykov, who passed as a student the severe school of the revolutionary struggle and was participant in the antifascist resistance movement at the time of the Second World War, develops in the years of freedom an active social worker and manifests himself as a talented publisher. Accumulating a wide and manyfold erudition, he defends in 1963 after a three years long specialisation at the famous Academy for Social Sciences in Moscow,

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with a great success his dissertation entitled "Criticism of the Abstract Art and its Theories", which was published in several languages. Investigating for years and at the spot not only the art in the USSR and the other socialist countries, but also in West Europe, Latin America and the USA, he is also a superb connoisseur of the Bulgarian art. He has published a great number of monographs and a multitude of studies and articles on a high scientific level, suggesting own original concepts and solutions of important problems in the theory and history of art, and one can say that he is the most outstanding representative of Bulgarian aesthetics and art knowledge. He is professor, a member-correspondent of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Scientific Union of Arts at the Academy, Chairman of the Society of Aestheticists, Literary Critic and Art Specialists in Bulgaria. Editor in chief of the magazine "Problems of Art". He is a member of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, of the boards of the Committee of Culture, of the Society of Bulgarian Painters, etc.

Atanas Stoykov is the author of a series of aesthetico-historical studies — about Winkelmann, Lessing, Hegel, and about such huge representatives of the marxist-leninist aesthetics as Lunacharski, Todor Pavlov, Mariategy, Christopher Caldwell, Ralph Fox. In some of his studies he interprets in an original way the contribution of Lenin in aesthetics[4]. We shall however try here to show in short the more important theoretical opinions and methodological ideas, which he defends and develops in the field of philosophy and history of art, as well as of the criticism of modern art in the world and in Bulgaria.

In his analyses of the nature of art Atanas Stoykov applies a complex methodological approach — simultaneously a gnosiological, sociological and aesthetical one. This approach examines the art phenomenon as a specific reflection of reality from fixed ideological positions. He makes an investigation of the work in its whole complexity, multi-layerness, multi-aspectness, dynamics, in all its relations and interactions with the social and cultural historical context. He accounts both the deining (in the end) role of objective factors, and the direct decisive role of the creative subject, the obligatory presence of the unrepeated individuality of the painter and the peculiar style contained in all components of the work. From this true marxist methodological position Atanas Stoykov examines and solves convincingly such a fundamental problem, as is *the problem of alienating the labour and dehumanising the art.* His monograph "Art and Alienation" (1970), although not very big in volume, represents according to us a sample of a philosophico historical analysis, which gives us the key of a true understanding also of the characteristic processes in the contemporary art life.

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Stoykov refutes the allegations of a number of western authors, according to whom alienation is inherent to any human society, because it allegedly roots in the nature of man itself. In the sense of Marx he differentiates the *objectionalisation* of man's creative powers from their *alienation.* Especially significant according to him is not to mix up *alienation* among people as a *psychological* phenomenon with the *alienation* as a *social* phenomenon, as the *alienation* of labour in the system of the private ownership of the means of production, which leads to alienation of man from his creative gist, converts him from aim into means, deprives him of individuality. Just on this basis emerges also alienation among people, the total "atomisation" of society. As practice of the real socialism already proves, with the revolutionary reorganisation of the social-economical system the roots of social alienation are being taken away, the premises for a gradual surmounting among people are being created. Of course these are complex and contradictory processes, but without understanding their essence in the reality we cannot explain much of that what happens in the art which reflects it.

Atanas Stoykov thinks that creation of a work of art cannot take as a rule the form of alienation, because the deed of the artist himself is deeply individual and any real creation of art is unique. However when the painter works by compulsion, when he makes a compromise with himself, accepting to create something which is against his taste, then the artistic work and its product acquire in a certain respect an alienated character towards its creator (I, 47). Such is foremostly the fate of the majority of creators, who work as mercenaries in the conditions of capitalism.

The Bulgarian investigator finds that the literature and art creators may be referred to three groups according to the way in which they interpret social alienation. The first group contains those who organically do not accept alienation, depict it critically, are convinced that it can and must be surmounted by means of eliminating its engendering reasons. He has here in mind such big names as Gorki, Barbusse, Andersen Nexo, Brecht, Gutuzo, Sikeyros, and the Bulgarians Smirnenski, Vaptzarov, Ludmil Stoyanov Ilia Beshkov, Boris Angelushev, Stoyan Venev, and others. Stoykov ranks into the second group creators, who, having often felt the densiest bitterness of alienation, depict it with a tremendous force, are sometimes indignant at it by their entire being, but in some cases fall into debility before it and then they are deeply dejected and taken up by a heavy pessimism. Characteristic here is the case with Franz Kafka, whose contradictory and peculiar creative work Stoykov especially analyses. To the third group belong those who think of alienation as of an eternal and unavoidable fate of man and mankind, coming to an involuntary or even conscious apology of the evil (I, 52-53).

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In his numerous publications Atanas Stoykov examines deeply and multisidedly the various theories, schools and individual transformations of the dehumanised art. He puts the opinions of the well-known Spanish philosopher and essayist Ortega-y Gasset to a circumstantial criticism. With his works "The Rebellion of Masses" and "The Dehumanisation of Art" this author became nearly the most authoritative ideologist of modernistic art. The Bulgarian investigator reminds Ortega's assertions that contemporary art by its intrinsic nature is unpopular, "something more, it is anti-popular", that art of the twentieth century is an art only for aristocrats of the of the spirit, that the contemporary artist must "break with the human look of reality, to dehumanise it". On this occasion he states. "If Ortega-y-Gasset was alive now, taking in at a glance the development of art in the western countries, he could say, not without pride, that he proved provident enough..." (I, 59).

But the Spanish thinker pretends that the trend towards dehumanisation is inherent to the new art in general. Here, too, Atanas Stoykov expresses his decisive disagreement with him. He proves that ideologists of the type of Ortega deal only with one series of facts, which at that do interpret onesidedly, ignoring fully other, much more essential facts and trends. "The big delusion of people like Ortega-y-Gasset consists on the second place of the fact that they have quite narrow and straightly dogmatic ideas about realism in art. For them realism exists only in the forms which he has accepted in the nineteenth century." (I, 62) Such a scantiness is shown by Stoykov also in the polemics, which he leads with such famous non-marxist authors like Thomas Munro, Herbert Reed, Rene Yuig, Heinrich Lutzeller, and others.[4]

On the ground of H. Reed's assertions backed on Freud, that the abstractionist was "the freest" painter, Stoykov writes! "The abstractionist is in fact, especially if he is a tashist, 'the painter of action', the freest artist in the world. Closing consciously his eyes for the riches and variety of life and nature, such an artist limits by himself his creative freedom within the frames of his entirely individual world. Something more, he even strives to deprive himself of what distinguishes man from all animals — the mind, the conscious life, and to become slave of his instincts, subconscious aspirations, biological reactions. An artist who consciously denies such achievements and expressive means of art, as drawing, perspective, chiaroscuro, etc. and does not want to know them and does not take the trouble to learn and use them, such an artist predestines himself and his creative work to an exclusive poverty." (I, 261). The representatives of the non-modernistic schools also do not achieve an "absolute freedom" — in his monograph "After the Decline of Abstractionism" (1970) Atanas Stoykov examines thoroughly the later

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metamorphoses of the dehumanised art, which asserts again its non-freedom, its voluntary subjugation to dogmas and limited rules[3]. By the way it is well known that the aesthetic concepts of western theoreticians and critics inspire or justify the respective practical cultural policy. As Atanas Stoykov establishes, the interested circles in the USA and in the West in general do everything that the world should not learn of the existence of artists like Wyes, Groper, Jack Levin, Shan, R. Kent, R. Sawyer, Refrege, U. White and even of E. Hopper and R. Diberncorn too. That is why he examines in details in his big and richly illustrated monograph "The Art in the USA" the work of these painters, and proves that just they, continuing the best traditions, raise the contemporary American art to the highest[5].

As Atanas Stoykov points out, if there is a view upon the newest art development in the world as a whole, one cannot help seeing that two lines and trends are struggling in it, sometimes crossing themselves. Among them the dominant, defining, perspective position is occupied by the tendency towards renewal, towards an upkeep and a constant enrichment of an active realism. Most outstandingly and categorically this is manifested in the *art of the socialist realism.*

Atanas Stoykov reminds that in this same year 1925, when the famous essay of Ortega y Gasset, which forboded dehumanisation general, was issued, the glory of Romain Rolland had risen, Maxim Gorki had reached huge authority in the world, Picasso was already in his so called classical period, Mathisse was in the boom of his creative powers, the deeply human art of Kathe Kollwitz had come to its maturity, the Soviet art still more attained attention, interest and sympathies of the public. Just at this time begin to shine the names of some of the greatest poets of our age — Block, Essenin and Mayakovski, theatric Europe and America are applauding Stanislavski, Vakhangov and Meyerhold and see in them the novators of the theatre. The new art — the cinema at this same 1925 celebrates its greatest victory—the film "The Battleship 'Potyomkin'" of Sergey Eisenstein. And these are only a few of the brightest names and facts (I, 63).

Atanas Stoykov multisidedly analyses in his works the new really avantguard art of the XXth century. He juxtaposes its aesthetics not only with the dehumanised aesthetics of the modernistic and neo modernistic art, but also with the aesthetics of the classic and contemporary critical realism. The socialist realists are full upto overflowing of respect towards the creative work of such gigants as Gogol and Tolstoy, Stendhal and Balzac, Goya and Courbet Tagore and Faulkner, they look at them as at their direct art inheritance, on which they incessantly draw moral and various creative experience (I, 110). But the creators of the new art also see their historical limitedness. They have a scientific understanding of the

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social determination of human fates and of the class foundation of the big crises in contemporary world, they have a clear social ideal, alien to the utopies and delusions. The materialistic world philosophy and the dialectic method help the talented artist to achieve a true social-psychological analysis of the phenomena and characters which he wants to recreate. Reminding the known thought of Lenin, that the communist party spirit in literature and art consists of the uniting of the ideas of scientific socialism together with rationalising and depicting of the practical working people's struggle for its realisation, Stoykov writes: "And because this uniting is done by a man, who is endowed with a special artistic talent, he makes it true entirely individually in unrepeated art images. Just this shows that we have not a simply communist party spirit at random, but particularly an artistic one." (4, 289-290).

According to Atanas Stoykov the method of socialist realism presumes an equivocal attitude towards the social reality (I, 107). On the one hand it is critical in respect of the old, anachronistic capitalist society and the whole stratum of prejudices and ideas, humiliating man and human dignity which it bears in itself, including the spirit of alienation too. On the other hand it affirms anything new, progressive, which the new working class carries with itself, depicts with sympathy the birth and building up of the new socialist society. He points out however that together with the depicting of the new socialist reality, the critical principle, the new literature and art go on to develop and lead a valiant struggle against conservatism, the prejudices of the past, as well as against the negative phenomena, born by the innate internal contradictions of socialism, by whose overcoming he approaches maturity. And still what dominates here is the pathos of approval and creation.

In his publications Atanas Stoykov analyses the renewal process which began in socialist art in the second half of the 50's, when in the artistic life and aesthetics in the USSR, Bulgaria and in most of the other socialist countries any conservative—dogmatic ideas are decisively surmounted and the spirit of courageous search and daring is affirmed, when in the centre of literature and art stands the man with the entire riches of his endurances, with the entire dramatism of his self-affirmation as a personality. This Bulgarian investigator displays himself as an ardent follower of Lenin's policy in the field of art, of that line which presumes a fine understanding of the peculiarity of artistic creation, respect towards the known creators, generous help for the development and self-education of the talents, tolerance in respect of the search and experiments, freedom of creation and constructive criticism, incessant elevation of the people towards art and approaching art to the people.

Atanas Stoykov works on the problems of aesthetics, his investigations on world's and Bulgarian art distinguish themselves by the

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competence of analysis, originality of reasonings, scientifical objectivity and argumentation of the assessments. He is one of those who do not like the ezotheric style, he possesses the difficult skill to write clearly, without vulgarising things, to be both nuanced and categorical enough. That is why he is read with interest and pleasure both by the wide circles of intelligentia and by the theoreticians and and creators of art not only in Bulgaria, but also beyond frontiers.

Prof. At. Stoykov is a big friend of India and a high conoisseur of its ancient and contemporary art. Significant enough in this respect is even only his evaluation of the huge monographic research work of the world famous Indian art expert and aestheticist Prof. Dr. Kanti Chandra Pandey (see "An Interesting Work on Comparative Aesthetics", Philos. Thought, No. 10, 1973. This reviewed work is the second part of Prof. Dr. K. Ch. Pandey's deep investigation on "Comparative Aesthetics"). Prof. At. Stoykov shares the high evaluation of the competent scientific, aesthetic and philosophic society in India and in a number of other countries of the world, stating that Prof. K. Ch. Pandey's work is a detailed and deepgoing investigation of the formation and development of aesthetic thought not only in India, but also in the West (the first volume refers to India, the second one to the West) Prof. Stoykov ends his highly ethurated evaluation with the stressed thought that a similar research work could be done only within the powers of scholars-aestheticists with an immense philosophico-aesthetical and art-expert erudition and a fine knowledge and feeling of art, what Prof. Dr. K. Ch. Pandey is.

QUOTED WORKS BY ATANAS STOYKOV

1 Criticism of Abstract Art and its Theories. Sofia, Nauka i Iskustvo (Science and Art), 1963.
2 Art and Alienation. Sofia, Nauka i Iskustvo, 1970.
3 After the Decline of Abstractionism. Criticism of the Basic Directions in Contemporary Modernism. Sofia, Nauka i Iskustvo, 1970.
4 Aesthetical Reflections. Studies, articles and scientific papess. Sofia, Nauka i Iskustvo, 1973.
5 The Art in the USA. Sofia, Nauka i Iskustvo, 1980.
6 Mariategy and the Latino American Culture. Sofia, Partizdat (Party Publishing House), 1982.
7 The Art in Cuba, Sofia, Nauka i Iskustvo, 1983.
8 An Interesting Work on Comparative Aesthetics. Sofia, Philos. Misl (Philos. Thought), No. 10, 1973.

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II

Are Sense-data Independent Existents ?

B. Sambasiva Prasad

Philosophers like G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, C. D. Broad, H. H. Price and A. J Ayer observe that illusions and hallucinations prove that physical objects are not perceived directly. They contend that people directly see only the colour, the shape, the size, the sound and the like called 'Sense-data' and the physical objects are known at a later stage in terms of these sense-data.

There are different views among the philosophers towards the nature of sense-data. While Moore, Russell and Broad, observe that sense-data are independent existents, Price argues that sense-data are events and Ayer contends that sense-data are 'linguistic devises' or 'verbal conventions.'

This paper states and examines the issue that sense-data are independent existents.

Philosophers like Moore, early Russell and Broad claim that sense-data are independent of the percipient's mind. In order to maintain the independent existence of sense-data, Moore makes a distinction between act of sensation and object of sensation and calls the latter as the sense-datum.[1] Moore argues that though the act of sensation is psychical, the object of sensation is not psychical. The object of sensation exists independent of the percipient's mind and such an object of sensation is called sense-datum. For instance when a blue colour is seen, there are two ideas involved here: the act of sensation (seeing the blue colour) and the object of sensation (the blue colour) Moore claims that the 'seeing of blue colour' is not

1 G. E. Moore, *Philosophical Studies*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951 pp. 17, 169.

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independent of sensation but the 'blue colour' itself is independent of sensation. Such a blue colour existing independent of sensation is called the sense-datum.

Moore points out that there are two main reasons for such a distinction. The first reason is as follows. A patch of colour exists though we do not perceive it. But our experience in getting such a patch of colour ceases to exist when we turn over our head from the patch of colour. The second reason for the distinction is this. Sense-data are the surfaces of the physical object, at least in real perceptual situations. So sense-data are in the place where the physical objects are at least in real perceptual situations. Thus a patch of colour is there where the envelope is; whereas our experience in getting such a patch of colour (sensation) is within our body. So the places where the sense data and sensations occupy differ from each other. So a distinction between sense-data and the sensation is necessary.[2]

Thus for Moore, the entity which is experienced "must in all cases be distinguished from the fact or event which consists in its being experienced.[3] Such a philosophy of Moore necessarily discards the Idealism of Berkeley, according to which there is no independ nt object of sensation apart from the act of sensation.

Similarly Russell believes that sense-data are not mental fabrications. They are real entities existing independent of the knower. In order to show the independent nature of sense-data, following Moore, Russell too makes a distinction between the sensation and the sense datum and pleads for the independent existence of the latter. In the language of Russell: "Whenever we see a colour, we have a sensation of the colour but the colour itself is a sense-datum, not a sensation. The colour is that of which we are immediately aware, and the awareness itself is the sensation.[4]

Thus Russell gives the name 'sense-data', to things, that we are immediately aware of in sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardness, roughness and so on.[5]

In his work 'Mysticism and Logic' Russell rejects the theory that sense data are psychical and subjective. He observes here that the arguments that prove the subjectivity of sense-data do merely prove physiological subjectivity i.e., causal dependence on the sense-organs, nerves and brain and hence this is not a psychological

2 G. E. Moore, *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*, Allen and Unwin, 1953, p. 31.
3 G. E. Moore, *Philosophical Studies*, p. 169.
4 Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, 1976, p. 4.
5 Ibid.

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subjectivity.[6] Therefore, sense-data unlike beliefs and volitions that happen to be part of the subject, are independent of the percipient's mind. The existence of the sense-datum is not logically dependent on the subject. In fact there is no a priori reason why a particular sense-datum should not persist after it has ceased to be a datum.[7] Russell argues that it is owing to our failure to distinguish between sense-data and sensations that the sense-data are treated as mental.[8] But once we make this distinction, the sense data cannot be treated as subjective.

Russell goes to the extent of arguing that there is a possibility for unsensed sense-data, called the 'sensibilia' which do exist in the external world. When the observer comes into contact with these sensibilia, these will become sense data just like a man on getting married becomes a husband. To quote Russell: "I shall give the name *sensibilia* to those which have the same metaphysical status as sense-data, without necessarily being data to any mind. Thus the relation of a *sensibile* to a sense-datum is like that of a man to a husband; a man becomes a husband by entering into a relation of marriage, and similarly a sensibile becomes a sense-datum by entering into a relation of acquaintance. It is important to have both terms; for we wish to discuss whether an object which is at one time a sense-datum can still exist at a time when it is not a sense-datum. We cannot ask 'Can Sense-data exist without being given?' for that is like asking 'Can husbands exist without being married?'. We must ask 'Can *sensibilia* exist without being given?' and also 'Can a particular *sensibile* be at one time, a sense-datum, and at another not?'. Unless we have the word *sensibile* as well as the word 'sense-datum', such questions are apt to entangle us in trivial logical puzzles".[9]

Thus Russell claims in his works such as *The Problems of Philosophy* and *Mysticism and Logic* that sense-data are not psychical but physical which are independent of the mind.

Following Moore and Russell, Broad observes that sense[10] though to some extent qualitatively mind dependent, they are not psychical or mental.[11] Sensa are not states of mind It is true that

6 Bertrand Russell, *Mysticism and Logic and other essays*, Allen and Unwin 1951, p. 149.

7 Ibid., p. 152.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., pp. 148-49.

10 C. D. Broad, prefers to call 'sense-data' as 'sensa' and the 'Sense-datum Theory' as the 'Sensum Theory'. Ref. Broad's work: *The Mind and its place in Nature*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951 pp. 181-82.

11 C. D. Broad, *Scientific Thought*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952 , p. 265 66.

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feelings and desires are the states of mind. But sensa are not like feelings and desires. So sensa are not mental. If we treat sensa as mental, it leads to an absurd conclusion that some states of mind are literally hot, red or round etc.[12]

On the contrary sensa can exist independent of the percipient's mind. This is the reason why a sensation of colour can be conveniently distinguished into act and object of sensation (sensum) where the latter can exist independently of the former.

The so called sensations can be arranged in an order starting with the sensations of sight, passing through those of taste and smell, and ending with sensations of headaches. It is true that it is difficult to distinguish between act and object of sensation in the sensations of headaches, but we can make such a distinction easily in the case of sensations of sight and sound. Realists preferring the latter always distinguish act and object in a sensation. But representative realists, preferring the former opine that it is always difficult to distinguish between act of sensation and object of sensation. Broad holds that though it is difficult to distinguish the sensation and the object of sensation, it is not impossible to draw such a distinction. Such distinctions are however, obvious in respect of the sensations of sight, taste, sound etc. Hence it is "necessary to hold that sensation and the sensum are not identical"[13] and therefore "we cannot argue that sensum = sensation = a presentation".[14] So sensa are physical realities, existing independent of the mind.

The above discussion leads us to the view that Moore, Russell and Broad are committed to the notion that sense-data are independent existents. This conception is a target of attack by philosophers like H. A. Prichard and Gilbert Ryle.

Prichard observes that treating appearances of objects as some kind of objects is based upon a "mistaken idea that perceiving is a form of knowing"[15] With this mistaken idea, sense-datum theorists are of the opinion that perceiving a certain sound, is a question of an apprehension or a knowing of that colour or sound. This leads to the conclusion that secondary qualities such as sounds, colours, tastes and so on exist independent of sensation. But the truth is that secondary qualities such as Colours, sounds etc. do not exist independent of perception and hence, perception is not a kind of knowing. But the sense-datum philosophers argue in the wrong way round. Instead of arguing as they should argue, that because

12 Ibid., pp. 258.
13 Ibid., p. 257.
14 Ibid.
15 H. A. Prichard, *Knowledge and Perception*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1950, p. 202 In this context Prichard used 'Perception' and 'sensation' as identical terms.

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the secondary qualities necessarily depend on our perceiving them, perceiving cannot be a kind of knowing, they argue that because perceiving is a kind of knowing what we perceive cannot depend on our perceiving them.

If sensations are knowings, mistakes about what we perceive should be impossible. But it is a fact that we often commit mistakes in what we, see feel and touch. Hence perceiving cannot be a kind of knowing. Philosophers like Moore and Russell wrongly profess that perception is a kind of knowing and hence they are "not only begging the main question, but begging it in the wrong direction."[16]

The truth is that the sense-data specify that physical objects. It is the physical objects that are red, green, smooth and hard. But these properties, red, green, smooth etc. are not separate objects or entities over and above the physical objects — tables and chairs. Prichard explains this with an illustration. If he eats a number of things — say, some cheese, some bread and some salt etc., they together form a certain group. But their membership of this group does not constitute them things having a certain common characteristic. The things which he eats are united simply by his eating them and his eating them does not constitute them things of a separate sort. Similarly, the sound and the feeling of roundness which he is apprehending are united only by his apprehending them; and though they are things which are being thus apprehended by him they are not separate things existing by themselves.

Ryle observes that it is true that observation of a horse race entails certain glimpses, but these glimpses are not themselves observations. Having sensations "is not by itself descrying, any more than bricks are houses, or letters are words".[17] Having a sensation cannot itself be a species of perceiving, finding or espying. "If all clothes are concatenations of stiches, absurdity results from saying that all stiches are themselves very tiny clothes".[18]

Infact sensations and observations categorially differ from each other.[19] Thus we can speak of the motives from which a person listens to something, but not of the motives from which he has an auditory sensation; the person may show skill, patience and method in peeping, but not in having a visual sensation. So also it makes sense to speak of a person suspending from watching a race, but it makes no sense to speak of someone refraining from feeling pain.

"Sensations then, are not perceivings, observings or findings; they are not detectings, scannings or inspectings; they are not appre-

16 H. A. Prichard, *Knowledge and Perception*, p. 213.
17 Gilbert Ryle, *The concept of Mind*, Harmandworth, Penguin Books, 1963, p. 203.
18 Ibid., p. 204.
19 Ibid.

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hendings, cognisings, intuitings or knowings. To have a sensation is not to be in a cognitive relation to a sensible object. There are no such objects. Nor is there any such relation."[20]

So it is not the 'looks' that we see as the sense-datum theorists suppose. On the contrary we see the objects, such as horses, dishes, planes etc. Seeing 'looks' is as absurd as to speak of eating nibbles of biscuits since nibble is already the noun of eating. It is the biscuits that we eat; it is not the nibbles of biscuits that we eat. So also it is the objects that we see; it is not the looks of objects that we see. 'Look' is already a noun of 'seeing' just like 'nibble' is already a noun of 'eating'.[21]

For R. M. Chisholm too, appearances of objects are not in turn observing some kind of objects. In the language of Chisholm : "We perceive a thing when the thing as stimulus object has acted upon our sense-organs, thereby causing us to be appeared to. The appearances of things, however, are not stimulus objects that effect our sense-organs and therefore they are not themselves anything that we perceive. We do not see, hear, or feel the appearances of things."[22]

It is true to say that something appears F. But from this we should not infer that the object presents an appearance that is F, as the sense datum philosophers suppose it to be. For instance from the sentence 'The man appears tubercular', we do not infer 'the man presents an appearance which is tubercular' and from the sentence 'The books appear worn and dusty and more than two hundred years old, we do not infer 'the books present appearances which are worn and dusty and more than two hundred years old.'

The sense-datum philosophy treats the appearances as some kind of physical objects. A physical object is conceived as that which gives us an appearance. When the 'appearance' itself is conceived as the physical object, then these 'appearances' will give rise to some other appearances and this goes ad infinitum. Thus when we assimilate appearances to substances or concrete things, we multiply entities and also problems beyond necessity. "We find ourselves confronted, for example, with such strange questions as : If the appearance can be white in the sense in which a rose can be white, does it also have a certain weight, an inside, and a backside ? Could it be that the backside of the white appearance, the side that (somehow) faces away, is green, or blue, or yellow?"[23]

So appearances are not the substances or concrete particulars. On the contrary, Chisholm believes that they are only adverbs in

20 Ibid.
21 Ibid , p. 205.
22 R. M. Chisholm, *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 94.

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our language.[24] In the sentence 'The thing appears white' the word 'white' functions as an adverb. The function of an adverb is *not* to attribute a property to a substance, but attribute a property to an other property as in the sentence 'He is excellently tall', or to attribute a property to an event, process or state of affairs as in the sentence 'He is walking slowly'. Therefore the word 'white' in the sentence 'The object appears white' tells us something about the state of affairs which is an object's appearing. It tells us something about the way in which the object appears, just as 'slowly' may tell us something about the way in which an object moves.

Being alive to the difficulties against the independent nature of sense-data, Price and Ayer though support the sense-datum philosophy, never treated the sense-data as independent existents. Price observes that sense-data are 'events'[25] which are neither physical nor psychical but neutral in their status. Ayer contends that sense-data are only verbal conventions or linguistic devises,[26] introduced to solve the problems of illusions and hence these should not be mistaken for independent existents. Ayer argues that the sense-datum is the name given to what is directly seen in an illusion or hallucination and hence such of the sense datum should not be mistaken for an independent object.

We also find in the writings of later Russell that he no more treats the sense-data as independent objects. On the contrary like Price, Russell too treats them as 'events' which are neither physical nor mental but neutral in their status.[27] Russell cites the seeing a flash of lightning, touching the coldness of a frog, as the instances of events.

In fact at a later stage Moore himself expresses his disapproval of ideas in his paper on 'The Refuatation of Idealism' where he makes a distinction between act of sensation and object of sensation, and treats the latter as sense-datum. To quote Moore :

"This paper now appears to me to be very confused, as well as to embody a good many down-right mistakes; so I am doubtful whether I ought to have included it. But in this case I have another excuse; namely that it is a paper to which a good many allusions have been made by contemporary writers on philosophy and I was told that for some readers at all events, it would be a convenience that it should be reprinted along with the rest, if any for the sake of reference".[28]

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23 Ibid., p. 95.

24 Ibid.

25 H. H. Price, *Perception*, Methuen and Co., Ltd. 1961, pp. 116.

26 A. J. Ayer, *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*, Macmillan, 1969, p. 57.

27 Bertrand Russell, *The Analysis of Mind*, Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1951, p. 143.

Bertrand Russell, *An Outline of Philosophy*, Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1951, pp. 288, 292-93.

28 G E. Moore, *Philosophical Studies*, p. viii.

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III

Beyond Cultural Morality

David K. Burke

This paper is a brief, exploratory discussion of a situation which can lead to the development of a moral posture above and beyond cultural limitations. This situation, involving the direct revelation of a higher truth by certain spiritual Masters, allows one to go beyond ordinary morality, I shall argue, and reach a level of understanding and a state of consciousness where he, himself, becomes a matrix and a source from which morality devolves.

Morality usually refers to a system of attitudes, beliefs, principles and feelings regarding proper conduct which we feel is universally valid. If I consider it wrong for me to act in a certain way under certain circumstances, I consider it also wrong for you to act that way. To speak of the relativity of morals—as the anthropologists do—is to speak of someone else's morals, the morals of another culture. It is *their* morals that are relative. For if a person truly accepts a certain morality, he cannot in all sincerity say that it is permissible for others to act in a contrary fashion. If I believe it is wrong for me to kill someone in order to seize his wealth, I believe it is also wrong for you to act this way, no matter what kind of moral system you accept.

In most cases, morality arises out of a particular cultural experience. It reflects the unique collective consciousness of that culture : that substrata of deeply rooted emotional feelings, intellectual beliefs and metaphysical assumptions which distinguish one culture from others. It expresses the world view of a culture, the symbolic framework through which the culture approaches the world.

Given this to be the case, an inner tension immediately becomes apparent. Morality, by its very nature, aspires to universality, yet

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it is bound to particularity. It wants to embrace all mankind, but it soon sees that it is neither suitable nor acceptable to all mankind.

From a spiritual point of view, morality can be said to reflect a particular culture's experience of God. Or put another way, morality is a particular cultural manifestation—I wish to argue—of the one divine truth. A morality emerges when the divine unfolds and reveals itself in the world through certain cultural channels. No morality, then, can offer a complete view of the ultimate truth, since it is irretrievably bound up with the symbols, beliefs, attitudes, etc. of one culture. Morality, the product of an interchange between divinity's revelation and culture's receptivity, always expresses the divine truth in its own way.

Since all moralities express the one universal truth, they immediately feel that they themselves are universal. Herein lies morality's aspiration to universality, its claim to universal validity. Since people actually *see* the truth in and through their own morality, they don't realize that the truth may be glimpsed through other moralities as well. Morality can be compared to a window through which one can see the sun. Someone sees the sun through his window and becomes so dazzled by the vision that he forgets the window is even there. Immediately he wants to pull the rest of mankind over to where he is since, according to his view, this is where the sun can be found. He fails to realize that there are other windows which reveal the sun from an entirely different, and possibly even fuller, perspective. Each morality feels that it is for everyone, but each contains a distinct cultural perspective that particularizes it and limits it.

There are a number of different modes through which the divine may reveal itself in a culture, thereby giving rise to a particular morality. One obvious example are the Ten Commandments. The Commandments themselves, according to the Bible, came directly from God, but they were shaped and molded by the consciousness of Moses and, later, by the culture to which he offered them. They became bound up with the symbols and linguistic idiom of the Jewish people. The Ten Commandments became bound up with Jewish social custom and law, and assumed a particular cultural orientation. The direct message of God became a Jewish truth, or a Judaic-Christian one if you will.

Another example can be found in the case of Christ, where—according to the spiritual point of view—the divine chose to reveal itself through the utterances and teachings of a historical figure. During this historical period, there existed a rare opportunity to ask specific questions, to seek clarifications, to struggle toward a clearer grasp of the divine truth. But even so, the version that finally emerged as the accepted, crystallized Christian morality was at best a culturally biased one. To begin with, the original vision—

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infinite and universal—had to be abridged and limited just so it could be conveyed through human speech. And even then, men understood Christ's words in their own way and transmitted his vision according to their own collective understanding. The end result, Christian morality, represents only a limited version of truth, a particular truth rather than The Truth.

In the formation of most individual or personal moralities, the revelatory aspect is less dramatic than in the cases of Judaic and Christian morality, and the cultural aspect is more particularized. The voice of God does not normally manifest itself from the top of a mountain or through the lips of a great holy man; rather, it expresses itself more subtly, through the hearts of ordinary individuals. And culture does not take the form of social custom, common linguistic modes or collective attitudes and beliefs; but rather, the particular way in which these express themselves in one individual. In other words, the interchange between divinity and culture is more like a tete-a-tete, the private encounter within each man's consciousness of his own inner divinity and his cultural reality.

When the divine reveals itself in an individual, it speaks through his innermost self or soul, which he is usually not even conscious of. Divinity expressing itself in and through a person may be compared to an endlessly flowing river, forever heading towards increased conscious awareness. As this river flows through the various cultural formations that a person consciously or unconsciously accepts, as it works its way up from the innermost self to the conscious mind, it imbues these formations with its own spiritual essence. And this gives rise to personal morality. This imbuing action, the ebb and flow of this river, its silent murmur, is sometimes called the inner voice. Morality, then, is something fluid, always being replenished by this divine flow, always expressing the ever-flowing wisdom of this inner voice. And it is this spiritual essence, this revelatory aspect, that gives our morality its claim to universality. It is this quality that makes us feel that our morality is valid, not just for us, but for everyone. It is this quality that permits us to call certain attitudes, feelings, etc. by the name *morality*.

In the foregoing examples, I have indicated different ways the divine expresses itself as morality, and suggested that this morality reflects the one divine truth, but from a particular cultural perspective. At this point, I wish to explore a rather different mode through which higher truth is expressed, and discuss how it manifests itself as a "morality" completely free of cultural limitations. This mode involves the direct revelation of divine truth by certain spiritual Masters through silent meditation. The end result is what I should like to call a Transcendent Morality, culturally unadulterated, whose very essence is the breath of divinity.

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Indian philosophy speaks of Illumined or God-realized spiritual Masters, who have achieved total and conscious oneness with the divine. During meditation, these Masters have the capacity to completely obliterate their human identities and act as pure channels for the divine, dedicated vehicles in which the divine can focus itself and through which it can express itself. For the remainder of this paper, I shall be drawing on my experience with a spiritual Master named Sri Chinmoy, who is the spiritual head of some forty spiritual centers around the world and spiritual director of the United Nations Meditation Group in New York.

The divine truth that he reveals during meditation, that quality which he transmits unadulterated from the Source, I shall refer to as *Light*. In one sense, the word Light is a metaphor, referring to a form of illumination. But phenomenologically, it bears a certain resemblance to physical light. When receiving this Light, one feels that he is glowing, that light is actually entering him and that his inner self, like some effulgent inner sun, is glowing. It is as though a floodlight were suddenly focused on one, offering on a "flood" of awareness, though it is not an awareness of any particular object or thing. It is like an intuitive grasp of some higher Reality, which immediately fades once the mind tries to conceptualize it, but which reemerges once the mind grows silent. It may be described as a kind of knowledge, though not the kind that can be broken into segments, expressed in mental concepts or ideas. It is the sort of knowledge that in normal discourse gets lost in the interstitial spaces between ideas. It is too fluid and subtle to be expressed in words. It is an inner certitude of a divine Reality.

Unlike the truth we get from the inner voice, this Light does not have to work itself up through the various layers of attitudes, beliefs, etc.—the cultural overlays—in order to reach a level of conscious awareness. In this situation, the divine truth is received directly by the inner being and absorbed by the outer consciousness without being touched by intervening cultural forces. The reason for this, in brief, is that the person is consciously in touch with his soul during this experience. His outer consciousness is interiorized. So the Light which the soul receives from the spiritual Master is directly absorbed also by the conscious self—and not in any culturally determined form, but *as Light*.

Through repeated encounters with a spiritual Master, a person finds himself absorbing increasing amounts of this illumination. The impact of these experiences takes the form, however, not of any kind of morality. Rather, it gives rise to what might be called a *divinized leaning*. Over the course of time, one develops a spontaneous inclination, a natural capacity, to express the divine in all that he does. But this is not the divine as it is translated into morality, not the

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divine particularized by various cultural formations, but divinity in its most pure and unadulterated form. He becomes what may be called a focus of divinity. The divine truth flowing in and through him does not encounter any cultural forms; rather, it flows through uninterrupted. And it is only when it actually enters the world—when it is translated into words or actions or interpreted by other men—that it becomes particularized and limited. The person at this time becomes a matrix of morality, above and beyond culture, a source from which the divine emanates. He becomes, in a sense, another Christ or Buddha: man as God and God as man, a matrix from which morality eventually devolves to humanity.

The world today is undergoing a process of spiritual evolution, which is being greatly accelerated by the efforts of spiritual Masters like Sri Chinmoy, At some period in the near or distant future, this kind of divinized leaning will be found in all men. At that time the need for morality—in fact, the whole concept of morality—will become outmoded, replaced by the spontaneous flow of man's own divinity. As Sri Chinmoy expresses this: "What is liberation? It is the extinction of a divided consciousness in the all-pervading oneness of the Supreme. What is spiritual perfection? It is the constant capacity to live in God and to reveal Him in one's every movement."

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IV

Bergson's Theory of Numbers

A. Appan Ramanujam

All human societies have some partial conception of number as used in counting. The procedure of counting consists in correlating items to be counted with the elements of some readily surveyable standard sequence. For this counting to be correct the correlation effected must be one to one and the standard sequence employed must be a progression; that is it must have a first element but no last. There are different views on the concept of number: the scientific and the philosophic. This article gives briefly both the views and Bergson's theory of numbers in particular. Bergson's concept of number is based on his metaphysics; i.e., he explains number from his theory of consciousness and duration.

Mathematics and Number :—

The mathematics of number originated with the Baby-lonians and Hindus. The numbers involved in counting — 1, 2, 3, etc.—are the simplest and most fundamental kind These have been called the natural numbers. Rational numbers (all numbers expressible as fractions), real numbers (all numbers that measures lengths and areas — e. g. $\sqrt{2}$, complex numbers (those having imaginary components based on $\sqrt{-1}$, and transfinite numbers (numbers uncountably large) are called "artificial" numbers. Some call zero a natural number, whereas others do not. In nineteenth century a unified theory of numbers developed and it has shown how the mathematical theories concerning the artificial numbers can be reduced to a theory concerning the natural numbers. Within the area of elementary number theory the prime numbers are of especial interest (a prime number is a natural number greater than 1 that is evenly divisible by no natural number other than 1 and itself).

Philosophy of number :

The main philosophical issues with regard to number theory concern the kinds of meaning, truth, and knowledge that are involved

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in it. One broad category of philosophical views of number comprises views according to which the laws of number theory are somehow liberally true. Literalistic views about the metaphysical status of number may be divided into nominalistic, conceptualistic, and platonistic views.

Nominalism :

Nominalism is the view that there are no abstract entities, and as a literalistic view of number it holds that numbers are literally concrete items in the world, occurring at particular times. However, no series of actual concrete items in the world seems capable of being known to constitute a progression in the full sense required by number theory, and for this reason nominalism fails to provide a complete literalistic interpretation of number.

Conceptualism :

Conceptualism may roughly be characterised as the view that abstract entites exist, but only insofar as they are created by the activity of human thought. As a literalistic view of number conceptualism may be regarded as holding that numbers literally exist as timeless abstract things yet are mental constructions and have no being independent of the mind. Kant and Brouwer are the central figures of this theory. They maintained that a pure intuition of temporal counting serves as the point of departure for the mathematics of number. This theory faces many difficulties. E. G., if numbers were viewed as mental constructions, it would then seem doubtful that numbers could be known to apply to what exists outside the mind.

Platonism :

By platonism is understood the realistic view, akin to that of Plato himself, that abstract entities exist in their own right, independently of human thinking. According to this view, number theory is to be regarded as the description of a realm of objective, self-subsistent mathematical objects that are timeless, nonspatial, and non-mental. Platinism conceived it to be the task of the mathematician to explore this and other eternal realms of being. In recent thought platonism as a view of number has been associated with the logistic thesis, the claim that the theory of numbers is reducible to logic. Frege was the original proponent of the logistic thesis, which Russell and whitehead subsequently expounded in their monumental *Principia Mathematica*. The reduction of the natural numbers to logic is a procedure of exactly the same sort as the reduction of the artificial to the natural numbers, but in this case the natural numbers themselves, and the operations on them, are defined in terms of concepts of logic, and their laws are deduced from laws of logic. Set theory is here regarded by Frege and the authors of *Principia* as

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a part of logic rather than of mathematics; the reduction in fact a reduction to set theory.

Nonliteralistic philosophy of number :

According to this theory, the significance of number theory does not consist in its literal truth— There are two kinds of this theory. One is formalism which holds that number theory is only a scheme of marks, with rules for their manipulation; no attempt should be made to regard combinations of these marks as expressing meaningful statements. According to this view no meaning, truth, or knowledge is embodied in number theory; it is an abstract game, the study of whose rules is intellectually stimulating (rather like chess, but more intricate) This game (unlike chess) can be turned to practical use, for certain ways of applying combinations of its marks have been evolved that are very helpful to people who carry out practical activities of counting and measurement.

Another nonliteralistic viewpoint holds that although the laws of number theory should not be regarded as literally describing mathematical objects, they should be regarded as indirectly expressing generalizations concerning the nature of correct counting. These would presumably be necessary truths explicative of the concept of correct counting rather than inductive generalizations about actual counting. In this spirit, "5 plus 7 equals 12" could be regarded as indirectly asserting that whenever the words "one" through "five" are called out in one-to-one correlation with the items of a group and then the words "one" through "seven" are called out in correlation with the items of another, quite separate group, the words "one" through "twelve" would be required if the two groups were to be pooled and all the items counted together. This view gives to number theory some real content (although nonliteralistic). This can also give a more direct account of why mathematical theory can assist our practical activities of counting and measuring.

Bergson's Theory :

There are two central ideas of what may becalled Bergson's philosophy of mathematics: first, the inseperability of the concept of number from that of spatial magnitude: second, the view that the act by which the intuition of spatial magnitude is posited is itself a *durational* act, an instance of duree reelle. While the first idea is fairly known and was widely criticised, the second was largely ignored, although it was the only one which was compatible with the rest of his philosophy.

Number and Space :

In his *Time and Free Will*, Bergson tried to show that numerical multiplicity is nothing but the multiplicity of homegeneous units juxtaposed in the homogeneous medium of ideal space. He pointed

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hat a mere *enumeration* or listing of numbers of a certain
counting.[1] When we really count instead of mere enu-
for instance, when we count sheep in the herd, we delibe-
regard individual qualitative differences between them, in
g their number we even disregard their common features
which makes them to belong to the same species and treat them as homogeneous units each of which is qualitatively identical to other and each of which still remains distinct from other. What differentiates such qualitatively indistinguishable units must be *a principle of differentiation other than qualitative* and this is precisely space. In other words, it is the juxtaposition of these units in the ideal medium of space which make them diverse and distinguishable despite their qualitative identity.[2]

Kant's view :

Kant's view of number is radically opposed to Bergson's. He correlated counting with an a priori intuition of time. In *his Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant wrote. "Thus number is nothing but the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a homogeneous intuition in general, an unity due to the fact that I generate time itself in the apprehension of the intuition". The fact that the duality of arithmetic and geometry is based on the duality of time and space is evident from the following passage: "Geometry is based on the pure intuition of space. Arithmetic produces its concepts of number through successive addition of units in time.[3] The necessary and synthetic character of arithmetical propositions is due to the fact that the arithmetical operations take place in the ideal medium of time while the similar character of geometrical propositions is due to the underlying a priori intuition of space. However Kant's view on the relations of arithmetic to time was not free from ambiguities. The successive character of counting played a large role in his view. But it was pointed out that all intellectual operations in truth, — *all mental processes* — have a similar successive character. Why then single out arithemetic operations for such privileged linkage with the "a priori intuition of time" ?

Bergson's analysis of the process of counting :

Bergson showed that an analysis of the process of counting, leads to a significantly different conclusion from that of Kant. His analysis consists of three steps :

(a) In the first place, Bergson shows that no counting can result as long as we remain conscious of one single act of counting without retaining the recollection of proceeding acts. Counting thus requires

1 Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, p 76.
2 Ibid., p. 95.
3 Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'*, Humanities Press, New York, 1962, p. 129.

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a certain temporal span of consciousness, a mnemic retention of the anterior acts without which we would be for ever confined within the narrow limits of the moment in which one single act of counting actually is taking place.

(b) But such mnemic retention of anterior acts can occur in two very different forms and thus it is only a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of counting. Thus in listening to successive strokes of the clock, I either count them or I do not. In the first case I not only retain mnemically successive sounds, but I also juxtapose them in the ideal medium of intuited space, that is, I locate them, stripped of their qualitative differences, along a geometrical line, called 'axis of numbers', that is, in 'one-dimensional geometrical space', The units, though homogeneous, remain nevertheless distinct in virtue of their juxtaposition. In this case, and in this case only, the conditions required for counting are present.

(c) But there is the *third* possibility: instead or either remaining in a pure present, or in juxtaposing the remembered past moments in the ideal one—dimensional space, *I can retain them mnemically without counting.* Bergson illustrates it by his analysis of retrospective counting—the analysis belongs to the subtlest in psychological and epistemological writings.

"Whilst I am writing these lines, the hour strikes on a neighbouring clock, but my inattentive ear does not perceive it until several strokes made themselves head. Hence I have not counted them; and yet I only have to turn my attention back-wards to count up the four strokes which have already sounded and add them to those which I hear. If, then, I question myself carefully on what has just taken place, I perceive that first four sounds had struck my ear and even affected my consciousness, but that the sensations produced by each one of them, instead of being set side by side, had melted into one another in such a way as to give the whole a peculiar quality, to make a kind of musical phrase out of it... In a word, the number of strokes was perceived as a quality and not as a quantity; it is thus that duration is presented to immediate quantity; it is thus that duration is presented to immediate consciousness, and it retains this form so long as it does not give place to a symbolical representation derived from extension"[4].

We are thus returning to the same notion of 'heterogeneous continuity' or 'succession without separation' of which 'qualitative multiplicity' is just another name. The passage just quoted shows how this type of multiplicity is related to numerical multiplicity. The former is clearly more fundamental; from it and by it the multiplicity of countable units is generated. In the empirical description

4 Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, pp. 127 128.

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given above Bergson shows that it was our refocussed attention that dissociated our immediate memory of the original unitary successive whole a sort of 'musical phrase' into the distinct and countable units. This refocussing clearly had two correlated and complementary effects by which the immediate recollection of the original temporal *Gestalt* was modified; it abstracted from subtle qualitative differences of the four successive sounds which were due to their interpenetration; and in making them thus qualitatively identical, it separated them by ideally juxtaposing them. In truth, these two effects are two aspects of one and the same act — the act of juxtaposition; it would be ideal to argue which aspect comes first.

But this act of juxtaposition itself is still a *temporal durational* act. It is an apparent paradox that the act *negating* duration (i. e. positing juxtaposition which is by its own nature the relation between *simultaneous terms*) is itself *durational*. This twofold, paradoxical or 'dialectical' character is even more conspicuous in the act of counting and Bergson is fully aware of it.

"In a word, the process by which we count units and make them into a discrete multiplicity has two sides; on the one hand we assume that they are identical, which is conceivable only on condition that these units are ranged alongside each other in a homogeneous medium; but on the other hand the third unit, for example, when added to the other two, alters the nature, the appearance and, as it were, the rhythm of the whole: without this interpenetration and this, so to speak, qualitative progress, no addition would be possible".[5]

Hence it is through the quality of quantity that we form the idea of quantity without quality.

This is the *second* aspect of Bergson's philosophy of mathematics which could be equally well called psychology of mathematics since it deals with the psychological dynamism by which the concept of number and arithmetical addition are generated. Arithmetical units and the correlated spatial intervals on the axis of numbers while being completely homogeneous and external to each other, cease to be so on the metamathematical level; for if they would remain absolutely distinct and separated or absolutely homogeneous and undistinguishable, no number greater than one could ever be conceived, no intuition of space *including* two points could ever arise. Two point—numbers are posited on a geometrical line ('one—dimensional space' or 'axis of numbers') not only *outside* each other, but also as being *together*, *beside* each other; and this *togetherness* resides in the *act* of juxtaposing intuition, not in its content; that is, not on the geometrical, but on the meta — geometrical level.

5 Ibid,, p. 123.

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Criticism of Bergson's theory of Numbers :

Russell vehimently attacks Bergson for correlating number with the intuition of space. He charges Bergson with the confusion of numbers with particular collections, completely ignoring Bergson's explicitly made distinction between enumeration and counting. Russell even goes so far as to claim that Bergson does not give any reason — whether good or bad — for his view linking spatiality with number[6]; he irresponsibly overlooks the fact that practically the whole second chapter of *Time and Free Will* deals with this problem and that in it Bergson *no less than five times*[7] returns to a detailed analysis of the process of counting and the intuition of space involved in it. Russell also criticises Bergson for his alleged tendency to visualize.[8] Russell clearly misunderstood Bergson because he confused "intuition of space" with a *crude* visualization, even though Bergson explicity avoided this confusion. No point was stressed by Bergson more than the *homogeneity* of space, that is, the absence of qualitative sensory differences between its parts. He explicitly assimilated the intuition of space to the 'pure intuition' of Kant.

The logicists among mathematicians claim that it is the logical concepts of arithmetical series which underlies the geometrical continuum and not vice versa as Bergson claimed. This, according to them, is the true meaning of 'arithmetisation of the continuum. But, as mentioned above, this belief is due to the fact that the logicists — including Russell — are little trained in introspective analysis and thus fail to detect more elusive visual elements of spatial intuition in the very ideas of number and of set (class) in general. It is the ideal medium of space which makes the distinction of qualitatively identical units possible; it is the infinite divisibility of the same intuited space which makes the "arithmetization of continuum", that is, its unlimited division into the point — like elements possible.

6 Bertsand Russell, *The Philosophy of Bergson*, Macmillan, London 1912, pp 14 15.

7 Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, pp. 77-79, 86-87, 104-105, 121-123, 127 128.

8 Op. cit., p. 9.

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V

William James on the Cognitive Value of Mystical Experience

Stephen H. Phillips

One who upholds the cognitive value of mystical experience is committed to what I call the "parallelism thesis." In ordinary life and discourse, sense experience is taken by everyone, except a very few overscrupulous and skeptical philosophers, to have evidential value. For example, if someone were to ask me why I believe I am sitting in a chair, I would respond that I see it and sense it tactually. The crucial question in the epistemology of mysticism is whether mystical experience has evidential value in a parallel fashion.

This issues raised by this question are far too complex to be treated in this short paper. Here my aim is to examine the views of the American philosopher William James on the question whether mystical experience might have objective indications in the strong sense accorded to it by an advocate of the parallelism thesis.[1]

James in his classic study *The Varieties of Religious Experience* reveals himself to be a philosopher of undoubted sympathy toward mystics. James imparts great value to mystical experience, and in such a valuation both a proponent and an opponent of the parallelism thesis could possibly agree. However, James classifies mystical

1 Indian traditions of mysticism in particular advocate such a parallelism thesis, which is well-expressed in the Sanskrit term, *alaukikapratyakṣa*, "other-worldly sense experience," the most common term for sense experience '*pratyakṣa*' being used. Also, mystical experience is often said to bring God, the Absolute, or Nirvana "*sākṣāt*," into "immediate experience." For example, from the Tantric Kṣemarāja's commentary on the *Śivasūtra*, sūtra 3.28: *caitanyarūpasyā 'tmano yaj jñānam sākṣātkāraḥ, tad asya dānam*. "That cognition of Self as consciousness which becomes immediately evident (or before the eyes, *sāksāt*) is His [Śiva's or God's] gift." Innumerable references could be given.

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experience as feeling, as feeling having no generalizable import other than its intrinsic value or desirability.[2]

This position accords well with a prominant strain in mystic literature. Mystics of diverse traditions have echoed the Buddha's famed eschewal of conceptualization of Nirvana in his zealous endorsement of that kind of experience: "Don't waste time with words; do what is necessary, e. g. meditate, consecrate, purify, to gain the supremely valuable experience." James forcefully defends this idea while he sides with those who deny evidential value to mystical experience in the strong, object-entailing sense accorded to it by the parallelism thesis. James would shift mystical experience's analogue to subjective feelings, which we ordinarily do not take as veridical of anything universal or objective, and away from sense experience, which we ordinarily do take as veridical of real objects experienceable by others.

He tries to support his classification by citing the fact of the great diversity of reports issuing from mystics worldwide. But why should feelings be any more or less diverse than objectively veridical experiences? He makes much of the point that mystical experience is individualized. But so is sensory perception. His very own citations of mystics' writings dispute any implied claim that the mystics (of his very own study!) report their experiences as more like strictly subjective feelings and as not seeming to be objectively veridical.[3]

By glorifying mystic feeling in terms of life-value, James diverts attention from questions of possible objective evidental value accruing to mystical experience. Whatever be that life-value, these questions remain. Indeed, I believe that if mystical experience is not objectively veridical, it has little life value. Given that mystics typically take their experiences to be objectively veridical, if James is right then the mystics are wrong to do so. An experience which is taken

2 William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (New York: Mentor, 1957, first published 1902). Actually James finds "very little generalizable import," but I may be allowed, by philosophic license, to alter his position better to make a point. Furthermore, the overall picture James conveys is of mystic experience being more like non cognitive feeling than anything else with which we are familiar.

3 For a far from all inclusive set of citations or comments which James gives supportive of *my* position, see *Varieties* pp. 103, 218, 219, 228, 267 68, 295 fn. 3 (Tennyson quoted), 296 97, 300-01 304 (Whitman quoted), 305, 306-07, 309 11 (Al-Ghazzali quoted), 313-14 (St. Theresa quoted), 321 22, 344-45 (Caird quoted, a source somewhat too philosophic to support my point. some might think), 357 (a quote with negative connotations though there is claimed veridical experience of God), 361, 363, 381, 387 f. 28 (V. Vivekananda quoted), 388 fn. 30, and 389 fn. 31.

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to be objectively veridical but is not is an illusion, for example a mirage. The desert traveller takes his experience to indicate an oasis, but it deludes him. If mystical experience is taken to be objectively veridical while in fact it is not, could it be so valuable as James supposes? Could illusory experience be, as many mystics take their special experience to be, the *summum bonum* or *parama-puruṣartha*.

But aside from that reply to James, another cogently answering him, and all those who would echo the Buddha,[4] is a defense of philosophy in terms of its value for life and as an irrepressible part of what it is to be human. James tries to exalt individual feeling at the expense of intellect :

> In spite of the appeal which this impersonality of the scientific attitude makes to a certain magnanimity of temper, I believe it to be shallow...(for)...so long as we deal with the cosmic and the general, we deal only with symbols of reality, but as soon as we deal with private and personal phenomena as such, we deal with realities in the completest sense of the term...That unsharable feeling which each one of us has of the pinch of his individual destiny as he privately feels it rolling out on fortune's wheel may be disparaged for its egoism, may be sneered at as unscientific, but it is the one thing that fills up the measure of our concrete actuality... Individuality is founded in feeling; and the recesses of feeling, the darker, blinder strata of character, are the only places in the world in which we catch real fact in the making, and directly perceive how events happen, and how work is actually done. Compared with this world of living individualized feeling, the world of generalized objects which the intellect contemplates is without solidarity or life[5].

Why should intellect and feeling be so opposed as James construes them? As he well recognizes, human feelings are informed by intellect.

James also understands, existentially no doubt as well as theoretically, the irrepressibiltiy of philosophic practice :

> We are thinking beings, and we cannot exclude the intellect from participating in any of our functions. Even in soliloquizing with ourselves, we construe our feelings intellectually. We must exchange our feelings with one another, and in doing so we have to speak, and to use general and abstract verbal formulas. Conceptions and constructions are thus a necessary part of our religion; and as moderator amid the clashes of hypotheses, and mediator among the criticisms of one man's constructions by another, philosophy will always have much to do.[6]

4 Actually, intellectual understanding of Nirvana, is not, by and large, eschewed by Buddhism. "Right view" is one of the points of the famed eight-fold path.

5 James, p. 379.

6 James, pp. 330 31.

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This to say, though James obscures the point, that philosophy has much to do in adjudging what we should and should not believe. If mystical experience is affective and non cognitive as some of its philosophic critics have alleged,[7] agreeing with James in this but hardly in their views of the value of mystical experience, then indeed it probably should not count in determining what we should believe about the way the world is objectively. But mystics do claim that their experiences compel them to believe many things about objective reality. They *take* their experiences to be objectively veridical. They, the ones who most intimately know the individualized mystic "feelings," view them as evidencing universal reality, as much as or more than sense experience.

James' accordance of superior reality to immediate, individual experience in this way injures his own position. He allows the mystic the authority of his own experience, while failing to give weight to the mystics' insistence upon the veridicality of their peculiar experiences. Of course, a non mystic should question whether mystical experience is objectively veridical or not. James is correct to that extent. But in sum, his affective classification and his arguments for a superior reality in feeling are indecisive on the crucial issue.

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7 Bertrand Russell, *Mysticism and Logic* (New York: Longmans, 1918), pp. 11-12. (Russell is one of the few to note that mystics typically take their experiences to be objectively veridical. He simply suggests, smugly, the experiences are not in fact veridical.) Alasdair MacIntyre, "Visions," in *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, ed. A. Flew and A. MacIntyre (New York: Macmillan, 1955). W. E Kennick, a book review of W. T. Stace, *Mysticism and Philosophy*, *Philosophical Review* Vol. 71, 1962, pp. 387-90. And others.

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VI

Language, Speech and Meaning — A Reconsideration of Austin's Notion of Speech-Acts

Tandra Patnaik

The unique feature of Austin's "*How to Do Things with Words* is his viewing of linguistic communication as an act. He highlights that language is not a group and conjuction of symbols mechanically uttered. It is not a symbol or a word or a phrase, which is the unit of linguistic communication. It is "the *production* of the token in the performance of the speech-act that constitutes the basic unit of linguistic communication".[1] In the present paper, I would like to share the Austinian view that our linguistic interchange involves a multiple and complex levels of act, they are the act of phonetics, syntax, semantics and pragmatics. However, objections may be raised against his classification of acts, especially the distinction that he makes between the rhetic level of locutionary act and the illocutionary act. The subtle distinction is based on the distinction between the "meaning" and "force," which may appear to be somewhat blurred. This may be due to the fact that Austin is not very explicit in his analysis of the term 'meaning'. I will like to confine the scope of my paper to this area only to examine whether "meaning" used in the context of communicative linguistic application, can theoretically be separated from the illocutionary force. So here my task is two fold Firstly, I will make an attempt to examine the concept of meaning, especially in the context of phatic act and rhetic act; and secondly, in the light of above discussion I

1 John R. Searle — What is a Speech Act from *Philosophy in America*, pp. 221 22.

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will reassess the plausibility of the distinction between the rhetic act and illocutionary act.

PHATIC ACT, RHETIC ACT AND MEANING :

Austin correctly observes that a distinction must be made between the levels of the act (1) of saying something (2) in saying something, and (3) by saying something. On the basis of three levels of act he makes a distinction between the three levels of speech acts- (1) Locutionary act (2) Illocutionary act and (3) Perlocutionary act.

Regarding the scope of the Locutionary act he further analyses that it includes "the utterance of certain noises, the utterance of certain words in a certain construction, and the utterance of them with a certain "meaning" in the favourite philosophical sense of that word i.e. with a sense and certain reference".[2] To these three phases of locutions he gives the name of (1) Phonetic act (2) Phatic act and (3) Rhetic act, respectively.

As we are concerned with 'meaning' we must notice that the problem of meaning apparently comes up only in the rhetic level. However, a further examination reveals that Austin refers to meaning also in the phatic level. He says "The pheme is the unit of *language*; its typical fault is to be nonsense — meaningless. But rheme is the unit of *speech*: its typical fault is to be vague, void or obscure".[3] These lines are crucial in the sense that Austin makes here certain observations about the speech-acts. First, a distinction is made between the *language* and the *speech*: secondly he shows that in the locutionary dimension upto the phatic level our concern is not the speech but language; and lastly, he clearly indicates that in the phatic level also the questions of meaning and sense are involved (for their typical fault is to be nonsense and meaningless). But later in some places he insists that the question of meaning properly belongs to the rhetic level. How our concern is — Does Austin understand the term "meaning" in the same sense in the context of phatic act and rhetic act ? If not where lies the difference ? This tangle must be cleared, so that we can understand Austin in a more favourable light.

MEANING, LANGUAGE AND SPEECH :

At this point we may introduce a distinction between "meaning" as it is related to language and "meaning" as it is understood in the context of *speech*. The clue to the distinction is already indicated by Austin. Of course, there is a vital distinction between the language and speech. Language is a rule-governed activity, which is matter of using certain vocabularies, in confirmation with the syntactical rules and the rules adopted through conventions. But speech is a function of language, i.e., when the language is used as a

2 J. L Austin — *How to do Things with words* p. 94.
3 J L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words* p. 98.

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tool of communication. In the level of speech, apart from the grammatical and syntactical rules certain subtle and complex elements are called for; they are how the language is uttered, in what context, with what intention; and to some extent the speaker—hearer relation is to be highlighted. So the term 'meaning' in the phatic level and the rhetic level cannot be understood in the same sense. In the phatic act (which is concerned with language) the meaning is *a—communicative*, but in the rhetic act (which is dealing with the speech) meaning is *communicative* on the basis of the distinction between language and speech, let us make a distinction between M^a (meaning a-communicate) and M^c (meaning communicative) M^c includes the characteristics of M^a plus something more which are not at all a matter of concern for M^a. Both in the case of language as well as in the level of speech 'meaning' is an inevitable function, yet a distinction between the two senses of meaning must be recognised.

The validity of this distinction can be realised once we look to the fact that even the grammarions are concerned with meaning and sense. For the grammarians, even the smallest unit of a language, i.e., a word must convey any sense. "Atm" is not a word because it does not convey any sense. Similarly in grammar books we rarely come across a non sensical expression like "Redness is sleeping" as an example of sentence. Though the grammarians are not bothered about the truth-falsity dimension of a sentence, yet they cannot produce a piece of non-sense and pass it off as a sentence. It is a sheer injustice to say that, that in the level of language (phatic level) there is no involvement of the question of 'meaning' and 'sense'. But here it should be noted that an utterance by a speaker, though grammatically correct and literally meaningful, may draw a blank in the communicative level. For example, a man standing on the street may say "The black cat is in the room" to every passerby. But his utterance, in very like-lihood, may be taken as an expression of non-sense by the hearers. Hence he fails to communicate because the context, his intention etc. are not specified and moreover, his rapport with the hearer seems to be lacking. Here we can take an example from Austin to explain the point. Somebody says "The bull is going to charge", but the hearer, in full normal sense, will not understand the utterance unless he is in a position to know whether there is any context for uttering so, or whether the utterance is meant as the recitation of a part of the rhyme, a report or the issuance of a warning. So M^c is far more complicated than M^a, and meaning in the level of language (phatic) is definitely distinct from the meaning in the level of speech (rhetic).

RHETIC MEANING AND ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE:

Keeping this distinction between M^c and M^a in view, let us approach the other Austinian distinction, i.e., between the rhetic

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meaning and illocutionary force. Austin does not explicitly analyse what he means by 'meaning' as belonging to the rhetic act. He simply says that the meaning is equivalent to 'sense' and 'reference'. If we assume that he understands these two terms in Fregean sense then certain doubts creep up. Frege elaborately analyses the concept of 'sense' and 'reference' as applied to phrases and words. But regarding sentences, he says that sentences expresses a 'thought' as their sense and have a truth value as their 'reference'. If this view of 'reference' is adopted then our utterances need to be assertive in order to have reference. But Austin admits imperatives and interrogatives as rhetic act. Moreover, Austin's interpretation of truth-falsity dimension has much more wider application than that of Frege. In that sense it crosses the limits of the rhetic act. Certainly for Frege, the truth-conditions are fixed but for Austin they vary according to the situation, intent and purpose of the speaker. So even if we take up the Fregean interpretation of 'reference' as truth-value, we find that in the hands of Austin the term truth-value assumes a wider range and goes beyond simple assertions or constatives. Then what may be the exact meaning of rhetic 'meaning' which can be differentiated from the force? Hence, another point of distinction may be made between 'meaning' and 'force'. It may be suggested that the meaning in the rhetic level implies the propositional content of an utterance. The propositional content is the meaning which remains constant, though the illocutionary force of utterances may vary.

Let us consider the following utterances—
"He said that the bull is going to charge"
"He warned that the bull is going to charge"
"He asked that whether the bull is going to charge"

In the above examples 'the bull is going to charge' is the propositional content and the act of reporting, warning, asking, etc. exemplify the utterance's force aspect, which may vary from case to case. So the force is variable, whereas the propositional content is constant, which Searle symbolizes as the F (P) formula. But the F (P) formula fails for F is not invariably variable. "The bull is going to charge" — this utterance may have the force of an assertion, warning or interrogation, but definitely not the force of a command or request. Prof. Searle clearly points out that no propositional content is 'force neutral'[4]. It is the propositional content which largely determines the force, that an utterance can have. So force is not totally separable from the meaning.

Another plausible distinction may be maintained between the rhetic level and illocutionary level, on the ground that the rhetic act

4 John. R. Searle, "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts" from *Essays on J. L. Austin* Ed. Isaiah Berlin, p. 149.

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determines "what meaning the utterance *has*" ? and the illocutionary act determines "how the utterance is *meant*" ?. But in the level of speech, can we in general understand what is the meaning of an utterance, just by knowing what literal meaning it *has* ? can we totally forget about what is *meant* by an utterance ? Moreover, what meaning an utterance *has*, implies what is its literal and conventional meaning This can very well be determined in the phatic level (i. e., the level of language) But once the language is used as a vehicle of communication certain other factors must be taken into account, i.e., (1) the involvement of the speaker (his intention and purpose of uttering so, his responsibility for backing it up etc.) (2) the context in which the utterance is made (3) 'securing of an up take' in the hearer. These factors force us to consider, apart from what meaning an utterance *has*, how the utterance is *meant*. So the watertight distinction between the rhetic meaning and illocutionary force fails, once we consider the fact that both the levels of act are concerned with *speech* Austin himself admits, "...for some years we have been realizing more and more clearly that the occasion of an utterance matters seriously, and that the words used are to some extent to be 'explained' by the 'context' in which they are designed to be or have actually been spoken in a linguistic interchange. Yet still we are too prone to give these explanations in terms of 'the meaning of words'. Admittedly, we can use 'meaning' also with reference to illocutionary force ... But I want to distinguish *force* and meaning in the sense meaning is equivalent to sense and reference, just as it has become essential to distinguish sense and reference".[5]

From the above lines it is evident that he admits the role of 'force' in the determination of meaning. But for some reason, which he never fully explains, he wants that the term meaning should be reserved to mean only sense and reference. We should have no objection to the distinction between 'sense' reference' and 'force'. But if two distinct concepts 'sense' and 'reference' can contribute to meaning, then why not the force be included as one of the contributing factors to the meaning of a speech-act. In other words why not make meaning a three-fold process (i.e., sense, reference and force) instead of two-fold process (i.e., sense and reference). For meaning understood in the context of speech includes something more than the literal sense, it points to certain conditions that contribute also to its truth-falsity dimension, (in extended sense it can be called the 'reference'). But truth falsity dimension is dependent to some extent on force — potentiality of an utterance. This is evident from the following remarks made be Austin. He says, "It is essential to realize that 'true' and 'false' like 'free' and 'unfree', do not stand for anything simple at all, but only for a general dimension of being

5 J. L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, p. 100.

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a right or proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in these circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and with these intentions" [6] If this is what he means by being true then the truth-dimension includes illocutionary force. So even if the sense means 'thought' and reference means 'truth value' then the truth value is not also force-neutral. Here we find that the distinction between the rhetic level of meaning and illocutionary level of force collide.

However, it may again be argued that the rhetic act *gives* the meaning; whereas the illocutionary act makes the meaning *explicit*. But does not Austin admit that the typical fault of rheme is to be vague and void ? So, it naturally follows that in the rhetic level itself some amount of explicitness is demanded. In the examples of rhetic act to some extent, he makes clear how the utterance is used i,e., whether as a report or a question or a command. So it follows that the difference of explicitness in the level of rhetic act and illocutionary act is a matter of degree only.

CONCLUSION :

It is indisputable that the Austinian distinction between the different levels of speech act is a matter of abstraction only. In practice, the locutionary act and illocutionary act are inseparable. Austin clearly states that, "To perform a locutionary act is in general, we may say, also and *eo ipso* to perform an illocutionary act..." [7]

However, I feel that the classification of different level of acts should have been based on a principle; and the distinction between the speech and the language could have served better as a basis of distinction. So the phonetic act and the phatic act which are concerned with language could have been classed together; and the rhetic act and illocutionary act, which are concerned with the speech and M^{c} could have been placed under a separate class. By doing this Austin could have avoided the ambiguity between the rhetic and illocutionary level, which has come under heavy criticism by different philosophers.

6 Ibid., p. 145.
7 Ibid., p. 98.

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VII

Gandhian Theory of Truth

Surendra Pd. Srivastava

Man as a species of animal kingdom shares much in common with other animals like hunger, thirst and sex etc. But he differs from other animals in one distinctive factor, namely rational faculty. Frederic has rightly said, "... all animals and plants have mortal souls of will and appetite, man alone has a second soul which we might call mind and which Plato calls reason, to account for the possibility of man's becoming reasonable or rational".[1] Exclusively endowed with rational faculty, man guides himself with certain conscious plans to come over the struggle for existence successfully and survive desirably. He, for the purpose, makes efforts to understand the experiences by analysis and interpretations. By analyses and interpretations of experiences he distinguishes between what is true and what is false. The distsnction made between the experiences results in the elimination of what is false from what is true. This elimination paves the way to the attainment of 'truth'. The very attainment of truth is the assumption and essence of Indian Philosophy. Philosophy in India, of course, is literally termed as a 'vision of truth' or 'Darsana' which inclines to maintain that there can be direct realisation of 'truth'. Radhakrishnan has pointed out, "The term 'Darsana' comes from the word 'Dris', to see. This seeing may be either perceptual observation or conceptual knowledge or intuitional experience. It may be inspection of facts, logical enquiry or insight of soul."[2]

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1 Frederic Metchell. "On Teaching Philosophy of Education" in *Review Journal of Philosophy and Science*, edit. by Michael V. Belok and Dr. J L. Coveen (Meerut, India, Anu Prakashan). Vol V, No. 1 and 2. 1980, p. 5.

2 S. Radhakri hnan, *Indian Philosophy* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1923), Vol. I, p. 48.

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Philosophy as a vision of truth has a history. Truth, of course, is heterogeneous. Its different characters have been discussed from different angles and attitudes. Controversy and mystery, therefore, shroud truth. However, we can take up truth for our convenience from two standpoints—epistemological and metaphysical.

Epistemologically taken, truth means validity of knowledge. Valid knowledge contains truth. But, how do we know that our knowledge is valid and as such contains truth. These are in fact some ways of testing the validity of knowledge.[3] These ways are the theories of truth. These theories are—correspondence theory, coherence theory, pragmatic theory and intuitive theory. The first theory adheres to perceptual, the second to conceptual, the third to both perceptual and conceptual and the fourth to the intuitive vision of truth.

The Gandhian truth, taken epistemologically as valid knowledge, does not come under the correspondence theory nor under the coherence theory. It assumes but does not adhere to the pragmatic theory. It, of course, assumes and adheres to the intuitive theory of truth. According to the intuitive theory, truth pertains to immediate knowledge. Truth reveals itself immediately to reason and reserves its berth for certainty. Truth is self-evident and intuitively certain.

It seems much relevant and serviceable for comparative studies to say that the Advaitism of Sankara, the greatest Vedantin of ancient India, appeals much to Gandhi who says like Sankara, "To find Truth completely is to realise oneself and one's destiny, in other words, to become perfect."[4] He accepts Advaitism of Sankara to the extent that it becomes sometimes difficult to distinguish them. Relevantly speaking. Gandhiji holds like Sankara that all knowledge from the very conditions of its origin is valid and its truth is accepted directly or intuitively by the self illuminating transcendent consciousness which underlies and makes possible all knowledge. The Gandhian knowledge ensued from the transcendent consciousness, self-luminous in character, is therefore self valid and does not call for external arguments perceptual and conceptual.

The Gandhian theory of truth is based on his very concept of God. He holds in complete agreement with Sankara that God is sat-chit-Ananda[5]—one who underlies truth, knowledge and bliss.

3 D M. Dutta, *The Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy* (Calcutta: The University of Calcutta, 1961), p. 212.

4 S. Radhakrishnan, "Mahatma Gandhi: His Message for Mankind" in *Mahatma Gandhi*, ed. by S Radhakrishnan (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1939), p. 338.

5 Srimati Sophia Wadia, "The Path of Satyagraha" in *Mahatma Gandhi*, ed. by S. Radhakrishnan (London George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1939), p. 303.

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He believes that truth is God and God is Truth. Further, he believes that where there is truth, there is also knowledge which is true. He means by this that chit or knowledge is mixed with God. Knowledge as part of God, therefore, is always subject to truth.

Gandhi, of course, looks upon the world as various facets of God and has the beautific vision of the same. With this vision all knowledge contains truth and is inevitably subject to truth. But, the vision of his is neither perceptual nor conceptual. It is rather intuitive.[6] It consists in the feeling of His constant presence in our heart.[7] He believes like Tolstoy that "... the kingdom of God is within you".[8]

But, the Gandhian truth as God should not be mistaken for epistemological idealism. He rather advocates realism in the sense that it covers all spheres of life. "So he makes truth a concrete realism,"[9] says Carl Heath. Though his truth is internal and subjective, yet it is objective and is realised in our actions. G. D. H. Cole says, "Truth, for him, was not a thing external, to be acquired and assimilated from the environment: it was something within him, subjective as well as objective, to be lived personally, and unattainable except by being so lived."[10]

It is very interesting to note that the intuitive theory of truth has been advocated even by the eminent empiricist realist of modern western philosophy, John Locke. He regards immediate knowledge as valid. In an immediate knowledge we know the affirmative or negative relation between two ideas, intuitively. 'The whole of 'A' is greater than its part 'B' is such, according to him, that is self evident and need no other argument. He says, "But, though this be the most obvious truth that reaction discovers and though its evidence be (if I mistake not) equal to mathematical enquiry: yet it requires thought and attention; and the mind must apply itself to a regular deduction of it from some part of our intuitive knowledge, or else we shall be as uncertain and ignorant of this as of the other propositions, which are in themselves capable of clear demonstration."[11]

6 M K Gandhi, *Pathway to God* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1971), p. 54

7 Ibid., pp. XIV XV.

8 Vincent Scheean, "Last days" in *Mahatma Gandhi* ed. by S.Radhakrishnan (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.; 1939), p 449.

9 Carl Heath, 'M. K. Gandhi: Apostle of light and Truth Force" in *Mahatma Gandhi* ed. by S Radhakrishnan (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1939), p. 92.

10 G D H. Cole, "Tribute to Gandhi" in *Mahatma Gandhi*, ed by S. Radhakrishnan (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1939), p. 395.

11 John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (London: J. M Dent and Sons Ltd., New York: E. P Dutten and Co Inc., 1947), p 298

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One of the most distinguished philosophers of the contemporary western age, Bertrand Russell, also adheres to the intuitive theory of truth in particular reference to his inductive principles. 'Two plus two is four' is self-evident according to him. It needs no other argument and cannot be deduced from anything more evident. He says, "The truth of propositions asserting such properties cannot be made even probable by any argument from experience, since such arguments, when they go beyond hithertoo recorded experience, depend for their validity upon the principles in question."[12]

Moreover, it is surprisingly enough to mention Rene-Descartes, the father of Modern Western philosophy in general and of rationalism in particular, as an upholder of the intuitive theory of truth.[13] He rejects all empirical and scientific knowledges and believes in the self revelatory knowledge of '*cogito ergo sum*'. The knowledge of soul and God, according to him, being revelatory in nature contains truth and is free from self contradiction.

Truth, logically speaking, are broadly of two kinds — one that involves self-consistency of is free from self-contradiction. The other is that which corresponds to sensous world. The former is logically known as formal truth and the latter as material truth. B. N. Roy says, "Formal Truth means self consistency or freedom from self-contradiction amongst thoughts themselves,"[14] and "material truth means correspondence of thoughts with things of the actual world."[15]

The Gandhian intuitive theory of truth may thus logically be put under formal truth. He, in fact, does not see any inconsistency in some objects of knowledge like soul and God. These objects of knowledge, soul and God in particular, are such that do not correspond to actual state of affairs. However, they are free from self-contradiction and contain self-consistency. Hence, knowledge of such objects is always formal and intuitive in nature. However, Gandhi seems to have been inclined to emphasise that his 'truth' is also a material one in the sense that he regards each and every thing of the world as the expression of God who is but truth itself.

12 B. Russell, *Human Knowledge — Its scope and limits* (London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1951), p. 236.

13 John Veitch, *The Method, Meditations, and Selections From The Principles of Descartes* (Edinburgh and London : William Alackwood and Sons, 1879), p. XXV.

14 B. N. Roy, *Deductive logic* (Calcutta: S C Sarkar and Sons Pvt. Ltd., 1979), p. 17.

15 Ibid.

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VIII

The Meeting of East and West In the Neglected Vedanta

Robert C Whittemore

According to Alfred North Whitehead, arguably the most important figure in contemporary Western speculative thought, "the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato."[1] By that he means, "that if we had to render Plato's general point of view with the least changes made necessary by the intervening two thousand years of human experience in social organization, in aesthetic attainments, in science, and in religion, we should have to set about the construction of a philosophy of organism."[2] With due allowance made for the difference in cultural outlook, a cognate characterization is, I suggest, applicable to the philosophy of the Upanishads as interpreted in the several systems of the neglected Vedanta [3] including under that rubric the bhasyas of Ramanuja, Nimbarka, Bhaskara, Srikantha, Madhva, Baladeva, and Sripati Pandita, the expositions of Vallabha and Vijnana Bhikshu, are nearer to our own time, the works of Dayananda Sarasvati, Sri Aurobindo, and Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. I do not propose to rehearse here the particular merits of these Vedantins and their modern counterparts. The bhasyas of the former are available in English translation,[4] as are the relevant works of the latter.[5] For

1. Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, Corrected Edition. Edited by David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 39.
2. Ibid.
3. 'Neglected,' that is, in comparison to the attention lavished in the West and in India on the teachings of the Advaita Vedanta.
4. Ramanuja, *Sri Bhasya* (Varanasi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1962); Nimbarka, *Vedanta Parijata Saurabha* (Calcutta : Royal Asiatic

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the present purpose it suffices to distinguish two types of Vedanta; 'types' rather than 'schools' since one of these embraces several systems, or, more accurately, several variants of one system. The two types are, first, nondualism exclusive of differences, which category comprehends the system of Vedanta called Advaita, and, second, nondualism inclusive of differences, which type includes all of the above-named. It is, I submit, to this second type, the neglected Vedanta in its several variant expressions both medieval and modern that he who seeks the meeting of East and West will find it.

The Purva Mimamsakas teach and the Advaitins accept that there are six criteria (*sadlinga*) for the interpretation of Vedic purport. There must be unity of theme (*ekavakyata*), exemplified in the harmony of the initial and concluding passages (*upakrama upasamhara*) of the part or whole in question, and this theme must be recurrent (*abhyasa*). The conclusion to be drawn should be novel (*apurva*), fruitful (*phala*), uniformly praised or consistently deprecated (*arthavada*), and intelligible in the light of reason (*upapatti*). Authority is vested in such scriptures as subserve these six criteria. Hence the Mimamsakas, applying the *sadlinga* to the ritualistic portions of the Veda, find their unity of theme in the injunctive passages (*vidhis*) and subsequently reject the authority of such non-injunctive texts as cannot be correlated with commands to duty. This conclusion is challenged by the Advaitins. Application of the *sadlinga* to the mantras and the upanishads reveals the purport of the scripture to be the comprehension of Brahman as the Self. "Other parts of the Veda may have," Sankara concedes, "no authority except in so far as they are connected with injunctions; still it is impossible to impugn on that ground the authoritativeness of

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Society, 1940); Bhaskara, *Brahma-sutra-bhasya* (Calcutta: Pracyavani Mandira, 1968); Madhva (Anandatirtha), *Vedanta-sutras* (Tirupati: Sri Vyasa Press, 1236); Srikantha, *Srikantha bhasya* (Calcutta: Pracyavani Mandira, 1959); Baladeva, *Vedanta-sutras* (Allahabad: Panini Office, 1912); Sripati Pandita, *Srikara bhasya* (Bangalore: Bangalore Press, 1936). The *Anu-bhasya* is, so far as I know, unavailable, but see C. Manilal Parekh, *Sri Vallabhacarya, Life, Teachings and Movement* (Rajkot : Sri Bhagavata Dharma Mission Press, 1943).

5 See Aurobindo, *The Life Divine* (Pondicherry : Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1960); *On the Veda* (the same, 1956); *Essays on the Gita* (the same, 1959); *Isha Upanishad* (Calcutta : Arya Publishing House, 1945). Also Dayananda Sarasvati, *Satyarth Prakash* (Allahabad: Pratinidhi Sabha, 1915); *Introduction to the Commentary on* the Vedas (Allahabad: Pratinidhi Sabha, 1925). Also R D. Ranade, *A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy* (Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1926); D. S. Sarma, *Studies in the Renaissance of Hinduism* (Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University, 1944); and Edward Shils, *The Intellectual between Tradition and Modernity: The Indian Situation* (The Hague: Mouton, 1961).

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passages conveying the knowledge of the Self; for such passages have their own result[6] They teach us our identity with Brahman, and this knowledge suffices for release—independently of any action taken in conformity with the *vidhis* "That the knowledge of Brahman refers to something which is not a thing to be done, and therefore is not concerned either with the pursuit or the avoidance of any object, is the very thing we admit; for just that constitutes our glory, that as soon as we comprehend Brahman, all our duties come to an end and all our work is over."[7] If so, the Mimamsaka errs in taking the purpose of the Veda to be the injunction of actions. Release being nothing but being Brahman, it follows that the purpose of the Veda is to lead us to the realisation of that fact. Wherefore, the Advaitin concludes, not action but nondualism is the purport of authoritative scripture [8]

The further details of the argument whereby Sankara and his successors establish the correctness of their conception of Vedic purport *vis a vis* that of Mimamsa need not detain us. The vagaries of the advaitin dialectic deserve a book of their own, and fortunately it has been written not once but several times.[9] It suffices to say that all varieties of panentheism, east or west, agree with the Advaitin that the basic teaching of theology is some sort of nondualism. But this, of course, is not what the Advaitin has in mind in saying that "Brahman alone is real and that it is made known by verbal testimony."[10] The nondualism he has reference to is rather that identity of individual soul and highest self intimated in the Great Sentences (*Mahavakyas*), i.e., "That art thou." "I am Brahman," "This Self is Brahman," and in various other passages of the Vedanta. The Brahman he elucidates is not the One objectified in the monistic mantras, but rather that which is, as Self, eternal subject beyond all objectification. "The sastra's purport is not to represent Brahman definitely as this or that object, its purpose," says Sankara, "is rather to show that Brahman as the eternal subject (*pratyagatman*) is never an object, and thereby to remove the distinction of objects known, knowers, act of knowledge, etc., which is fictitiously created

6 *The Vedanta Sutras of Badarayana with the Commentary by Sankara.* Translated by George Thibaut (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1962), I. 1.4. Hereafter cited as Vedanta Sutras (commentary).

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 See T. M. P. Mahadevan, *Philosophy of Advalta* (Madras: Ganesh and Co., 1957); also K. Satchidananda Murty, *Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedanta* (Waltair: Andra University, 1959); also G. R. Malkani, *Metaphysics of Advaita Vedanta* and Prabhu Dutt Shastri, *The Doctrine of Maya.*

10 Mahadevan, *Philosophy of Advaita*, 60.

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by Nescience."[11] Should one question his assumption that the evidence of the Upanishads is more to be regarded than the witness of the samhitas, they would be told that this is justified by that principle (*apaccheda nyaya*) which says that the earlier of two contradictory texts is to be sublated to the later. Since the Upanishads are manifestly later, their evidence is the stronger. And there is no doubt in his mind as to which of the two types of Vedanta above distinguished is the more authoritative.

Even so, the Sankarite conclusion can hardly be said to have been established, for it may be that the master has erred in his interpretation of the purport of the Vedanta in general and the mahavakyas in particular. Impossible, replies the Advaitin, and this because his understanding of their purport is not derived from any analysis of the texts, nor yet from an interpretation of their context in the larger whole, nor even yet from the admitted authority of scripture, but wholly and solely from an immediate intuition arising in the mind on the hearing of the mahavakya. Since Brahman is, by definition, eminently immediate, the true knowledge of Brahman to be had from scripture is, likewise, immediate. Consequently, "if on hearing the *maha-vakyas* a person does not get an immediate intuition of Brahman, it is not," declares Professor Mahadevan, one of the most eminent of contemporary advaitins, "because those *vakyas* are incapable of generating that experience, but because there is the obstruction caused by impossibilities and notions of the contrary... When the obstacles, *viz.*, impossibility and notions of the contrary are removed by reasoning, from the Vedantic texts there arises unshakable immediate experience of Brahman."[12] Thus the Advaitin knows, and that without any possibility of being mistaken, that he and the Absolute are one, and in the moment of this knowledge he is free, "for if the knowledge of absolute unity has once arisen there exists no longer anything to be desired or avoided, and thereby the conception of duality, according to which we distinguish actions, agents, and the like, is destroyed "[13]

It is important to note that it is the *conception* of duality and not duality as experienced by the sense that is declared destroyed. That world which, in our ignorance, we take as real, does not itself vanish in the instant our intuition of Brahman. "The organs of a man of realizat on do not depart."[14] The liberated sage still lives in his body. Liberation does not imply his translation to another

11 Vedanta Sutras (commentary) I. 1. 4.

12 Mahadevan *op. cit.*

13 *Vedanta Sutras* (Commentary) I. 1. 4.

14 *The Brhadaranyaka Upanishad with the Commentary of Sankara*, Translated by Swami Madhavananda (Mayavati : Advaita Ashrama, 1950), 4. 4. 7.

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place: rather is it that he is translated to another *plane*. His body lives *in* this world, but he himself is no longer *of* this world. "Because formerly he was embodied and mortal on account of his identification with the body under the influence of his desires and past work, since that has gone, he is not disembodied, *and* therefore immortal."[15] For him the round of rebirth is no more. He has become one with that Light of Pure Intelligence which is the Self as Brahman.

Such, it is said, is the situation of the sage subsequent to his hearing of the mahavakya. But not all hearers of the sacred texts are sages, and many of them, if not most, do not appear to experience any such liberation. Why, then, the skeptic asks, do I and the vast majority fail to have this intuition if intuition it really is? Because, Sankara answers, of your ignorance; because, his followers add, of your spiritual unpreparedness. The very phrasing of your question reveals that it is so. For the self which the mahavakyas declare to be identical with Brahman is not the 'I' but the witness of the 'I'. The mahavakya 'This Self is Brahman' does not assert the identity of the 'I' with Brahman; it declares rather that Brahman is one with the witness Self. Similarly as regards the mahavakya 'That art thou': the difference between the 'I' and the 'thou' is an illusion born of ignorance. The true purport of the mahavakya is: That (Brahman) art thou (the witness Self). That everyone does not readily apprehend this truth is no reflection on the mahavakya. The fault lies rather with the skeptic and the secular majority. Spiritual proficiency is not to be expected of such as these, whose lives are governed by outward things. Profound contemplation, a firm disciplining of mind and body, and detachment from all worldly activities are the necessary preliminaries to realisation of the indifference of the 'I' and the 'thou'. For the intuition of the 'thou' as 'That', one must have first a very strong desire for liberation.

I grant, crys the skeptic, that these preliminaries are necessary; what I question is their sufficiency. For if the interpretation of the Advaitin is correct, the mahavakya 'I am Brahman' does not mean what it says, nor will all the desire, detachment, and meditation in the world suffice to dissolve the difference between this passage and the foregoing, or between these three and the mahavakya 'Knowledge is Brahman'. If the position of the Advaitin is well taken, the four "great sentences" must state the same truth, but the fact is that they do not. The objection does not trouble Sankara. The differences between the mahavakyas are, he is sure, merely apparent. They are the consequences of superimposition and, as such, are nothing real. In truth, there is no contradiction, for contradiction arises only as we have regard to the literal meanings, and in none

15 Ibid.

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of these passages is the literal the true. "If thus," write Sankara in his *Vivekachudamani*,

> "the Shruti, in the dictum 'Thou art That (Tat tvam Asi), repeatedly establishes the absolute identity of Brahman (or Ishvara) and Jiva, denoted by the terms 'That' (Tat) and 'Thou' (Asi) respectively, divesting these terms of their relative associations, then it is the identity of their implied, not literal, meanings which is sought to be inculcated, for they are of contradictory attributes to each other—like the sun and a glow worm, the king and a servant, the ocean and a well, or Mount Meru and an atom."[16]

To arrive at this implicit identity, each of these terms must, he thinks, "be carefully considered through their implied meanings, so that their absolute identity may be established."[17] For that purpose, neither the method of total rejection (*jahati lakshana*), nor that of complete retention (*ajahati lakshana*) will do. What is required is a combination of both (*bhaga lakshana*). Hence, he concludes,

> "Just as in the sentence, 'This is that Devadatta,' the identity is spoken of, eliminating the contradictory portions, so in the sentence "Thou art That,' the wise man must give up the contradictory elements on both sides and recognize the identity of Ishvara (Brahman) and Jiva, noticing carefully the essence of both, which is 'Chit' (consciousness), Knowledge Absolute. Thus hundreds of scriptural texts inculcate the oneness and identity of Brahman and Jiva."[18]

Including, it may be presumed, the other "great sentences," since in these also the identity of the terms is achieved by rejecting the contradictory while retaining the nonconflicting.

Unfortunately for the student seeking guidance in this matter, Sankara no where lays down any rules for the application of this method of *bhaga lakshana*. Apparently he thought it unnecessary to do so. But if that is the case, the *lakshana* may be superfluous. Are we, then, to revert back to the prima facie meaning of the mahavakya? The majority of advaitins, acutely sensitive to the difficulties posed by an acceptance of that alternative, will not allow it. The true purport of the mahavakyas is, to their view, only to be understood by taking the sentences in their secondary or implicit sense (laksyartha), for by the application of the six-fold criteria (*sadlinga*), we discover this secondary sense to be identical with that of "hundreds of scriptural texts." But if so, the *lakshana* is necessary! The dilemma is a cruel one. If the advaitin dispenses with the *lakshana*, his intuition is inexplicable; if, on the other hand, he does not, his intuition is no more an intuition but an interpretation of an

16 Sankara, *Vivekachudamani*. Text, with English translation, Notes, and Index by Swami Madhavananda (Calcutta : Advaita Ashrama, 1957). Sections 241-242.

17 Ibid., Section 247.

18 Sections 248-249.

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intuition But he must either dispense with the *lakshana* or retain it. Consequently, he must renounce all claims to truth based on immediate experience or be silent.

The advaitin must choose, and either choice exposes the inherent weakness of his philosophical position. Indeed, that may be an understatement. The advaitin having chosen, both choices, it seems, add up to a philosophically indefensible position : the vaunted dialectic of Advaita turns out to be no more than the elaboration of the conviction, held in faith. that the purport of the mahavakya is nondualism exclusive of difference. Why, then, should any student of the Veda accept that it is so ? Why, indeed, when other, and more cogent, interpretations of the purport of the scripture are available.

Within the ambit of Vedanta itself there are from seven to eleven such systems of interpretation.[19] Their authors are no less distinguished for piety and intellect than the advocates of Advaita. The intuitional insights of Ramanuja, Nimbarka, Srikantha, and Baladeva are not measurably less than those of Sankara or his disciples. Their spiritual character is as great, perhaps even greater. Their scholarship is sound. And their conclusion is unanimous : the mahavakya 'That art thou' cannot purport an absolute identity. This view, Ramanuja argues, cannot be upheld. It is impossible that Brahman, free from every shadow of imperfection, should be one with the imperfect self. Nor is the possibility enlarged by the assumption that the 'thou' is, of itself and in relation to the 'That,' unreal. All that is accomplished by such a supposition, according to Ramanuja, is the statement of a contradiction, since to be related to what it hurtful, and to be absolutely perfect, is self contradictory. If the advaitin takes the mahavakya in its primary sense, he must admit the difference in the denotation of the terms; if he takes it in

19 Depending upon the classification scheme adopted or the nature of the distinctions drawn. Exclusive of the *Nirvisesadvaita-vada* (attributeless non dualism) of Sankara, the seven basic (non advaitic) systems of the (neglected) Vedanta and their authors are: Bhaskara, *Bhedabheda vada* (difference cum non difference); Ramanuja, *Visistadvaita vada* (qualified non-dualism); Madhva, *Dvaita-vada* (dualism); Nimbarka, *Dvaitadvaita vada* (dual non-dualism); Sripati, *Bhedabhedatmaka-visistadvaita-vada* (qualified non dualism cum difference non difference); Vallabha, *Suddhadvaita-vada* (pure non dualism); Baladeva, *Acintya bhedabhedavada* (incomprehensible difference cum non difference) The other four systems, their authors and their affinities, are: *Saiva visistadvaita vada* (Siva qualified non-dualism) of Srikantha (this system approximates the position of Ramanuja); *Bheda-vada* (difference) of Suka (this system is akin to that of Madhva; *Atma-brahmaikya bheda-vada* (theistic pluralism) of Vijnana Bhikshu (also close to the system of Ramanuja); and the *Bhedabheda-vada* (difference cum non difference) of Yadava Prakasa (virtually identical with the system of Bhaskara).

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the secondary sense, he still has to contend with the differing connotations of the co-ordinated terms,

> "Hence," he writes, "in the co-ordination 'Thou art That,' the word 'That' denotes the highest Brahman...while the word 'Thou' denotes the same highest Self insofar as having for its body the individual souls together with their bodies... the co-ordination with the individual soul thus proves only the difference of Brahman from the soul, which is a mere mode of Brahman; and hence we hold that different from the Self consisting of knowledge, i e., the individual soul, is the Self consisting of bliss, i e., the highest Self."[20]

With this last, Nimbarka and Srikantha are in basic agreement, albeit they demur at the visistadvaitin description of 'Thou' as a mode of the 'That.' It is, suggests Srikantha, more accurately denominated an attribute. Nimbarka, on the other hand, conceives of the 'Thou as a power. In the various interpretations of the *Brahma Sutras* these differences of description loom large. Here, however, they are insignificant. What is here important is the underlying unity of viewpoint they imply; that, and the fact that the experience of the three great Vedantins denies that intuition of identity which, if the advaitin is correct no Vedantin can deny.

The sense of the sentence and its context is that the 'Thou' is an attribute, power, or mode of the 'That.' Such is the view of the three most prominent schools of the Neglected Vedanta, and truth to tell, it, or something more like it than advaita, is the view of every other school as well. This is a hard fact that every student of Indology would do well to remember, the more so as the success of the advaitins in associating Vedanta with their own peculiar interpretation of the Aranyakas and Upanishads has tended to obscure it. But, you say, if that is true, and the majority of medieval Vedantins are not disposed to accept the Advaitin interpretation of intuition, how is it that in our time Vedanta has become virtually synonymous with Advaita, for surely this could not have come about without good reason? The reason, according to Advaita, is the teaching of the Veda with regard to Brahman. The 'That' throughout referred to is, they say, Nirguna Brahman, i.e., Brahman without attributes. Hence to maintain, as does Srikantha, that the 'Thou' is an attribute of the 'That,' is, as Advaita sees it, to go directly counter to the sense of scripture, and the same, they argue, is true of every system which takes the 'Thou' to be a real appearance, aspect, mode, part, atom, or power of Brahman, for it is manifestly impossible for the impartite to exhibit partibility! And so it is—if Brahman is, in truth, unqualified even by the attribute of impartibility. Here as before, however, the Advaitin begs the

20 *The Vedanta Sutras with the Commentary of Ramanuja*, Translated by George Thibaut (Varanasi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1962), I. 1. 13.

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question, and that by presupposing what the neglected Vedanta calls in doubt, namely, that the purport of the Vedanta is Brahman unqualified by *any* attribute whatever. The Advaitin, of course, denies the presupposes that to which his experience bears witness. The recognition of the 'That' as Nirguna Brahman is for him an immediate intuition, and as such not a matter for dispute. Faced with the protest of the soul that it has seen reality, the subleties of the schools are, according to Radhakrishnan,[21] all silenced. "For how," Sankara asks, "can one man contest the fact of another possessing the knowledge of Brahman—vouched for by his heart's conviction ?"[22] How indeed, except by reminding the Advaitin that protest is no substitute for argument.

Argument, that is, which takes its premisses from scripture, for, when all is said, the ultimate appeal is to the Veda. The *samhitas* surely lend themselves to non advaitic modes of thought; consequently the advaitin appeals from the *mantras* to the mahavakyas. But these latter, taken by themselves and out of context, are, it now seems, susceptible of a variety of interpretations, no one of which is capable of establishing itself as self evident truth; consequently, both advaitin and non advaitin must appeal from the mahavakya in itself to the mahavakya in situ, from the purport of the mahavakya as intuited to the purport of the mahavakya as determined by its upanishadic context. The principal Upanishads, the advaitins tell us, purport non-dualism; should their contention be substantiated by examination of the relevant texts, all our argument will have been for nothing. Conversely, should these texts prove out as a doctrine of unity-in-difference, the way to a panentheistic understanding of the purport of the Veda will be clear.

Of the one hundred and twelve Upanishads listed by Dasgupta,[23] eleven are designated 'principal' because Sankara saw fit to write commentaries on them. They are the *Isa*, *Kena*, *Katha*, *Prasna*, *Mundaka*, *Mandukya*, *Taittiriya*, *Aitareya*, *Svetasvatara*, *Brhadaranyaka*, and *Chandogya* Upanishads. The last two are generally acknowledged to be preeminent in authority by virtue of their length, antiquity, and the preeminence accorded to their teaching by Sankara, Ramanuja, and the other bhasyakaras. To these eleven are sometimes added the four Upanishads cited by Sankara in his commentary on the *Brahma-Sutras*, namely, the *Kausitaki*, *Paingala*, *Jabala*, and *Mahanarayana*. The authority of Ramanuja suffices to effect the inclusion of two Upanishads of later date, the *Subala* and

21 Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Two Volumes (London: Allen & Unwin, 1962). II, 512.

22 *Vedanta Sutras* (Commentary), IV. 1. 15.

23 Surendranath Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*. Five Volumes (Cambridge: The University Press, 1922-54), I, 28n.

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the *Culika*, while modern scholarship recognizes three more, the *Maitri*, *Vajrasucika*, and *Kaivalya*, making a total of twenty principal Upanishads.

Do they, taken as a whole, compose an internally consistent system of doctrine? "Some alien and alien minded scholars," writes S. Kuppuswami Sastri in his Introduction to the Advaita Ashrama edition of the *Brhadaranyaka Upanishad*, "are not inclined to see any systematic presentation of a philosophical doctrine in the *Upanisads* and believe that the *Upanisads*, including even the *Brhadaranyaka*, form a spiritual conglomerate of several things of varying value belonging to different stages..."[24] That this belief is mistaken should, he thinks, be evident to any serious student of the texts since "those who carefully study the *Brhadaranyaka* and *Sri Sankara's* great *bhasya* thereon, cannot easily resist the feeling that the *Brhadaranyaka* thought is an *integral whole* which is rooted on the *advaita doctrine*...and which refuses to accommodate itself in a satisfactory manner to any form of pluralistic realism or to any kind of the timid spiritual and metaphysical compromises involved in the *bheda-bheda* (difference cum identity) phases of monistic thought belonging to the *Pre-Sankara* or *Post-Sankara* stage in the history of *Vedanta*."[25] And what is true of this greatest of the Upanishads is, he is sure, also true of the rest, for does not Sankara himself declare that "there are no passages in the Upanisads that contradict the unity of Brahman."[26]

The Mimamsakas say that passages of the Upanishads clash with the authority of the ritualistic portion of the Veda, but this, Sankara thinks, is not correct since these passages have a different meaning:

> "The Upanishads establish the unity of Brahman; they do not negate instructions regarding the means to the attainment of some desired object, or prevent persons from undertaking it, for, as already said, a passage cannot have more than one meaning. Nor do ritualistic passages fail to lead to valid knowledge regarding their own meaning. If a passage produces valid knowledge regarding its own special meaning, how can it clash with the other passages?[27]

Obviously it cannot—if it be granted to Sankara that those passages whose import is ritualistic actual entail a special meaning not inconsistent with the general meaning of those other passages which, it is assumed, establish the unity of Brahman. But who will grant this? Certainly not the Mimamsakas, for they deny Advaita. Most

24 *The Brhadaranyaka Upanishad with the Commentary of Sankaracarya.* Translated by Swami Madhavananda (Mayavati: Advaita Ashrama, 1950), xvi.

25 Ibid. Sastri's italics.

26 Ibid., 2. 1. 20.

27 Ibid.

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certainly not the non-advaitic Vedantins, for they do not allow Sankara's presupposition regarding the nature of the unity ascribed to Brahman. To be sure, the scholars of the neglected Vedanta will concede the sublation of the special in the general, and were this all that the advaitin's argument presupposed, it would occasion no objection. However, as their opponents well know, it presupposes something more, namely the ignorance of those who take seriously any passage having a different meaning than that permitted by the advaitic interpretation of the mahavakyas. It presupposes finally the consignment to blinding darkness of those foolish enough to think that the ritualistic passages lead to valid knowledge even as regards their own meaning. For what the *Brhadaranyaka* decrees, the commentator must proclaim: "*Into greater darkness, as it were than* even *that* (blinding darkness) *enter those who are devoted*, or attached, *to knowledge*, that portion of the Vedas which deals with things that are the outcome of ignorance, i. e. the ritualistic portion..."[28] As for those who dare to take literally the very many non-ritualistic texts denying absolute non dualism, "our reply," says Sankara, "is that they are the scum of the Brahmana and other castes, who, with their minds poisoned by vicious reasoning, hold views about the meaning of the Vedas that are divorced from tradition."[29]

Tradition notwithstanding, the Advaitin has still to explain how and why it is that most, if not all, of the non-ritualistic texts purport identity. Identity not unity, for that the import of the whole is the unity of Brahman is not in question. That it is so, all non-advaitic schools (excepting only the *Dvaita-vada*) and most of the "scum" will agree. But unity is not yet identity, and, if the arguments of the bhedabhedavadins are to the point, it can never become so. That Sankara himself was thoroughly aware of the need to justify the assumption of identity, his extended treatment of the subject in his bhasyas on the *Brahma Sutra* and the *Brhadaranyaka Upanishad* bears witness. The pertinent sloka is *Brhadaranyaka* 1. 4. 10.

> "This (self) was indeed Brahman in the beginning. It knew only Itself as, 'I am Brahman.' Therefore It became all. And whoever among the gods knew It also became That; and the same with sages and men."

That this passage is properly understood only in the context of the Brahmana (chapter subdivision) in which it occurs, is something no scholar should doubt. Any interpretation which ignored or, what is worse, distorted its context with the end in view of accommodating it to a preconception otherwise lacking scriptural foundation, would be such as no scholar worthy of his calling could allow. Now the

28 Ibid., 4.4.10 Quotations from the Upanishad italicised by Sankara.
29 Ibid., 2. 1. 20.

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Fourth Brahmana of the First Chapter of the Brhadaranyaka has its topic the creation of the world from the Self. Nowhere in the Brahmana or, for that matter anywhere in the Upanishad, is there any assumption of a pure identity falsely understood as self-superimposition. Prima facie the Brahmana purports a real creation This much the advaitin admits, but denies that the obvious meaning is the true meaning. For him there is a higher purpose, namely, the purpose of eliciting that purport which reconciles every prima facie inconsistency, and that purport is non-dualism. The advaitic interpretation. then, must be the correct one, since in it alone are all spiritual contradictions overcome.

That it is so as respects the sublation of all contradictions we would not deny. What Hegel said of Schelling's Absolute is no less true of the Advaita of Sankara: in the darkest night all cows are black. This truth is incontestable, but, and this is what its advocates both Eastern and Western tend to overlook, it is also trivial. Moreover, neither the Advaitin nor his Vedantin critics have ever defended the proposition that all scriptures are equally authoritative. Were it so, Advaita, as the one position sublating all of the contradictory texts, must perforce be accepted. But the Advaitins themselves repudiate the authority of the injunctive and pluralistic texts, choosing, as we have seen, to rest their case on the purport of the mahavakyas, and this choice negates the force of every argument from universal application. It remains. then, that the correctness of the advaitin interpretation is, in the first instance, to be judged by its commensurability with the context of the Brahmana to which the sloka interpreted belongs, and, in the second instance, by the intelligibility of the interpretation itself. That Sankara's account is wanting in commensurability is scarcely open to doubt. Is it in any better case as regards its internal consistency ?

If it is reasonable to require of a thinker that he use language non-equivocally, the answer must be—no. That a finite self should, out of ignorance, believe that it is not Brahman is natural enough, but that Brahman Itself should either be, or believe Itself to be, ignorant passes understanding. That one of many should be so deluded as to think that it was one, is certainly possible, What is not possible, however, is that the one should be so self deluded as to believe that it is one of many. The Absolute is simple incapable of mistaken thoughts or actions. To superimpose upon Itself the notion that it was not Brahman, it would have to know that it was not Brahman, but this is just what in its ignorance it cannot know. In other words, the very notion of an ignorant self-imposition is self-contradictory. For from whence and how could this Brahmanic ignorance arise ? Is it that Brahman is forgetful of Its omniscience as Jahweh was with poor Job ? Certainly Brahman is not forgetful

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of ... nipotence, for, if we can believe Sankara, even in Its ignorance ... exercises its power of superimposition. Shall we say then th... Its omnipotence contravenes Its omniscience? The only answer Sankara offers for these and any other questions that might be asked is to suggest that every such question is irrelevant since plurality as such is nothing but a dream. That all plurality is but imagined in Brahman we know, he asserts from hundreds of texts. In evidence he offers four and adds that "since the whole phenomenal world is imagined in Brahman alone and is not real, you (the questioner) say very little when you condemn this particular idea (of superimposition) as improper."[30]

And so you do—if it is true that the whole phenomenal world is unreal. But is it, even for Sankara? On this point of his teaching the advaitins themselves are divided. The modern minded among them seek to save the appearances by defining 'real' and 'unreal' in such wise as to exclude from either category errors, dreams, illusions, and imaginings Thus 'real' according to Chandradhar Sharma, "means *real for all time* and Brahman alone can be real in this sense. Similarly, 'unreal' means absolutely unreal like the hare's horn, which this phenomenal world is not Hence this world is neither real nor unreal."[31] Exactly what it is. Sharma does not claim to know. But he is sure that it is not illusory :

> "It is *true for all practical purposes*. What does it matter to us, worldly people, if it is not *absolutely true* in the philosophical sense? When the '*reality*' which is denied to this world means '*reality for all time*' the 'unreality' which is attributed to it means 'non eternality.' Who can stand up and say that the world is not 'unreal' if 'unreal' means 'non-eternal'?[32]

Nobody surely, except those who would remind the advaitin that in equating the unreal with the non eternal he is simply reasserting that which his definitions presumably aim to deny, viz. that this empirical world is unreal, for the non eternal is nothing if not empirical. Just so, allows Professor Mahadevan, but when we (the advaitins) say that the world is unreal, "we do not predicate its unreality in the sense of empty nothingness...Nor is it unreal in the sense of void. *Maya* is existent but not real. Unreal the world is, non existent it is not,"[33] The world exists—as an appearance. However, as Bradley has taught us, it makes a difference whether or not this appearance is understood as *mere* appearance, i.e., something equivalent to illusion or mirage, or as an appearance of (perspective on) the real. If Advaita interds this latter, then we have to do with

30 Ibid., 1. 4. 10
31 Chandradhar Sharma, *A Critical Survery of Indian Philosophy* (London: Rider, 1960), 279.
32 Ibid.
33 Mahadevan, *Philosophy of Advaita*, 235.

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a doctrine of degrees of reality, and that, as Bradley and his fellow idealists have shown, is a philosophical position to be reckoned with.

Unfortunately, for such of Sankara's followers as would exonerate him from the charge of having explained away that which requires to be explained, the basic tenet of Advaita denies the possibility of degrees of reality. The Saguna Brahman by whose agency the universe acquires name and form is not to be thought of as a lower reality. The creator (Isvara) is, like his creation, ultimately unreal. Both exist, we are told, as expressions of maya, that is to say, as mere appearances, for to say that may exists is to say no more than that it is *mere* appearance, and that is to say nothing at all if it is not to say that the world and God are illusory. Mahadevan himself concedes as much. "The world creation," he declares, "is an illusory product of maya. Isvara is Brahman qualified by maya."[34] Sankara appears to go even further when he tells us in his bhasya on the *Mandukyopanisad Karikas* of Gaudapada, "that maya or illusion is never existent. Maya or illusion is this name we give to something which does not (really) exist (but which is perceived."[35] Since it is perceived, it cannot be dismissed for absolutely nothing: as it does not exist, it ought not to be taken or mistaken for something real. Thus we correctly understand it when we realize that it is neither real nor unreal, but indescribable, (*anirvacaniya*) and is to be accepted as such. Recognizing this, the scholastics will have

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34 Ibid., 207, 253.

35 *The Mandukyopanisad with Gaudapada's Karika and Sankara's Commentary*. Translated and annotated by Swami Nikhilananda (Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Asrama, 1955). IV. 58. It may be objected that 'existence' as used in the quotation from Sankara signifies something different than 'existence' as employed in the quotation from Professor Mahadevan, and that hence Sankara does not really mean to imply that maya is not existent, but only that it is not a concrete reality. But if maya is not real, what then, we ask, is real? Prabhu Dutt Shastri, in his *The Doctrine of Maya* (London: Luzac, 1911), 137, denounces the critics of mayavada for gratuitiously assuming that maya is a reality. That, he insists, is a misconception. The truth is rather than maya is indescribable (*anirvacaniya*): "maya we say is neither *sat* nor *asat*, neither an "entity' nor a "non entity." It is not *sat*, since it *appears* at least, or in other words, maintains itself as an *iva* ("as it were"). Consequently, "when we do not believe in the real existence of maya, what logic is there in requiring us to prove the existence of it?" (pp. 126-127) Only this much, that the advaitin remains under obligation to reconcile the non-existence of maya with its facticity, and that by offering some justification for his repudiation of the law of excluded middle. But one looks in vain to Shastri for such an explanation or, indeed, any explanation whatever.

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nothing to do with the apologetics of the modern minded. Nor should they. For if the whole phenomenal world is nothing but an indescribability, and citations from Sankara might be multiplied to show that such in fact it is for him, then they are certainly misguided who occupy themselves with questions of mere epistemology or with arguments purporting to prove the inconsistency of the indescribable.

Is it true, then, that the whole phenomenal world is unreal, or, more accurately, an indescribable illusion? That there are instances to be discovered wherein pluralistic passages of scripture are preceded and followed by texts repudiating *absolute* difference is not denied, but these are so far from being the rule that in most cases it requires considerable ingenuity and textual manipulation to descry them. No matter, replies the advaitin, since the perfection necessarily attaching to the notion of the supreme Self debars conceiving the beings, gods, worlds, and individual selves fixed in It as real. And so it does if perfection necessarily entails the exclusion of the imperfect.

But does it? In reason or in scripture? Certainly not in reason, for perfection, as Charles Hartshorne has repeatedly demonstrated, may mean, and indeed in the history of philosophical theology, Indian as well as western, frequently has meant, the coincidence of one individual's actuality with all actuality, and its potentiality with all possibility.[36] As thus defined, the perfect (Absolute Brahman) is That which includes and surpasses the sum total of imperfect things, and that in such a way as to appropriate in each succeeding moment of Its life the totality of their being and value. In western thought the prime exemplar is the tri-natured deity of Alfred North Whitehead; in India the notion is implicit in the systems of Ramanuja, Nimbarka, Sripati, and, in our own time, the darshanas of Aurobindo and Radhakrishnan. The advaitin will, of course, dismiss this panentheistic notion of perfection for an idle speculation having nothing whatever to do with Brahman as That is understood from the Upanishads. But herein, I submit, he would be wrong, for the passages which imply the conception of the perfect (Brahman) as the unsurpassed self-surpasser and container of all actuality and possibility are fully as numerous and important as those purporting to support the Advaitic interpretation of perfection.[37]

36 Charles Hartshorne, *The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays* (Lasalle: Open Court, 1962), 98. For the philosophical development and justification of the conception, see the same author's *Reality as Social Process*, *The Divine Relativity*, and *Man's Vision of God*.

37 Thus the Chandogya Upanishad teaches that all creatures have their root in Being: "they have Being as their abode, Being as their support." (6 8. 4.; "Verily, what is called *Brahman*, that

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Of the three basic objections raised by the advaitins to the theology of unity in-difference, the first two have been examined and found wanting. That the introduction and conclusion of every purportful scripture teaches identity is, as we have seen, a claim not borne out by the scriptures themselves. No more, it should now be apparent, do all the texts support an interpretation of perfection which requires us to infer the unreality of everything imperfect. There remains, then, the third objection, and that, from the Indian standpoint, the most important, the objection, that is, from scripture itself. For panentheism is defined as that notion which asserts that everything is literally inside God, who, as the encompassing whole, at once transcends and includes the manifold of its parts, whereas the scriptures teach a Brahman without parts (Svetesvatara Upanishad 6. 5. 19); Mundaka Upanishad 2. 2. 10 and 3. 1. 8); without inside, without outside (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 4. 5. 13); without an earlier and without a later (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 2. 5. 19). That these texts contradict panentheism as heretofore defined is obvious. So too is their import. But if their meaning is so plain as to preclude any interpretation at all favorable to panentheism, if furthermore, their authority is accepted—as it must be, then he clearly errs who claims to see in the Upanishads a doctrine of unity-in-difference. As it is said : "He goes from death to death, who sees in it, as it were, diversity."[38]

It is a fate to give one pause. To ignore the texts cited is out of the question. So too is any challenge to their clear meaning or acknowledged authority. The proponents of Indian panentheism

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is what the space outside of a person is." (3. 12. 7); "Verily, what is called space is the determined of name and form. That within which they are is the *Brahman*, that is the immortal, that is the self." (8 14. 1); "Containing all works, containing all desires, containing all odours, containing all tastes, encompassing this whole world...this is *Brahman*. Into him, I shall enter, on departing hence. Verily, he who believes this, will have no more doubts." (Chandgoya Up. 3. 14. 4) The Mundaka Upanishad confirms that it is so: "what is luminous, what is subtler than the sub le, in which are centred all the worlds and those that dwell in them, that is the imperishable *Brahman*." (2. 2. 2); "He in whom the sky, the earth and the interspace are woven as also the mind along with all the vital breaths, know him alone as the one self." (2 2. 5); "The one self within all beings," we read in the *Katha* Upanishad, "becomes varies according to whatever (It enters) and also exists outside (of them all)" (2. 2. 9); "In It all the worlds rest.". (2. 3. 1); "It moves and It moves not; It is far and It is near; It is within all this and it is also outside all this." (Isa Upanishad 5.) The list is incomplete. A dozen other texts ought to be added to it (see Kaivalya Upanishad 10 19; Maitri Upanishad 6. 17. 32; Svetas-vatara Upanishad 1. 6., 3. 7., 4. 10., 6. 2., 5. 7; and Taittiriya Upanishad 2. 8. 1.

38 Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 4. 4. 19.

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(the Neglected Vedanta) perforce must live with and accept the fact that there is purportful scripture contradictory of unity in difference. Is this, then, to concede that the advaitin's third objection is decisive as against the panentheistic interpretation of the purport of Vedic authority? By no means. The fact that any particular interpretation is contradicted by five or even fifty passages out of several thousand does not constitute a refutation of that interpretation unless it is true, as the advaitin says, that Upanishadic thought is an integral whole. Were the Upanishads all of a piece and of one voice, the existence of even one authori ative text contradictory of a particular interpretation might serve to refute that interpretation. But the Upanishads are not all of a piece. The reality is rather, as Dasgupta says, "that germs of diverse kinds of thoughts are found scattered over the Upanishads which are not worked out in a systematic manner."[39] "Not being systematic philosophy, or the production of a single author, or even of the same age and epoch, they contain," according to Radhakrishnan, "much that is inconsistent and unscientific."[40] If he is correct, no one interpretation can hope to be consistent with all of the texts. Each in its turn is faced by passages as difficult to explain as to explain away. Hence the fact that panentheism is contradicted by some half-dozen out of the several hundreds of purportful passages tells very little against the possibility that it correctly bespeaks the spirit and plain sense of the Veda as a whole. It will be argued that this reply to the objection is irrelevant, that virtually every school of Vedanta interpretation can in good conscience claim as much, and indeed had the panentheistic alternative no better case to make against the objection, it would scarcely constitute a serious challenge to the reign of Advaita Vedanta. The traditional account does, after all, offer an explanation of the whole of scripture without exception, and it is not unreasonable to require of the interpretation that would supplant it as the true purport of the Veda that it do as much: That the case for Advaita is made only at the cost of a consistent begging of the question is beside the point as far as the requirement is concerned. Either the objection is answered by adducing a panentheism compatible with the scriptural denial of parts or it is admitted that unity-in-difference is unscriptural, and Advaita is left in possession of the field. For his part, the advaitin has no doubt as to which of these it is to be. The panentheist, he is sure, cannot deny that panentheism entails the notion of a whole of parts, and by his (the panentheist's) own admission the objections from scripture are not open to question either as respects their meaning or their authority. Thus the first alternative is foreclosed, and with it the possibility that the purport of the Upanishads is panentheism.

39 *History of Indian Philosophy*, I. 41-42.
40 *Indian Philosophy*, I. 139ff.

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It is reopened and the possibility restored with the realization that the panentheistic idea is not synonymous with the idea of a whole of parts. *Per se*, panentheism is nothing more than the belief that whatever is inside God. As a corollary, it implies that there is nothing in any way external to the encompassing. But that is all that is entailed in the definition of the term. Some panentheisms, it is true, have conceived the encompassing as literally nothing more or other than a whole of parts, but those whose vision has most enriched theology are not to be found among them. The darshanas of Hegel, Bradley, Royce, Heim and Whitehead,[41] to name but five of the most prominent recent expressions of panentheism in western philosophical theology, entail so much more than the notion of a whole of parts that they cannot without violence to their words and thought be characterized in such simple terms; no more, I contend, is it meaningful to so characterize the panentheism of the Upanishads.

"This is the truth," the Mundaka proclaims, "as from a blazing fire, sparks of like from issue forth by the thousands, even so, O beloved, many kinds of beings issue forth from the immutable and they return thither too." (2. 1. 1); "As a spider sends forth and draws in (its thread), as herbs grow on the earth, as the hair (grows) on the head and the body of a living person, so from the Imperishable arises here the universe." (1. 1 7). Brahman expands and the universe emerges, for in fact the universe is nothing but the enlargement of Brahman "By contemplative power Brahman *expands*. From that food is produced. From food, life (thence) mind, (thence) the reals (the five elements); (thence) the worlds" (Mundaka Upanishad 1. 1. 8) "From him, indeed, who is in the self come forth all living creatures, all worlds, all the vedas, all the gods and all beings." (Maitri Upanishad 6. 32). Regarding this, the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad asks: "since he who blows is like one, how then is he one and a half? (the answer is) because in him (when he blows) all this grew up." (3. 9. 9) The answer is, Varuna tells his son Bhrgu: "that Brahman is bliss. For truly, beings here are born from bliss, when born, they live by bliss and into bliss, when departing, they enter." (Taittiriya Upanishad 3. 6. 1) The same is the teaching of the Chandogya Upanishad: "Verily, this whole world is Brahman, from which he comes forth, without which he will be dissolved, and in which he breathes. Tranquil, one should mediate on it." (3. 14 1)

41 See the following articles by the present author: 'Hegel's "Science" and Whitehead's "Modern World," '*Philosophy* (Great Britain), 31 (1956), 681 699; 'Whitehead's "Process" and Bradley's "Reality," ' *The Modern Schoolman*, 11 (1954), 56 74; 'Karl Heim: Panentheism and the Space of God,' *Concordia Theological Monthly*, 30 (1959), 824 837; and Chapters XX and XXIV in R. C. Whittemore, *Makers of the American Mind* (New York: William Morrow, 1964).

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It is excellent advice, which taken leads inevitably to the conclusion that the proper object of meditation is no featureless identity but a unity, not merely Self but, as the Brhadaranyaka has it, "the world of the Self." (1. 4. 15) The expanded Brahman is nothing other than the contents of this world; Its contraction is their dissolution, or, as some schools of the Vedanta maintain, their transmutation. Brahman is, at one stage in the cosmic cycle, partless. But not at all stages. For Itself, that is as grown to the dimensions of the universe, Brahman is, in some sense, part-inclusive. There is no contradiction here, merely a difference as respects the frame of reference. Common sense and the fact that the Upanishads are but a rather more sophisticated and subjective reexpression of doctrines first found in the Samhitas[42] declares that it is so, but these the advaitin has no ears to hear. So certain is he of the inconsistency of scripture, that he is ready to pronounce the creator (Isvara) and his creation alike illusions in order to resolve scriptural contradictions. But in fact there is no contradiction only a difference of perspective, and that reconcilable on the supposition that particular texts have reference to particular stages in the cycle of Brahman. Allow that the purport of the Veda is panentheistic and the reconcilation is accomplished The identity texts are then taken to refer to Brahman as contracted, the plurality texts to Brahman as expanded. Even the injunctive texts have their place in this scheme of interpretation inasmuch as they are understood as describing the patterns of religious activity appropriate to the worshipper in God. The panentheistic interpretation has much to recommend it. It illustrates the continuity of doctrine from the earliest scripture to the latest. It preserves the plain meaning of the texts, satisfies the demands of logic and is not inimical to common sense. It requires of no man or woman that he or she imagine that they are not something that they are. Moreover, it possesses the singular merit, not to be despised in this science minded age, of compatibility with the dominant theory of contemporary mathematical cosmology, namely, the "big-bang" hypothesis. Finally, as a counterpart to the panentheistic tradition in western philosophical theology, it permits, consents, and declares the meeting of east and west in a common ground of understanding. Why, then, one wonders, has this view been so little regarded by Indian commentators ? Indeed, the new *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* does not even list the term panentheism in its exhaustive index ! If our supposition were true, surely it must have commended itself to someone.

Not necessarily. In the first place, the particular species of panentheism here displayed, i.e., the conception of the whole as the

42 The panauxotheistic idea is, for instance, expressed in the *Purusa Sukta* (*Rg Veda* X, 90, 2 4).

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expansion of Brahman, is practically unique. Western theology offers nothing to exactly compare with it, excepting the system of John Scotus Eriugena. It has never been formally named. Charles Hartshorne's various classification schemes take no account of it. For want of a better designation, I shall call the conception panauxotheism, from the Greek, *pan*, all or everything, *aux* (o) *esis*, expansion, *theos*, divinity; hence, panauxotheism, everything as the expansion of the divine. Since there is nothing external to the expanding divinity, space itself being but a byproduct of the expansion, panauxotheism is properly classified as a species of panentheism. That it is such a species as is not synonymous with the idea of a whole of parts follows from the recognition of the stages. But it is not to be expected that any Vedantin would see this. For in India, philosophy invariably follows authority, and authority, in the persons and position of Sankara and his modern disciples, was established a century and more before the rise of the first dissenting school of Bhedabheda-vada. Consequently, the manifold efforts of the Neglected Vedanta to accommodate their views to common sense and the continuance of the early Vedic notion of Brahman were inhibited from the start by Advaita, and that inhibition is, even today, operative in the thought of Radhakrishnan[43] and his contemporaries. Moreover, the psychology of the religious mind itself has worked to obscure or deny panentheism. The things that men require from their gods, love, forgiveness, hope, an ideal, are such as tend naturally to promote the notion that man himself is other than, estranged from, and suppliant to an immutable Perfection. Man's physical weakness and sometime sense of worthlessness encourage the notion of a complete separation of the divine from the human even as they discourage the belief that man lives and moves and has his being in God. Lastly, the Indian mind has never been, and is not now, geared to speculation divorced from practice. That theory only is really respected in India which issues in a spiritual life. To know that he lives in the midst of divinity is, for the Vedantin, much less important than the realization that the divine lives in him. No wonder, then, that the supposition of panentheism cum panauxotheism should want for Indian interpreters. The idea simply does not have for them the significance that it assumes in the tradition derivative from Proclus and Synesius through Cusanus, Bruno, Spinoza, Hegel, and Royce, to Whitehead and Hartshorne. It is indeed present in Indian

43 In all fairness, however, it should be noted that Radhakrishnan does recognize in at least one passage that the purport of the Upanishads is, from the objective side, Brahman as panauxotheism describes It. "We need not," he writes, "trouble ourselves about the etymology of the word (Brahman). To us, it is clear, Brahman means reality, which grows, breathes or swells." (*Indian Philosophy* I, 164n)

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thought, but present only as implied. For our purposes, however, that suffices.

In the beginning there was nothing manifest; at the end all will be in all. Between these scarcely imaginable poles the gods and worlds arise, flourish in their seasons, and subside. Only Brahman endures. Such is the substance, and also the sum, of Vedic teaching, and for those willing to recognize as much, the position here taken will not seem radical. Nor should it, seeing as how it is no more than an articulation of a theme sounded early and late in *sruti* and *smrti* alike. The same panentheism which is in the samhitas appears in the Upanishads and is manifest in the Gita and the Puranas. Is this to say, then, that the purport of the whole of Veda is panentheism? I would not be so bold as to answer in the affirmative without significant qualification. Intimations of panentheism there in plenty, but the literature is vast. There is too much of it that is cryptic, and more that is too vague. Intuition is all, and the many intuitions do not always coincide. The sense of the whole is elusive and we are too far removed from it in time.

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IX

The Limits of Situational Ethics

Ija Lazari-Pawlowska

G. E. Moore rejects in his "Ethics" the view "that there are certain specific kinds of action which are absolutely always right, and others which are absolutely always wrong", "which ought absolutely always and quite unconditionally to be done or avoided". He finds it "extremely unlikely" that there could be moral norms to which there are no exceptions. We could declare—he says—that it is absolutely always our duty to obey a norm only if a particular kind of action would produce absolutely always the best possible results. The total results of an action depends, however, not merely on the specific nature of an action, but on the circumstances in which it is done, and the circumstances vary so greatly that it would not be reasonable to declare in advance that a particular kind of action will in all circumstances produce the best possible results. G. E. Moore advises therefore to accept the ordinary moral norms "as *general* rules, to which there are very few exceptions, without pretending that they are absolutely universal."[1]

In my paper I want to discuss the problem of the conditional and unconditional validity of norms raised by G. E. Moore. In moral philosophy this problem usually finds an extreme solution. Some authors proclaim that *every* moral norm ought always be obeyed, without exceptions, while others ascribe only a conditional validity to *every* moral norm. I will call the first position an *extreme rigoristic* ethics, the other—an *extreme situational ethics*.

Both positions have some justification. The adherents of rigorism fear that moral chaos could result if human activity would not be regulated by percepts binding irrespective of the situation. Adherents of situational ethics, on the other hand, reject any unconditionally valid precepts, because their acceptance can easily deteriorate

1 G. E. Moore, Ethics. Oxford University Press. London 1958, p 108 113.

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into a dogmatic application of rules; they maintain that the relevant duty can only be determined by the particular situation. In their extreme forms neither of these positions seems to be tenable. I shall attempt to set up in their stead a *moderate situational ethics*, according to which many norms, but not all, should be treated as rules admitting of exceptions. This moderate situational ethics could be equated with a moderate rigoristic ethics, since both standpoints express the same ethical tendency, namely that of ascribing unconditional validity to some, but not to all, rules of conduct. Before I take up the defence of the moderate approach, I should like to look closer at the extreme positions.

Extreme rigoristic ethics

Kant was a moral philosopher who associated the whole realm of morality with unconditionally valid postulates; he foresaw no deviations from any moral norms. He conceived of his categorical imperative ("You should act in such a way that you could wish the maxim of your action to become a universal law of human conduct") and gave several examples of maxims which illustrate various concrete applications of it. However, criticism of these maxims are raised because of Kant's refusal to recognize any exceptions to them, under any circumstances.

If it is always wrong to tell a lie and always wrong not to protect a person from great disaster, provided we can supply the protection, what have we to do, if we can protect a person only by telling a lie? Let us note that if the norms are interpreted in a certain way there is no actual collision between them. One can assume that the second norm implicitly contains conditions restricting its application, so that what it actually means is: "One ought always help people in distress, except under circumstances A, B, C..."; one of the limiting circumstances can be lying.

The above mentioned formulation which admits that moral norms permit of exceptions, cannot please those authors who insist on the unconditional validity of all moral norms, because this formulation states expressly that one of the rules is not unconditionally valid. Such authors try to rescue their extreme rigorism by setting up a great amount of minutely detailed norms, each of which is provided with a universal quantifier. They claim that if a justified exception to a given norm occurs, it testifies that the norm has been wrongly formulated. Consequently, it must be adjusted so as to take into account all situations that deviate from the previous formulation. We only have to formulate our norms more exactly, it is argued; an exception is always the fault of an inaccurate formulation.[2]

2 Comp. e.g. P. Ramsey, The Case of the Curious Exceptions. In: G. H. Outka, P. Ramsey, (ed.) Norm and Context in Christian Ethics, New York 1968.

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According with this view moralists should formulate such norms as : "One should never help someone by lying", "One should never help strangers if one's own family will suffer as a result", etc. (the examples are my own). I have tried to show elsewhere[3] that measures of this kind, insofar as they are considered meaningful at all, can only reduce the number of situations in which conflicts arise, but they cannot eliminate them entirely. This is so, because it is impossible to formulate every or, should we say, any norm so precisely as to take into account all situations and all factors regarded as essential. We can refer here to the norm which forbids helping strangers at the expence of one's own family (if someone were to put it forward). To meet the above condition, we would have, for example, to define what is a trifling inconvenience for the family and what is a serious loss; — and the eliciting of these modifying factors would have to be carried on ad infinitum. I use this example to show the monstrosity of such an undertaking. In accordance with this conception a moralist should not formulate the general principle of helping people, but only numerous detailed rules; their sum total, however, if we were to make them even more precise, would still not encompass all the situations in which help can be given.

Exponents of an extreme rigoristic ethics usually show little concern for the conflicting nature of the values they recognize. It is easier to understand this when we consider that in a concrete situation we often fail to do justice to all relevant values, e.g. telling the truth and sparing suffering; instead, we concentrate on only one of these values, namely that one which we consider as directly engaged in the situation. When asked, we normally mention only our obligation to tell the truth. The harm which our truthfulness may cause, is, as it were, a side-effect of our action. The second norm involved may come to our consciousness only later, after we have become aware of the foreseeable consequences of applying the first norm. This shows that whether or not we perceive the conflict objectively inherent in a situation depends to some extent on the power of our imagination.

Moral philosophers who accept extreme rigorism sometimes try to rescue their position with the help of some semantic measures. For example, they narrow the extension of the word "lie" to describe only those cases of conscious telling the untruth which they regard as impermissible, thereby increasing the negative emotional colouring of the word "lie", whereas in the case of conscious telling the untruth which they consider to be permissible they apply some other, usually euphemistic, name, e.g. "the concealment of truth" or

3 I. Lazari Pawlowska, Kontradiktion und Inkompabilitat in einem ethischen System. In: H. Albert, E. Topitsch (ed.), Werturteilsstreit. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Darmstadt 1971.

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"words which hide the truth". With these semantic measures it becomes tautologically true that one should never lie, in the same way that one should never commit murder, since the word "murder" is simply taken to mean illicit killing. Of course, this position implicitly admits that in certain situations lying (in the wider meaning of the word) can be permitted, what actually means a retreat from extreme rigorism.

In fact, rigorism cannot be defended with regard to the whole realm of accepted values, but only relative to a chosen part of it. It is only to a few moral principles that we can always remain faithful, regardless of the situation and regardless of the consequences.

The duality of attitudes concerning the conditional or unconditional validity of norms boils down to the fact that some people are ready to depart from every norm, if by doing so they hope to achieve some beneficial effect (not necessarily for themselves), whereas others treat certain norms as unconditionally valid, allowing for no exceptions. Whether or not departure from some moral norms can be justified is not the real problem. The question is whether it would be justifiable to depart from *every* moral norm, whether every mode of behaviour is permissible, if it effectively serves to ward off a sufficiently great evil.

Extreme situational ethics

Moral philosophers who are aware of the conflicting nature of our moral values and take this maximally into account, usually represent an extreme situational ethics. The following declaration of J. Wilson is characteristic for this school: "No principle (unless it is a tautology, in which case we could hardly call it a principle), is universal in the sense that there are no exceptions to it, or that we could not conceive of exceptions to it."[4] In his well-known essay "Existentialism is Humanism" J. P. Sartre declares himself most emphatically in favour of situational ethics. He claims that any set of principles falls dawn when a person is faced with a moral dilemma, since those principles pull him in different directions, demanding different acts which cannot possibly be reconciled with each other. So the person's moral problem starts with deciding which of the competing principles should receive the priority in the given situation. According to Sartre no a priori solution has any use. One cannot decide in advance what someone else's or even what one's own duty will be in a future situation. All moral decisions are creative acts. The right decisions are those which are autonomous and concrete. Every person is responsible for his decisions.[5]

4 J. Wilson, Reason and Morals. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge 1961, p. 93.

5 J. P. Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism. N. Langiulli (ed.), The Existentialist Tradition. Doubleday Anchor Books. Garden City 1971.

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The way of thinking which I have here outlined finds now many adherents outside existentialist philosophy. Some of these praise the spontaneity, autonomy and authenticity inherent in this moral programme, while others stress that it encourages people to make their moral decisions upon thorough reflection and to carry full responsibility for them.

This first tendency is represented, for example, by Carl R. Rogers. In his opinion a mature person "tends to move away from 'oughts'." He does not try to stick rigidly to any set of principles, rejecting all such maxims as "I should do this or that", to which he has been socially conditioned. He discovers an increasing pride and confidence in making his own decisions and in guiding his own life, according to his actual evaluations which are fluid and flexible. He does not imitate anyone in his moral activity, not even himself, being always open to new valuing experiences.[6]

According to other authors situational ethics means that moral decisions should be taken upon thorough reflection on what will be the lesser evil in the particular set of circumstances, and that the subject should carry full responsibility for his decisions. This is what A. Schweitzer had in mind when he said that ethics cannot be fitted into tabulated rules and regulations. He rejected any routinist use of norms and cautioned against applying, once and for all, ready conflict-solutions instead of giving priority to one obligation or another, depending on the many different factors which intervene in particular cases He maintained that in moral conflicts we can arrive only at subjective decisions, but we have to guide ourselves always by the sense of highest responsibility. For Schweitzer moral maturity goes together with resolving of conflicts and with the constant awareness that even the choice of what is without doubt the lesser evil still always means a sacrifice of a value.[7] It is to be stressed, however, that Schweitzer did not represent situational ethics in its extreme form, since he considered the absolute validity of certain norms as a necessary condition to preserve humanitarianism; — his injunction against torture, slavery or capital punishment can be cited as examples of such norms.

Situational ethics deserves approval for many reasons. It is opposed to a dogmatization of moral life, to rigid codes which disregard the subtler differences between situations, and it saves the moral autonomy of the individual. The intentions of some adherents

6 C. R. Rogers. Toward a Modern Approach to Values. The Valuing Process in the Mature Person. In: P. Kurtz (ed.). Moral Problems in Contemporary Society. Englewood Cliffs. Prentice Hall, 1969.

7 A. Schweitzer, Kultur und Ethik. In: Ausgewahlte Werke in funf Banden, Vol. 2, Union-Verlag. Berlin 1971, p. 388.

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of the situational ethics would seem to correspond to the rejection of all rules which are to serve as ready made behavioural patterns. Instead of inculcating upon people rigid moral codes, secular or religious, they seem to prefer simply to make people aware of the plurality of values, and then to give them the freedom of choice. This is an exciting prospect. However, such a one-sided solution of problems which by their very nature are extremely complex, does not withstand the test of life. I maintain that, when entangled in moral dilemmas, we should have the freedom of choice from a range of alternatives, which although wide, is, however, limited. It is at this point that the important question arises: What lies beyond these limits, which acts should be treated as absolutely impermissible, regardles of the circumstances?

Unconditionally valid norms:

To consider the problem of unconditionally valid norms I will differentiate between norms of differing degrees of concretisation My aim is to show that those norms to which unconditional validity can justifiably be ascribed, must above all be sought amongst the most and amongst the least concretized ones.

1. The least concretized norms. Such norms express fundamental moral ideas. They indicate a desired course of action, a general way of life, a basic attitude towards other people, and so on. To this category belong the ideas of universal love, of benevolence of minimalization of suffering or of consideration for other people's interests. Principles which express fundamental moral ideas stand at the head of a set of directives which are treated as a system of ethics. They are not only very general, but also very vague. Moralists who put them forward intend them to be universally valid, — and this can actually be the case, since they do not prejudge any concrete choices or concrete actions, leaving the decision to the discretion of the individual involved in a given situation.

I shall illustrate this with an example. A. Schweitzer ascribes unconditional validity to a principle which is — in his words — "the basic idea of moral good, which is universal and absolute," This is the idea of "reverence for life": "Ethics is nothing else than reverence for life... Everything which in the usual ethical valuation of interhuman relations is looked upon as good can be traced back to the material and spiritual maintenance or enhancement of human life and to the effort to raise it to its highest level of value."[8] This extremely general idea, which unites, as it were, all the aspirations which Schweitzer considers to be of moral value, can retain its validity in every situation, regardless of the circumstances. Schweitzer

8 Ibid.,, p. 378.

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wanted people to behave *always* "in the spirit of reverence for life". In the same way other moralists suggest that we should *always* be guided by love of our neighbour, universal benevolence, and so on. Schweitzer was conscious of the fact that the idea of reverence for life, which he himself described as vague, does not provide anyone with a set of detailed prescriptions for his behaviour in concrete situations. More precisely, it does not provide anyone with a *moral code*, i.e. a complete set of noncontradictory norms, ordered hierarchically, norms, which would unambiguously prejudge the solution of every moral problem. The vagueness of such moral ideas permits their flexible application to concrete situations, which is precisely why they can retain their unconditional validity.

The examples of moral norms which I have cited had a substantive (material) character. I should like to distinguish them from so called formal principles. Some moralists put such a formal principle at the head of their system, accrediting it with unconditional validity. Formal principles contain no concrete advises for behaviour; they only gather substance in relation to an individual's structure of values, or when combined with a specific system of ethics. Going out from the same formal norm various individuals may reach opposite conclusions, depending on the set of values they accept.

Kant's categorical imperative is an example of a formal principle. Further examples can be quoted: "One should behave in accordance with one's own conscience." "One should obey the norms accepted by his society". The so called golden rule is also a formal norm.

Of course, the difference between a formal principle and a very general substantive one is not very clear. We can assume, however, that a substantive principle, even a general and vague one, indicates a certain line of decisions, although it does not usually prejudge them concretely. Such a principle, despite its inexactitude, nevertheless rules out certain types of action, while a formal principle does not. For example, the substantive principle of universal goodwill and benevolence rules out revenge, while a formal principle for example Kant's categorical imperative, neither recommends revenge nor rules it out. Kant, it is true, assumed that his categorical imperative ruled some actions out, e.g. lying and suicide; however, we should remember that he addressed his imperative to people as "rational beings" and believed that, basing themselves on his imperative, everybody — as a "rational being" — would come to the same behavioural maxims to which his own convictions about what is right and what is wrong had led him. His concept of "rational beings" already included an affirmation of specific moral choices.

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2. Norms of medium concretisation. I have singled out the most general moral principles as a category of directives which are usually accredited with unconditional validity; these can have either a substantive or formal character. Substantive norms of a medium level of concretisation are different in the discussed respect. I mean such norms as e.g. "Do not kill", "Do not steal", "Do not lie", "Do keep your promises";— they are most often mentioned as being classical examples of moral norms. Each of them can be treated as a concretisation of the idea to love one's neighbour, to minimize suffering etc.

It seems to me that situational ethics is primarily applicable to this type of norms, and in fact these norms are most often treated as being only valid *as a rule*. Their aim is to protect specific values (life, property, truth, mutual confidence), but if they conflict with other values, we may regard a deviation from them as being justified, in order to defend values which are more precious to us in the given situation.

The conflict of accepted values is the methodological reason, why the cited examples of norms should be included in the category of norms which are only conditionally valid. However, it is not a deciding reason; ultimately it is an individual's moral decision what kind of validity he ascribes to a moral norm. Everybody can accept some norms as unconditionally valid on the basis of his moral preferences. In our cultural tradition, as in many others, it is usually the case that norms of medium concreteness are treated as only conditionally valid. But there is no unanimity about this. Schopenhauer, for instance, speaks of *the right of man to lie*, and Kant speaks of *the merely assumed right to lie*. The Indian Jainists treat as an absolute prohibition not only intentional killing of human beings but also of animals, whereas our cultural tradition permits several exceptions to the norm of non-killing. It is, of course, possible to declare such a prohibition to be of unconditional validity and strive consistently to apply it without any deviation, even in the case of self-defence, war or the like. It is possible to treat any particular norm as unconditionally valid. What we cannot do, however, is to proceed in this way with regard to *all* norms simultaneously; we cannot do it without falling into contradiction. Whenever we ascribe absolute validity to a norm, we place it in the scale of values higher than all other norms which may enter into competition with it. Therefore, for example, he who regards killing as being unconditionally prohibited gives to non-killing greater importance than to self-defence or to defence of other's lives in the case of an attack endangering life, or to the defence of one's country in the case of war.

3. The most concretized norms. The distinction between norms of a low, a medium or a great degree of concretization is of course

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fluid. However, there cannot be any doubt that the norms "do not kill" is more concrete than the norm "Have consideration for the interests of others", and the norm "Bakers should not pour poison into bread" is more concrete than the norm "Do not kill". Some advocates of extreme situational ethics would probably moderate their radical views if we were to point out certain highly concretized norms and ask them whether they would really admit any exceptions to them. For example, do they really consider that an ordinary backer who in ordinary times bakes bread for ordinary people, can in any situation be morally justified in pouring poison into bread? If the answer to this question would be a negative one, then they would at the same time be negating extreme situational ethics, for they would be accepting that in their opinion not all norms are only conditionally valid. I surmise that the radical declarations of many adherents of situational ethics do not reflect their real intentions. Probably everybody considers certain courses of actions to be reprehensible under all circumstances. The injunction against these actions is often felt to be so obvious that it is not explicitly formulated. For example, we do not formulate a norm which declares that in normal road conditions a driver should never intentionally run over a child who is playing in the road. Such examples could be multiplied. I only want to show that people who are aware of a possible conflict of interests and ascribe only conditional validity to the norm "Do not kill", would probably agree that the two norms mentioned above (regarding the baker and the driver) should be treated as unconditionally valid. These two norms also concern killing, but they are now much more concretized; — it has been specified who undertakes the action, who is the victim of it and in what circumstances it takes place.

The weak point in my examples concerning the baker and the driver is that we do not suppose any real conflict of interests in the described situations. In the case of torture the matter is different. The injunction against torture is most often assigned the status of an unconditionally valid norm. But even in this case there is no consensus. For example, S. Moser writes: "There is almost universal agreement that even the most stringent moral principles admit of exceptions in some situations. For instance, torture is obviously a great evil, but it is difficult to deny that it is right to extract information by torture from a man who refuses to name the place where a large group of innocent people is being tortured by his fellows, a gang of perverts"[9] Amnesty International, on the other hand, is

9 S Moser, Absolutism and Relativism in Ethics. Charles C. Thomas Publisher. Springfield 1968, p. 47.

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outspokenly opposed to torture under any conditions, considering torture as never justified.[10]

At a seminar on ethics in Basle (1976) the participants listed the following acts as those which should always and unconditionally be avoided: torture, the death penalty, slavery, terrorism, racial discrimination, encitment to ethnic hatred, the imprisonment of uncomfortable political opponents in psychiatric hospitals and the use of nuclear means of destruction.[11]

I think that it is reasonable to regulate by detailed rules only a small part of morality. The question arises: Which part? I have so far characterized norms only formally, without going into their content. But I assume that there is no satisfactory general content-based answer to this question. We can only give examples of such norms, and these examples will bear witness to what transgressions we find intolerable on the basis of our value system.

Whether or not we treat a norm as unconditionally valid is to some extent a matter of our individual choice and decision. One person will consider that he is obliged to be a strict vegetarian, while another will consider that he is obliged to say nothing but good about his parents. Such decisions can play a great role in shaping an individual's life. But what I am here primarily concerned with is to demonstrate that we need unconditionally valid norms for our living together in society. We need them to safeguard certain interests — our feeling of security, for instance. When we buy bread we must be able to trust that it is not poisoned. When we decide to be treated in a hospital we must be able to trust that no doctor will exploit us exclusively as a means to medical progress and reduce us to mere object of experimentation. We must be able to trust that the doctor will not on his own initiative take us an eye or a kidney in order to make another patient happy whom he regards as more valuable. We must believe that our autonomous well-being will be considered. The behaviour of people must be predicable within certain limits, we need some elementary guaranties without which we could not live confidenly together.[12] This is why it is taken for granted that certain social roles, especially professional roles, have unconditionally binding directives which are not merely accepted tacitly but are explicitly formulated. To become convinced about this fact it is enough to familiarize oneself with the ethics of medical profession.

10 Amnesty International, Bericht uber die Folter. Fischer Taschenbuchverlag. Frankfurt 1975.

11 Comp. H. Baur, Johannistreffen in Basel. "Schweitzerisches Reformiertes Volksblatt", 1976, No. 11, p. 174.

12 Comp. G Patzig, Ethic ohne Metaphysik. Vandenhoeck a. Ruprech. Gottinger 1971, p 61.

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Adherents of an extreme situational ethics are in the wrong when they claim that in fact exceptions are admitted in the case of every norm; — of course, it does not mean that no exceptions are made. At most, they can declare that this is how it should be in their opinion. I believe, however, that their declarations are often rather the result of an unreflected generalization than a well thought-out programme.

The temptation do declare oneself in an unqualified way for or against the unconditional validity of norms is felt by many moral philosophers; the reason is the unambiguous and consistent character of such a declaration. But to me it seems divorced from reality.

In conclusion I should like to express my sceptical attitude to the onesidedness often encountered in moral philosophy. An elasticity in our decision-making is valuable, but sometimes the lack of elasticity is to be appreciated. It is right to weigh carefully the foreseeable consequences of our actions, but constant "no" with regard to some kinds of actions seems to be the better moral course.

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X

The Humanism of the Theistic Existentialists

K. P. Verma

Humanism is the name of the Philosophical tendency or attitude of mind which attaches primary importance to man and to his faculties, affairs, temporal aspirations and well being. It is a theory which essentially tends to render men more truly human and to make his original greatness manifest by causing him to participate all that can enrich him in nature and history" [1] It has a long history and it has been variously interpreted in different ages by different humanists of the world. Our concern in this paper is very much limited. Here we would discuss the humanism of the theistic existentialists only. Since existentialism is fundamentally a philosophy of 'man' it is quite evident that the theory is itself a form of humanism. Our discussion is therefore, based on the light the theistic existentialists throw on humanism.

In the history of existentialism Soren Kierkegaard, Karl Jasper, and Gabriel Marcel are figured as the chief exponents of the theistic existentialism. What they have in common is simply the fact that they deny the priority of 'essence' to 'existence' and so they are called 'existentialists' rather than 'essentialists'. And being existentialists they all attach the greatest value and importance to the individuals rather than Universal, and more particularly to the existence of the human individual rather than to the intellectual concept of humanity as a class. In fact, all existentialist writers seek to justify in some way or other the freedom and importance of human personality. They place man on the top and attach much importance

1 Jacques, Maritain, *True Humanism* (tran. by Adamson) (London, 1954), Intro., p. xii.

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to the individual freedom and responsibility. Seen in this perspective all existentialists may generally be called humanists.

Broadly speaking, the philosophy of existentialism as Humanism may be classified under two heads: (1) Theistic Humanism of which the chief exponents are Soren Kierkegaard, Karl Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel, and (2) Atheistic Humanism of which the chief advocates are Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger and Jean Paul Sartre. "The first kind of humanism recognises that the centre for man is God; it implies the Christian concepation of man as at once a sinner and redeemer, and the Christian conception of grace and freedom... The second kind of humanism believes that man is his own centre, and, therefore, the centre of all things. It implies a naturalistic conception of man and freedom."[2]

Here I would discuss the philosophy of humanism from the theistic existentialist's point of view. In fact, the philosophy of Existentialism began with Soren Kierkegaard. He was the first man to raise his voice against the traditional way of depicting man. As a Christian moralist he denounced the pseudo prestige of the political, social and religious institutions of his time and launched a crusade to make man free of their influences. He held the view that these institutions were mainly responsible in reducing men to an anonymous entity rather than acknowledging them as persons valuable as an end in themselves. Not only these institutions but also the imposing metaphysical systems of his time which were responsible in making the nature of man irrevocably fixed. Men were practically reduced to zero and they were compelled to conform to the demands of these institutions by forgetting their own freedom of choice. In a word men were institutionalised and were shown in pre-established relationship to the cosmos and as such they were offered the narcotic of self-delusion which inhibits them from gaining self-knowledge. As the contemporary existentialists Karl Jaspers put it following Kierkegaard, "The philosopher of systems is, as a man like some one who builds a castle, but lives next door in a shanty. Such a fantastical being does not himself live within what he thinks, but the thought of a man must be the house in which he lives or it will become perverted."[3] "Arguing against Hegel's intellectualism Kierkegaard pointed out that our own awareness of personal existence comes about by a transrational act rather than the abstracting activity of the intellect. Intellect of Reason, according to him, tries to pick out the abstract aspects of thing, and ignore and miss the whole wealth of inner existence. But "the reality of every one's existence", says Kierkegaard, proceeds from the 'inwardness' of man, and not from

2 *Ibid*, p. 19.

3 Peterfreund, S. P. and Denise, T. C. Contemporary Philosophy and its Origins (East-West Student edition, 1968), p. 198.

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anything that the mind can codify, for objectified knowledge is always at one or more removes from the truth. Truth is subjectivity."[4] The word 'subjectivity' is very significant and for Kierkegaard it means the self consciously existing concrete subject, i.e. the individual. According to him, 'Every human being must be assumed in essential possession of what essentially belongs to being a man."[5] He openly declares that men exist on earth as discrete individuals having peculiarities of their own and possibilities innate in them. Here Kierkegaard's real intention was "to make each of us aware of our primal subjectivity so that we may live authentically. He conveyed the message that one can only live authentically, become a person by bearing the sole responsibility for his decisions, rather than by appealing to the authority of custom or even of one's own past patterns of thought."[6] And for fulfilling this task of becoming authentic or achieving one's own personal existence, Kierkegaard suggested some ways According to him the awareness of the conditions for becoming authentic constitutes a part of self knowledge: "The task of the subjective thinker is to transform himself into an instrument that clearly and definitely expresses in existence whatever is essentially human."[7] But the full truth, i.e. the completion of the individual self knowledge is possible only through an intensified awareness of one's own encounter with God. In other words an individual can truly know and realise his true self only through an encounter with God. And this encounter, according to Kierkegaard, is possible only by having faith in God. Faith alone can enable us to know and have an inward experience of God. Faith becomes, therefore, the via media through which the individual can participate and realise his true self in the eternal Being of God. Thus Kierkegaard observes that man "True self is the finite self as related to the infinite subject, i.e. God"[8].

But the foregoing view of Kierkegaard appears to be some what preplexing. For on the one hand he believes in the existence of discrete individuals having no nexus underlying them, and on the other hand he regards them as partic pating in the eternal Being of God. Thus his absolute subjectivity becomes absolute objectivity in his total self displacement before God which is the effect of his persistence in a reiterated absolute choice of the infinite. It does not seem quite convincing and intelligible as to how a temporal being

4 Mairet, Philip. *Jean Paul Sartre Existentialism and Humanism* (Reprinted 1963), p. 6.
5 Blackham, H. J. *Six Existentialist Thinkers* (Fourth Impression, 1958) p. 21.
6 Peterfreund and Denise, op. cit, p. 191.
7 Blackham, op. cit, p. 121.
8 *Kierkegaard Anthology* (ed. by Robert Bretall, 1968), p. 268.

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can encounter with an eternal one, i.e. God. Kierkegaard has of course suggested that this paradox of the man-God relationship can be solved by having faith in the incarnation of God and in this connection he has referred to the person of Christ, the temporal. But to my mind, even if we grant this idea of incarnation conceived by Kierkegaard, the demand of faith does not end here. For how do we know that the God to whom we are led by our intense inwardness is the Christian God alone ? Might it not be satan, a nameless something or even an imaginative projection ? To this Kierkegaard had nothing definite to put forward. He simply said, "Of greatest importance is not the external rationally appraised what to which we relate, but rather the inward felt bow. An objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation process of the most passionate inwardness is the truth, the highest truth attainable for an existing individual."[9]

It is important to mention here that Kierkegaard is a theistic existentialist. He has an unflinching devotion to Christianity. To the question what an existing individual should make of himself Kierkegaard says that they should lead an ethico-religious life depending ultimately on a common ground. According to him God is the positive foundatation and common ground of all existent individuals and also of their intersubjectivity. His view of humanism is clearly reflected in his own saying which runs thus: "by leaping into the depths, one learns help oneself. learns to love others as much as oneself. "Indeed, a real man (i.e. a person who has realised his true self) can alone be a true humanist Sensuous love has to be transformed into the sublime and eternal love for God; and to love God is to love all." This is Kierkegaards religious Humanism.

The next chief theistic humanist was Karl Jaspers. Like Kierkegaard, Jaspers also emphasises the importance of the discrete individuals. According to him "every individual is a distinct existent : and a man in peril can best relize this. "For Jaspers being oneself is the human reality which no body can deny. But unlike Kierkegaard he depicted three realms of Being which, according to him, are in one sense reducible to one another. These realms are being oneself, being there and being in-itself Being oneself refers to the personal existence, being there means objective world and being in-itself points to the transcendental world. Now, according to Jaspers "the person who is made aware of them may participate in all the three."[11]

So long the individuals are in the realm of being—oneself they hold their separate existence and are free to take their own decisions.

9 Perfreund and Denise, *op. cit.*, p 192.

10 Bhattacharya, S. R An Enquiry into the fundamentals of Existantialism (First edition 1979). p 121.

11 Blackham, *op cit* , p 58.

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But this state of affairs does not continue for long and being aware of their inherent limitations, being-oneself transcends his limit add enters into the realm of being there i.e. in the realm of objective world. Here Jaspers observes that the freedom of the individual is not possible in the complete isolation of each other for there is no such thing as a completely isolated personality. According to him "there is always an interplay between persons, which occurs not only in contemporary society but also within the structure of history."[12] He, therefore, emphasises the need of the intercourse among the free individuals which calls 'communication'. "Communication, says Jaspers, "is the most precious and the most fragile of all possible achievements"[13]

Having entered into the realm of being there, i.e. in the objective world man finds himself in a better position, some of his limitations are now over. But that is not all. His continuous effort for the realisation of his authentic self still continues. And in fulfilling this mission of life man crosses the boundary of the objective world and enters into the realm of being-in-itself, i.e. the realm of God. "Man's freedom makes him feel his potentiality for realizing the divine will. The world, realized as a phenomena becomes to man the symbolic language of God."[14]

Thus we see that according to Jaspers God becomes the absolute imperative for the realisation of the individual's authentic self. It means Jaspers also was not able to grant the isolated and distinct existence of the individuals. He also, like Kierkegaard, ultimately took recourse to God nullifying the importance of the distinct existence and authentic selfhood of the individuals. His philosophy of existentialism is, therefore, rightly be called a Philosophy of theistic humanism.

Closely associated with Karl Jasper's view on Humanism is the view of Gabriel Marcel, another theistic humanist of the 20th century. Like Jaspers, Marcel has brought Philosophy back to the contemplation of Being. According to him man is the only being who may make promises, blind himself and determine his future. He further holds that the individual is concerned with the interior of the situation in which he is enclosed with his own internal reality, rather than with the collection of qualities by which he is defined.

Emphasizing the importance of individual existence Marcel opines, "Personal existence is an experienced reality which can be clarified and confirmed by reflection and indicated to others, it can

12 Thuly, Frank, *A History of Philosophy* (Second Indian edition), p. 583.
13 Blackham, *op. cit*, p. 58.
14 Datta, D. M. *The Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 528.

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be tested and attested."[15] He further asserts that the individuals are distinct from one another and they are existing separately in this spatio-temporal world. But like his predecessors he also feels and admits that we are also united as being in the all embracing. Being of God. For him the distinction between the 'I' and the 'Thou' is more apparent than real. In this connection he has explained the meaning of 'I' as 'having' and the 'I' as 'being'.

According to Marcel, when 'I' as having a body and life look within myself, 'I' find that I am not simply a person having a body and life external to me, rather I am a being or person embedded with the existing situation comprising things or 'thou' i.e. persons other than myself. This realization of 'I' as being 'thou' brings individuals closer to one another by developing a relation of fidelity among them. "But this bond of fidelity," according to Marcel, "is contingent since it holds among individuals existing in the spatio temporal world: and the same becomes eternal, when it is conceived as grounded on God. Each individual is, therefore, required to realize his true self by an immediate experience of the all-inclusive absolute, God."[16] Thus for Marcel the relation of external fidelity between individuals and the transcendent Absolute, i.e. God, is the ground of humanism. "And one can be a true humanist only when one reaches the transcendental realm of inter subjectivity by establishing the relation of 'eternal fidelity' 'between oneself and the supreme subject God."[17]

Here also like Kierkegaard and Jaspers we find the denial of the importance of individuals as distinct existent of the world. Individuality, in the absolute sense of the term, could not be maintained by Marcel also. Besides inter-subjectivity and interdependence of the individuals living in the society, God has been taken as the unifying bond of the individuals. This is what, we may say, the theistic humanism of Gabrial Marcel.

15 Blackham, *op. cit*, p. 84.
16 Bhattacharyya, *op. cit.*, p. 123.
17 *Ibid*, p. 17.

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XI

A Theoretical Approach to Behaviour

Saeeduzzafar

Social scientists, particularly psychologists, have devoted their whole life in an attempt to understand 'Man' but unfortunately the man could not solve the puzzle of 'Man' completely to the satisfaction of everyone. The basic and perhaps the oldest question in the history of science is why man behaves the way he behaves? In essence all fields of psychology are centered around this vital question. It is so attractive that different schools of thought revolve around this quiry just like earth moves around the sun.

At present there are three major and dominating schools of thought that have given their different approaches for the understanding of man's behaviour. These are psychoanalytic approach, cognitive approach and behaviouristic approach. Psychoanalytic approach describes man as 'homovolens' that is man is primarily a creature of strivings and emotions and his behavior is determined by blind and unconscious inner urges. Freud, the father of psychoanalytic approach, was of the view that each aspect of man's behavior can be explained in terms of sex, though he used the term 'sex' in broader sense. The other model of man, proposed by cognitive theorists, is known as 'homo sapiens'. The model emphasizes that man is a creature of meanings. Accordingly, he has the ability to grasp the meaning of the situation and his behavior is guided by his understanding of the situation. Finally, behavioristic approach presents man as 'homo mechanicus' emphasizing that man is like a machine. The model compares man's behavior with that of the functions of a complex computer that may be programmed to link certain kinds of input to certain kinds of output.

However, there is thinking among psychologists that neither of the model alone is sufficient to explain man's behavior rather man is a synthesis of all three models.

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My approach to man is quite different from all the three models discussed above. The approach exposes the bitter realities of man's nature. Since human being does not want to face many realities, I am afraid that my approach may be discarded at the outset. But rejection or acceptance of any approach does not change the facts.

To me man is primarily a creature of 'gain'. The approach, we may call personal or realistic approach, stresses that man's behavior is primarily guided by this sense of gain and loss. Man is always in pursuit of gain and tries his best to avoid loss. All his actions are determined by the concept of gain. Here the term gain is used in broader sense. It is not limited to monetary gain rather it has many dimensions such as materialistic gain, social gain, psychological gain and spiritual gain. Monetary gain, which has many shades, is the example of materialistic gain, while recognition, social status or social approval etc. are included in social gain. Satisfaction of conscience and assumed reward in the life after death are the examples of psychological and spiritual gains respectively. Last two types of gains are unique in the sense that these are given weightage by noble persons, saints and prophets.

Now the vital question is whether or not this new approach may explain various types of behavior manifested by the human beings? If we apply this approach realistically, it would become quite apparent that even the most complex behavior may be explained in terms of this new approach. Let us give some examples of simple and complex behavior and see how these behavior patterns are explained in terms of 'realistic approach! To start with the begining of man's life: why newly born child cries immediately after birth? Different explanations are given by different approaches to account for such simple behavior. According to my approach the newly born child cries because crying behavior inflates the lungs of the child and makes respiration possible hence saves the life — a great gain for the child.

Like simple behavior the examples of complex behavior are numerous but we will concentrate on few important and representative examples to show how even most complex behavior may be explained in terms of the 'realistic approach'. Some of the important questions in social psychology are: Why does man develop friendly ties with one and hostility toward other? Why does man like something and dislike other things? Why does man act as a social reformer? If we are bold enough to introspect ourselves realistically, we will find that development of cordial or hostile relations, likeness or dislikeness depends on our perception of the situation purely in terms of gain and loss. Thus if we find that Mr. X may be beneficial to us in any way, we will try to develop cordial relations with him. Again the development of such cordial relations depend on relative

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gains which we may achieve. For instance, if we find that cordial relations with. Mr. X demand to sacrifice larger gains, then we will avoid such cordial relations. Similarly, a man who acts as a great social reformer, he behaves so in order to achieve either one or all four types of gains. Thus the social reformer is not basically motivated by his desire to render his free services for uplifting the society rather by his inner urge to achieve the gains perhaps the social gain. He is, therefore not obliging the society rather he is obliging his 'self'

Even such extreme behavior as donating large amount of money for the construction of a hospital or school for poors (apparently there is materialistic loss); serving old and sick parent day and night, may also be explained adequately within the framework of realistic approach. An individual, according to this approach, donates large sum of money not primarily to help the poor but to gain social prestige and everlasting social recognition. Moreover, if the donator is highly religious minded, then he does so to achieve spiritual gain. In other words, basically the donator is not helping the poors but helping himself. Similarly, one serves his old and sick parents not so much due to his inner desire to serve them but due to his inner urge to achieve either materialistic, social, psychological or spiritual gain. If the son is highly religious minded and believes that his worldly deeds will determine his life after death, then he serves his parents (even when there is no chance of materialistic gain, that is when the parents are extremely poor) to achieve spiritual gain. In other words he serves his parents to make his own life after death comfortable and colourful—the most important gain for a religious person. On the other hand, if neither the son religious minded nor his parents are rich, then he may simply serve the parents to achieve social or psychological gains or both.

These few but highly sigaificant instances from different aspects of man's behavior clearly suggest that man is always after the gains and his behavior is guided by his perception of gains. In short, he is a selfish animal. He never cares about anything except himself. It is a bitter as well as a naked truth about man's nature and we, as human beings, should accept it frankly, I am, however, afraid that many thinkers, writers, philosophers and social scientists may not only refuse to accept his truth but may show their unpleasant reactions to my theory.

I admit without any hesitation that at present stage the theory has no scientific ground; it is purely tentative. I am, however, confident that in near future it may be tested by sophisticated scientific methods.

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Book-Reviews :

L. P. N. Sinha : *Reflections on George Berkeley's Philosophy*, New Delhi, Classical Publishing Co., 1984, pp. 148, Rs. 70/—

This book is a collection of several papers of Prof. L. P. N. Sinha earlier published in national and international journals where in the epistemological, ontological and ethical problems of Berkeley's philosophy have been analysed.

Berkeley is regarded as a subjective idealist and an empiricist. He was an opponent of atheism and the Manichean dualism. Philonous is the *Third Dialogue* written by Berkeley conclude the argument by affirming that the same principles which at first sight lead to scepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring men back to common sense. Dr. Sinha restresses the empirical dimensions of Berkeley's epistemology.

In the *A New Theory of Vision* Berkeley appears as a realist and behaviouristic materialist. He has been interpreted here as a genuine empiricist and not merely as the propourder of an intermediate standpoint between Locke's inconsistent empiricism and Hume's visualism. He does not maintain the Lockean distinction between primary and secondary qualities.

Berkeley accepts only single appearance and dismisses double appearance The visual experience is the sign that indicates the tangile object. Berkeley accepts the sign theory of perception. Perception occurs through the cooperation of the senses. Berkeley argues against considering perception of an object through the painting on the retina.

Berkeley supports Locke's contention that perception is a learning. If perception is regarded as a vision gives genuine experience and not merely discretely sensed entities like lights and colours.

Since Berkeley repudiates the Lockean distinction between primary and secondary qualities, hence, he accepts the reality of mind and its ideas. As a confirmed theist, he affirms the creation of senses by God and mind exists because it has before it ideas of senses. In *Alciphron* Berkeley's theism is fully substantiated. Berkeley used the word immaterialism in his *Principles* to characterise idealism.

The essays collected in the book under review are marked by clarity, analytical orientation and logical argumentation. Relevant comparisons have been instituted between Berkeley and Aristotle and Berkeley and B Russell This work will enhance the reputation of the author as an expert in the modern western philosophy.

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Kedar Nath Tewari : *Comparative Religion*, pp. 225, Motilal Banarsidass, Indological Publishers and Booksellers, 41 U. A Bungalow Road, Delhi 110 007, 1983 Price Rs. 50/— Cloth.

The author of this book Dr. Kedar Nath Tewari is Head of the Department of Philosophy at the Bhagalpur University, Bhagalpur Bihar. The author has confessed that the present book is primarily meant for the use of B. A. Hons. and Post-graduate students of Philosophy and Religion of the Indian Universities.

The author has very ably divided the whole book into ten chapters as follows : I. Comparative Religion : Nature, aims and Objectives. II Hinduism. III. Buddhism. IV. Jainism. V. Zoroastrianism VI. Judaism. VII. Christianity. VIII. Islam. IX. Sikhism and lastly Comparison and Appraisal. In every chapter the author has given an Introduction and examined the basic features of all religions and discussed God. World, Man, Evil and suffering, Life after death, Human destiny, ethics, prayer and principal sects of each religion.

Dr. Tewari has done a great service to the students of comparative religion by writing this book. He has taken great pains in making the subject matter very clear and even laymen can derive the advantage of knowling much about various religions. He has considered the basic questions which are common to all religions and have examined them thoroughly making them clear. The book is a concise and at the same time a literary piece of work covering important details about the various religions. After going through the book one will have insight of all the religions covered in the book. In the end two chapters have been added Comparison and Appraisal in which on the basis of different religions he has compared the various concepts and examined them in the light of different religions and lastly added a chapter on The Possibility of Universal Religion.

The present book of the author is concise and systematic tretise on various religions and covers all the basic concepts of religion. The book will prove of immense use for the students of Religion of the Indian Universities. At the same time it will prove an important Introduction for general readers as well. It is written in a simple, critical and lucid style.

Convention of Religions in India, pp. 215 published by Bimla Publishing House, Delhi 110052 (India) Reprinted in 1982. Price Rs. 100/— $ 20/—

The present book contains the Proceedings of the Convention of Religions in India which was held at Calcutta in 1909 to celebrate

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the birthday anniversary of Swami Vivekananda. These proceedings were printed and published during the same year by Shri S.N. Sen. Apart from the proceedings the book contains several other things, such as The Chairman's Speech. The Presidential Address, speeches by Rai Narendra Nath Sen Bahadur. Swami Premananda Bharati, Dr. Chunnilal Bose Rai Bahadur, Geeta Society Delegate. We have in this book many contributions on different religions by eminent scholars of those religions. The religions covered in this book are : Israelitism—I. A. Isac, N.E. David and M E.D. Cohen; Zoroastrianism—Jivanji Jamshetji Modi, Dhanjishah Meherjibhai Madan; Buddhism (Northern School)—Dawsardup of Gontak, Darjeeling, Buddhism (Southern School)—Anagarika H. Dharmapala and Bhikshu Punnananda; Brahmoism—Prof. Benoyendranath Sen; Christianity (Protestantism by—Rev. Herbert Anderson; Christianity (Roman Catholicism—John A. Francis, and Christianity (Pente Costal League)—Samuel A. Chisholm; Islam—Maulvi Mirza Abul Fazl. and S. Khuda Bux Esq., and Islam (Ahmadiya Sect) Maulvi Mahammad Ali of Quaidan; Sikhism Babu Jodh Singh of Amritsar.

The different essays written in this book are clear exposition of various sects and religions by eminent scholars, who are followers of their own sects. The different essays bring before us the true spirit of the different religions, and they clearly indicate the difference between religions is not real but superficial. But the irony is that the practitioners of religions in all ages and in all contries have emphasised the differences more than the essential unity; in all religions and, in consequence, discord in the name of religion has divided one sect from the other, and peace and harmony which is the desideratum of all religions, have remained an unattainable ideal. The essays in this volume make it amply clear that if the desideratum is to be achieved mankind must sink their differences and pin their faith in the ultimacy of the eternal truth which has been the basis of all religious life. This book introduces to various religions of mankind and al o reminds us what ultimately religion must mean to all of us.

This is an ideal book covering the important points of all religions. Such conventions of Religions should be held from time to time and the proceedings of conferences shouldd be known to public through Press media. Unless people know the real ideals of religions how they can practice these in their lives. The ultimate aim is one but the roads leading to attain this aim are varied. Though it is a book published as early as in 1909, but still it has value. The publishers deserve our thanks for republishing such an important publication. Cheap editions for making it more popular should be brought out so that the common readers may also derive advantage.

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Robert C Neville : *Reconstruction of Thinking*, pp. 350 + xii, State University of New York Press, State University Plaza, Albany, New York 12246 U. S. A. Price $ 23.50. (1981)

The author of this book Robert Neville is Professor of Philosophy and the Director of the Centre for Religious Studies at State University of New York, Stony Brook, U. S. A. He is author of four more books published earlier : *God the Creator*; *Cosmology of Freedom*; *Soldier, Sage, Saint* and *Creativity and God*.

This book begins with a systematic philosophic examination and reconstruction of the conception of thinking. The whole book is divided into two parts besides Preface, Notes, Bibliography of works cited and Index The first Part Foundations consists of four main chapters which are further subdivided as follows : 1. Foundational Issues of Thinking subdivided into An Historical Crisis in Thinking. Valuation, A Foundational Hypothesis and Structure of the Argument, 2. Cosmology and Its Sources — The Nature of Cosmology. Critique of Cosmology. Plato and the Cosmology of Thinking. and Aristotle and the Task of Cosmology, 3. Axiological Cosmology — Cosmological Categories, Body Nature and Society, A Metaphysics of Value. Cosmology : Norms and Good Thinking, 4. Responsib lity. Norms. and the Social Reality of Thinking — Epistemology of Value, Critique of Axiology, General Norms for Thinking and Responsibility. Part II Imagination consists of A Beginning, 5. Imagination as Synthesis: Religion — Phenomenology of Synthesis, Critical Interpretation, Cosmology of Imagination as Synthesis and Religion and the Commonality of the World, 6. Imagination in Perception, Beauty — Phenomenology of Imagination in Perception, Critical Interpretation, Cosmology of Imagination in Perception, and Responsibility in Imagination in Perception, 7. Imagination as Appearance: Form — Phenomenology of Appearance, Critical Interpretation, Cosmology of Appearance, and the Public Character of Image-Formation, and lastly 8. Imagination as Engagement: Art—Phenomenology of Engagement The Criticism of Images, Cosmology of Imagination as Art, and Responsibilities of Imagination.

The author in Preface of this book says: The aim here to construct new conceptions of thinking, and tries to answer the questions: In what sense is there a foundation for human experience/How can we even think about foundations for experience ? The first part of this volume addresses the question of foundations, explaining something of the philosophic work necessary to raise the question and presenting the thesis that thinking is founded in valuation, which first appears in imagination. The second part then develops a reconstructed conception of imagination. The author asserts that the development of a systematic philosophy as a post-modern cultural

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artifact is just right. The present book is self consciously historical in its attempt to position itself with the diverse modes of philosophy needed in the present.

The attempt has been made to criticize philosophers whose approaches are radically different in the hopes of establishing a wider community and to state positions in as vulnerable a way as possible.

The book is an interesting study and a great contribution to the field of philosophy. It is a scholarly contribution and literary piece of work. The author deserves our congratulations for systematically bringing before the readers his views regarding Reconstruction of Thinking. He has made the use of graphical presentations in this book which has made it systematic and thorough.

Birendra Prasad Mishra: *Ethics of the Hindus*, pp. 176 published by Mrs. Shyama Mishra, Dillibazar, Kathmandu, (1982) Price Rs. 52/—

The author of this book Dr. Birendra Prasad Mishra is Professor of Philosophy and Sanskrit an Chairman Instruction Committee, Tri-Chandra Multiple Campus in Kathmandu (Nepal). And is also Chairman of the Subject Committee of Philosophy Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, Tribhuvan University, Kathamandu. The present book of the author has grown out of the thesis which he submitted for his Pn D. Degree in Philosophy at the Patna University.

The author has to his credit various articles which were published both in India and in Nepal.

Dr. Mishra has done a good work in the field of Indian Ethics. We have very few books on the subject so far published. Indian ethics has contributed to a large extent to the Indian culture and its importance is being realised now even in the foreign countries. The Hindu ethical foundations are of permanent value and can be of great help to us in a reorientation of our individual and social life which can make people happier even today and enable the individual to attain all round development of his personality.

In this small and concise book Dr. Mishra humbly mentions in his preface that this book is an attempt to present before the readers a systematic and synthetic view of the Hindu ethics based primarily on the great epic, the Mahabharat The whole book has been divided into six chapters. I. The notion of Dharma. II. Social and individual Ethics. III. Political ethics. IV. The Problem of Fate and free will. V. The different standards of morality, and lastly Summary and conclusion, besides Introduction and Bibliography. In Introduction Dr. Mishra has discussed the importance of Mahabharata and its value for study giving quotations

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from great scholars who have acknowledged the Mahabharata as a great work of lasting importance.

Some quotations referred may prove of immense value in understanding this great Epic, the Mahabharata. Dr. Sukhthankar mentions the opinion of Joseph Dahlmann—' a treatise on jurisprudence (Dharmashastra). K. M Munshi says "The Mahabharata is not a mere epic, it is a whole literature in itself, containing a code of life, a philosophy of social and ethical relations and speculative thought on human problems; according to C. Rajgopalachari the epic has been influencing the character and civilization of the major poulation of the world; C. Y. Vaidya observes, "That the Mahabharata was made the vehicle of moral and religious instruction"; A.A.McDonell regards it as 'moral encyclopaedia; K. S. Ramaswami Sastri regards it as encyclopaedia of Indian culture; Monier Williams regards it as Encyclopaedia of ethics, philosophy and history, etc. The author has mentioned many opinions of scholars regarding the importance of the Mahabharata

The author says that the book aims at a critical study of the Hindu ethics in general and the ethical ideas in the Mahabharata in particular. Dharma is the central point of the Mahabharata. Dharma plays a vital role in the Hindu ethics and it has been very well discussed in chapter I and in other chapters Social and Individual ethics, Political ethics, the problem of fate and free will and the different standards of morality have been discussed. In the end quite exhaustive B bliography (Sources) has been provided which may be of immense value to new researchers in the field. The author has provided Transliteration chart and Abbreviations in the beginning which have added to the utility of the book.

The treatment in the book is simple and clear. It will be an important contribution of lasting value in the realm of ethics, for students as well as general readers.

Several mistakes have crept in the book which must thoroughly be examined and removed in the forthcoming editions.

Dr. Mishra deserves our thanks for bringing out such a nice treatise on Hindu ethics.

J. L. Shastri, (Editor) : *Brahmanda Purana* 5 Vols. Translated and Annotated by Ganesh Vasudeo Tagare, Ancient Indian Tradition and Mythology series Nos. 22-26 Price Rs. 75/— per Volume 1984.

Puranas contain Ancient Indian tradition and are of encyclopaedic nature These treat mainly five subjects, viz (1) Creation (2) Dissolution and Re-creation (3) Genealogies or Gods, parriachs and kings (4) Epochs of Manus and (5) History of ancient royal dynasties. Even in this Brahmanda Purana we find five-fold tract of the Puranas :

The present Purana is called Brahmanda Purana wherein Brahma is the chief interlocutor. Divided into four sections it throws light on the manifold facets of life f om creation to dissolution of the Universe

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The text of the Brahmanda Purana is divided into 3 parts : The preliminary (purva), the middle (madhya) and the concluding (uttara). The preliminary part consists of two sections, namely Prakriya and Anusanga. The former consists of 5 chapters, the latter contains 33 The chapter Nos. of the 2 sections run serially. The middle part consists of section 3 named Upodghata. The serial numbers of chapters in this section start afresh with the number 1 and ends with the number 74. The final part (Uttarabhaga). Consists of section 4 named Upsamhara consisting of 4 chapters begins with the fresh number.

The Volume No. 22 contains the Brahmanda Puranana Part I (chapters 1 38) Completing the first two sections (Prakriya and Anusanga) of the text in English Translation. This is one of the Volume in series on Ancient Indian Tradition and Mythology. This Purana is encyclopaedic in character. It deals with miscellaneous topics such as Cosmogony. Religion, Philosophy, History, Geography and Astronomy. It is called Brahmanda since it gives explanation of the real state of affairs about the Universe.

The Volume consists of two sections viz Prakriya and Anusanga. The first Section I Prakriya Consists of five chapters and the Section II Anusanga consists of 33 chapters. Quite exhaustive Introduction is given in the beginning Consisting of ten Parts— I The title of Brahmanda II Text criticism : Materials III The Brahmanda as a Maha-Purana, IV Religious Sects in the Brahmanda Purana—Saivism, Vaisnavism — Saktism — The Sun worship-An obscure cult — Godharma — Non Vedic Religions, V Dharma Sastra — Ancient Lores — The Science of Music, VI Religion and Philosophy in the Brahmanda Purana : Vedanta,— Samkhya — Yoga — Bhakti Tantra VII — The Parasuram Legend, VIII Historical Tradition in the Brahmanda Purana, IX The date of the Brahmanda Purana and X Appendix to the date of the Brahmanda Purana.

Volume No. 23 in the Series contains the Brahmanda Purana Part II (chapters 1 43) of the third section Upodghatapada of the text in English Translation Volume No. 24 contains the Brahmanda Purana, Part III (chapters 44 74) of the third section Upodghatapada, of the text. Volume No. 25 contains the Brahmanda Purana Part IV Comprising chapters 1 4 of the fourth section. Upasamhara and 5-30 of Lalita Episode) and in Vol. No. 25 Part V (chapters 31-44 of the Lalita episode) in English Translation.

The aim of this Series is to universalize knowledge of Ancient Indian Tradition and Mythology through English. Old Sanskrit text has been rendered into English as precisely as possible. The translation is based on the standard edition of the Venkateshvara Press.

The text is verywell edited. The learned translator has added ample materials in the footnotes which facilitate correct interpretation of the text.

Motilal Banarsidass deserves our most heartfelt congratulations for bringing out this very important Purana and introducing Ancient Indian Tradition and Mythology to English knowing people. They deserve praise for doing a great service to the cause of Indian Culture and Philosophy. We hope they will be doing much more service by publishing more and more unexplored literary and cultural works of Indian Tradition.

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I

Beyond Faith : A New Epistemological Certainty

David K. Burke

It is often assumed that we cannot be certain about the existence of God in the same way that we can be certain, for example, about whether or not it is raining outside. We can see and feel the rain, but not God. We usually speak about our *faith* or *belief* in God, as contrasted with our certainty regarding matters of immediate sense experience. This kind of certainty represents one of the highest certainties available to man. It cannot be shaken by mental doubts; it is virtually incontrovertible. A great philosopher can come up with numerous arguments demonstrating why we can never be certain whether it is raining outside, but after he has expressed his views, his wife will ask him if it is raining and he will look out the window and, without a moment's hesitation, say : "Yes, dear. We had better get our umbrellas."

In this paper, I wish to discuss a situation which offers the same certainty in religious matters as we can have in questions regarding the weather; in other words, a situation where the same criteria of certainty have been met, the same kinds of rules of evidence satisfied. The situation occurs in the presence of certain spiritual Masters, known in Eastern philosophy as Illumined or God-realized, who have the ability to *show* us God through having become one with Him. These Masters are able through their meditation to completely lose themselves in contemplation of God, so that they actually merge with the Divine. When this occurs, the opaqueness of the human personality turns transparent, and the spiritual Master becomes like a clear window through which one can see the face of God. He becomes a channel through which the Divine expresses itself, a focus of divinity where the Divine becomes concentrated and palpable.

Paper Contributed to the XV World Congress of Philosophy at Varna (Bulgaria).

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Depending on various factors, a person observing this — even if he is not intellectually or consciously aware of what is transpiring— will undergo certain religious experiences which have an immediacy, incontrovertibility and corroborability quite similar to sense experience. And these experiences lead to a religious certainty of at least equal value to the certainty that comes from sense experience. In my discussion, I shall use as an example the case of one particular spiritual Master with whom I am personally familiar: A Bengali spiritual Master who is the spiritual head of some 40 spiritual centers around the world and spiritual director of the United Nations Meditation Group in New York. His name is Sri Chinmoy.

Let us return for a moment to our analogy of the rain. You ask me if it is raining outside. I look out the window and see the rain coming down. I step outside and feel the rain striking my body. "Yes," I say. "It is raining outside." "Are you certain ?" you ask. "Yes," I reply. "Come see for yourself if you need any more proof." Further corroborative evidence is also available, though it is hardly necessary. I see people walking around with umbrellas. Someone else in my house makes some remark about the rain. Perhaps my lumbago starts acting up.

In order to determine whether it is raining, I must possess a certain kind of receptivity to sense experience. If I lack the capacity to see the rain or feel its wetness, I can hardly be certain that it is raining, hear-say evidenee notwithstanding. In fact, I would not even know what rain is, except in the most intellectual and abstract sense. This capacity or receptivity, which is a prerequisite of sense experience, I shall refer to with the generic term: *outer vision*.

A more appropriate analogy can be found in the case of music, which represents a more complex sense experience than the situation with the rain. In order to have a musical experience, I must possess a discriminating ear that perceives the difference between various tones, pitches, etc. But I must also have the capacity to hear that quality of tone and sequence of sounds in a work of music that makes it more than a random collection of noises, the thing that makes it, in fact, a work of art. And this capacity requires something more of me than mere outer vision does. Also, it is worth noting that this capacity is not constant; sometimes it does not function. On some days I may not be in the mood to sit through a symphony, or I may have other matters on my mind, and I find that I am just unable to *listen*. My ears hear the notes, but I am not really listening or absorbing anything.

A similar kind of capacity or receptivity, which I shall refer to as *inner vision*, is a prerequisite for religious experience. There is nothing mysterious about this inner capacity. It is quite normal and natural, and everyone has it to some extent. Some people are born

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with a greater inner receptivity than others, and from a very young age are very sensitive to religious experience. In many people, however, this inner vision remains undeveloped, largely because our culture does not encourage its use, and they are not open to religious experience. These cases obviously fall beyond the scope of my topic. Sufficient numbers do possess this inner sensitivity, however, and are sufficiently aware of it, to permit an intelligent discussion of it.

When Sri Chinmoy begins to meditate, we can notice with our outer vision certain physical changes in his expression. His eyes will flick back and forth very rapidly, or roll back and disappear behind his eyelids. His facial muscles may tighten or relax. But he will not speak nor make any other bodily movements. This is the extent of our experience with the outer vision.

With the inner vision, however, we get a most remarkable and virtually indescribable religious experience, that can be conveyed in only the most sketchy fashion. There is an awareness that the spiritual Master is actually seeing God and talking to Him face to face. There is the realization that the Master's focus of attention is somewhere out in the universe, far beyond this small planet of ours. There is the realization that the Master has completely given over his body to the Divine, which now flows through him and possesses him. This experience is often accompanied by a great, almost uncontainable joy; some people are moved to tears. There are sometimes related experiences, such as feeling one's head expanding with light, or seeing a bright aura emanating from the Master.

All these factors, and infinitely more, converge into a single experience, beyond words, which has an almost overwhelming immediacy and incontrovertibility. This experience makes one feel that one has actually been in the Living Presence of God, or seen God through the spiritual Master's eyes, and leaves one absolutely certain that God exists. This certainty transcends mere faith or belief; it even goes beyond the certainty of sense experience. It is more the kind of certainty that one has regarding his own existence. If I may use the term, it is the soul's certainty.

If someone asks *how* we can be certain, we can only point and say : "See for yourself." Of course not everyone sees this to the same extent. But a great many people will have sufficient receptivity to this kind of experience to at least see and feel that something remarkable is occurring.

It would be a serious mistake to dismiss this whole experience as a subjective fantasy, or figment of the imagination. Just as any normal person is able to distinguish real rain from imaginary rain, and differentiate between rain and something like snow or sand, so also can a person discriminate between an authentic religious experience and a false or imagined one, which does not stem from any

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spiritual source. One can tell the difference by the very quality of the experience, by its fabric and texture. Though the vocabulary and conceptual framework necessary to *express* such distinctions is still largely undeveloped, the ability to *perceive* such distinctions is not at all unusual and certainly not abnormal. Once one has experienced the Divine, he is not easily confused by an imitation.

Furthermore, this experience can be corroborated by the experience of others. A wide variety of people of all ages, backgrounds and walks of life—people who are considered by others to be mature, socially adjusted and psychologically stable—undergo similar experiences when encountering Sri Chinmoy during a meditation. Many of them have advanced academic degrees, some in the Physical Sciences. Also, the experience is not an isolated occurrence; it is repeated on subsequent encounters with Sri Chinmoy, which further attests to its authenticity.

But perhaps the most striking corroborative evidence can be found in the after-effects. As a result of their experience with Sri Chinmoy, people often find themselves permanently affected, not only with respect to their attitude toward God, but in more subtle ways. Their nature seems somehow changed; they begin acting differently. As their encounters with the spiritual Master are repeated, these changes become more pronounced. Gradually, almost imperceptibly, their relations with others begin to soften at the edges. Where they were once selfish or tight-fisted, now they are open and giving. Where they were once quick to anger, now anger is nowhere to be found. It is as though the bulwark of the personality suddenly becomes fluid, and attitudes hardened over the course of years begin to melt. These changes come naturally, without say conscious effort or struggle, and prove lasting.

In this paper, I have discussed a mode of religious experience which is becoming increasingly common in the United States and elsewhere in the world today. It is a subject, I feel, which has enormous epistemological and metaphysical implications. This is only a brief introduction. I hope I have pointed to areas for further philosophic study and brought to the level of philosophic discourse a subject that normally remains outside the range of intellectual inquiry.

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II

Philosophy Today in Cuba

Dale Riepe

INTRODUCTION : SOME BACKGROUND NOTES

The real motive behind the Monroe Doctrine was to "save" Cuba from Great Britain. not to defend Latin America against the Holy Alliance of Spain, France, and Austria. There was another motive as we shall soon see. Such was the conjecture of Waldo Frank in *America Hispana* [1] Frank appeared on the American scene during what Van Wyck Brooks called *The Confidant Years*[2] when O'Neill, Sherwood Anderson and Ben Hecht dominated the intellectual scene. Frank, with James Oppenheim and Louis Untermeyer, founded *The Seven Arts* a forum for the then latest opinion in writing and politics. He was the target of Argentine fascists and was literally attacked by strike breakers in Kentucky. Brooks in his autobiography calls him "...the most courageous of men."[3]

Frank was unique among critics and novelists of his day. Who else paid any attention to Latin America when somebody talked about "America" ? He knew Spain and wrote about it and the relationship between Spanish culture and Latin America.[4]

Frank knew that while vacuity abounded in North America, there was a rich renewal in Soviet Russia. He complained because his fellow writers had no philosophy, agreeing with the French critic who said that only in the United States are the novelists not intellectuals. Too many North American writers were pleased to be indifferent to the issues of the day. Yet he appreciated the ceaseless activity of his countrymen even if he approved more that Latin Americans did not accept mere well being as the highest value.

1 (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1931), p. 268.
2 (New York: Dutton, 1932).
3 *Days of the Phoenix* (New York: Dutton, 1957), p. 23.
4 *Virgin Spain* (New York : Boni & Liveright, 1926).

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Frank believed that canny North American politicians once having saved Cuba from Great Britain during the President Monroe days believed that Cuba "of its own free will" might elect to join the Union as Texas did a few years after the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine.[5]

North Americans cheered on the Cubans against the Spanish. Jose Marti, unfortunately, was killed by a wandering bullet a month after he landed from a rowboat in 1895 to complete the revolution against Spain. He stepped off at Oriente, Oriente which would again be made famous sixty years later by Fidel Castro who from there led the second great Cuban revolution against an imperial power.

Following independence from Spain, Cuba once again found itself under the imperialist heel. The United States Congress served up the Platt Amendment with which the Cubans had to conjure for the next sixty-five years because it served USA Manifest Destiny. The Platt Amendment was made up of provisions sponsored by Senator Orville H. Platt, but drawn up by Secretary Elihu Root, a master of inadvertent dialectics. Provisions of the Amendment included that Cuba would not enter into any treaty with any foreign power impairing its independence, that public debt could not be contracted beyond the power to pay, that the United States was authorized to preserve Cuban independence, and that Cuba agreed to sell or lease to the USA land needed for a naval station. From a logical and semantical point of view the Amendment was perfect as an example of paradox since part one and three enjoined precisely what was said could not be done. By the provision of the Amendment Cuba *did* violate the first condition that it would not enter into any treaty with a foreign power (the foreign power being the USA). And yet this provision itself was contradicted by the treaty that specified it. This is an instance of Russell's paradox. The same is true of the third provision by which the USA would intervene to preserve Cuban independence. The paradox here consisted in the United States intervening against itself so that it would be removed as an impediment to Cuban independence.[6]

Within twenty years, the United States had acted so as to turn Cuba into another Barbados or Jamaica. An army of occupation came

5 From Vero Beach, Florida comes a recent report that Senator Barry Goldwater stated before an audience of 300 retired Republicans that it was a "big mistake" when former President John F. Kennedy "called off" the 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion and gave up a chance to over Cuba. *Buffalo Evening News* (15 March 1983). Goldwater could not admit that the counter revolutionary force was defeated, not called off.

6 *Encyclopedia of American History*, ed. Richard B. Morris (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), p. 293.

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in order to make Cuba liveable for North American capitalists, their henchmen, their compradors and their dependable local servants. There were three immediate ends in view : successful growing of sugar and tobacco and a growing market for North American goods. Tens of thousands of blacks from Haiti and Jamica were brought in to Cuba (as well as some Chinese) to cut the increasingly North American-owned cane. Forty per cent of the arable land within a short time was directly owned by North American capitalists and most of the rest was under North American banks. Thus was accomplished the virtual enslavement of the Cuban people who according to the Platt Amendment were to be free. A Capital building at the Prado was constructed to look like the Capitol in Washington. And philosophy was introduced to bring the "strenuous life of adaptation" to the Cubans who had been fed on scholasticism and Spanish romanticism combined with the positivism of Comte and his successors.

PHILOSOPHY UNDER YANQUI RULE

What was philosophy like under the Yanqui rule in Cuba? North American philosophers such as William James and John Dewey were invoked. Pragmatism became a kind of unofficial philosophy, not surprisingly as a successor of positivism. The residue of positivism provided by Enrique Jose Varona y Pera (1849-1853) who had apologized for being under necessity of attacking scholasticism[7], and Jose Luz y Caballero (1800-1862) whose chair ia philosophy Varona took. Jose Antonio Saco y Lopez (1797-1879) was a philosopher active in the "respected Economic Society." He wrote a history of clavery and desired its abolition, although like Thomas Jefferson, he himself owned slaves. His conservative tendencies are indicated by his proposing co operation with Spain so that Cuba would not be annexed by the United States. As William Rex Crawfold comments : "Such reasonableness, in 1848 or any other year is not calculated to rouse the wild enthusiasm of Latin Americans."[8]

The brains of Cuban positivism was Varona who became Vice-President of the Cuban Republic and in his last years watched from his library in Havana the degradation of Cuba by American hustlers, lumpers and jobbers. Varona admired much of Comtism. agreeing that metaphysics should be relegated to a lower cultural and evolutionary stage near theology. It was to be replaced in the nineteenth century by science. Latin America, on his view had suffered sufficiently from theology and the literary view of life in imitation of Madrid. He himself became a disillusioned pacifist and nihilist after the first World War trading positivist neo-Kantian technical philosophy for admiration of Montaigne and Anatole

7 William Rex Crawford, *A Century of Latin-American Thought*, rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1966), p 218.
8 *Ibid*, p. 220.

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France seemingly unaware of the latter's conversion to communism. Other influence on Varona were Spencer, Ward, Giddings, Tarde and Durkheim. Of interest with respect to the last three was their involvement in "imitation theory" transported from Plato to sociology Under this notion, the individual imitates himself and thus sets up concentric pools of social behavior. Tarde initiated this view with Giddings who joined him against Durkheim. Since the initial furor some accommodation occurred between the followers of Tarde and Durkheim.

Jose Enrique Rodo (1872-1917), the idealist philosopher of Montevideo said of Varona that "You might be the Prospero of my book[9], but certainly there is a more Dionysian concern in Varona than in the Apollonian hero of Rodo. Beyond that, where Rodo worried about the crass utilitarianism of North America, Varona was an anti-imperialist. He also opposed the emphasis upon speculative philosophy that ruled the University of Havana at the time. Again, he was the associate of Julio Antonio Mella, who founded the first communist party (Partido Socialista Popular) of Cuba. To manifest that speculation scarcely need accompany high ideals, Raul Roa, an outstanding student leader influenced by Mella said in his book *Bufa Subersiva* that :

> ...from 1928 until September 30, 1930... the university became shamelessly linked to the establishment military overseers in the classrooms, and the Patio de los Laureles' glorious history besmirched by insolent army brass."*

Varona's association with Mella is certainly one of the reasons he has been promoted with Sartre and A. J. Ayer (*Logical Positivism*) to the magic circle of non-Marxist philosophers in the 1960's to be published and encouraged to be read among philosophical classes.[10] The subjective-idealism, indeed Berkeleyism of Ayer, appeared to be overlooked as if Bogdanov's having known Plekhanov could keep Lenin from attacking him.

Of importance to Cuban philosophy is the person of Jose Marti (1853-1895), who, although s rictly no philosopher began his radical career early. At seventeen he was put in military prison and then exiled to Spain. On shipboard he pointed his finger at "the butcher" who was the director of the prison Marti had just left, and execrated his treatment of prisoners. His tract, the "Political Prison in Cuba"

9 *La vida nueva*, Vol. I: Aaiel (Montevideo, 1900). Prospero, the master, is named after the Duke in Shakespeare's *Tempest*. Rising above sensuality and irrationality, Prospero embodies disinterested action: culture, intelligence and spirituality for Rodo.

* Crawford, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

10 Donald Clark Hodges, "Philosophy in the Cuban Revolution," *Marxism, Revolution and Peace*, ed. Howard L. Parsons and John Somerville (Amsterdam: Gruner, 1977), p. 14.

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won him instant fame in Spain where he found sympathy for the cause of liberty. At the universities of Madrid and Zaragoza he demonstrated his "distinguished" gift or oratory after only three years of *liceo* training. There is reason to believe that Fidel Castro has long identified with Marti with respect to oratory and radicalism.

Four years after leaving Cuba, Marti returned. But before stepping once more on his native land, he became a teacher in Guatamala which he reached via Paris, New York City and Mexico.

Resuming his life of agitation, he was again deported to Spain nine years after he arrived there the first time. From Spain he traveled to New York City where he lived a month and then moved to Caracas where he taught French language and French literature. After a fiery interview with the tyrant of Venezuela, Guzman Blanco, Marti found it prudent to leave the country and go back to New York City. Not long afterwards, on January 29, 1895, he gave the signal for the uprising in Cuba, but died when a stray bullet fatally struck him at Oriente.

What he fought for was freedom for Cuba and a better America, and America where Latins learned from the Northerners and where the Northerners learned from the Latins. Together they could avoid the idleness and futility he found in Europe. No intellectual systematizer, Marti nevertheless had certain basic economic ideas suited to the new life he anticipated. What was needed, he said, was the division of land, education of the Indian, opening up of communication, dropping of useless literary education and replacing it by scientific training. He read Marx, Darwin, Spencer and Henry George. He never fully understood Marxism, remaining an eclectic with a passion for the independence movement from the ideas of the French Revolution to social democracy which meant above all, political freedom, economic opportunity and what he believed was the end of exploitation. With Simon Bolivar he is a major Latin American expression of bourgeois national independence movements. Fidel Castro invoked the spirit of Marti in citing Marti's sensitivity to subjective factors when he stated in the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba that "Cuba...has the most powerful weapon in the morality, the ideological firmness and soundness of the people's revolutionary conscience." These even worked in gaining North American acquiescence in the revolution.[11]

11 Richard Nixon states in his *Memoirs* (1978): "Most of the State Department's Latin American experts advocated immediate recognition of Castro's government. But Allen Dulles and others in the CIA and NSC felt that we should delay.. was he an unwitting front man for the Communists, or perhaps even a Communist himself ?" Dulles and the NSC should receive credit for saving Fidel an unnecessary step through the political phase of bourgeois independence.

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Professor Jorge Garcia Gallo, formerly head of the philosophy department at the University of Havana after it was first reorganized subsequent to the revolution of 1958 to 1961, has treated Cuban education under the Yanqui from 1900 in his paper "Education in Cuba", read at the Cuban-North American International Philosophers Conference of 1982.

Part of the deplorable consequences of North American intermeddling in Cuban education Gallo noted, was the weighty emphasis put upon the philosophy of William James and John Dewey with the usual muddleheaded effects. I shall always remember the comment made to me by Professor Paul Henle at the University of Michigan (where Dewey first propagated his philosophy). He said that William James never produced a student who was a first-rate philosopher, thus indicting several of his own teachers. Of James' ethics and his philosophy of self-adaptation, Van Wyck Brooks exclaimed, "He was unable to create values because he never transcended his environment; and his failure to do so is perhaps typical of the failures of all those other men who might have deepened and strengthened the character of our society."[12]

Paul Crosser in his *Nihilism of John Dewey* demonstrated why the study of Dewey had led to confusions that continue to haunt North American education. His most serious imputation concerned Dewey's blurring of the relationship of subject and object and hence truth and validity so commonly beclouded by positivists and other subjectivists, (such as the Unity of Science group).

During the so-called golden years of education under the encouragement of American imperialism, between 8,000 and 35,000 teachers were unemployed in Cuba. In the schools were taught religion, militarism, the American English language, and the American Way of Life. Latifundism was taught as the proper ideology. Throughout the education system was shameless moral and intellectual degradation. Classrooms were bought and sold under the Batista Gauleitership with money openly stolen from educational funds and the schools the center of political malpractice and corruption according to Gallo in his "Education in Cuba." Subjects were taught and chosen by formalists who openly prevented the use of scientific material to impinge on the general scholasticism

Under Batista there were no stated objectives of education, a huge drop-out rate and a shocking absence of promotions. Children of workers and the workers themselves were neglected. Education among the peasants was almost non existent. Literacy was less than fifty per cent.[13]

12 See Van Wyck Brooks, *The Early Years 1908-1921* (New York: Harper, 1968), p. 238.

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The imported ideology of North America was cosmopolitanism. It condoned repudiation of patriotic sentiments and national culture and tradition in the name of the unity of mankind, whose effect was to extirpate proletarian internationalism. There was a linkage between educational methods and the University of Michigan through Item Four. Part of the spinoff of cosmopolitanism, combined with Yanqui greed were 270 overcrowded brothels, dozens of hotels and motels renting rooms by the hour and 700 bars with *meseras* or hostesses, some of whom should have been in school. This was their first step towards prostitution. The employer and the government each got $ 52.00 per day while the girls got $ 2 25 from the bar. As for the omnipresent gambling in Havana it was not convenient for anyone to keep records. There were, for example tens of thousands of slot machines throughout Cuba.

Three years after the Cuban Revolution, the literacy had risen from 49% to 97% through the self-sacrifice of 105 thousand Teachers who spread over the whole island by techniques which have been subsequently adopted by Nicaragua.

The so-called invasion of Nicaragua by 500 Cuban troops shrilly announced by Alexander Haig as Secretary of State under Reagan were teachers for the literacy program flown into Nicaragua, according to Commandante Jose R. Fernandez at our dinner (19 May 1982) at LaBodeguita del Medio, Hermingway's favorite eating spot in Havana. Dr. Fernandez. Vice President of the Council and Minister of Education, the most impressive soldier I have met since visiting the Rajputana Rifles on review in New Delhi in 1951. stands six feet seven inches with a jaw like a battering ram and arms as long and wiry as those of an upland gorilla. He was the leader of the defending army who stopped the two thousand counter-revolutionary invaders sent to the Bay of Pigs by John F. Kennedy. He was assisted by volunteers, he said that evening, from seventeen countries, a glorious week in the annals of anti-imperialist defense.

In the Museum of the Literacy Campaign (Museo de la Alfabetizacion) in recording the 707 thousand children and adults who were taught to read and write in 1961, we read where "...thousands of young volunteers, some trained teachers and others not owning even an intermediate education, many only 11 or 12 years old...set forth into the mountains, and braved swamps, drowning, disease, accident and murder to carry out the call of the Revolution, as Howard Parsons has recorded.[14] One letter of thanks that I read standing in

13 "Education in Cuba", unpublished paper from the Cuban North American International Philosophy Conference 1982. This paper with the others presented are being readied for publication by Edward D'Angelo of the University of Bridgeport.

14 Parsons, "Socialist Cuba—Bright Hope of Human Betterment," *New World Review* (Jan-Feb 1983), pp. 13-14.

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the museum was "They never cared about us. But now they care and we are learning to read and write at home in our spare time".

There is no private school system in Cuba. When we remember the divisiveness encouraged by loose talk against evolution, against serious economic science, against any serious inquiring philosophy in large sections of the United States private school system, we reflect upon several major advantages of depluralization for education. Transfers can be made between any two schools without disruption of studies since from elementary to junior high to senior high curricula are comparable with the use of the same textbooks. In polytechnical schools, breadth of skill is emphasized (following Marx's humanism) to avoid dead ends and worker obsolescence so common under corporate capitalism.

THE REVOLUTIONIZED PHILOSOPHICAL PROGRAM IN CUBA

Optimists might believe that without a CIA or National Security Council, the United States and Cuba would today be trading as friends, would have saved millions of dollars and have avoided the Bay of Pigs and a Missile Crisis that nearly ended the world.[15] As Richard Nixon states in his *Memoirs* (1978) :

> "Most of the State Department's Latin American experts advocated immediate recognition of Castro's government. But Allen Dulles and others in the CIA and NSC felt that we should delay...was he an unwitting front man for the Communists, or perhaps even a Communist himself ?"

He was not, but after the hostility evoked by these undiplomatic manglers, he became one, skipping altogether the political phase of bourgeois independence and enabling Cuba to take immediate socialist steps up the pyramid towards communism.

After the self removal of the sulky North Americans from 1959-1961, Cubans began their revolutionized philosophical program in 1962. All but one of the philosophers at the University of Havana fled in 1962 bringing about an inadvertent housecleaning. The new philosophy department was organized within the Faculty of Humanities. Its rationale, according to Donald Clark Hodges (1923—) was to begin with philosophy but to end up with a particular science."[16] Bringing about the transformation was no snap since philosophy

15 The most cogent, widely publicized and fully-documented account of the role of the Kennedy brothers and others in the Cuban Missile Crisis has been written by John Somerville, Emeritus professor of philosophy at City University of New York. A shorten ed account appeared under the title : "We Almost Ended the World in 1962" (*Chicago Tribune*, June 25, 1980). Other references to it have appeared recently in *The Churchman, Mainichi, Los Angeles Times*

16 Hodges, *op. cit.*, pp. 11 12.

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was growing to a profession of several hundred teachers including those in five universities and in Higher School of the Communis Party of Cuba. Some training in traditional historical philosophy was soon re-instituted but not to the extent Hodges claims that would be acceptable or mandatory in say, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic or the USSR. There was a mood in Cuba after the Revolution that considered the ingratiating and sedentary philosophy common among North Americans with table d'hote offerings of everything from pastoral existentialism to seminars in Wittgensteinian oracles as "cost-ineffective," to adopt the phrase of Hodges. As the Cubans never fully accepted a Spanish or North American model in philosophy, so it appeared to avoid a German or Soviet model as well.

The philosophers were busy in Cuba. From 1975 to 1910, 81, 324 Communist Party members and candidates took courses in Marxism Leninism 16,034 of them were graduated from the basic courses in the provincial Party schools while 65,290 were graduated from the Political and Ideological Advancement Schools according to the Main Report of the Second Congress.[17]

Philosophy in Cuba was somewhat of a luxury on the view of Hodges. Its practitioners must be supported by the people in the countryside with what appeared to be negligible returns. Certainly the pre scientific, pseudo scientific or metascientific philosophy outside the realm of Marxism appeared to the Cubans to be "frequently fatuous, effete, or of interest chiefly to antiquarians."[18] Cuba still cannot afford, twenty years after Hodges' first report. to be a clearing house for the Caribbean or Latin America as the Soviet Union has been for budding European socialism. Even so, Cuba has played a conspicuous role in helping to ideologically educate its less developed neighbors. In Cuba the usual fare prescribed at North American universities from neo-Kantian epistemology to various religiously-oriented courses under philosophical titles. have been abandoned Never-the-less, logic and philosophy of science were considered worthy of a serious place in the curriculum from the early 1960's. The logic pursued, however, is not confined to symbolic logic/mathematical logic of the Anglo North American tradition of the twentieth century, but includes dialectical logic of the Lenin Ilyenkov variety since a number of the teachers, especially in Havana. have been training in the Soviet Union.[19] A major difference in Cuba today compared to the early period that Hodges was

17 *Of the 2nd Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba* (Havanna : Political Publishers, 1980), p. 76.

18 Hodges, *op cit* . p 11.

19 E V. Ilyenkov was a member of the Institute of Philosophy when he died in the early 1970's. Best known of his works outside the

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writing about in the sixties, is that today there are a number of Cuban philosophers who have trained or who are training in Soviet universities. This will have the effect of making them less uneasy with the Hegelianism that Hodges found objectionable and perhaps caused him to express a certain sympathy for the long-ingrained positivist spirit he found congenital in Cuba. Certainly, positivism may have a liberating effect on feudal ideology and institutions much as does skepticism of the Humian variety. Its subsequent development into logic without ontology gives it potency for such broths as Karl Popper's.

The heart of the Cuban philosophical curriculum at the University of Havana, the country's standard-bearer in educational policy, is represented by Professor Dr. Gaspar Jorge Garcia Gallo's *Elementos de Filosfia Marxista* (Havana, Gente Nueva, 1978) Its subject matter is divided into three parts : Ideology, Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism, Under Ideology the main subdivisions are Conception, Judgment, Reasoning (deduction and induction), Hypothesis, Law and Science, and the Historical Formations of the Concept and Illusions of Ideology.

Under the "illusions of ideology" fall myth and magic. Divisions under myth and magic are the development of religion, the rise of consciousness and corresponding ideologies and the rise of social consciousness. He treats of these with greater detail and historical examples in his *Filosofia Ciencia e Ideologia*.[20]

Thereupon follow discussions of judgment and reality and the judgment of value.

The next subheading is the Ideology of Class Struggle succeeded by the Elements of Cognitive Development and Forms of Social Consciousness.

A slight change of emphasis now appears in that Gallo raises questions concerning the position of communists with respect to religion and law, followed by a brief account of the rise of bourgeois ideology and proletarian ideology.

(In his later book, Gallo produces a chart opposite page 34 which gives a brief account of the differences in ways of looking at

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USSR is his *Dialectical Logic*, tr. H. Campbell Creighton (Moscow: Progress, 1977). The American modal logician, William Tuthill Parry, first managing editor of *Science and Society*, has the highest opinion of his work. Besides philosophy, political economy, social psychology and management are taught at the national party school. See Jorge I. Dominguez, *Cuba, Order and Revolution* (Cambridge Belknap, 1978), p 337.

20 (Como la Filosofia se Hace Ciencia con el Marxismo); (Habana: Cientifico-Tecnica, 1980).

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philosophy, including those of Xavier Zubiri,[21] Julian Marias,[22] of the Madrid School of Philosophy founded by Ortega y Gasset. Sartre, Gramsci, Rosental and Iudin, editors of the short *Soviet Dictionary of Philosophy*) were also listed.

What is materialism and what is dialectics are next raised. Discussed under these are the "Three Faces of Science". Marxism is seen as both science and ideology.

Dialectical Materialism is the concern of the next section. Discussed are matter, motion, space, time, soul and spirit. Laws, the principle laws of dialectics (quantity-quality, struggle and unity of opposites, negation of negation) are examined. The question is raised as to how knowledge of these laws creates confidence and security in social life. (Such considerations help socialist intellectuals keep a cool head when being provoked by envenomed bourgeois intellectuals)

Gallo's third and last section deals with Historical Materialism. What is the basis of Social life ? he asks. Here follows a discussion of the forces and relations of production. Then comes an account of the mechanics and dialectics of social revolution including the base and superstructure of society. The nature of social classes and the class struggle lead him into the conception of social revolution in connection with the state. Social being and social conscience present an interlude because of the example from contemporary Cuban life. It is centered in the case of a medical doctor who cannot tolerate the revolution. The doctor, because of bourgeois hypersensitivity to his own comfort and hyposensitivity to that of the working class, frets about the loss of his "jaiboles" sipped of an evening with his important political and banker friends in his exclusive club. He wishes to flee to the luxury of Miami and Palm Beach where the building code allows only four-story condominia. This tale is followed by a discussion of the role of personality for the individual and the role of personality for the masses.

For Cuban students, Gallo's account of the fundamentals of Marxist philosophy is more acceptable than the first Russian manual translated into Spanish written by Fedor Vasil' evich Konstantinov (1901—)[23] which was first used in Cuba in the 1960's. Hodges claims that :

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21 Member of the Madrid School of Philosophy, who believed that more emphasis should be put on Nothingness than on Existence

22 With Ortega and Marias philosophy is a mode of life. Perhaps a line from the *Shijing* (Book of Songs) brings this out : "The treading step of the unicorn responds to the cry of the osprey. "See Feng You lan, *Reflections on the Past* Forty Years ed. and trans. William A. Wycoff, *Chinese Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. XIII, No. 2-3 (Winter Spring 1981 82), p. 148

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> ...under the influence of the oldest and strongest tradition of philosophical positivism in Latin America the Cubans were quick to embark on a course of semantic demystification and deHegelianization of contemporary Soviet interpretation of dialectical materialism and the dialectical method.[24]

Of course to credit positivism with demystification as contrasted with any form of Marxism may be grotesque vilification. The positivist categories of "freedom" alone could take mythologizing precedence over the rapt dialectical effusions of the *Economic MSS.*

I myself, who am writing nearly twenty years after Hodges, got no impression of any positivist influence upon the present Cuban philosophers with whom I talked or whose papers I heard at the Cuban-North American International Philosophy Conference of 1982. Perhaps the positivism slipped out in informal discourse with Hodges in the 1960's. When I reread the papers there was nothing that struck me as incipient or residual positvisim. Perhaps I was attuned only to the most recent Viennese-American varieties of it. Never did I hear a reference to Comte, Mill, Spencer, Ayer, Naurath, Carnap, Schlick, Wittgenstein, Reichenbach or Popper (who has become a Neo Platonist). My brief encounter was with Cubans a generation later than the one Hodges writes about so who knows what changes have taken place with respect to positivism or how much Soviet and other tutelage has sharpened the Cuban view respecting positivism.[25]

Hodges criticized the *Lectures* of the 1960's at the University of Havana as they dealt with historical materialism. Although the

> ...Cuban revolution within Marxist philosophy has succeeded in making the concept of philosophy cover not only abstract unity of theory and practice, but also the Marxist and Leninist science of history making...[i]t had not...altogether succeeded in this enterprise.[26]

Where the Cuban philosophers fell short, Hodges thought, is in not dealing with the Marxist critique of the labor theory of value and Marx's theory of capitalist accumulation. This is to say that they showed the *method* of historical materialism but not the *theoretical development* of historical materialism.

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23 Editor in chief of *Voprosy filosofii*, Director of the Institute of Philosophy, editor in chief of the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, President of the Philosophical Society of the USSR (1971—). His major fields of research are social development, socio economic formations and the role of progressive ideas and revisionism.

24 Hodges, *op cit.*, p. 14

25 Professor Gary Hasick, political science professor in Latin American Studies at the State University of New York at Buffalo agrees with Hodges' assessment concerning positivism. *Conversation*, 14 March 1983, Buffalo, New York.

26 Hodges, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

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Hodges noted with respect to *Pansamiento Critico*, the leading Cuban philosophical journal, published by the philosophy department of the University of Havana (then under the direction of Fernando Martinez). that...it shows traces of Althusser's interpretation of philosophy as a scientific critique of ideologies, particularly non-philosophical ones.[27] Articles in this journal are not confined to arcane philosophical discussions but include economics (which can of course be just as arcane) and the other social sciences generally, because "...social theory in Cuba is closely tied to revolutionary." Hodges noted. Serious emphasis upon revolutionary practice was not only true of *Pensamiento Critico* and other scholarly publications across a wide spectrum. It fit also the characterization of the Cuban political style according to Richard R. Fagen. This includes "Pragmatism, flexibility, and adaptability; the search for a politics of unity and harmony;...the search for appropriate political forms;...and human transformation and the search for productivity."[28] Is it possible that some of these could be mistaken for positivism ?

The three systematic seminars for undergraduates taught by the members of the philosophy department at the University of Havana in the 1960's were as follows :

(1) the works of Marx and Engels with a background in Hegel and Feuerbach (Gallo treats this in his chapter in *Science and Ideology* entitled "The Roots of Marxist Gnoseology." Gnoseology includes not only the Anglo-American conception of epistemology but also "wisdom" and "psychological factors").

(2) major European Marxists from Engels up to and including Lenin (especially Plekhanov and Luxemburg).

(3) contributions of Marxist philosophers since Lenin with emphasis upon Gramsci and Althusser. Hodges lists among the Althusser school, Maurice Godelier's *Rationality and Irrationality in Economics* [By "rational" Godelier means "efficient" and "just". We remember that Althusser published an interview conducted by Maria Antonietta Macciocchi entitled "Philosophy as a Revolutionary Weapon" (1968)] and Regis Debray's *Revolution within the Revolution*. One of the contributions of Gramsci to the understanding of Marxism was to point out that philosophical and scientific idioms of the present can be "translated" into the past in an organic manner by means of Marxism. More important is the idea that "Philosophy must become politics to be true, to continue to be philosophy : 'tranquil theory' must be 'executed practically', must become 'effective reality'. Although these recent foreign Marxists were studied at

27 *Ibid.*

28 Fagen, "Continuities in Cuban Revolutionary Politics," *Monthly Review*, Vol. 23, No. 11 (April 1972), p. 25.

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Havana, the work of Jose Carlos Mariategui (1895 1930)[29] was not, for instance, his *Seven Interpretative Essays on Pueruvian Reality* (1928).

On the view of William Appleman Williams, "[t]he [North] American propensity to externalize evil is at least as well known as any known to history."[30] He notes that we have tended also to externalize good, an early example of which is Jefferson's reliance on the frontier to underwrite prosperity. In the meantime the USA has fought American Indians, England, France, Spain, Canada, Mexico, Nicaragua. Hawaii, China, Columbia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Japan, Korea, and made 76 invasions or "interventions" in Latin America.** As soon as it was clear that the Eisenhower Government was going to put the squeeze on Cuba, Fidel Castro retaliated by taking over the Texaco and Esso refineries for refusing to process Soviet crude petroleum. Revolutionary Law 851 of 6 July, 1960 established the legality of Cuban nationalization of American and Cuban property.[31] The United States then cut the Cuban sugar quota by 700 000 short tons. And so it went.*** It had immediate consequences for the Cuban view of philosophy. Gil Green commented on this that "Revolutionary Cuba is a thorn in the flesh of the US ruling class and that is as it should be. No one expects the Mafia to make friends with those who have tossed it out on its ear ..."***

The rapidity of development of Fidel Castro from populism to Marxism-Leninism would have been highly unlikely without United States negative co-operation (negation of negation). As Hodges points out, "In Cuba the turn toward socialism formally began with

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29 Jose Carlos Mariategui (1895-1930) was a leading founder of ¡Partido Socialista (PSP) of Peru. According to the Soviet critic V. Miroshevsky, Mariategui was an old fashioned petit bourgeois socialist, in ' El pop ilismo en el Pery." *Dialectica*, Vol. I, No. 1 (1942), pp. 41 59. See also Geraldine Skinner. "Jose Carlos Mariategui and the Emergence of the Peruvian Socialist Move-Ment," *Science and Society*, Vol. XVIII, No. 4 (Winter 1979-80), pp. 447 471. See also Mariategui. *Defensa del Marxismo* (Lima, 1974). See also his *defensa del Marxismo*. Special th inks go to Prof. William Stein of the State University Department of Anthro pology for his advice and information of Mariategui. See his "Images of the Peruvian Indian Peasant in the Work of Jose Carlos Mariategui." Unpublished MS (1983).

30 *The US, Cuba and Castro* (New York: *Monthly Review*, 1962), p. 140.

** Sergio Guerra and Alberto Prieto, *Estados Unidos Contra America Latina: dos Siglos de Agresiones* (Habana: Casa de los Americas, (1979).

31 *Ibid*, p. 143.

*** Editorial Commen', *Marxism Today* (July 1970), p. 195.

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Fidel's May Day speech following the CIA sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961."[32] Cuban philosophy could not tolerate waste, inefficiency, concessions to material incentives. These guidelines Fidel borrowed from Che Guevara who became chief economist thinker for the revolution. In "Socialism and Man in Cuba" Che said "To build communism, a new man must be created simultaneously with the material base."[33] Ethics, sociology and economics merged. Also important was Che's statement "On the Concept of Value" (October 1963) and his 1964 articles on socialist finance, banking, credit and planning. Socialist man is enveloped not only in ideological considerations but in the socialist mode of production. Earlier, Che had already made his most important philosophical contribution—*Guerilla Warfare* (1960). According to Hodges Che here taught that (1) superior example in revolutionary practice could win support and create popular initiative, (2) an insurrectionary vanguard can win support and create objective conditions not quite ripe and thus force events favorable to the revolution and that (3) in Latin American nations such struggles must take place in the countryside.[34] Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy in their account of the

32 *The Bureaucratization of Socialism* (University of Mass, 1981), p 102. The efficacy of "Guerillaism" or "Focoism" has been challenged in *Worker's Vanguard* in a long article entitled "Worker's Revolution vs. the Guerilla Road," No 325 (11 March 1983). Guevarists, who it is claimed had petty bourgeois disdain for the urban proletariat, were joined by Fidel Castro who is quoted as saying: "The city is a cemetary of revolutionaries." Particularly dangerous was Che's calling on the class-conscious tin miners of Bolivia to leave the mines and join guerillas in the jungles, *WV* claims. "The shameless Debray went even further and condemned the entire Bolivian proletariat for 'hypertrophy of classconsciousness (in Che's *Guerilla War*) because the workers were convinced that they must lead the peasants!!" Most of the Guevarist guerillas were not socialist but called for national liberation through armed struggle to establish a democratic regime. "One of the reasons that a guerilla movement is forced to represent the interests of segments of the 'patriotic' bourgeoisie is its own concomitant property-hungry peasant base... On different occasions, the guerilla leadership will have to rely on the financial backing of 'patriot' bourgeois and landlord sectors." This is quoted with disapproval from *Spartacist* No. 11 (March-April 1968). Not only are actual events in Bolivia the proof of their contentions say the Spartacists but Lenin himself in "guerilla Warfare" (September 1906) stated that guerilla warfare cannot be the only or the chief form of mass insurrection. Looking it up myself—DR—I find that Lenin emphasizes that when certain methods of struggle essential under certain conditions. Marxism demands says Lenin "...making detailed examination of the concrete situation of the given movement at the given stage..." *CW*, Vol. 11xx tr. C. Dutt, (Moscow: FLP, 1962), p. 214.

33 *Ibid.*, p. 164.

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Cuban Revolution pointed out that it was fortunate and probably unique in Cuba that the Cuban proletariat was working in the countryside in 160 sugar factories instead of being stuck in city factories during the revolution.[35] This would militate against Che's broad generalization which was much repeated by various left-wing political groups for the next twenty years. Furthermore, Cuba was fortunate in having a peasantry and landless farmers with weak ties to religion [unlike the situation in Poland] Whether this condition will again appear is also a matter of conjecture. With respect to superior example in (1) and the creation of objective conditions by an insurrectionary vanguard, these seemed to have occurred although for how long became a matter of debate. Descriptive of their continuity, after a first flush of exemplification, might bring pessimistic after-thoughts based on performance. Human beings even in the heat of revolution can become mercurial about a variety of activities —for example, about deciding how much self-sacrifice is equitable.

Concerning the vocabulary of Marxist philosophy, Che and Fidel appeared to agree that socialism may be defined as the "abolition of exploitation" rather than the workers' ownership of the means of production or economic planning for need or use instead of profit. Building socialism as an ethical activity consists in abolishing exploitation. When that stagnates so does the building of socialism.

Now a new man is required. His essence consists in voluntary labor... the communist man of voluntary labor. Work is performed for others rather than for material rewards. No model for this is portrayed in Hodges' account, but surely one model is that of the mother performing a thousand tasks of voluntary labor for no reward other than an occasional thanks, and if she is very lucky, a fugitive kiss.

Voluntary labor has an important impact upon the role of bureaucratic salaries. According to Fidel in a speech 13 March 1968, they are a form of waste. Higher salaries are imperialistic and exploiter's tricks. Under-developed countries can't afford such luxury. For 200 thousand students, on the other hand, room board, clothing, books, laboratory equipment are already provided by the society—virtually a communist situation. Here we have a large outpouring of humanity. Providing these needs, however, is just the tip of the

34 Hodges "Philosophy in the Cuban Revolution," p. 20 Paul Baran, Reflections on the Cuban Revolution," *Monthly Review* (January 1961), points out that the special situation in Cuba was that it was not "inhabited by a petty bourgeois stratum of small peasant proprietors... thus never became a "breeding ground of bourgeois ideology'." p. 466.

35 *Cuba, Anatomy of a Revolution* (New York : Monthly Review, July-August 1960), pp. 80-81.

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iceberg of needs under a truly communist state where each received according to his need. One student needs a violin, another a piano, another a bassoon and so forth. Providing these needs requires a level of productivity that goes far beyond anything dreamed of under American capitalism with its seeming plethora of goods.

We reluc antly break off this fascinating lucrubation in order to return specifically to what is more commonly thought of as philosophy under bourgeois conditions. We turn once more to the Cuban-North American International Philosophical Conference of May 1982.

THE CUBAN–NORTH AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONFERENCE OF MAY 1982

The constant attempts to tie up Marxist-Leninist theory with Cuban practice proved a heady experience for the North American participants of the conference. Even though there was naturally enough more exhortation than actual merging of theory with practice, its even being mentioned as a reflex from Reagan's Philosophy of Selfishness was a moving experience. As far as anyone seemed to know, it was the first conference of its kind to be held between the two nations. It was the result of many hours of planning and execution by Placido Merrero, diplomat with the Cuban Mission to the United Nations and Edward D'Angelo, professor of philosophy at the University of Bridgeport. Earlier efforts such as that by John Somerville, emeritus professor of the City University of New York were short-circuited. Three of the members of the American delegation had previously (in 1975) had the good fortune of participating in a similar conference in Varna, Bulgaria so were highly optimistic about this face to face meeting which proved equally gratifying. Marrero succeeded in arranging the exchange when it seemed that it would fail because of strict enforcement of a trading-with-the-enemy regulation that President Carter had interpreted somewhat flexibly but which under President Reagan appeared to be in for rougher times. Our group was accepted as having a genuinely scholarly mission so we were allowed to travel to Cuba 14 May 1982 and stayed for a week.

The Cuban philosophers who participated in the conference, in order of their appearance on our conference program were Dr. Thalia Fung, whose paper was entitled "About the Transformation of the National Revolution of Liberation into the Socialist Revolution in Cuba". We listened to her paper and the others at the new central convention center in Havana which boasts all the facilities for which o could hope. We had four highly trained translators at our eight four-hour sessions at the Center which made listening a pleasant experience. Two of our members knew Spanish and three of them knew English.

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Dr. Fung, whose father was a Chinese coolie brought to Cuba to work the sugar cane with other Chinese and Haitians, was followed by the economist-philosopher, Dr. Hector Ayala whose paper was on "The Principle Economic Transformation of the Cuban Revolution." Next in appearance was the exposition of Lic. Arnaldo Silva, the author of *Cuba and the International Sugar Market* (1975), and a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba as well as a lecturer in philosophy at the Havana Party Higher School Silva read a paper "About Distortions of National and International Dialectics in the Cuban Revolution." He is close to receiving his doctorate at Moscow State University. Invited to speak at the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in Baltimore, December 1982, he was refused a visa on the ground that he was "a high official of the Communist Party."

Sandwiched between the Cuban papers were the American papers. The next Cuban to appear on the program was Professor Dr. Gaspar Jorge Garcia Gallo, formerly head of the philosophy department at the University of Havana after it was first reorganized (1964-1968). His paper on "Education in Cuba" traced the development of Cuban education from 1900 to the present. His paper was succeeded by that of Dr. Antonio Diaz on "The Participation of the Cuban People in Socio Political Life." Diaz was followed by Lic. Carlos Trapaga who read his paper on the topic of "About Culture in Revolutionary Cuba."

"The Philosophical Ideas of Jose Marti" was read by Lic. Alberto Ronda, succeeded by Lic. Cosme Cruz whose paper was entitled "Social Development and Historical Regularity in Pre Revolutionary Cuba." He also was denied entry into the United States to attend the American Philosophical Association meetings in Baltimore According to Cindy Fox, a State Department representative, he also was "an official of the Communist Party Central Committee."

Lic. Hernan Yanez, also working on his doctorate in Philosophy at Moscow State University, delivered a paper entitled "On the Crisis of Contemporary Bourgeois Ideology and Cubanology." And finally Dr. Zaira Rodriguez presented the concluding Cuban paper on "The Principle of Objective Partisanship as a Methodological Basis for Social Research in Cuba." She did her graduate work at Moscow State University and the Institute of Philosophy under B. M. Kedrov, I. S. Narski, T. I. Oiserman among others in the area of history of philosophy. All the papers elicited questions or extended debate and requests for amplification.

The senior member of the Cuban delegation, Professor Gallo, as we have already noted, graphically showed the effects of imperialism on Cuban education and educational philosophy. As we

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have seen, Cuban Marxists deplored the spoon-feeding of the views of William James and John Dewey during the period beginning with the Presidency of Truman. Yet, despite his idealism, irrationalism, voluntarism, fideism and subjective reduction of reality to pure experience, James was against Manifest Destiny and did develop the idea of a moral equivalent of war. Dewey's record is somewhat more unsavory, particularly since his last years were plagued by the view that there was little to choose between communism and fascism. But we have already referred to such events.

Now I wish to turn to the last paper of the conference, that given by Dr. Rodriguez on objective partisanship. Her view was as follows :

When the revolution takes over, science becomes the director of the productive forces as a material force in its own right. Science takes over the management and control of the economic, political and ideological processes. Scientific practice has constantly growing effects on mankind. It follows that indissoluble relations between science and value appear and grow in influence in all aspects of human activity. Here she amplifes the increasing role of science in the transformation of everyday life, as follows :

> ...the materialist dialectical solutions to the main questions of philosophy allows Marxist Leninist theory to scientifically approach the questions of the multi dimensional relations of man to the world. Science's activity is the transforming of practical activity of men making up the core of all social activity. Through this instrument, cognitive and valuative activity are conditioned.

In considering men as creating their own histories, Rodriguez maintains, we must observe five aspects of their development. First, they become the actors and protagonists of their universal historical drama. Second, the changing conditions of social phenomena constantly influence our knowledge of them. Third, the specificity of the knowledge of social/historical processes acquires for researchers the simplicity of natural formation—the only possible one in advanced social life. Fourth, economics, politics, religion, art and morality are closely related to class judgments. Fifth, despite the difficulty of dealing with social phenomena that are generally regarded as unrepeatable, still they must be explained and interpreted under general laws and regularity, that is to say, under theoretical conceptions. Out of these conceptions, a typology of social laws is developed and seen as not acting in an isolated way. Marxist analysis of social processes are, of course, distant from economic reductionism and such analysis is characterized by dynamism and creativity.

Objective partisanship proclaimed by Marxism/Leninism is different from the purely valuative conception of idealistic axiology

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which proposes a normative or teleological interpretation of objective knowledge in history and culture. "Contemporary idealistic axiology is characterised by denying the possibility of objective knowledge of social phenomena and hence makes an apology for the ideological, political and cultural values of contemporary bourgeois society." Hence, *bourgeois (social) research in this area is centered around defining its norms rather than in describing objective laws.*

Of primary importance to objective partisanship are (1) philosophical monism; (2) rejection of passive reflection; (3) acceptance of dialectics in action; (4) rejection of neutralism; and (5) progress, peace and human solidarity.

Each of the other papers, while reflecting on philosophy and indicating the importance of philosophy in understanding the direction of socialism and communism, indicated the attempt to move beyond "understanding the world" the doing something about changing it. There has been a continuous attempt to continue the parallel construction of socialism and communism in Cuba, a technique initiated by Che in connection with his vanguard hypothesis. Why wait to go through a stage envisioned by Lenin, when the vanguard under special circumstances can move right into communism despite the initial lag in capitalist oriented management ?

Strong feelings of love, voluntary work, the outpouring of large doses of humanity were emphasized in Che's "Socialism and Man in Cuba." There was to be no room in the new communist society for high bureaucracy salaries which are a form of waste according to Fidel in a speech 13 March 1968. For the students, there has already been a realization of some of the blessings of communism. An elementary level of communism is apparent in free medical care, virtually free housing, free sports events with public transportation becoming virtually free. Water and electricity are becoming free. In Prague and other socialist cities West of Moscow, my family and I remarked that public transportation seemed virtually free with an apparent attitude of drivers and conductors that it is often troublesome if not unsocialist to collect fares. In Bulgaria and elsewhere rents were so low that they seemed virtually free to a North American big-city dweller.

Although Che, with Fidel's approval, attempted to avoid the bureaucratization process which has crept over socialist countries, their effort began to falter as the USA economic blockage thrust Cuba further into the theory and practice of the USSR. Hodges' account of the "heresies" of Yugoslavia, China and Cuba is of critical and historical importance.[36]

36 Hodges, *Bureaucratization*, p. 168f.

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Lest we are left with the unrealistic and sentimental impression that love and moral incentives continued after Che, we find that a demand for material incentives became increasingly strong in the Cuban 1970's. The cause of disenchantment, according to Hodges, was that the party militants were becoming demoralized through "battle fatigue on the plains." They were doing more than their fair share under the unwritten law of *moira*. They did not have the leisure or privacy to recoup their draining energies after struggling vigilantly against conscious and unconscious enemies of the revolution. And there were a succession of crises to meet only too frequently generated north of Key Largo. Widespread political indifference of the Cuban masses aggravated the situation.

Partly at fault was a narrowing of participation and a people too trusting of the revolution's elite. It is up to the workers, Hodges believes, to decide the salaries for the bureaucracy.[37] But can they be trusted to keep them low enough ? Will they be up (or down) to the standards of a socialist Solon ?

With the USA encroaching more and more on Central America, a region in powerful flux of class struggles at various levels, Cuba will be called upon to provide leadership in a number of areas.[38] It has the philosophical reserves to do this after more than twenty years of concerted effort. Much is demanded of Cuba in relation to its physical resources, although ideologically it is prepared to play a continuing leadership role. It is particularly fitted to advise in the present situation which no longer can count on a gradual transition to social democracy through electoral victories. Like Cuba, El Salvador and Nicaragua and others are being catapulted into revolution and hard-nosed socialism. It appears that the Reagan administration will goad Central America into responses that will accelerate the leftward movement of Central America.

As an aftermath of the Cuban-North American philosophy conference, the Cuban philosophers were invited to speak at the December 1982 meeting of the American Philosophical Association in Baltimore. Chosen by the Cubans to represent them in the United States, as we have already mentioned, were Lic. Cosme Cruz and Lic. Arnaldo Silva. After most arrangements had been made by Professor Robert Stone of Post College and Professor Clifford Du Rand of Morgan State University, Silva and Cruz were denied visas at the last minute. The reason given for this action was that these men were "high officials of the Cuban Communist Party." Many efforts were made to reverse the decision by a host of interested people without success.

37 *Ibid*, p. 178.

38 See James Petras, "Latin America: Class Conflict and Capitalist Development," *Monthly Review* (December 1981).

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Enforcement of the restriction appeared to be inappropriate and inconsistent since when the Society for the Philosophical Study of Marxism invited Soviet, Bulgarian, East German and Yugoslavian professors over the years, beginning in 1962, the visa restrictions appeared flexible. Outstanding instances included entry by Professors Martin, a high Party official for decades and P. N. Fedoseyev Vice President of the Soviet Academy of Science, both of whom were philosophers. Academician Fedoseyev appeared at the Cleveland Club in 1969 with Professor John Somerville of City University giving an on-the-spot translation to an attentive audience of mostly Cleveland businessmen on the topic of detente. His appearance had the blessing of the late Cyrus Eaton, founder of tha Pugwash Conferences and noted Cleveland industrialist. These facts must be contrasted with the reported view of the State Department spokesman, Alan Romberg, who said that the denial of visas is in line with longstanding policy.[39] In the light of recent intelligence that numerous Nazis are parading in and out of the United States since the finale of the second World War One must conclude that the policies of the White House (and the State Department ?) are less congruent with the views of Jefferson than with those of Alfred Rosenberg.

39 *New York Times* "Around the World" Section (30 December 1982); See also "Philosophers decry barring of 2 Cubans from convention in city." *The Sun*, Baltimore (29 December 1982) See also "Group Protests Barring of 2 Cuban Speakers." *The Washington Post* (28 December 1982) Among the letters of protest was one from the Secretary of the AAUP in Washington (7 January 1983) which states : "This Association, which has been committed since its founding in 1915 to the preservation of academic freedom, rejects the premise that persons invited to visit this country for academic purposes may be denied entrance by our government because of their political beliefs of associations."

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III

The Conversion of J. P. Sartre

Pradip Kumar Roy

In the Philosophic literature of Existentialism, J. P. Sartre by his diversified contributions stands unique. His philosophic literature is influenced by the tradition of Continental Rationalism, Idealism, and by Marxism. His philosophic line (which he names as 'Moment') from Descartes to Kant, from Hegel to Husserl, Heidegger and Marx paves the way of his diversified thought. It springs from his passionate interest from human beings. His entire philosophy is an attempt to describe a mode of being — human being.

The philosophical development of Sartre can be divided in the following way. His first phase of writings gave rise to the *Phenomenological Psychology*. In the second phase he came on the *Ontology of Human Existence*; the third marked the *Conversion to Marxism*. In the limited space of this paper I shall be concerned with the third phase of his writings i. e. his conversion to Marxism.[1]

In his much and world reputed book *Being and Nothingness* Sartre says that man is ultimately bound to fail. It is not possible on his part to escape from this state. So Sartre opines, "Every human reality is a passion in that it projects losing itself so as to found being and by the same stroke to constitute In-itself which escapes contigency by being its own foundation, the *Ens Causa Sui*, which religions call God. Thus the passion of man is the reverse of that of Christ, for man loses himself as man in order that God

1 For the discussions of Sartre's *Conversion to Marxism* and his *Critique of Dialectical Reason my sources are mainly* :

1 Sartre, J. P., *The Problem of Method*. Tr. by H. E Barness, London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1963.

2 Caws, P., *Sartre*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979.

3 Aronson, R., *Jean-Paul Sartre... Philosophy in the World*. London: Verse, 1980.

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may be born. But the idea of God is contradictory and we lose ourselves in vain. Man is a unless passion".[2]

Sartre, inspite of this hopelessness promises at the end of *Being and Nothingness* to write a book *On an Ethical Plane*. Concerning the doomed nature of our relations with others he is of the opinion that this can be achieved only after a *Radical Conversion*. But the radical conversion is the conversion to Marxism and the promised book which comes out is the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. In this book he extends the Anthropology of *Being and Nothingness* through a theory of *Praxis* and thus claims in correcting Marxism. It is an intricate attempt to reconcile the individuality of man with political and social commitments. To Sartre, in the Twenteith Century Marxism is the only possible philosophy.

In fact Sartre of *Being and Nothingness* is severly criticised by the hostile critics that his notion of freedom pays very little heed to the hereditary and environmental conditioning. His philosophy, the critics claim, provides no room for any positive social philosophy. It is merely psychological, mere abstraction and the individual consciousness is 'splendidly independent' and alone. Sartre himself realises the problem and we find the result in his *Critque of Dialectical Reason* where he provides a social and political philosophy—the relation of the human beings to the universe, to the group, to the nation, to history and in a nutshell a panaromic view of man's position in the world. Peter Caws in this respect remarks that Sartre tries "...a reconciliation between existentialism and Marxism. the determination of the individual by himself on the one hand, by history and the collectivity on the other. But the theory of *Being and Nothingness* does not provide for the force of the environment; having just emerged from a time of war in which the isolation of individuals, in terror and mistrust, had been one of the dominant facts of existence, Sartre can be pardoned for laying emphasis, however romantic, on heroic self determination".[3]

Here a few words can be said about Sartre's new efforts. *In Being and Nothingness*, consciousness which Sartre calls freedom recognises itself in *anguish* or in other words basically it experiences itself in desire. In the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* this anguish or desire is substituted by *need*. The fundamental existential structure of man, according to Sartre now, is need. In desire there is a possibility of 'unrestricted movement'. But the need is something different. It brings in something from outside. Man cannot escape this necessity. Moreover, need according to Sartre, is related to *scarcity*." There is simply *not enough* of the kinds of matter to

2 Sartre, J P., *Being and Nothingness*. Tr. by H. E. Barness, London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1957, p. 615.

3 Caws, P., *Sartre* pp 118 119

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which *need* directs its demand".[4] The term scarcity bears a special meaning to Sartre. By srarcity he means "both the lack of the most immediate things which enable men to stay and the lack of those other things which are necessary to make people's lives satisfying, once they have got beyond the problem of mere subsistence", and adds society 'chooses its expandables'."[5]

Sartre's notion of freedom bears the *double aspect* of responsibility. Thus when we say that man is free we mean that he is responsible for what he does But in a society where individual's endeavour is shattered by economic exploitation, this kind of freedom is nothing but a kind of mere psychological abstraction. Although psychological and political freedom are not identical, they are inextricable. It is due to the fact that man can fight for his political freedom only when he is free and also recognises that he is free. On the other hand, a society justifies opression only when it takes for granted that man is not free and is determined by some absolute nature. But to Sartre, man demands political freedom and practical freedom as he is existentially free. In the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* the same echo is found. According to Sartre, man lives by 'internalizing the external'. By his free act of consciousness man takes what is out side and makes of it a structure of his inner life. In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre holds that each and every life is unique and adds that the individual's act represents the class also to which he belongs. Furthermore, the reality of the class bears as much wet as the purely material structure in the *practico-inerte*. Individual *praxis*[6] plays an important role in the class structure and the characteristics of a particular class. It is on this individual *praxis* that this class structure alongwith the characteristics of a particular class is dependent.

Regarding the limitation of freedom in *Being and Nothingness* which was a kind of abstraction, Sartre is now interested in Political freedom. He feels that in an exploitive society, talking of this kind of freedom is nonsense and says that, "the mode of production of material life generally dominates the development of social, political, and intellectual life."[7] Extending this idea further Sartre says that man cannot go beyond this factual evidence. It is possible only

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4 Sartre, J. P., *The Problem of Method*. p. XV. (Italics in original)

5 *Ibid*, p. XVI.

6 These two terms *Practico inerte* and *praxis* bear special meaning to Sartre's later works. By the former Sartre means something which is more than just matter. It consists of all those things which go to make up man's experience of finitude. By the latter is meant by him any meaningful human action in its material environment.

7 Sartre, J P., *op cit., The Problem of Method*. p. XXIV.

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when the social relations and technical progress help in freeing man from the chain of scarcity.

So in the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* we find a new approach which is a major shift from *Being and Nothingness*. According to Sartre in an exploitive society the individual ethics will be at best a compromise. So he recommends a social reorganisation. The source of values on which ethical conduct is dependent must be the choice of the free individual working together. The ethics of a philosophy of freedom is impossible in a society where man is not free. In the present age man does not possess "real Freedom"! He is hopeful of a society where scarcity will not be the determining factor. And only then such freedom is possible. To him, only a dialectic society where human beings consciously make history, may indicate such freedom.

According to Sartre the ultimate ideal for mankind would be a world where all men will work together consciously in making a common history ..... which he calls 'group-in-fusion', a genuine 'we subject'. The individual *praxis* here becomes a common *praxis* and the 'common individual' emerges. "In the group-in-fusion there is no longer an I You division or I they. Rather it is a collection of 'thirds' in which each third is a 'myself' inasmuch as all are working to accomplish the same goal. The group achieves ends which are my ends but which I could not attain by myself. The aim of the group is to develop and to utilise those qualities and potentialities which are peculiar to each of its members".[8] And the need for a dialectical reason, according to Sartre is "to study a person, a human group or a human object in the synthetic reality of their signfications and of their relations to the developing totalisation; it is essential to prove that any isolated knowledge of men or their products must either transcend itself towards the totality or reduce to an error of incompleteness".[9]

Sartre has now turned to some extent towards a kind of dialectical sociology which seems very far away from the individualism developed as a characteristic feature of his earlier moral theory. He now criticises his own lack of understanding of the way the moral autonomy of the individual is qualified by the fact that he lives in an exploitative society. "True moral freedom is now projected into a future that will not be realised until the dialectic of human antagonism has run its course and of this future Sartre says we can know nothing. Nevertheless, while Sartre is clearly dissatisfied with the virtually total neglect, in his earlier work, of the social aspect of morality, his present description of existentialism as an 'enclave

8 *Ibid.*, p. XXVII.

9 Quoted in P. Caws, *op. cit.*, *Sartre.*, p. 150.

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within Marxism' substantially exaggerates the degree to which his fundamental position has changed."[10]

In a prefatory essay to the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, name ly, *The Problem of Method* Sartre distinguishes between philosophy and ideology. He holds that every age has one and only one dominant philosophy and a variety of ideologies.[11] These ideologies grow up automatically. Any philosopher whether he is aware of it or not, whether he likes it or not, the dominant philosophy of his age will write only that which can be understood as a part of this dominant philosophy. In the twentieth century, according to Sartre, the dominant philosophy is Marxism because we are not moved yet beyond it Existentialism is a subordinate ideology. It work from within and attempts to influence the future development of Marxism. And Sartre writes, "It is a parasitical system living on the margin of Knowledge, which at first it opposed but into which today it seems to be integrated" [12]

This seems to be a greater concession to Marxism. One of the reasons that Sartre wants to subordinate existentialism may be the danger of the cult personality with respect to himself. Moreover, he does not like the term 'existentialism' as a 'brand name' as it is now used [13] But the way in which existentialism had come to be understood as a fairly wellmarked line of thought from Kierkegaard to Sartre himself is in a way 'anarchronistic' to subordinate it to Marxism Peter Caws in this respect remarks, "In fact in his essay on Kierkegaard he speaks of the transhistorical status of the subject as 'singular universal', and it seems plausible to think of existentialism and Marxism as co nplementry, just as the individual and the collective are. rather than assimilating one into the sphere of influence of the other. Kierkegaard was scandalised that Hegel should have tried to give philosophy a begining, and Sartre is the philosopher who seems to have the most difficulty with endings; even if

10 Edwards. P , (ed.). *Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*. Vol. VII, New York : The Macmillan and Co. Ltd , and the Free Press, 1967. p. 292.

11 By 'Philosophy' Sartre means great creative systems which cannot be transcended until and unless history has moved on in some way or other. By 'ideology' what he means is a merely much humbler person than the philosopher. Philosophy merely develops the great original systems of ideology... the philosopher exploits the domain.

12 Sartre, J. P , op. cit., *The Problem of Method*. p. 8.

13 Sartre, J. P., *Sartre in the Seventies*: *Interviews and Essays*. Tr. by P Auster and L. Davis. London: Anoredeutsch. 1978, p. 60. Regarding the name Existentialism' Sartre says, "The word is ridiculous. Besides, as you know. it wasn't I who chose it they stuck it on me and I accepted it. These days I wouldn't. But no one calls me 'Existentialist' any more except in the text books where it does mean anything " p. 60.

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Marxism is a 'moment' in the history of philosophy there seems no reason for the same to be true of existentialism''.[14]

Sartre wants to grasp the human reality in the historical, concrete, positive and total. This human reality is produced by collective and group activity directed consciously towards common ends. "But Sartre's ontological projects inactive since the conclusion of *Being and Nothingness* had established no level of existence beyond the *ekstasis* of the for-itself represented by its being for others, with a tentative excursion in the direction of an elusive 'we subject'."[15] So, Marx's Social Theory becomes acceptable to him and he is convinced that Marxism is the only 'indespensable and inescapable' philosophy of the present age, the third 'moment' of the history of modern philosophy.

This oscillation in Sartre's philosophy may be due to various reasons. One of the reasons may be that just after the war Sartre was very much preoccupied with political affairs and with the public career of existentialism. Since then Sartre tries to find out a 'Political foundation of Anthropology' and starts rethinking the whole of the question of social reality from Marxist point of view. After an intensive study of history, economics and a re-reading of Marx, Sartre's definitive abondonment of the *Morale* came in 1950. Here Sartre finds a close link between Politic and Ethics. "The moral attitude appears when technical and social conditions render positive forms of conduct impossible. Ethics is a collection of idealistic tricks intendended to enable us to live the life imposed on us by the poverty of our resources and the insufficiency of our techniques".[16] Sartre further takes up a project for a *morale* under the title 'Moral and Society' organished by the Gramsci Institute in Rome in 1964-65. In 1969 he declares that he has worked out a complete system of dialectical ethics which only needded to be written up for publication.

It is Sartre's versatility that often contributes to his obscurity; his thought constitutes a stream of currents from philosophy, literature, politics and sociology His efforts in answering the question 'What ought we to do' ends on a despondent note. Man, he, concludes, is 'helpless'.

While making a transition from the 'Individual' to the 'Group', Sartre abandons the bonafide 'contingency' he assures to the individual that no one individual has any natural right over another; and each is as much *de trop* as another. When the 'group' comes into being the 'contingency' is the first victim. 'Institution and authority'

14 Caws, P., *op. cit., Sartre.* pp. 143 144.
15 *Ibid.*, p. 142. (Italics in original).
16 Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 15.

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which owe their existence to the artificial instrument of 'the oath', invent a new contingency of values...a consciously chosen set, and fetter the 'free' individual contingency to the new 'objective' values.

Sartre allows for an evolution of the concept of freedom, in his 'scientific' analysis of the process of transition from individuals to the group. He denies the fundamental existential contingency and assigning to history a deterministic character, suggests that after the group formation, freedom is equivalent to resisting its break up, which can be ensured only by joining a revolutionary party. But granting that history is deterministic, there is no 'free' choice involved in joining the party, as that act would be historically 'inevitable' or 'natural'. Here we notice a shift in the conflict of one's own freedom and the necessities of the human predicament to the freedom of the collective and the inescapable forces of the dialectic of history. And conflict between freedom and necessity leads Sartre to infer the impossibipity of an ethical theory.

Sartre's attempt in extending the anthropology of *Being and Nothingness* to complement and rectify Marxian dialectic society leads the entire existentialist philosophy head-on into the viscuous mass of Marxism. The process of history does not make room for the individual's existential praxis defined by Sartre as :

(a) In each and every human action dialectic is fundamental;
(b) All the historical development is rooted in the praxis of the individual persons.

His aim is to define the role for the individual's existence in society; show a way to commit his freedom, and render Marxism more inclusive. But in the process of doing so, Sartre actually denies the dialectic of history. The latter does not follow as a result of individual dialectic of each member of the human class because individual human adventure through history has no single structure.

In a broad sense, Marxism and Existentialism complement each other, although the premises of the individual praxis are not compatible with Marxist dialectic of society in history. While Sartre learns from Marx the 'importance of action' in removing the forces that try to destroy the human capacity to exist in open mutuality, he warns Marxists that "specific remedies cannot resolve irremediable structures" and also that "the importance of practical action does not protect it from the risks of failure and incompleteness".[17]

Sartre is grateful to Marx for the idea that moral ideals are the 'demonic tools of immorality' if it does not lead people into real action, translating the 'ought' into the 'is'.

And Sartre keeps us expecting.

17 Allen, G., "Sartre's Construction of Marxist Dialectic", *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 33, 1979, p. 107.

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IV

Spontaneous-Dialectical Aspect In Ancient Indian Philosophy*

K. D. Kanev

Spontaneous-Dialectical Aspects In "Mahabharata"

Both the materialistic and the dialectic trends in ancient Indian philosophy find their reflection in one of the great works of Indian epos — the "*Mahābhārata*".

"*Mahābhārata*" outlines the contours of several philosophic teachings. Some of them contain elements of the philosophic school Sāṃkhya, forming at that time, which shows itself in its initial period as a materialistic school, but later on as a dualistic one.

One of the teachings with an underlined directedness is known in literature as *Pariṇāma-Vāda* (literally a teaching for the changeability), which stands in closest relation also with the teaching *Svabhāvāvāda* (literally a teaching for the nature). Characteristic of this teaching is the stressed passiveness of spirit (*Puruṣha*) in respect of the active matter (*Prakṛti*), which is a primary one and is in an eternal process of construction and destruction, all changes being explained with its own nature. The spirit (according to the supposed creator of this teaching — the sage Pancashikte) is identified with the consciousness and is examined as evolving from the matter and disappearing with the body's death, i.e. an independent soul from the body does not exist.

Svabhāva-Vāda (the teaching for the nature) is at the closest connected with the s.c. *Niyati-Vāda* (the teaching for the necessity or regularity). In its initial period the relevant teachings were not strictly philosophical, but further on their naive.materialistic directedness is still clearere outlined. Defending the superiority in the

* Continued from *Darshana International*, Vol 15, No. 3, July 1975, p 20–30.

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world of the qualitatively undefined matter (*Prakṛti*) one of the followers of the relative trend (the sage Prahrada) states inter alia : "He who admits the changes of the matter — *Prakṛti*, and does not admit that *Prakṛti* is more supreme, he himself is foolishly proud... And where do pride and illusion remain for the one, who has understood that all changes of *Prakṛti* are due to *Svabhāva* ?" And more, "This entire world exists by the force of its nature (*Svabhāva*)..." (A quotation after Pizzagalli, p. 90-91). Explaining the movement, the changes and generally the variety in nature by means of itself (and not by the interference of super-powers — God Brahman, etc.), in reality the sage affirmed the comprehension about the necessity or regularity as internally adherent to the mat er-nature.

Even only taking into consideration the above reasonings, it becomes clear enough that besides the naive-materialistic directedness within the shown teachings they contain also a definite dialectical directedness. In general, still in the middles of the last millenium B. C. dialectic aspects are also stored up in a number of materialistic teachings, a proof of which are also a number of reasonings, reflected in "*Mahābharata*".

Spontaneous-Dialectical Aspects in the Basic Ancient Indian Systems (Schools) and Teachings

The period of forming the basic philosophical systems (schools) and teachings in ancient India begins about the VIIth century B. C. and continues till the beginning of the new era.

Lokāyata-Charvaka is the first philosophic school formed at that time. It synthesises in itself the basic thoughts of the materialistic and dialectic aspects up to this moment. But in this school are at hand also definite spontaneous-dialectical aspects.

The adherers to Lokāyata-Charvaka supported that in its root world is a material one. For its basis they took four elements (water, earth, fire and air), which in combination create its variousness. So for example it is said in the ancient allegoric play "Prabodhacandrodaya" : "...The visual world is your single support. The earth, the water, the fire and the air are the basis for everything..."

The Lokāyata Charvaka school looks at consciousness as adherent to the living human body, as emerging in a result of "the transformation" of elements. Again in the same play we read : "The mind is created by the well-known elements in man..."

In another original source ("Sarva-Darśhana-Sangraha") we read : "Only out of them (of the elements — o.r. /own remark/), when they are transformed in the body, consciousness is born..., and when they are destroyed, consciousness also disappears".

The adherers to the Lokāyata-Charvaka school are not only ardent defenders of materialism, but also consistent atheists, and

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this is still more a convincing proof, that the movement, the change and the development are explained with the peculiarities of nature itself.

In spite of this endeavours of the Lokāyata-Charvaka enemies to admit its huge significance and role, in spite also of some of its naive and limited theoretical findings, the first materialistic and atheistic school Lokāyata-Charvaka is legally considered as a great conquerance of Indian philosophic thought.

Saṃkhya

In the early period of the Sāṇkhya school formation it is supported that the world is a material one, that it is a manifestation of the common and qualitatively undifferentiated primary matter (*Prakṛti*). The matter is the first basis and at the same time the first cause, from which as a consequence the whole universal variety emerges.

As a primary substance the matter (*Prakṛti*) has three attributive qualities or properties, the so called *Gunas*: *Sattva* (pleasant); *Rajas* (unpleasant) and *Tamas* (neutral), with the contradicting nature with which the modifications of the matter, inclusive of individuality, are explained. As a result of the contradictory interrelations among the three *Gunas* at first the s. c. *Buddhi* arises, following *Ahamkāra*.

With *Buddhi* the undifferentiated or undevelopped matter becomes a developed one and so emerges the s.c. intellect.

In the process of further evolution appears what is called *Ahamkara*. And this is in fact the process or the principle of individualisation, or in a most general sense the differentiation of the subject from the object.

With *Ahamkāra* the five fine and the five coarser elements (*Mahābhuta*): water, earth, fire, air and ether, are differentiated. Again with *Ahamkāra* also the ten senses (*Indryas*) appear. Five of them are in effect the sense organs (eye, ear, tongue, nose and skin), and the rest are the organs of activity (voice, arms, legs, excretory and reproducing organs). A middle one is also the mind (*Manas*), as a central organ of senses.

So it follows after the Sāṃkhya school that man or the individuality is a "combination" or a definite "conjunction" of the material elements plus his psychic abilities.[1]

The cause of the development of the matter (*Prakṛti*) and of the contradictory nature of the s.c. *Guṇas* still at those times it was thought as uncleared, and this gave reason to make conclusions in favour of dealism. The idealistic directedness becomes with the

1 In connection with the respective products of Sāṇkhya it is spoken about the so called "25 principles".

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flow of time (especially at the beginning of the new era) more and more definite, because in Sāṇkhya there begins still more to consolidate a new standpoint, resp. that parallelly exists with the oldest matter (*Prakṛti*) there exists also a reasonable starting point or spirit (*Puruṣha*) whose essence is consciousness. In the light of this new philosophic conception, from the qualitatively undifferentiated prime matter the universal variety is created, but as a result of the "unification" of matter (*Prakṛti*) with the spirit (*Puruṣha*) or in other words, as a result of the "union" the starting balance of *Prakṛti* is destructed and it is induced to act, to be modified.

Up to this day the followers of the Sāṃkhya school utter contradictory standpoints in respect of whether the materialistic or the idealistic directedness in it is dominating, while the standpoint is predominant that in its early classical form Sāṃkhya is atheistic.[2] At that we have referred especially on this place only to those aspects in Sāṃkhya which certify a certain spontaneous dialectical directedness.

Yoga

Yogism follows a complex and longlasting road of development. A strongly practical and theoretico-philosophical aspect can be differentiated in it. In the full sense of the word archaic is just the Yogist practice, dating back as far as to 2 3 milleniums B. C.

We personally adhere to the standpoint that the roots of Yogism interlace with the early naturalistic ideas and at the most with the s.c Tantrism. In this relation a peculiar determinism is characteristic both for Tantrism and for the archaic Yoga practice. This one is quite clearly expressed in the s.c. "Yoga triple complex" (*Āsanas, Prānāyama, Samyama*). And here already, in the archaic Yoga practice, a spontaneously dialectical directedness could be found. E.g that the specific *Yoga* breathing and certain bodily postures (the s.c. *Āsanas*) can discipline the mind and vice versa; the mind concentration and some other human spiritual activities have a huge influence upon the dirigeability and the functions of single systems, organs and upon a number of other human body activities.

With arising of the social inequality and the formation of the cast society in India the archaic *Yoga* practice inevitably acquires an ideologic (resp. philosophic, religious and other "vestment". The main merit for all this on the first place has the supposed author of the s.c. "Yoga Sutras"—the sage Patanjali, who generalised the basic things about Yogism.

In a philosophical aspect *Yoga* stands at the nearest to the dualistic philosophical school Sāṃkhya. As the first basis of the world

2 See D Chattopadhyaya, Indian Atheism (transl. from English), Moscow 1973.

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the matter (*Prakṛiti*) is accepted, parallelly with which there exists a spiritual beginning, or the spirit (*Puruṣha*) Quite characteristic is the moment that beyond its "contact" with the matter, spirit is considered as idle.

As attributively adherent to the matter, the s.c. *Guṇas* (*Sattva*,, *Rajas* and *Tamas*) are considered, with whose contradictory nature also the development of the matter, i.e. the variety of the universe is explained.

For a "Product" of matter and its supreme form of manifestation the thought or the mind (*Citta*) is considered, whose modifications are again explained by the contradictory nature of the s. c. *Guṇas*.

The endeavour to explain both the development of the matter and the modifications of the thought or mind with the contradictory nature of the s.c. *Guṇas* and not with the interference of God or some other superpowers, proves not only a definite materialistic and non-religious directedness, but also a spontaneous-dialectical one.

Buddhism

Independently from the subjective intentions and assertions of Buddha to bear no attitude to the s.c. "ten philosophical questions", in his elaborated theoretical (foremostly ethical) problems a philosophical directedness is contained.

For example the philosophical directedness is doubtless when he deals with the principle of dependence and conditionality of the material and the spiritual phenomena, considered by Buddha as a general and spontaneously acting law. In the light of this in its essence dialectic principle, according to Buddha the possibility is excluded: (a) to admit the existence of an eternal reality, independent from certain conditions; (b) to admit the possibility for a "liquidation" of the existent. Buddha renders to this theory the most extensive significance, thinking that without its comprehension his teaching remains not understandable altogether.

Buddha examines his theory of the Karma as a peculiar manifestation of the more general principle of dependence and conditionality of things and phenomena. In the same way Buddha's theory of the general changeability and inconstancy of all the things in the world is logically derived from the principle of dependence and conditionality. The principle of changeability in Buddha's notion leads in fact also to denying any supreme substance.

In a close connection with the principle of changeability is set up Buddha's theory of the soul. This is a logical and factual rejection of the religious-idealistic theory of soul's eternity. One looks at consciousness more as at a "sum" of experiences. In general soul or consciousness are understood as a specific manifestation of a peculiar

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"totality" of a material body, a material mind and a formless consciousness, and not as eternal and independent from nothing spiritual substances.

According to our opinion even only the above said convincingly enough proves that in Buddha's theoretically developed, foremostly ethical principles philosophical elements or "germs" are also contained. And just these have served to be a basis of the later differentiated 18 Buddhist directives, from which the four basic typically Buddhist philosophical shoots are shaped: Vaibhashika, Madhyamika, Sautrantika and Yogacara. And as we shall see, the spontaneous dialectical aspects, especially in the first two schools, are indisputable.

One of the most characteristic and general moments in the Vaibhashika and Sautrantika schools is the peculiar combination of the atheistic with the typically Buddhist theory of the s.c. "bearer" (Dharma). Although it is admitted that the universal variety is built up on single elements or their atoms, they are not examined as substantial. For an absolutely real being or essence of the world just the s.c *Dharma* (the unchangeable "bearer" of all material and spiritual phenomena) is postulated, being something like an unchangeable substance. Another is the unanimity question of the nature of *Dharma*, on which there is no unanimity among the interpreters of Buddhism.

VAIBHASHIKA is one of the Buddhist philosophical schools, according to which the world, including consciousness, exist objectively. Human mind and soul are considered as synonyms of consciousness and the existence of man's soul is denied.

What refers especially the s.c. "bearers" (*Dharmas*), they are, under the form of interrelations between the elements or their corresponding atoms, owing to their own material nature, in an eternal "stream" of combinations. With man this "stream" (of phys cal elements) is "calmed down" and "dies away" hardly with the typical Buddhist *Nirvana* considered as a special kind of *Dharma*.

It is hardly necessary to underline that for the school Vaibhashika not only the materialistic, but also the spontaneous-dialectrical directedness is characteristic. But with its later followers a certain retreat from these principles is noted.

SAUTRANTIKA is the second philosophical school that also supports that the material and the spiritual phenomena exist objectively, and it rejects the existence of an eternal soul.

The a herers of this school stood at the spontaneous dialectical idea that everything in the world is in a state of eternal changeability, of an eternal "standing up" or "becoming". In their idea of the selfchanging and the s c. "stream in the Vaibhashika school there is no factual difference.

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The theory of identification of things or phenomena with the idea for them is considered to be a wrong one and there is an endeavour to a philosophical differentiation of the subject from the object. According to Sautrantika the ideas about things etc. are not objects, but their "copies" got as a result of mental and thinking activity.

Independently from the fact that this school supports the ideological thesis of the objective existence also of objective phenomena, it will be absolutely inconsistent to deny its materialistic directedness too. Hardly later (mainly in the XVIIIth and XIXth centuries) theism also crept in into the Sautrantika school.

Even only from the above mentioned Buddha's ideas and the typically Buddhist philosophical schools Vaibhashika and Sautrantika, we consider that the viewpoint about the existence of a materialistic directedness not only, but also of a spontaneous dialectical one in them is confirmed. In this sense sounds also the conclusion of Engels', that both the ancient Greeks and the early Buddhists have been spontaneous dialecticians.

CONCLUSION

Still at the beginning (Part I) we pointed out that we shall especially here dwell only upon some of the spontaneous-dialectical aspects of the ancient Indian philosophy. Our analysis had at that as an object foremostly ideas, thoughts, etc., having a definite materialistic or atheistic directedness. And it is hardly necessary to mention that respective dialectical aspects are also contained in a number of idealistic views, theories, etc. In general the ancient Indian philosophy is primitive and original not only in an ontologic and gnosiologic aspect, but also in a spontaneous-dialectical one.

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V

The Role of Hyperventilation Upon the Yoga Retention Time

Elena St. Marinova & Marin C. Marinov

I. INTROUCTION

It is known that oxidation processes during breath are some of the basic ones for man's vital activity. The environment conditions, the different activities of man and his health, physical and psychical condition have an essential influence upon the intensity of breath. The maintenance of breath activity and intensity on an optimal level is being performed from the breathing centre, which—according to modern science—lies in the lower part of the cerebellum. Nevertheless, with his different activities as speech, singing, etc., man disrupts the rythm of autoregulational breathing and deliberately directs his breathing activity. To direct, or more exactly, to retain according to his own wish his breathing, is something necessary for a great many kinds of activities and professions of man (e.g. the divers). An untrained man can retain his breath for 30-60 seconds. The trained one can increase this duration of time to 2 minutes and more. The time of breath retention depends on many factors, as :

1. The phase of breathing—in a condition of inhaled breath retention is longer than in a condition of exhaled breath.

2. Environmental temperature—when feeling coolness or heat the retention time is shorter.

3. Concentration of CO_2 in alveolar air—this is on the basis of the automatic mechanism for the rythm of breathing.

4. Food—unsuitable food and stomach overloading are strongly decreasing retention time.

5. Other factors as : age, general physical, psychical and health condition and constitution.

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6. Swallowing procesees and internal lung movements during retention increase its duration.

There exists a quick and effective method for breathing elongation, based upon the possibility to decrease the CO_2 concentration in the alveolar air through oxygen concentration increase. In normal breathing the concentration of CO_2 in the alveolar air does not exceed 13-14 per cent, due to the incomplete exchange during breathing, while in normal air it is about 18 20 per cent. Through hyperventilation it is possible to increase the O_2 concentration in alveolar air up to this upper limit (18 20 per cent). It is thought that this by itself will lead to an increase of retention by about 40-50 seconds. In the process of superventilation, that may last for a long time so that a repeated passage of the whole quantity of man's blood through the lungs is possible, the CO_2 concentration in blood will substantially decrease. This on its side will bring to an additional lengthening of the retention time, reaching a total of 2-4 minutes. When necessary one can resort from an extremal increase of the retention time to a superventilation in an oxygen atmosphere. Thus a 10 minutes superventilation in oxygen lengthens the retention time up to 6-14 minutes.[1,2] Breathing of pure oxygen, however, as it is known, is accompanied by different harmful effects for the organism (some of these are longlasting). On this reason the inhalation of pure oxygen is not recommendable. Besides, the oxygen concentration increase is not in the sense of the recommendation of Dr. Buteyko and many other well-known yogins.

In this way we come to the task to fix quantitatively the superventilation in such a way that we could achieve a maximal effect of the retention time increase at a minimal number of superventilation cycles. To this aim we set ourselves the task to investigate how retention time depends on the number of superventilation cycles.

II. THEORETICAL CONCLUSION FOR THE DEPENDENCE OF BREATH RETENTION TIME ON THE SUPERVENTILATION CYCLES

If we evaluate quantitatively the oxygen-(or respectively the alveolar blood-) saturation degree of alveolar air with the value q, and the maximal saturation degree with the value q_o, then obviously the value q will quantitatively change during one cycle by Δq — a value which must be proportional to the degree of non-saturation. Characterising itself with the difference between q_o and q, then

$$\frac{dq}{dn} = \lambda (q_o - q)$$

or

$$\frac{d(q_o - q)}{q_o - q} = -\lambda dn$$

$$\ln (q_o - q) = -\lambda n + a$$

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i.e,

$$q_o - q = e^{-\lambda n + a} = Ae^{-\lambda n}$$

where $n \to \infty$. $q \to q_o$, i.e. $A = q$
or finally

$$q = q_o (1 - e^{-\lambda n})$$

If we assume that the breath retention time T is proportional to q, so we can write down a similar expression for it too, i.e. :

$$T = T_{max} (1 - e^{-\lambda n})$$

III EXPERIMENT AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

The experiment was made by the authors of this article upon themselves during a two months' time — in the morning from 6 to 7 o'clock before breakfast, after a short preparation consisting of a light bestirring self-massage and a 5 minutes relaxation in a sitting posture. The investigations were carried out after the scheme of Professor Joshi[8], which we applied for a retention both in an inhaled state and in an exhaled one. At that, according to us, the "Kapala-bhati" procedure is not very easy to be mastered on a large scale and this technique is not connected with a full breathing. We thought that a procedure which is close to the "Bastrika" ventilation would be more complete. The number of cycles in 1 minute must not be very large, so as to render the procedure very tiring. On the other hand the cycle number must not be very small too, in order not to make the cycle speed very close to its speed at normal deep breathing. That is why we decided that a speed of 80-100 cycles in a minute is optimal. To find out how time of retention depends on the hyperventilation cycles we made retentions after a different number of hyperventilation cycles.

According to the scheme :

1. Every day, independently from how many hyperventilation cycles will be experimented with, after that retention of breath was done without hyperventilation, threefoldly in an inhaled stage, with pauses of 1 minute. We also did one retention in an exhaled state.

2. We carried out a fixed number of hyperventilation cycles, followed by one retention in an inhaled state, with one minute pause after that, a second retention without hyperventilation before it, one minute pause and one similar retention more. After another one minute pause — again one retention in a state of exhalation.

3 We made three retentions in an inhaled state and one in an exhaled state, with a fixed number of hyperventilation cycles before every retention.

The results of the experiments are shown in Table 1.

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TABLE 1

Number of super—ventilation cycles		5	10	20	40	60
without super-ventilation	retention in an inhaled state	60	63	61	63	70
	retention in an exhaled state	36	40	40	36	31
with superventilation only before the first retention	Ist retention (immediately after superventilation)	87	94	96	114	111
	IInd retention (1 min. after the first one)	69	84	76	79	87
	IIIrd retention (1 min. after the second one)	72	86	76	80	90
	IVth retention (1 min. after the IIIrd but in an exhaled state)	47	48	43	47	50
with super-ventilation before each retention	retention in an inhaled state	88	100	113	127	126
	retention in an exhaled state	52	66	82	93	86

* Each result shown in the table is an average arithmetic value of twenty measurements with an average quadratic fault of about 2.

IV. DISCUSSION OF THE EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

The results shown in the table give right to conclude that more than 30-40 hyperventilation cycles do not lead to a marked increase of retention time and thus it is not necessary to perform them (i. e. the dependence is connected with saturation).

The results of the table referring to retention with hyper-ventilation only before the first retention, show that the effect of the retention time lengthening due to hyperventilation disappears immediately after the first retention. Such a result is also noted by Professor Joshi. Not cleared up remained only the question whether the effect of hyperventilation will be sustained for some time after ceasing and if there is no immediate retention after that. In order to clear up that question we made an additional experiment in which we chose the number of hyperventilation cycles to be 40, because with this we are already sure of saturation. With this experiment a period of rest before retention follows the break of the last hyperventilation cycle during which time a normal breath goes on. The result is shown in Table 2.

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TABLE 2

Duratin of rest in seconds	30	60	90	120	180
Retention time without rest, in seconds	96	105	106	114	110
Retention time with rest, in seconds	126	130	130	139	123

* The average quadratic fault of the results is less than 4%.

As the table shows, the introduction of rest between the hyperventilation procedure and retention not only does not lead to a decrease of the retention time, but on the contrary — a certain increase is noted. The question remains to be settled how long this rest could be, and this will be the subject of an additional research. This matter is a debatable one and we shall accept with thanks all opinions, remarks and discussions on it.

The emotional picture during retention time was the following: immediately after hyperventilation, with the start of retention, we had a feeling of fatigue lasting 1/4 to 1/3 of the retention time. This was followed by a peculiar blissful state which sometimes covered 1/2 of the retention time; by the end of the retention time (about 1/4 of the time before the end of retention) a desire for inhaling emerged and when this became irresistible retention was interrupted. Swallowing and "breathing" movements at this last stage lead to a certain elongation of retention time.

The application of other techniques of superventilation as "Kapalabhati", a free accelerated deep breathing, lead to results different in their absolute value, but the observed regularities continued to exist.

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VI

Correlates of the Concept of the Self

R. Bharadwaj & H. M. Sharma

INTRODUCTION

Since the person cannot subscribe to a meaning of himself in a 'vacuum', the concept of self is generally a picture of self in some role, in certain situation, in some position, in performing certain set of functions or in some relationships, where personality remain the action system arising out of the interplay of self and role (Sarbin, 1959) Self as the central construct, (Jung, 1951, Roger's, 1959) is the core of one's being, (Koffka,1945), the end product of one's experience, (Blackham, 1968) or emerge as the nucleus of the personality.

Self as 'object' is a product of social interaction and is an important aspect of personality in which individual differences are meaningful, (Hall and Lindsey, 1957) and thus it is a person's view of himself (English and English, 1958), Eysenck, (1975) observes it as the totality of attitudes, judgements, values related to the behaviour qualities. It includes identification with standards, attitudes and values that he incorporates, as well as other's attitude towards an appraisal or himself alongwith person's evaluations and cognitions (Borgatto, 1965). It has both 'good me' and 'bad me' which provide pleasant feeling and dissatisfactions respectively structured on the basis of reality and value assumptions and give rise to 'self-identity'. This provides a 'self-ideal' and creates the frame of reference of the individual and characteristic life style is evolved that guides and control his behaviour.

Findings of so many researches have brought to the fore ample evidence with regard to the development of the self in different situations. He is noted that variation in interests affect the concept of self (Darley, J. G., 1941). Inadequate physical development demotes the concept of self (Mussen and Jones, 1957). Family influence makes a self image about himself (Perkins, 1958). Peers, parents and physical drive on the adolescents growing sense of self have

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also discussed (Ham A Check et al 1973). Age promotes the concept of self (Perkins, 1958) Self concept remains constant during adolescence in boys (Mong. R. H. 1973). School behaviour or positive perception of teachers promote the concept of self (Fullerton, 1973). Self concept is, sex proof (Smith, 1978), masculine (Engele, 1959, Nystul, 1974) and girls show different varities of self concept than boys. Peers relation promotes the concept of self in boys, in empathic adolescents (Kulshrestha, R., 1 82).

It is evident that the above related perspective of concept of self presents a clear picture regarding the correlates of self and the growth and integration of the self remains a vital concern at individuals own level and is also related to personality potentials, socio-economic settings, cultural influences, attitudes, value-orientations, interests, sex and education The main question arises as to — how do these peers relations, cultural determinism and sex affect the concept of self in university going students. Moreover, the above ingradients of relatedness have mostly drawn from foreign sources and a great need remains to have an Indian perspective.

Methodology and Design

The research comprises of one '2×2×2' trivariate experiment. This is based on factorial setting and 'ANOVAR' is used for different types of analysis because it provide us an extremely flexible procedure for determining the factors which influence the variation of the dependent variables (Roscoc, 1969). In such experiments the I. Vs are manipulated not through active control but through selection, because we enter the experiment usually allowing them to control artificially (D'Amato, 1970). The independent variables of this study are peers relation, in terms of high and low relation; cultural determinism in terms of cultural conformist and cultural rebellious or non conformist and sex in terms of boys and girls. The research paradigm thus have eight treatments and seven null hypotheses (i.e. 3 main effects, 3 bi variate inter-actions and one trivariate interaction). The dependent variable is the concept of the self. The scores for each variable have been obtained through the standardized tools.

Sample

The elements of the Universe are 250 students of Aligarh town studying in undergraduate classes, both boys and girls and remain distributed in clusters of two different colleges of Aligarh. The elements are listed and drawn at random with regard to their sex. The final sample of 80 elements as per requirements of the research paradigm has b en drawn at random through a multistaged random sampling. In the sampling method it is also noted that the required size of 80 elements out of 250 sample remain a good estimate of the universe at large.

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Results

'The ANOVAR Summary'

Source	SS	df.	M.Sc.	F.
Treatment	436.50	7		
PR	8.45	1	8.45	0.79
CD.	0.80	1	0.89	0.07
Sex	12.80	1	12.80	1.20
PRxCD	33 80	1	33.80	3.17
PRxSex	304 20	1	304.20	28.61xx
CDxSex	76.05	1	76.05	7.15xx
PRxCDxSex	0.45	1	0.45	0.04
Error	765 40	72	10.63	
Total	1201.95	79		

Through the empirical verification of seven null hypotheses it is now clear that Ho No. 1, 2 and 3 are retained, Hence peers relation, cultural determinism and sex does not affect the concept of the self univariately. Interaction exists between peers relation and sex and between sex and cultural determinism. Hence Ho No. 4 is retained and 5 and 6 are rejected. Ho No. 7 is also partially rejected. The breakup show 3 significant results :

Source	SS	F
PR x Sex — CDH	140.62	13.22xx
PR x Sex — CDL	164.02	15.42xx
CD x Sex — PRH	44.10	4 14x

Summary of Results

1. Peers relation promotes the concept of self in—boys either they are conformist or rebellious.
2. Peers relation denotes the concept of self in girls either they are conformist or rebellious.
3. Cultural determinism promotes the concept of self in girls and in girls possessing good Peer's relations.
4. Cultural determinism denotes the concept of self in boys and in boys possessing high Peers relations.
5. The concept of self is masculine in high Peers relation possessing adolescents, in rebellious adolescents, in adolescents possessing high Peers relation imbued with conformity or non-conformity.
6. The concept of self is feminine in less Peers ralation possessing adolescents, in conformist adolescents, and in adolescents possessing less Peers relation with or without cultural conformity.

Discussion and Conclusion

To say that Peers relation promotes the concept of self in both boys and girls (Kulshrestha, 1982) is partially confirmed. With our

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findings, that peers relation promotes the concept of self in boys either they possess conformity to the culture or they are rebel to it. Here we notice that peers relations demotes also the concept of self in girls either they are conformist or rebellious. It's a new fact. Whereas conformity to the culture promotes the concept of self in girls in general or they possess high peers relations, but cultural determinism demotes the concept of self in boys and also when imbued with high peers relation, Self concept is feminine, (Perkins, 1958, Engele, 1959, Musa et al, 1973, Nyslul, 1974) is also confirmed with new addition when they possess less peers relations. Masculinity of the concept of self is also observed and confirmed with the findings of (Engele, 1959, Feiss, D. et al, 1975 and Sue et al 1978). It is also noted that the self concept is also masculine in high peers relation possessing adolescents, in rebellious adolescents and in those adolescents possessing high peers relations imbued with conformity or non-conformity.

Thus in Indian socio-cultural setting, peers relation, cultural determinism and sex are important correlate of the self. It is important to note that Indian adolescents develop their concept of self in a quite different manner with most who have associated to their cultural possessions, customs, peers relations and it is more pleasing to observe that Indian ideology in its socio-cultural setting is more congenial to the growth of concept of the self. The Hindu philosophy states that the self is but a speck of the Brahma, the infinite being and of which the philosophy speaks neti, neti.

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VII

The Effect of Death Anxiety on Muslim Preachers and Non-Preacher

Abu Sufian Zilli

Death is terrible to Cicero, desirable to Cato and indifferent to Socrates

Man's concern with death is as old as his existence on this planet, and he like every other living being is destined to die. Does human existence really come to an end with death or an event of death is just one among the countless other events of existence. This question has haunted human mind since milliea. Individual is not prepared to part with his identity and existence. Life may come to an end on the physical plane but its existence and identity must continue. Man cannot possibly reconcile with the idea of total annihilation. Identity and existence are, therefore, dearer to a person than life itself. Man is not perhaps afraid of death. He is afraid of the annihilation of his existence through the inevitable process of death.

Almost all religions based on faith support man's aspiration for the continuation of his identity and existence.

Here specially, Islamic religious philosophy teaches us that an abiding existence beings when the mundane existence comes to an end. This worldly life is only a preparation for lasting existence in after-life. The good and bad actions of an individual decide his fate and he is entirely responsible for his seeds thereafter. Islamic religious philosophy develops a kind of psychology in the individual that develops the fear of death in terms of its consequences. But, at the same time, it also encourages the love of God to the extent that one can emancipate or shed away the fear of death through it entirely. Death can bring for him a better and lasting existence where he can re unite with his Lord.

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A person having a strong faith in God, charged with the love of God, tends to transcend the fear of death and even tumultuously welcomes death because it extends the meaning of existence. Death anxiety cannot, therefore, overtake and haunt the mind of an individual who carries a faith leading Islam. The investigator, therefore, assumes that death anxiety would be minimum among the respondents who have a strong religious involvement and participation. Although reports are contradictory in this regard, but one thing seems to stand out rather clearly from the hitherto studies. People who have a deep religious involvement does seem to have the ability to overcome death anxiety.

In the earlier studies reported in the symposium of 1960 Swenson and Jeffers et al definitely reported a different type of relationship between death anxiety and religious attitudes.

In their study entitled, "Religiosity, Generalized Anxiety and Apprehension Concerning Death", Williams and Cole found that high religiosity manifested the least anxiety on all dimensions of insecurity. Low religiosity group showed greatest generalized insecurity and anxiety. The middle group of the religiosity dimensions showed high scores on physiological measures of general anxiety. This study actually contradicts Freud's observation that religion is the product of insecurity. It is interesting to note in this study that deep involvement yields low scores on generalized anxiety and apprehensions about death. Moreover, the religious attitude was measured in terms of participation in religions and not mere verbal admission that one believes in religion. However, the study conducted by Martin and Wrightman also found that high religiosity was associated with less fear of death.

Burrows (1971) has drawn attention to the fact that "it is not religiosity perse but comfort with his religious beliefs that determines a person's fear of death and attitude towards death." Templer (1972) has brought out the role of deep religious involvement in minimizing the fear of death. Martin and Wrightman (1964) have pointed out that little attention has been given to philosophy of religion. While, it is believed that the specific nature of death anxiety, depends on the type of religious involvement which, in our opinion, is governed by a particular philosophy of religion.

The significance of this study is derived from the fact that death anxiety has been studied in a cultural background where attitude towards death differ drastically from the attitudes which have their roots in the modern western civilization. Death is not abhorred by the Indian people, nor do they consciously or unconsciously avoid talking about death. On the contrary, death has meaning and significance for the Indian mind in the context of their religious background.

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No study of this sort has come to the knowledge of the investigator through a survey of literature in this area. Hence, this study can be said to be of an original nature and is thus worthwile and significant in its own right.

Design :

Since the idea leading present investigation stem-forth from certain major points of Islamic philosophy contained in the Holy Quran Therefore, 52 Muslim subjects were avowed from different revered seats of Islamic theology of Azamgarh districts, whose age ranges between 55 to 58 years. In order to keep the investigation within manageable limits, only one religion, namely, Islam was studied. An original form of Templer's (1970) Death Anxiety Scale was administered individually on each subject of both the Preacher and Non Preacher groups. The scores were subjected to t-test with the view to obtain the significance of difference between two group means. An interview was also scheduled in the light of two categories of words, namely, 'A' and 'B', which are related to two different aspects of the philosophy of religion relevant to one's concern about death.

Category 'A'	Category 'B'
1 Nakirain	1 Zikr
2 Azab e Qabr	2 Tobah and Istighfar
3 Dozakh	3 Aurad and Wazaif

Category 'A' included words related to "ordeals in the grave" while category 'B' included words related to "preparation for death".

Result :

The most frequently used statistical technique e.g. t-test was applied to work out the result. The means and S.D's of the preacher and non preacher groups were found to be 13.42, 5.10 and 15 38. 6 25 respectively. The t-value obtained for this difference was 2.10 which is significant at .05 level obviously.

The result presented in the exact figures tends to bring to limelight an interesting aspect of the relationship between death anxiety and religious faith. In spite of their involvement in religion, death anxiety is significantly higher among Non Preacher Muslims than the Preacher ones, the means being 15.38 and 13.42 respectively, and significant at .05 level.

Certainly, it is true that Islamic religious philosophy tends to develop an attitude which enables a person to overcome fear of death.

This result tends to support the view of Templer (1972) that death anxiety is considerably allievated through deep involvement in religions.

However, the finding of the present investigation gives us an indubitable picture of Islamic religious philosophy when we go deeper into their meaning. The deeper analysis of the result brought to light the fact that Non Preacher Muslims were actually frightened with the immediate and remote consequences of death and not of the

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very fact of death itself which enhances fear of death instead of minimizing it.

Unfortunately, a comparative study involving Preacher and Non Preacher Muslims is not found elsewhere in the literature which is available to the present investigator.

It is also quite understandable in the light of aforesaid fact that Non Preacher Muslims having lesser involvement in religion would tend to be more heavily dominated by this worldly attitude and hence they might perceive death as terrifying because it takes away every thing in which they are sentimentally involved. A number of respondents who were interviewed by the investigator in each group did express clearly their anxiety-ridden attitude as regard the consequences of death in after-life.

It appears that death anxiety as related to religious faith has many dimensions. And the fear of hell as a consequence of death can possibly enhance death anxiety. It is not, therefore, surprising to find that deeper religious involvement in this sense decreases death anxiety.

Conclusion :

Studies around death anxiety requires a close examination and scrutiny in the light of the investigation.

Religious outlook, religious faith, religiosity, religious beliefs and religious operation, all need clarification from a methodological view point before we can assess their effect on death anxiety.

We, therefore, suggest that different dimensions of the fear of death must be thoroughly investigated and different types of religious involvement must be carefully studied in the context of specific cultural background before we can say anything safely about the relationship of death anxiety and religious beliefs. Information gathered through cross-cultural studies would be indispensable in this regard in the opinion of this investigator. Hence, further studies of the relationship of different religious faith and fear of death might be a good step in this direction.

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VIII

Vedic Gods : An Analytical Study

D. Nirmala Devi

In the earlier stage, every god was looked upon as the creator of the universe. Almost all the *mantrās* in the *Ṛg Veda* were in praise of gods. These gods were the masters of the moving spirits of the different powers of Nature. Unlike the Greek Gods, they cannot be separated in water-tight compartments. Like the natural powers they represented, they were also co-related with one another.

In the *Nighaṇṭu* the word '*Aditi*' is given as synonym of *Pṛthivi*,[1] the earth, *Vāk*,[2] voice, *Go*,[3] cow and in dual form, of *Dyāvāpṛthivi*[4], heaven and earth. In the *Nirukta* it is defined as 'unimpaired'[5]. In another part of the same work the word '*Aditi*' has been used as the name of a goddess who is placed at the head of the female divinities of the intermediate region.[6] According to Yāska, *Agni* is also called *Aditi*.[7] Skandasvāmin says the word '*Aditi*' has been used in different senses in different schools of Vedic interpretation. *Aitihāsikas*, the historians or legendrians take *Aditi*, as the mother of gods, while the *Nairuktas* the etymologists, as 'unimpairedness'; *Ādhyātmikas*, the spiritualists, take *Aditi* and *Prakṛti*, Nature.[8]

According to Max Muller, '*Aditi*' a god or goddess, is in reality the earliest name invented to express the 'Infinite'; not the Infinite

1 *Yāska-Nighaṇṭu*, Ed. Rajwade, I. 14. BORI, Poona, 1940.
2 *Ibid.*, I. II. 48
3 *Ibid.*, II-11. 6.
4 *Ibid.*, III. 30 21.
5 *Nirukta of Yāska with Comm. Durgācārya*, Rg. IV. 22. Ed. Bhandarker, Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, No. LXXXV, BORI, Poona, 1942.
6 *Ibid*, XI. 22.
7 *Ibid*, XI. 23.
8 *Nirukta of Yāska with Comm of Skandasvāmin*. 3 Vols Ed Sarup. L., Lahore, 1931.

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as the result of a long process of abstract reasoning, but the visible Infinite, visible, as it were, by the naked eye, the endless expanse beyond the earth, beyond the clouds, beyond the sky.[9] In many passages of the *Ṛg Veda*, *Pṛthivi* and *Aditi*, are mentioned separately and in those passages they are explicitly distinct from each other. Thus in the *Ṛg Veda* it is said : "May Earth and Heaven, the Sun, the waters, hear us, and the wide firmament ..... May *Aditi* with the *Ādityas* hear us."[10] "I invoke *Indra. Agni, Mitra, Varuṇa. Aditi*, Heaven, Earth, Sky, *Maruts*, Mountains and Waters."[11] O father Heaven, O beneficient mother Earth, O brother *Agni*, O *Vasus*, be gracious to us. All ye *Ādityas*, O *Aditi* united, grant us mighty protection.[12]

These and other passages explicitly bear out the fact that *Aditi* and *Pṛthivi* are not identical. Had they been identical they would not have been stated separately. In the *Atharvaveda* it is said: "The Earth our mother, *Aditi* the place of production, the mid-region our brother, save us from imprecation".[13]

In the *Ṛg Veda* it is said : "May *Aditi* defend us, may *Aditi* guard and shelter us, mother of wealthy *Mitras* and of *Aryaman* and *Varuṇa*".[14] In this passage *Aditi* is treated as nature who can protect and give shelter. In many passages of the *Ṛg Veda* she is invoked along with other deities to grant wealth in abundance, felicity and shelter. She is characterised as "the luminous, the celestial, and upholder of the people".[15] She is said to have possessed of "perfect, celestial, deathless meet for worship".[16] "May *Aditi* who is not — two, protect our cattle by day and by night. May ever increased *Aditi* protect us from sin".[17] She is the source and substance of all things, celestial and intermediate, divine and human, present and future. In the *Ṛg Veda* it is said: "*Aditi* is the Heaven; *Aditi* is mid-air, *Aditi* is the Mother and the sire and son; *Aditi* is all the Gods; *Aditi* is the five-classed men; *Aditi* is all that hath been born and shall be born."[18] This description of things, visible and invisible,

9 Max Muller F : *Vedic Hymns* (Tr) RV. I. 166. 12, n.4; of the Rg Veda, i. 230, SBE, No. XXXII, Oxford, London, 1891.

10 Ralph T. H. Griffith : *The Hymns of the Ṛg Veda*, III. 54. 19. 20. Ed. Shastri, J. L , Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, 1973, p. 192.

11 *Ibid.*, V. 46. 3 , p. 268

12 *Ibid.*, VI. 51 5 , p. 318.

13 Bloomfield, M: *Hymns of the Atharva Veda* (Tr.) 120. 2.

14 Ralph T. H. Griffith: *The Hymns of the Ṛg Veda*, VIII. 47. 9. Ed. Shastri J. L., Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, 1973, p. 435.

15 *Ibid.*, I. 136. 3., p. 94.

16 *Ibid* , I. 185. 3., p. 124.

17 *Ibid.*, VIII. 18. 6., p. 407.

18 *Ibid.*, I. 89. 10, p. 57.

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proves that *Aditi* is the personification of universal nature. In the *Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa* it is stated that *Aditi* is the body or outer form of the conscious principle which lies in the sun, moon, lightning and mid region etc.[19] In the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* it is said that *Aditi* is all this.[20]

In the *Deva Sūkta* of the *Ṛg Veda*, the process of creation is described as follows : "In the earliest age of the Gods, sprang out of non-existence. There after were the regions born. This sprang from productive power."[21] "Earth sprang from the Productive Power; the quarters were born from the earth; *Dakṣa* was born of *Aditi*, and *Aditi* was *Daksa's* child".[22] After her the auspicious gods were born.[23] Eight are the sons of *Aditi*, who were born of her body. With her seven sons she went to meet the gods and threw away *Mārtaṇda* (the eighth).[24] With seven sons *Aditi* approached the former generation of gods; she again produced *Mārtaṇda* for birth as well as for death."[25] On the passage '*Dakṣa* was born of *Aditi* and *Aditi* from *Dakṣa*'. Yāska remarks, "*Dakṣa* is an *Āditya*, i.e. the son of *Aditi*, and is praised among the *Ādityas*. And *Aditi*, on the other hand, is the daughter of *Dakṣa*, according to the text, *Dakṣa* sprang from *Aditi* and *Aditi* from *Dakṣa* How can this be possible ? They may have had the same origin, or according to the nature of the gods they might have been born from each other and have derived their substance from each other".[26] According to this observation of Yāska, it seems that both *Đakṣa* and *Aditi* are eternal and interdependent.

Every god was looked upon as the creator of the universe. Every god was considered as the supreme at one time or other. In the *Ṛg Veda*, God *Viṣṇu* is shown as having measured out the three worlds with his three steps—

> I will proclaim the mighty deeds of Viṣṇu of him who measured out the earthly spaces, who firmly propping up the higher station stood out in triple regions widely pacing,[27]

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19 *Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa*, I. 41. 7.

20 *Ait. Ar with comm. of Sāyanacārya*, III. 1. 6. Anandashrama Sanskrit Granthawali, No. 32. 2 Vols. 1930.

21 Ralph T. H. Griffith : *The Hymns of the Ṛg Veda*, X. 72 3. Ed. Shastri J. L., Motilal Banarasidas, Delhi, 1973, p. 585.

22 *Ibid.*, X. 72 04., p. 585.

23 *Ibid.*, X 72.5, p. 585.

24 *Ibid.*, X. 72.8, p. 585.

25 *Ibid.*, X. 72.9, p. 585.

26 *Nirukta of Yāska — with comm. Durgācāra*, XI. 23. Ed. Bhandarkar, Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit series, No. LXXXV, BORI, Poona, 1942.

27 MacDonell A. A. : *Hymns from the Ṛg Veda*, I. 154.1. Associate Press, Calcutta, 1923.

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Him whose three foot-steps filled with mead unfailing,
Raveal his blissful joy : who has supported
Alone the universe in three divisions
The earth and sky and all created beings.[28]

Gods like *Viśvedevas, Indra, Agni, Maruts* and Trastar are spoken of as having been made from the earthly and heavenly regions .

What was that one who is the unborn's image hath stablished and fixed firm these world's six regions.[29]

Max Muller says : "So, it was with these names of the Vedic Gods. They were all meant to express the Beyond, the Invisible behind the visible, the Infinite within the Finite, the Supernatural above the Natural, the Divine, Omnipresent and Omnipotent".[30]

"They call him *Indra, Mitra, Varuṇa, Agni* and he is heavenly nobly-winged *Garutmān*. To what is one, sages give many a title : They call it *Agni, Yama, Mātariśvan*".[31]

Among the architects of the universe *Viśvakarman, Hiraṇyagarbha* and the Person are important. There are two hymns about *Viśvakarman* in the available text of the *Ṛg Veda*. These hymns describe the process of the formation of the world. It is *Viśvakarman* who gave form to the world.

Viśvakarman has eyes all round, he has his face turned in all directions. He, the one God, created the Heaven and the Earth, and in so doing he blew out with both his arms, with wings. Wise men can ask this question as to what abode he had been in when he created the world. What were his highest abodes, intermediate abodes and the lowest ones ? *Viśvakarman* is asked to give instruction about oblations and also to perform sacrifice with his own body Through oblations, *Viśvakarman* expands, He is asked to perform a sacrifice with Heaven and Earth.[32]

In the second poem, the different qualities of *Viśvakarman* have been mentioned. He is the creator and the author of the diversification in the world. He sees all, knows all the worlds, bearing the one name of the gods. The waters are spoken of as bearing the first "Law" where all the gods had the vision.[33]

We get some clear information regarding the formation of the world in hymn attributed to *Hiraṇyagarbha*. The hymn starts with

28 *Ibid* , I. 153. 4

29 Ralph T. H. Griffith : *The Hymns of the Ṛg Veda*, I. 164. 6. Ed. Shastri, J. L., Motilal Banarasidas, Delhi, 1973, p. 110.

30 Max Muller, F: *The Vedas*, Sushil Gupta (India) Ltd., Calcutta, 1956.

31 Ralph T. H. Griffith : *The Hymns of the Ṛg Veda*, I. 164. 46. Ed. Shastri, J. L., Motilal Banarasidas, Delhi, 1973, p. 113.

32 *Ibid* , X. 81. 1-7., p. 591.

33 *Ibid.*, X. 82, 1-7, p. 591.

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a glorification of *Hiraṇyagarbha*, as the one who existed in the beginning at the head of all, the one lord of all that have come into existence. The hymn contains ten verses, and in the first nine of them there is refrain at the end, 'To which god may we make offerings ?' He is described as supporting the Heaven and the Earth, as the giver of soul and strength, as one whose commands the gods adore, whose shadow both immortality and death are, as the king of all that breathes and that keep their eyes open, as the one to whom belong the snowclad mountain and the oceans the cardinal points. He made the Heaven and Earth firm, he established the heaven, he measured out the space in the atmospheric regions. The Heaven and Earth look upon him. The whole of immense water went to him. He viewed the waters in his greatness, when the waters bore dexterity, when they produced the sacrifices. He was the one God above all the gods.[34]

When we come to the '*Sukta*', attributed to '*Puruṣa*' as the source of the universe, we find a significant change. In the case of the *Viśvakarman* and *Hiraṇyagarbha*, they are only the active agents. So the material cause is external. In the 'Supreme Person' we see for the first time a monistic principle in which the efficient and material cause got united. The description appears in a *Sukta* of sixteen verses. Here, we find the self-transformation of the infinite one into the finite many.

There is a glorificatson of the '*Puruṣa*' as having a thousand heads, a thousand eyes and a thousand feet. He encompasses the whole world and stands out ten fingers beyond that. It is to be noted that *Puruṣa* is not only one with the world but beyond it. The idea of transcendence is suggested by the statement that he is ten fingers beyond the cosmos. This all is the *Puruṣa*. He lords over immortality. Such is his greatness, and the '*Puruṣa*' is greater than that; the whole world is just one quarter of His and the three quarters of His, the immortal, is in the Heaven.

It is here that what is termed as '*Virat*' is said to have come out from the 'Supreme Person'. And another person was produced out of it. This person, being born, surpassed the world both before and behind. When this person sacrificed ('*yajña*'), all the beings in the air, in the woods and in the villages were born. The vedas arose out of this sacrifice. The various animals like the horses and the cows and the goats and sheep were also produced in this sacrifice. Here the entire process of creation is spoken of as a sacrifice ('*yajña*). Here a question is raised about this *Puruṣa* that was transformed into material at the sacrifice by the gods as to what became of his face, arms, thighs and feet. The reply that is given is that the wise

34 Thomas E. J. : *Vedic Hymns*, RV. X. 121. 1-10, John Murray, London, 1923.

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people were his face, the warriors were his arms, the thighs became the traders and out of his feet were produced the manual labourers. The moon was born out of his mind and the sun from his two eyes. *Indra* and the Fire were born from his face and the air came out of his breath. The atmosphere was produced out of his navel, and the heaven from his head. The earth was born from his two feet and the cardinal points came out of his ears. In this sacrifice, the Spring Season became the ghee, the Summer Season became the fuel and the Autumn became the oblation. The whole world was produced in this way. This is what happened when the gods performed the sacrifice with the *Puruṣa*. The *Sūkta* concludes with a verse in which it is mentioned that this sacrifice performed by the gods became the first process of law. It is also said that in this sacrifice the demi-gods (*Sādhyas*) and the poet-sages (*Ṛṣis*) also participated. Here we find that three-fold agencies of the good, the demi-gods (*Sādhyas*) and the poets participate in the sacrifice. But there is no clear indication about the way in which these agencies came into being. As they participate in the sacrifice in which the '*Puruṣa*' is the offering, they precede the appearance of the '*Puruṣa*'.[35]

There is another idea about the formation of the world found in the Vedas. It is philosophical in nature, but stated in a beautiful poetical language. It is called the 'Song of Creation'. The *Sūkta* starts with a description of the state of the world. There is no distinction between what is and what is not. There was no atmospheric region nor celestical region beyond. There was no indication of night and day. Here we find the principle of causality, which not only traces the whole universe to a single source but also suggests what its nature may be. All opposites like being and non-being, death and life, good and evil, are viewed as developing from within and therefore, have the possibilities of being reconcilable again in this fundamental principle. There was that one who breathed without a breath of air. Other than that there was nothing. In the beginning there was darkness hidden in darkness. All this was a sea of water with no mark or indication. On this there arose a will in the beginning, which was the first germ for the mind. The rays of light stretched across, was it below or was it above? Who then knows, who can explain, whence there arose this manifold creation? Even the gods appeared only after this manifolding process. Hence who knows whence that came into being? Listen, this manifold came from something, whether it created it or did not create it. That supreme lord in the highest heaven it is that is such a something and perhaps he knows; perhaps he too does not know it.[36] In this *Sūkta* the expression '*Tad Ekam*' ('that one') is very significant. It shows how the notion of a monistic principle is tending to emerge out.

35 *Ibid*, X. 90, 1 to 16.

36 MacDonell, A. A.: *Hymns from the Ṛg Veda*, X. 129, 1 to 7, Associate Press, Calcutta, 1923.

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IX

A Marxian Critique of Pragmatism

P. Pramada Devi

It is not the aim of this paper either to compare or analyse the philosophic value of either philosophies—both Pragmatism and Marxism may be having certain inconsistencies, but it should be noted that the basic feature of both philosophies is the philosophy of action, thus logical analysis shows that they belong to the same social system. As action is the fundamental idea of their philosophies they are more concerned with the empirical world, thus their negligence of transcendental order does not make any difference as far as demand of social action is concerned. Doctrine of supramundance world is rejected by orthodox marxism, yet it is accepted by a large number of catholics and muslims. Marxian way of social transformation is well accepted by many parts of the world giving priority over spiritual salvation. The social transformation meets the urgent earthly needs for which every single individual looks forward. It is this 'Pragmatic necessity' that made the large number of people opt the marxian way which can give a very safe feeling that they can achieve the immediate result only through this—because it is concerned with the philosophy of action—the social action.[1] Ignoring the mystical elements, pragmatic philosophy if examined in the light of practical aspects it becomes very clear why these two philosophies are much accepted by the greater part of the world. If only we can avoid the identification of pragmatism with American capitalism and protestant ethics then it can be considered as a method meant for resolving the tensions that arise in the new emerging civilization and then alone the pragmatic insistence that truth and

1 "Social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which mislead theory into mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice". Marx. Theses on Feuerbach.

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consequences are related can be understood. Whatever may be the motive behind but then moral worth of a social action can be judged only by the consequences flowing from it. Whether the supramundance order is rejected or accepted is a serious and a responsible philosophic choice, yet often this option is exercised only on the pragmatic basis. Thought does build a bridge between the empirical and transcendental order. It needs an existential leap, Kants attitude reflects this critical transition from theoretical to the practical reason. When Marx said religion is the opium of life, he was much criticised by the world of religion, but his rejection of religion was a pragmatic act. His feeling that philosophers have only interpreted the world but the need is to change[2], is also a clear evidence that reflects his pragmatic thought of action, May be it is religious or aesthetic, the contemplative activity presents a psychological problem to the revolutionary, and the revolutionary is in a fix of mystical dimensions and religious aspects, it is in such moments one has to overcome the ecstasy and make a return to the world of finite human beings, built by history from his 'promethean' age. But pragmatic method does not offer a 'technique' of such return, its emphasis on the right or will to believe makes the transition from belief to reality a dangerous of adventurous affair.

Pragmatism if means the maxim of Peirce to "consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object".[3] This maxim to certain extent guides and governs the marxist and non-marxist, and also helps in making certain responsible decision of the political choices. Very rarely we take up the logical analysis of the decisions that we arrive at-because we some how feel the justification of the choice. William James' identification of truth with good,[4] pragmatically arrived can be treated as a rationalization and justification because we have no other alternative by which we can say a proposition to be called pragmatically arrived at, it is in a way a naturalistic fallacy that defines action only in biological terms. Often Marxism also has to face this situation because any kind of action taken up by the 'leaders of action' in the interest of public is offered only such justification, when the adjective 'pragmatic' is used with any noun. care should be taken to avoid the ambiguity, but the ambiguity in the term pragmatism provides a chance to use it with any economic, political choice. Pragmatism, because of its identi-

2 "The philosopher's have only interpreted the world in various ways, the point is to change it" Marx and Engles on The German Ideology. p. 199.

3 Peirce. Philosophy in the 20th century. Introduction p. 59.

4 James. William Pragmatism. p. 59.

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fication of consequences with truth or non truth of a proposition makes justified with any philosophy or ideology we are dealing with. Even the adjective beneficial before the consequence, does not remove the ambiguity for the reason that when the action concerned is political act, the consequences are weighed by the agency which decides and not those who 'suffer' them. The situation remains identical whether the state is in the popular terms or according to the claims of the rulers, democratic or non-democratic. If it is true that in a theoretical discourse words change their meaning when their context changes, it becomes truer when the context is the empirical world of political decisions. The pragmatic caution that a belief does not remain true and therefore good, if it incidentally clashed with other greater vital benefits,[5] does not remove this ambiguity because it is after all the same men who are asked to decide if, firstly there was a clash, and secondly, what were those benefits with whom clash is not desirable.

The pragmatic theory of John Dewy, in Hegelian tradition, rightly insists that our ideas, beliefs, and purposes are not isolatable items of private experience to which consciousness of the individual has privileged access, but products of the whole interactive system of cultural institutions.[6] Dewey is aware that the idealistic tradition of the separation of theory and practice has resulted in the isolation of the 'executive means' and 'ideal interests' and therefore the solution can be found only in action wherein the phenomena of material and economic life are equated with the purposes that commands the loyalties of affection and purpose, and in which ends and ideals are framed in terms of the possibilities of actually experienced situations. It is here on this point of the unity of theory and practice that a dialogue between pragmatists and marxists becomes not only possible but might prove fruitful, Dewey's insistence on such a unity of theory and practice comes in a sharp contrast to the primacy of practice which James Pragmatic method implies. A consequence, not so much logical as psychological, of the intention to regard practice as primary is that James feels ecstatic when he talks of the present moment and contrasts it with that deadly prudential, preoccupation with a hypothetical future which misses the quality and excitement of the present existence.[8] This consciousness of immediate existence creats a right...and a will... to believe but fails to link the present with future which leads to the purposeful

5 Ibid., p 59

6 John Dewey Reconstruction Philosophy 20 h century Philosophy Reconstruction Moral Conceptions. p. 102

7 John Dewey: The Quest of Certainty, 'The construction of Good'.

8 James. William. Pragmatism p. 64.

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social action. To certain extent Dewey's integral view also fails to connect the present and future. It is here the marxian concept of a historical epoch' unifies the past with the present and points to the concrete future possibilities which lie hidden in the past-present continuum. In his analysis of time William James gives a significant concept of spacious present, which, in the life of an individual inincludes his personal past which has some sort of continuity, perceptual and effective, with the present and also extends towards the future having continuity with regards to the present universe of desires and hopes. The spacious capacity of spacious present depends upon the life-scheme of the person. The marxian concept of historical epoch is such a spacious present for beings who live, participate, and also struggle to transform their life situation. Man, as he is a series of relationships swings back and forth into the stream of history and forms and reforms his relationship with the natural and human world not merely to adjust with the world (as Dewey wants us to believe) but also to transform it according to his felt needs. William James could think of the spacious present in terms of personal experience, as his American experience does not allow him to grapple with past but pushes him to conquer the future. In the old and classical societies not only the third world but also the European world, the present extends far beyond into the past and forward into a future which can only be conquered through a full understanding of the past. As Santayana[9] has pointed out, not by behavioral adjustment as implied in Dewey's instrumentalism, but only by a radical restructuring of the entire social relationship that this man will be able to conquer the future and transform his situation. Many of such instances are offered by the contemporary history of the third world.

A theory of social action can become significant only when it is relevant to such a unified epoch and it is in this time-perspective that unity of theory and practice becomes instrumentally relevant. Satisfactoriness in concrete facts and truth taken abstractly and verified in the long run cannot be equated, as the temporary satisfactority is often false.[10] Though William James often talks about future, that sounds nearer to the future enjoyed in an aesthetic experience. But the future relevant for social action aimed at a change in the concrete situation of life is a determinate one, determined by the necessities of what Marx called the totality of the 'productive relations' and the 'forces of production'. Human history is not a static one, many news things do take place but not in the manner as they occur in the realm of Art. In the world of concrete human

9 George. Santayana: Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics. 20th Century Philosophy p. 372.

10 James William. Pragmatism p. 249.

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beings they are continuous with the past achievements and the concrete present possibilities.

Marx would have agreed with pragmatists, particularly with John Dewey, that man is self creative, but would have insisted that this self creation is a historical process, determined by the actual forces operating in a determinate situation. But as Marxian anthropology implies, this determinate situation is not viewed by all the participants of this process uniformly; it is viewed in a different way, rather in an opposite manner by the classes that comprise a given society and consequently the pragmatic test is also applied differently. It is here the ontological situation determines the epistemological. Phenomenologically speaking, the deprived masses of the third world will test the achievements and failures of their social systems from the point of view of their needs and the only criterion which they will employ will be the amount of promise the system offers to them in raising human condition. In this situation of conflict in the respective value systems of the class which manages the resources and the classes which receive the 'wages' a uniform measure of success which the pragmatic method implies becomes impossible. In this situation the pragmatic concept of theory and practice too suffers a breach. Man's knowledge of himself and his situation gets determined by his productive activity—the praxis and his judgement about the success of the system influenced by his perception of change in his situation. As Marx has rightly pointed out, this awareness of the total situation makes him an 'objective suffering being' but as his objects of desire and drives exist out side him as objects independent of him and also indispensable to the exercise and confirmation of his essential powers, these objects acquire a significant relationship with his being, they define his ontological position; he can express his life in such real sensuous objects". It means that man acquires meaningful relations with the world only in the process of history. Dewey says this process as a process of growing unities while William James says that human experience grows into a system of empirical unification, but as human experiences are not merely subjectively different, they also grow into different systematic unities according to their life-experience in terms of economic classes and social groupings, thus their universe of meaning and their thematic universe becomes systematically different. In the process of social action the subjective gets subsumed under the historical objectivity. Man does not over come the solipsistic predicament in an abstract epistemological scheme, but only by participation in the historical process which devides the 'others' into the oppressor, other the 'hell' and the fellow oppressed with whom he

11 Karl. Marx. Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts p. 389. Early Writings of Marx, Penguin Books 1975.

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has common universe of suffering to share. In this divided world, which this world is, a common measure of success or satisfaction can be a pragmatic dream, if such a phrase can be used, if any attempt at a pragmatic consensus cannot prolong the life of the 'illusory community in which, upto the present, individuals have combined and (which) always acquired an independent existence apart from them.[12] Since this consensual community denies to them their proper ontological status, they the oppressed, will not be satisfied by its success, they demand their full share in the social process. It is here to meet this demand the basic principle of action in both the philosophies viz. Pragmatism and Marxism is examined.

12 Ibid.

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X

A Proposed Classifications of Error

L. P N. Sinha

The following are the classifications of Error :



I— ERROR :

An Error is a false judgement made about an object perceived; and the falsity of the judgement regarding the object perceived is known after the truth is known. For instance : On perceiving a straight stick, partially immersed in water as bent a false judgement "This stick (straight) is bent" is made; but the falsity of the judgement is known after it is discovered that the stick is straight and not bent. Again on perceiving a piece of rope probably as a snake, a false judgement "This is a snake," is passed; but the falsity of the judgement is known after it is discovered that there is only a piece of rope and not snake.

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From the above it follows that an Error is not in the phenomenon i. e. either in a straight stick (partially immersed in water) looking bent or in the piece of rope appearing as a snake but in the belief that the visible stick is identical with the tangible stick instead of being different and distinct or the visible rope is identical with the tangible snake instead of being different and distinct.

The Error may be classified into : Perceptual Error and Conceptual Error. Let me first clarify the Perceptual Error.

II— PERCEPTUAL ERROR :

A Perceptual Error is an error which arises if we anticipate that an assertion about an object perceived in a particular perceptual situation is also true regarding an assertion about an object perceived in another perceptual situation. For instance : Perceptual Error arises if by perceiving a straight stick partially immersed in water as bent, we anticipate that the straight stick would also look bent when held in the air.

The whole thing may be further clarified as follows. When we say that "This stick (straight) looks bent", if it is partially immersed in water and when we say that "This stick (straight) also looks bent", if it in air, it is an illustration of Perceptual Error. The reason is that we make an assertion namely what is true in a particular perceptual situation (the straight stick partially immersed in water) is also true in another particular perceptual situation (a straight stick held in air).

From the above it is clear that Perceptual Error arises when the same object e.g. straight stick appears to one and the same sense, e.g. vision as bent in two different situations, e.g. when it is partially immersed in the water and when it is held in the air.

It would be useful to point out that Perceptual Error also arises even when it is supposed that an object is perceived as identical in the same situation through two different senses, namely *sight* and *touch*. For instance : By perceiving through vision, a straight stick partially immersed in water as bent, we anticipate that the same stick in the same situation would be perceived through touch also as bent. The Perceptual Error may be classified into Two-senses Error and Single-Sense Error. Let me first discuss the Two-Senses Error.

1. Two-Senses Error :

The Two-Senses Error is an error which arises, if and when by perceiving an object through one sense (say vision), we anticipate that the same object would be perceived through another sense (say touch) and vice versa For instance : By perceiving through vision a straight stick partially immersed in water as bent, we anticipate that we would also perceive through touch that very stick in that

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very situation as bent. Again by perceiving through touch a partially immersed stick in water as straight, we anticipate that we would also perceive through vision that very stick in that very situation as straight.

The Two Senses Error can be of five kinds : (i) Sight Touch Error; (ii) Touch-Sight Error; (iii) Double Vision; (iv) Geometrical Illusion; and (v) Phantom-Limb Pnenomenon.

Each one is explained below.

(i) Sight-Touch Error :

The Sight-Touch Error arises when by perceiving an object through sight, we anticipate that we would perceive the same object through touch. For instance : By perceiving through sight a straight stick partially immersed in water as bent, we anticipate that we would perceive through touch that stick in that very situation as bent. This is a Sight-Touch Error because although the perception of an object through sight is entirely different and distinct from the perception of an object through touch, it is supposed that the perception of an object through sight and touch is identical.

(ii) Touch-Sight Error :

The Touch-Sight Error arises when by perceiving an object through touch, we anticipate that we would perceive through vision the same object. For instance : By perceiving a pencil pressed between two fingers as two pencils, we anticipate that we would also perceive two pencils through vision. This is a Touch-Sight Error, because although it is a fact that the perception of an object through touch is different and distinct from the perception of an object through vision, it is supposed that the perception of an object through touch and sight is identical.

(iii) Double Vision :

The phenomenon of Double Vision means seeing a single object as double. This error is based on Thomas Reid's simple experiment (*Inquiry into the Human Mind*, 1764, Ch. VI, Sec 13).

In the experiment a candle is placed at the distance of 10-15 feet. And the observer is asked to obtrude a finger into his line of vision and there after he is asked to simultaneously look at one object and attend on the other object.

If the observer simultaneously looks at the candle and attends to his finger, he sees "two blurry fingers" but "one candle".

And if he simultaneously looks at his finger and attends to the distant candle, he sees "one finger" but "two candles".

But although "one finger" and "one candle" respectively appear as double, the visual experiences of "one candle" and "one finger" are uncorroborative to tactile experiences of these objects.

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The Double Vision is the Two-Senses Error since it arises in thinking that the double visual appearance of a single object is also corroborative to touch.

(iv) Geometrical Illusion

The Geometrical Illusion arises if we think that the geometrical figure or figures which we see through vision would be identical with their perception through touch. Of the two geometrical figures of equal size drawn on a piece of paper — one filled in with black colours and the other empty one, the filled in figure looks bigger than the "empty one". The error here lies in thinking that as the two geometrical figures look of two different sizes, they are also of two different sizes in measurement.

This error is Two-Senses Error because we believe that the two visible figures are identical with the two tangible figures.

(v) Phantom-Limb Phenomenon :

The Phantom-Limb Phenomenon means that a person whose limb, say his are or leg or any part of his body is amputated, feels that it is there.

This being so it is evident that the victim's feeling of his missing arm being present is not corroborated by his own visual experience of his missing arm as well as by the visual experiences of other observers about his (victim's) missing arm.

The Phantom-Limb Phenomenon is the Two-Senses Error because it arises as the victim's felling of the missing part of his body is not corroborated by his visual experience or by the visual experiences of other of the missing part of his (victim's) body as present.

2. Single-Sense Error :

The Perceptual Error arises even in the perception through any one of the five senses, e.g. vision, touch, taste, smell and hearing. This happens when an observer judges wrongly an object which he perceives through a sense.

The Single-sense Error may be (i) Normal and (ii) Abnormal.

(i) Normal Single Sense Error :

In the case of Normal Single Sense Error, the observer is in the normal state of mind, and the perceptual situation is also normal, stable and repeatable and because of which it is open to scientific study.

The Normal Single Sense Error can be of five kinds : (a) Visual Error; (b) Tactile Error; (c) Auditory Error; (d) Olfactory Error; and (e) Gustatory Error.

Each Normal Single Sense Error is stated below :

(a) Visual Error :

The Visual Error is committed if and when by perceiving an object through sight we pass judgement on the object perceived,

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which turns out to be wrong. For instance : We see a lake before us in the desert and pass judgement that "There is a lake before us". This judgement turns out to be false.

(b) Tactile Error :

The Tactile Error is committed if and when by perceiving an object through touch, we pass judgement accordingly, which turns out to be false. An illustration of Tactile Error is given here. Let some person put his right hand into the bowl of hot water and his left hand into the bowl of cold water. And thereafter let him put his both hands into a bowl of lukewarm water (equal quantities of the water in the first two bowls). The bowl of lukewarm water is cold to his right hand and warm to his left hand. This being so, if he makes the judgements that "The water that touches his right hand is cold" and "The water that touches his left hand is warm", his judgements are wrong. Here the illusion is that the bowl of lukewarm water is felt hot and cold respectively to his left hand and right hand, even though the bowl of lukewarm water is neither hot nor cold.

(c) Auditory Error :

The Auditory Error arises when we fail to distinguish between two voices, say between Human voice and bird's voice. For instance : when a stranger, for the first time, hears the cuckoo's voice in the spring season, he thinks that he is hearing some human voice. Thus he fails to distinguish between a human voice and a bird's voice. Only when he carefully thinks, he discovers that it is a bird's voice that he is hearing. Since the voice of the cuckoo is taken as the human voice, it is an Auditory Error.

(d) Olfactory Error :

The Olfactory Error arises when we fail to distinguish between two smells — for instance, the "smell of *juhi* flower scent" and the "smell of *beli* flower scent". This is so because the scent of both of them is nearly similar. Only when we are careful, we can avoid falling into this confusion and we are not in error.

(e) Gustatory Error :

The Gustatory Error arises when we fail to distinguish between the taste of jack (*kathal*) fruit cutlet and meat cutlet. This is so because their taste is almost similar, specially when the same spices are used in the preparation of cutlets of the two dissimilar objects. The error here arises because the taste of jack fruit cutlet is taken as the taste of meat cutlet. A habitual meat eater, however, can avoid this mistake and therefore he may not commit this error.

(ii) Abnormal Single Sense Error :

The Single Sense Error is abnormal, if the observer is abnormal or under emotional strain or drunk, and the perceptual situation, in

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which he perceives, is unstable and therefore unrepeatable and because of which it is not open to scientific study. The best example is Hallucination.

The Single Sense Error may be abnormal even if the observer is normal but he observes while he is asleep, and therefore the perceptual situation is beyond his control. And when the observer is awake, the perceptual situation is not available. Thus the observer (here dreamer) is hardly in a position to compare something of the remembered dream data with the reality. This can be well understood by any one because everybody has seen dream.

The Abnormal Single Sense Error may be of two kinds :

(a) **Hallucination; and** (b) **Dream.**

(a) Hallucination :

A man, whsn drunk, sees pink rats all around him, where there is no pink rat at all, Hallucination is a Sinele Sense Error simply because it is intractible for being an abnormal error.

(b) Dreams :

A person during his sleep dreams something. When he is awake he hardly remembers everything and also the situation in which the dreamer had dreamt event is not there. This being so, the dreamer, even after the dream is over, is unable to compare that little bit of dream which he remembers of the dream with the reality.

Dream is also a Single Sense Error simply because it is most intractible. The unavailability of dream-data is the chief reason why a dreamer is unable to compare dream event with reality.

Even if in a Dream there may be a play of two senses, there is no corroboration or lack of corroboration between the data of these two senses, because the dreamer is partly asleep and partly awake.

III— CONCEPTUAL ERROR :

In the Conceptual Error two concepts are referred to the same object and there is no reference to the particular perceptual situation. For instance : When we say "This is a snake" and 'This is a rope", they contradict one another, because "This" refers to the same object in these two cases. The error is committed because "snake" and "rope" are class concepts and they refer to the same object and there is no reference to the particular perceptual situation.

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XI

Making the Body Heard

David Appelbaum

Not by speech, not by mind:
Not by sight can Brahman be apprehended.
How can He be comprehended
Otherwise than by one's saying 'He is'?

So says the Katha Upanisad (VI 12),[1] raising again the question of how to express the 'facts' of self knowledge. I want to consider it as the signature of a corpus of work, collectively known as *sruti* whose expression of self knowledge moulded Vedic culture. My intention is to penetrate the enigma of this special kind of knowing by trying to understand how in the context of the *sruti* there can be a 'saying' without speech. This is an approach to the problem of transmission of the lamp. The demand of the method proper to this work is that the riddle be revealed, not dissolved. The riddle itself, says the hermeneutical method, carries ontological weight. It signifies an interrogation of our ownmost being, hence, to acknowledge and respect its mystery is a first step toward unveiling a primordial significance.

I want to begin with an obvious remark. Being comes under question only when one is attending to the question. It has the capacity to announce itself. Only we must learn the reciprocal capacity to hear its call. Attentiveness to the capacity of being to announce itself is what gives character to the *sruti* as a whole. The supposition there as to why being cannot be heard spoken is not that it is unspeakable; it is not. Rather, so long as we are defined by personality and the psycho cultural self, our words express no more than our own limits and limitations. As soon as we are able to relinquish a desire to possess our experiences on all levels, the

1 in R. E. Hume, tr., The Thirteen Principal Upanishads (New York, Oxford University Press, 1931), 2nd ed., revised.

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words uttered are not heard as our own. Then to be sure, it is not as the bearer of a name and genealogy that one speaks, but such a one who is spoken through. As Heidegger puts it

> If Dasein is to be able to get brought back from this lostness of failing to hear itself, [it must] find itself as something which has failed to hear itself, and which fails to hear in that it *listens away* to the 'they.'[2]

Reciprocally, Vedic understanding has it that only one who has become universal can speak with objectivity, to *say*, in the primordial sense. Though this surely places the sayer beyond the limits of cultural definition, being transhistorical, interest and inquiry in it is characteristic of numerous historical cultures. Of the few whose remains can be studied, Vedic culture exhibits an unrivaled comprehension of the problem of transmission by voice; and certainly the material available manifests the conditions of the self-perpetuation and self-discovery of such a knowing that remains unknown. So the Upanisad says,

> Thither neither sight nor speech nor intellect can go; we neither 'know' it nor can we analyze it, so as to be able to communicate it by instruction. (Kena Up I. 3)[3]

I want to consider Vedic culture of the early Aryan period as the exemplar of this investigation of primordial voice and the creation of transhistorical meaning by its utterances. By proper focus on some of its suppositions, it seems possible to me to uncover an account of the conditions for transmitting the unteachable, and at the same time approach the perennial teaching with a fresh ear. In all events, my approach will be contextual leaving aside questions about the origins of the thought, and concentrating on the peculiarly epistemic values belonging to the culture in whose midst such a saying arises.

My immediate concern is knowing about the organization of the senses which finds its roots in the culture represented by the *rsis*.[4] By their collective voice (*vac*) was sounded 'what has been heard', what we call *sruti*, so that the audience individually had the opportunity to experience the question of their being. Their special skill attests to their knowing what hearing meant, and, importantly, how to hear while relating to the other senses. Such knowledge, nonthetic and non-reflective in kind, is a prerequisite in the attempt to recapture the primordial level of discourse. It must first be heard said before it can be said.

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2 M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*. Macquarrie and Robinson, tr., (New York, Harper and Row, 1962), H 271.

3 in R. E. Hume, *op. cit*

4 Vedic material is uttered (chanted, sounded, sung) by a *rsi*. (Vrs, rush, flow, shine). The *rsis* are identified with the Seven Breaths (i.e. SB VI I. I. 1), or the six sense organs plus *manas* (BU II. 2 3. 4).

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The relation of historical culture to the structure of the sensorium is an aspect of the relation of culture to the structuring of the lived body experience taken as a whole. Each historical culture can be defined by how it effects its organizing of the lived body. Each has its degree of *proprioceptive* knowledge, the means of effecting structure: simultaneous awareness of all components of body experience, limited by how many are simultaneously included. The arrow of impact must travel between knowledge and culture in two directions. First, the expression of theoretical bodily knowledge, of any order of generality, is given a characteristic structure by culture. That is, how people of the culture relate or describe their body experiences is determined by the structuring of the lived body, in turn, determined by what the culture knows proprioceptively. This information is known only through the lived body's functions and movements. And secondly, how they theorize about the lived body's life is a formal representation of the state of proprioceptive knowledge in the culture. This means, for instance, our culture's reliance on the separation of subject and predicate in the propositional form of discourse is an indirect reflection of the passivity and estrangement we exhibit toward our lived body's experiences. They remain unvalidated and unacknowledged in step with our reflective separation of the doer from the deed. The disparate identities are maintained only so long as the integrity of the lived body shows action to be distinct separate from being. To be sure, perception of integrity requires a prior sensitization toward body experience which is not culturally valid today. Correlatively, desensitization yields to an unresponsiveness to one's primordial impulse to heed the question of integration.

Vedic India, by contrast, was in possession of a highly evolved concept of organizing the lived body. The evidence to support this contention does not exclude the arising of the Yoga *darsana*, with its postural practices (*asana*), sometime in the millenium before the Buddha was born. This *darsana* maintains methodologically that the controlled release of deep seated body tensions (*varsara*) enables one to realize the aim of liberating the yogin from his set of inherited and acquired tendencies toward negativities of all sorts. The restructuring of lived body forces accomplished, anxiety and sloth subsided, the possibility of knowing the moment-to-moment experience of oneself contemporaneously arises. Thus, the goal of any specific practise in yoga, it is held, is to effect this newly reharmonized structuring. The aim is proprioception. An example of this idea, and one I want to dwell on for the moment, occurs in the *Maitri Upanisad*. There it is reported that

> By closing the ears with the thumbs, they hear the sound of the space within the heart. Of it there is this sevenfold comparison : like rivers, a bell, a brazen vessel, a wheel, the croaking of frogs, rain, as when one speaks in a sheltered place. (V, 9).

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Reliance on the phenomenon of interir audition, as it is called, is of interest to my lead question. Interior audition, we shall soon see, evidences acute sensitization to the sensory possibilities of the lived body experience. It is at the same time an indication of a level of proprioceptive knowledge. Since only an advanced investigation of the lived body can uncover the deep facts of sensory reintegration, this reinforces the ascribing of it to Vedic India.

The phenomenological facts about interior audition, and its peculiar value in restructuring the lived body, as experienced, were apparently well-known. The sensorium (*manas*) was thought to be particularly sensitive to tempo and tone, the two attributes of hearing. It was recognized then that only *possibility* of structure is given at birth, and its development, a person's charge. Often couched in moral terms, evolution is, however, physiological. The development, moreover, demands a consistent relation of mental to bodily capacities over an extended period of time. Only in such a relation is the organic integrity of functions realized. There was, in this, a recognition that intelligence must mediate between thought's groundlessness and the body's ground, and so achieve *disencumbering*. Disencumbering represents one chief aim of restructuring: to relieve the body of physiological tension, so as to de-regiment mental, emotional, and physical life, and to allow organic reintegration of functions. The recognition in turn nurtures a deep metaphysical search for contact with ongoing reality, along with the self-reflexive attitude proper to this search.

The relative efficacy of interior audition in disencumbering the lived body is further evinced in the study of *nadam*. The *nadam* manifests as a series of tones, heard inwardly, and probably represents the different harmonics of breathing, circulation, and the frequency of the nerve impulse. The role it plays in revealing the epistemic value of a well structured lived body experience is central. Through exercise of the attention, it is made object of practices related in the yogic upanisads Later, they gain their codification in Patanjali's *Yoga Sutras*. An early aphorism (I 27) maintains that audibility is the prime attribute of the appearance of primordial awareness of *Isvara*. Hence, developing control of the attention permits a more structured experience in that the field of hearing is unified and that distracting influences are no longer problematic. It is further maintained by Patanjali that to the extent that unification of hearing, and not the body's downward and mortal tendencies, is compelling to the yogin, to that extent, he gains his freedom (*moksa*). Without structuring, the lived body experience is one of enervation. Hence, the potentials of the lived body, it is presumed, are to be realized when it is one that is heard.

There is one more factor important enough to mention in understanding the relation of interior audition and structuring the

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lived body. This is the use of subvocal repetition of sound. The *mantram*, and, if an unintelligible sound, the *dharani*, belong to this culture. From early Vedic times, from the time at least of the *Yajur Veda*, the particle *Aum* has enjoyed special significance in this regard. Later, Patanjali will hold it to be the audible expression of primordiality (*saguna Brahman*): in this state, the yogin stands apart from the forces of dissociation, fragmentation, and sensate death that continually affect his habitual nature. In traditional accounts, its value is that of an information capsule. It announces each of the four postulated states of consciousness. The first is given by the account in the initial phoneme (A), recalling a person to the normal, unstructured awareness in which we pass most of our lives: identified with a blurred impression of some dimly apprehended object in our sense-field. It is a state of the submergence of proprioception. The middle phoneme, (U), symbolizes the dream state, in which the body is prey to destructuring images of past impressions on one hand, and on the other, transhistorical, archetypal influences tending toward structure of a primordial kind. The final phoneme (M) is reckoned as the entry into deep dreamless sleep, the state of pristine, unimpeded structure. It, according to the account, if carried further, merges with a fourth (*turiya*) state in which the body bears primordial structure again, but now together with the impressions which arrive from the external world. This is the state of *audible* silence. It is that which the yogin aims to know experientially.

Turiya is the end of *mantram*. The re sounding of primordial experience, which does not begin at one level and end at another, but which prevades all levels like an echo, happens when a high degree of integration is struck. The operation of the *mantram* is clearly to tune or attune the ear to this echo. It is an exercise to focus the attention as if down along a single line, a single ray on the horizon of being. It is in general through the authentic element that the entirety of the field becomes manifest. Similarly, the perimeter is made visible only by locating the center. I say this to remind myself of the reason of my interest in apparently 'esoteric' auditory phenomena, in 'mystical hearing', in Eliade's words.[5] If what is esoteric and what is mystical have meaning, it perhaps has to do with the ability to organize the lived body experience. This is what remains alive and timeless, the living breath of the Vedas, the Brahmanas, and the Upanisads. The phenomena's apparent distance from our everyday existence reveals only our own abstractness. It is that the body is too close, not too far, to us that our ordinary level of proprioceptive knowledge is so limited. Even our minds are more distant than our bodies. What is revealed too

5 Eliade, Mircea. *Yoga: Immortality and Freedom* (Princeton University Press, 1958) pp. 128ff; 390f.

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are the limits of our capacity to appreciate the senses for what they are and how they function. They are, simply, encumbered. So too in the case of hearing. It is known that in a quiet woods, one can hear more than in a crowded terminal, in terms of disclosing the field as a whole. Conversely, the skill to reimport the sensory freedom of hearing back into the body yet-to-be- structured can induce the disencumbering force of the *mantram*, returning one to primordial wholeness of the lived body.

The Vedic body experience clearly utilized hearing foremost in structuring the sensorium. From this follow two other phenomenological consequences. The first is, as I have already indicated, interiority; the second, temporality, the time sense of sound. I want to discuss each separately. The first refers to the fact, easily seen for oneself, that the human ear can be trained in an inward as well as outward direction. I can listen for sounds coming from outside, in the room, or sounds coming from inside, in my body. The magnitude with which this fact affects the problem of structuring is not to go unnoticed. Take that other primary sense, sight, for example. The doubling of the vector, so to speak, in hearing induces in seeing the simultaneous looking towards and looking away. The act of looking, this means, is both looking from the outside in, and from the inside out. Within this process, the fixity of perspective, which has characterized our culture's sense of seeing since the Renaissance, begins to waver and dissolve. A multi-perspectival freedom in the sense of sight, characteristic of Hindu thought, emerges. Embuing vision with this quality, furthermore, sensitizes it to the horizon of the field, which always has the sensation of the body as its demarcation. Seeing in this fashion ceases to be disembodied *gazing*, in a cartesian trance, and takes on the property of being a function among other functions in a body that knows itself through an awareness of its internal movements and external influences. At the same time, it becomes a means of locating what cannot be seen and is beyond all seeing, but which preconditions seeing. It is a seeing which is impartial and non subjective.

Something needs to be added to understand the conditions imposed by taking hearing as primary. 'Seeing' the body is qualitatively different from seeing an external object. The reason is that the organ belongs to the living tissue of the object of its activity. There is no 'visual medium' which can be said to intervene. If we take this thought a step further, this absence must have its effect on the *lighting* of vision. To look inside demands a source of illumination which cannot logically be given independently from the act of looking. This means that, if there is 'darkness', it is the same as an uncalled potential to bring the interior of the lived body into the open. The placing of this demand on oneself, the awakening of one's conscience and its sense of responsibilities felt toward being, is,

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in the Vedic sense, the master of his self, 'one who himself officiates as his own sacrificial priest.' (MU VI. 10) He is master who answers the call to structure. Then, he burns the inert and gravity-inclined tendencies, sacrificed to the enlivened and enlarged sense of being under question. To this sense, his sensory experience is initial contributor.

After interiority, an acoustical synthesis opens the sensorium up to the dimension of temporality. All that we hear has a before and an after. The auditory event itself arises and perishes. Our ordinary experiences of hearing can be musically scored, as John Cage's work shows and thus are in musical time.[6] The relative impermanence of any sound imposes some obvious conditions on the act of listening: attentiveness, presence, a more or less active quality of heeding are all needed to receive the sound impression at the moment it is there. An element of temporal *simultaneity* is necessary. Imported back to the sensorium, it induces a noticeable change in seeing. No longer does the gaze remain the paradigm for that sense, as thought by Sartre and others.[7] It rather signifies a degraded, passive version of the fully integrated act. Staring occurs when sight is used in isolation from the rest of the body's senses, and without relation to the body experience as an ongoing whole.

When simultaneous in visioning, interestingly, *the glance*, an act whose value belongs to a different epistemic order, appears. Visioning attempts to keep pace with the ever-changing presence of the phenomenal world when it is engaged with the disencumbered body. Seeing in this manner tends not to dwell on an image or after-image or representational image of the thing. It does not fall into detachment, i.e., detachment of the image. The implications of this new model of visioning are quite broad. Consider as one the fact that vision, for our culture, is the model for memory. Remembering is recalling the picture of the thing or event.

The epistemic outlook peculiar to the Vedic experience is again evident. With its structuring the lived body experience, seeing is an aspect of presence rather than an act of a subject separated from its object. It, like any other sensory activity, has its own sensation. Like each of its counterparts, the sensation is primary. The representation derives from the primary experience of sensation. The memory-image is the impression left from the body's sensations through which it knows itself proprioceptively. As impression, it is soon replaced by another. For this reason, sufficient appreciation of the experience of simultaneity is essential. Simultaneity engenders continuity. There is a weakened reliance in the lived body so

6 Cage, John. Silence (Wesleyan University Press, 1964).

7 Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (H. Barnes. tr., New York, Philosophical Press, 1958).

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structured upon verbal recognition. Words, as fixed signs, have little value in the fluid field of vision. This is not, however, to say the elements appear without meaning and that nihilism predominates When visioning is integrated with the lived body, things are seen *as* meanings, not as entities bearing them as separate from their own identities

Let me recall the original question I presented above, of the relation of culture to the organization of the lived body experience. With respect to the plane of hearing, a high level of structure, we have seen, results when it is given primary attention. It is to the development of this potentiality that *sruti* relates, and, as was related, by the *rsis*, who brought it to speech (*vac*). Speech, or voice, more accurately, is the instrument through which restructuring is evoked. Since any discussion of the 'physiology' of the *sruti* would be incomplete without mention of the properties of voice, I feel it necessary to suggest some way of understanding this most elusive notion of the Vedas.

It is said in the *Rg Veda* (I. 164.45) that

> Speech is divided into four parts,
> The wise singers know them all.
> Three levels are hidden, and men never attain them.
> Men speak only the fourth.[8]

The *rsis* knew the disencumbering power of the Vedas depended on their own lived body experience at the time utterance. Hence, they found it necessary to abandon the level of conventional meaning, known impersonally, by most men, since that kind of utterance bears no necessary relation to the structure of lived bodies. (This has been called otherwise, 'idle chatter', the 'idols of the marketplace', and the like.) What characterizes it, in opposition to the other three, is that speaking is external to the act of uttering meaning. Furthermore, it has no proprioceptive value. The authority of the other three derives from such sensory content as is taken simultaneously to the vocalization. The measure of authority is the degree of integration of structure of the body as a whole. Other levels thus are articulations of this search for physiological primordiality.

Knowledge of voice has of course its technical side. Those saying the *sruti* could manage suitable modulations in rhythm and tonality. But the hiddenness of a well structured body experience was what they most directly sought. This has little or nothing to do with literal meaning or linear thought, less with rules and definitions. The authority given by structure is, as we saw in the case of hearing, in the moment of its implementing. The note sounded in delivery reverberates on the horizon of life, and gives it meaning,

8 in R. E. Hume, *op. cit.*

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extending throughout the various levels. It communicates without mediation. Entry into the hidden layers of speech, through full embodiment, thereby is given the force to shatter the limited historical perspective associated with everyday discourse. At the far end it joins the aperspectival frame in which is embedded the question I ultimately stand before, and before which I stand listening with acute attention. For it is the sound of the matrix, and the matrix as sound, the interrogative opening onto being, because of which I can listen to anything at all.

There is a final question in this line of study. What does one come to know in through the act of speaking? What epistemic value do we assign to *vac*? To speak of this subject, we must return once again to the structuring effect of making hearing foremost. When body tension is reduced to a minimum, and alignments returned to their natural state, the lived body experience is the physical awareness of its own present integratability and integrity. Deepening the integration of this experience deepens awareness, and conversely. To speak from the primordiality of this experience is one with allowing the deconstricting force physically to past outward, toward the audience, undisturbed. At the same time passage need not disturb the persisting integrity of the speaker's own structuring. It is one proprioceptive state addressing another, directly and without mediation. It is the key to transmission of self-knowledge I began this investigation seeking. It now seems that only in an awakened state of the body can the *rsis* convey his words with meaning. Only in a state in which habitual constrictions, the physiological correlates of *Avidya*, or mindlessness, have been left behind can the words have the necessary universality. Only with the degree of proprioception demarking this state is *saying* 'Brahman is' possible. The words may be there, but until they are said, nothing is. Or, as the *sruti* puts it, 'it is said to be that one thing by which when it is known, all things are known.'[9]

Conceivably this knowledge is forgotten knowledge. It is, I think, available to all who desire for themselves to possess remembrance. Phenomenologically, one discovers the *nadam* to have been sounded from before the time one begins to lieten for it. The return to primordial structuring is, according to all accounts, an open way. The implication I draw from this fact for this present investigation is to speak with the silence of openness is a step in the right direction. To recall the fact of audible silence is full of possibility of renewed discovery. Only with a quiet body do the mind-waves cease (*nirodha buddhicitta*), which, by their workings they conceive him manifold who is but One.'[10] (*Rg Veda* X 114.5).

9 in R. E. Hume, *op. cit.*

10 *Rg Veda*, in de Nicolas, A. T., *Meditations through the Rg Veda* (Boulder, Shambala, 1978), p. 205.

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XII

Justified True Belief is Knowledge

Joseph Wayne Smith

1 The Problem

One standard explication of the expression 'S knows that P', for a person S and statement P, is this: (1) S believes P; (2) S is justified in believing P and (3) P is true. This so called *justified-true-belief* account of knowledge, originating perhaps in Plato's *Theatetus*, is generally regarded to have been refuted by Edmund Gettier in 1963 [1] I will argue that Gettier has done nothing of the sort. A tradition in the philosophy of science has recognized that a good theory should be capable to dealing with *prima facie* counter-examples and allegedly counter-intultive consequences.[2] The justified-true-belief account of knowledge can I will argue, like a good theory, readily deal with Gettier style counter examples.

Let us cite Gettier's actual counter-examples to the justified-true-belief account of knowledge. Gettier's first example concerns a man called Smith, who had adequate evidence for the conjunction :

(1) Jones will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Smith is justified in believing that Jones will get the job because the president, a reliable man, has told him so. Smith is justified in believing that Jones has ten coins in his pocket because he has just counted them. Now (1) entails :

(2) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. Suppose however that Smith gets the job, and that Smith has ten coins in his pocket. Then (2) is true and Smith justifiably believes (2). However Smith does not know (2). Therefore. Gettier concludes, justified true belief is not a sufficient condition for knowledge.

1 E. L. Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge ?", *Analysis*, vol. 23, 1963, pp. 121-123.

2 I. Lakatos, *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes*, (eds.), J. Worrall and G. Currie (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978).

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In Gettier's second example, S justifiably believes q, where q is false, and infers that p V q where p is true, so that p V q is true. S has no evidence for p and therefore does not know p V q. But S justifiably believes p V q. and p V q is true. Therefore S does not know p V q even though S has a justified true belief p V q.

2 Reply

Let us grant that (2) is true, that Smith believes (2) and that Smith does not know (2). Therefore on the justified-true-belief account of knowledge it follows that (2) is not justified. What reason have we for believing that (2) is not justified ? The very good reason that Smith's putative knowledge of (2) is the result of an inference from (1) to (2), which whilst being formally valid, is in fact unsound. Hence Smith is not justified in believing (2). Someone may by chance get the right answers to a problem, but we cannot plausibly claim that that they know that the answer is right, nor can we claim that they are justified in their belief that the answer is right.

In Gettier's second example, S justifiably believes q, q is false; S does not justifiably believe p, p is true; S justifiably believes p V q and p V q is true. Let us accept that p V q is true and that S justifiably believes p V q. Then S knows that p V q even though q is false, contrary to Gettier. The reason why this seems counter-intuitive is that the inference $q \rightarrow p \vee q$ is what Dunn has called an analytic implication.[3] Our conclusion p V q contains a variable not found in our premise, and in a sense, gives us more information. If we reject this classical inference, then Gettier's problem collapses. But if we accept it, then we have no good reason to say that S doe ε not know p V q

3 Counter-Reply

An alternative Gettier-style counter-example to the justified-true belief account of knowledge, proposed by Keith Lehrer[4], may be taken to escape the above arguments used in defense of the justified true belief account of knowledge. Suppose that Smith knows two men in his office, Nogot and Havit, both of whom are known to be honest and reliable. Smith observes Nogot getting out of a new Ford. Nogot tells Smith that he has just bought the car. Now Smith is justified in accepting :

(3) Nogot owns a Ford is in my office.

From (3) Smith deduces :

(4) Some one in my office owns a Ford.

But suppose that Nogot was lying and does not own a Ford, but that Havit in fact does. Thus (4) is true, Smith has a justified true belief that (4). but Smith does not know that (4).

3 J. M. Dunn. "A Modification of Parry's Analytic Implication", *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, vol. XIII, 1972, pp. 194-205.

4 K. Lehrer, "Knowledge, Truth and Evidence", *Analysis*, vol. 25, 1965, pp. 168-175.

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4 Reply

Once more this example involves reasoning through a false assumption (3), and is open to our previous criticism. But Pappas and Swain[5] have given a reply to this counter argument. Suppose that m is Smith's evidence for (3) and that m is true and is known by Smith to be true. Smith deduces from m the existential generalization :

(n) There is someone in the office who told Smith that he owns a Ford and even showed him a certificate to that effect, and who up to now has always been reliable and honest in his dealings with Smith.

Now n is true, Smith is justified in believing (n), and thus knows n, according to the justified true-belief account of knowledge. Suppose though that on the basis of (n) Smith believes that (4), that someone in his office owns a Ford. Smith had an inductively justified true belief that (4), his reasoning does not allegedly proceed through any false steps and no part of his evidence for (4) is false. Smith does not however know that (4) because he has no evidence bearing on the reason that (4) is true, namely that Havit owns a Ford.

We are to suppose that the certificate which Smith saw is either a fake, or else it is Havit's. To simplify the problem, suppose that Nogot and Havit are the only two people in Smith's office, so that (4) is true precisely because Havit own's a Ford. Now (n) is accepted as true, and Smith is justified in believing (n). However (4) does not deductively follow from (n), so Smith's inference to (4) is inductively valid, if it is valid at all. As an inductive argument, Smith has no reason to be justified in believing that (4) because he has no evidence bearing on the reason that (4) is true, namely that Havit owns a Ford. It is precisely for the same reason that disqualifies Smith from knowing (4), that disqualifies him from justifiably believing (4).

Is this response reasonable ? I think that it is. Smith is behaving as a very poor scientist if he does not recognize that (4) may be true because Havit might own a Ford. Smith should have inquired about this before claiming that he was justified in believing (4). But since he did not, he is not justified in believing (4).

5 Morals

The methodology adopted by Gettier and his disciples, is what Lakatos has called 'dogmatic falsificationism'.[6] According to this position whilst all scientific theories are fallible, there is an infallible empirical basis, a set of hard facts. In this case the hard facts are not perceptual reports, but intuitions about knowledge and justification. However, this methodology is defective; theories are not that easily refuted. I have attempted to show here that the justified true-belief account of knowledge is not refuted by the hard facts of the intuitions of Gettier and his disciples

5 G S Pappas and M. Swain, "Introduction", in G. S. Pappas and M. Swain (eds). *Essays on Knowledge and Justification*, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1978), pp 11 40. Citation p. 16.

6 Lakatos, ibid., p. 95.

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Book-Reviews

Raj Khanna: *A Critique of the Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*, pp. 222, Deep & Deep Publications, D-1/24 Rajouri Garden, New Delhi 110027 Price **Rs.** 90/— (1983).

Dr. Mrs. Raj Khanna, the author of this book is a brilliant scholar and is Professor of Philosophy and Director Correspondence Courses, Panjab University, Chandigarh. Before joining this Department she had been at the Kurukshetra University in the beginning as Lecturer and later as Reader. This is her thesis submitted for the Ph.D. Degree at the Kurukshetra University in the year 1973.

Dr. Khanna in this book has made a critical and comprehensive study of the basic propositions in Logical Positivism. The author of the book is of the opinion that the logical positivists are in a sort of dilemma. The author has pointed out that the principle of verifiability is too narrow to account for the meaningfulness at different levels of human discourse. Every discourse has its own set of rules and if we follow those rules the different systems become intelligible to us. The author is against reductionism. She is of the opinion that one type of expression cannot be necessarily reducible into other type of expression completely and without remainder.

The whole book is divided into 9 chapters as follows, besides Preface and Foreword, Bibliography and Index. I. Introduction II. The Problem of Basic Propositions, III. The Nature of Basic Propositions, IV. Indubitability and Certainty of Basic Propositions, V. Basic Propositions and Experience, VI. Basic Propositions and Communicability, VII. Basic Propositions and the Problem of 'Meaning' and 'Truth', VIII. Basic Propositions and the Theoretical statements and IX. Conclusion.

The basic propositions are considered to be the foundations of empirical knowledge and it is, therefore, of utmost importance to study them in order to critically examine the claims of empirical movement in its true perspective.

Dr. Rajendra Prasad Prof. of Philosophy at the IIT, Kanpur has written a Foreword to this book and says Mrs. Khanna has very effectively emphasised the distinction between the concept of meaning and the concept of truth and says Mrs. Khanna has discussed well. She has kept the level of the discussion always high, and has made her point in a straight-forward, forthright manner. In her exposition she has exhibited maturity and objectivity, and that is why one can enjoy reading the book.

The author has critically examined the views of representative thinkers of the Vienna circle, especially Schlick, Carnap, Neurath, Hempel, Lewis, Ayer, Reichenbach and Von Juhos, etc.

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Dr. Mrs. Raj Khanna deserves our congratulations for critically evaluating the foundations of empirical knowledge in the context of logical positivism. It is indeed one of the best thesis on the subject of the Foundations of Empirical Knowledge based on the study of representative thinkers of Vienna circle. The publishers also deserve thanks for bringing out this volume.

Gopinath Bhattacharya (Editor) : *Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya Studies in Philosophy*, pp. 722. Motilal Banarasidass, Indological Publishers and Booksellers, Varanasi, Patna, Delhi. Head Office, 41—U.A. Bungalow Road, Delhi 110 007, Second Revised Edition 1983. Price Rs 150/—

Prof Krishnachandra Bhattacharya was an eminent Indian Philosopher. He joined Education Department of Bengal as a lecturer in 1898 and after having served as a teacher of philosophy for 32 years retired in 1930. He later and joined the Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner as its Director and remained there from 1933 to 35. He was the George V Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy at the Calcutta University from 1935 to 1937. He died on the 11th December, 1940. Prof. Bhattacharya has contributed significantly to philosophy.

These *Studies in Philosophy* represent all the published and a few unpublished writings of Prof. Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya. Volumes I&II are bound in one volume. Krishnachandra Bhattacharya had a deep study of ancient Indian Philosophy, particularly of Advaita Vedanta, Sankhya, Yoga and Jain Philosophies. Vol. I contains Prof. Bhattacharya's constructive interpretation of these systems. He was well versed in classical German Philosophy. His vast and deep study provided the intellectual background. He constructed a new system of his own which however is not easy to comprehend. Vol. II contains all the basic writings in which Prof. Bhattacharya's Philosophy has been formulated. The editor Dr. Gopi Chandra Bhattacharya usefully analysed the Author's position in some details.

The Vol. I comprise the following tracts : Studies in Vedantism, Sankara's doctrine of Maya, The Advaita and Its spiritual significance, Studies in Samkhya Philosophy, The Jaina Theory of Anekantavada and the Concept of Rasa. Vol. II The Subject of Freedom, The Concept of Philosophy. The Concept of the Absolute and its alternative forms. Studies in Kant, Some aspects of negation, The place of the indefinite in Logic, Definition of 'Relation' as a category of existence, Fact and thought of fact, Knowledge and Truth. Correction of error as a logical process. The false and the subjective The objective interpretation of percept and image. The concept of value and the reality of the future.

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Mr. Gopi Nath Bhattacharya deserves our congratulations in compiling in one volume the ideas of an eminent philosopher who has earned a name in the realm of philosophy. We have his ideas on various philosophical concepts. It has become much easier for students, both post graduate and research and as well as for the teachers of philosophy to find this much of philosophical wisdom in one volume. We have in one comprehensive volume the philosophical ideas of Prof. Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya. This is really a very valuable contribution to the philosophical literature of the twentieth century. Both the editor and the publisher deserve our heartfelt thanks for making available the ideas and thoughts of Prof. Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya.

The subject matter on different topics have been very well compiled from the writings of Prof. Bhattacharya.

V. M. Tarkunde: *Radical Humanism*, The Philosophy of Freedom and Democracy, pp. 220, published by Ajanta Publications (India), Jawahar Nagar, Delhi 110007 (1983)

Mr. V. M. Tarkunde is an eminent and distinguished personality of our country who was associated with Prof. M. N. Roy since 1936. Being influenced by the ideas of M. N. Roy and his movement Radical Humanism he left his legal profession in 1942 to work whole time in the Radical Democratic Party started by Prof. M. N. Roy. He has been the General Secretary of the Party from 1944 to 1948 when the party was dissolved by Prof. Roy because of the views advocated by him that party politics was not congenial to the establisation and functioning of a genuine democracy. Mr. Tarkunde was an active participant of Radical Humanist Movement. After the dissolution of the R. D. P. Tarkunde starded practicing in the Bombay High Court, became a judge in the High Court in 1957 resigned the post after 12 years in 1969 and practicing since then as a Senior Advocate in the Supreme Court of India. Mr. Tarkunde was the President of the Radical Humanist Association from 1969 to 1980 and has since April 1970 been the editor of the weekly Journal Radical Humanist which later became monthly. Mr. Tarkunde in co operation with Jayaprakash Narayan started an organisation called the Citizens of Democracy (CFD) for the purpose of defending and strengthening democracy in India. He has been the first General Secretary of this organisation and continued to remain its secretary all along. In September 1976, the People's Union for Civil Liberties and Democratic Rights (PUCL) was formed with Jayaprakash Narayan as President and Tarkunde as working President. He is the Chairman of the Indian Renaissance Institute, a research society founded by M. N. Roy. Mr. Tarkunde was awarded the International Humanist Award 1978 by the International Humanist and Ethical Union.

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The present book is based on the Philosophy of Radical Humanism. The author in the Preface of this book mentions that the basic frammework of the Philosophy of Radical Humanism was prepared by Prof. M. N. Roy in 1946 which was published in the form of Twenty Two Theses. He has adopted Radical Humanism as his own philosophy since the basic tenets were formulated. He says that it has become an integral part of his thinking and life and developed the facets which have enriched it.

Radical Humanism is a philosophy of action and a practical philosophy. It is a post Marxian philosophy. Prof. Roy in his earlier period was influenced by Marx in his thinking. Marxism has been modified by Roy and he says : "The positive elements of Marxism, freed from its fallacies and clarified in the light of greater scientific knowledge, are consistent with a more comprehensive philosophy, which he calls Integral or Radical Humanism; a philosophy which combines mechanistic cosmology, materialist metaphysics, secular rationalism and rationalist ethics to satisfy man's urge for freedom and quest for truth, and also to guide his future action in pursuit of the ideals" (*Reason, Ramanticism and Revolution*). The author in the Foreword says that this book is addressed to those who want to work for the upliftment of the deprived section of society without getting involved in power politics.

The whole book is a very clear exposition of the basic tenets of the philosophy of radical humanism based on the ideas of Prof. M. N. Roy and is divided into four sections as follows :

Section I: Introductory: What Radical Humanism is About, Its Relevance to the Contemporary situation, Failure of Current Ideologies and the Founder of Radical Humanism : Section Two : The Basic Approach: Materialism or Monistic Naturalism — The Philosophy of Science, Man Part of Nature, Individual and Society: Man and Measure; Section Three Personal Philosophy; Freedom — The Basic Value, Origin and Value of Human Reason, Secular Morality and the Quality of Life and Section Four : Social Philosophy : The Ideal Society, Political Organisation: Organised Democracy, Cooperative Economy and Decentralised Planning, Humanist Approach to Social Problems, Revolutionary Role of Ideas and Way to Humanist Revolution.

The whole book is clear, concise and brings before us the ideas of Prof. Roy is truly as the name indicates is Philosophy of Freedom and Democracy. It is unfortunate that people in our country do not realise the conditions of our society and do not make any effort to really understand the real meaning of freedom and democracy. Mr. Tarkunde has done a great service in bringing before us the real meaning of Freedom and Democracy as depicted in his philosophy of Radical Humanism to which he is wedded. The book is an authoritative version of the Philosophy of Radical Humanism by one who has been closely associated with the movement since its inception. It is a clear, concise and this book has a very concrete concern with practical aspects of the ideas of Freedom and Democracy. I am sure this book will give a clear vision to those who go through it. The author and publisher both deserve thanks for bringing out this book.

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